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Introduction 
Reminiscing years later about his scathing attack on The Birth of Tragedy, an 
unrepentant Wilamowitz asserted that Nietzsche had become "the prophet of a 
non-religious religion and an unphilosophical philosophy."1 Whether this 
statement is found wanting or not, it is certainly true that Nietzsche regarded his 
prophetic, Zarathustran role as paramount. If it is the essential role of the prophet 
to turn his glance to the past in order to project his vision with more confidence 
into the future, surely no one has fulfilled more faithfully the dual requirements 
of that office than Friedrich Nietzsche. For while his most cherished (and pro-
vocative) thoughts concern the future-the vision of the Obermensch and the idea 
of eternal return-Nietzsche's critical reckoning with the two great streams of 
cultural influence in the Western world, the Judaeo-Christian and the Graeco-
Roman, may yet prove to be his most important contribution to Western 
thought. In the present volume all the essays revolve to some degree around the 
central problem ofNietzsche's relation to the classical tradition. The term "classi-
cal tradition" here signifies not the actual culture of the Greeks and Romans, but 
that culture as it has been interpreted ( or misinterpreted) by various representative 
thinkers in the course of European history. The essays are, for the most part, 
comparative studies, i.e., it is the aim of the authors to contrast Nietzsche's 
interpretation of the classical tradition, or some aspect of it, with that of repre-
sentative thinkers and creative writers drawn from significant periods of Euro-
pean history. Thus, the question whetht:r or not Nietzsche's interpretation is 
closer than that of others to the historical facts about the Greeks and Romans is 
left open. 
The advantage of such an approach as that adopted here is obvious. By setting 
Nietzsche's version side by side with that of another, in many cases equally genial, 
interpretation of the classical tradition we gain a deeper insight into his mind, and 
at the same time an insight into the mind~ of those with whom his thought is 
brought into juxtaposition. Since Nietzsche's critical interests cover an astonish-
ingly wide range of subjects within the classical tradition, he affords an unusual 
number of opportunities for comparative studies of the kind to be found in the 
following pages. It is readily conceded that a certain arbitrariness and subjectivity 
necessarily inheres in a compilation of this kind. Some readers will miss a treat-
1 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Mollendorlf, My Recollections 1848-1914, trans. G. C. Richards (Lon-
don: Chatto & Windus, 1930), p. 152. 
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ment of this or that thinker in relation to Nietzsche, and in some cases with 
complete justification, but the editors have had to work within certain practical 
limits. The collection of studies is offered with no claim to completeness of 
coverage-whatever "completeness" would mean in such a context-of so large 
and manifold a subject. 
The volume includes essays from each of the following areas: age of the 
Church Fathers; Scholasticism; the Renaissance; the Enlightenment; Weimar 
Classicism; Romanticism; nineteenth-century Decadence. Of the fifteen essays 
included in the volume, five have previously appeared in some form: one has 
been published in German as part of a larger study (Ch. VII); one has been con-
siderably expanded (Ch. VI); one has appeared in English as part of a larger study 
(Ch. XV); one has been reprinted essentially without change (Ch. VIII); although 
written for the present collection, one essay (Ch. I) appeared earlier, with permis-
sion of the editors, in somewhat altered form. Thus, eleven of the essays were 
written expressly for the present volume. 
There is no question but that Nietzsche's influence is today both widespread 
and steadily increasing. Yet he remains, and is certain to remain, a highly prob-
lematic figure for Western civilization. For European man is inescapably heir to 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition and to the Platonism which Nietzsche reprobated. 
These components of our Western culture may have undergone considerable 
transformation in the course of two millenia, often quite secularized in the case 
of the former and distorted in various ways in the case of the latter, but they 
remain as essential ingredients of our civilization. Nietzsche, who coveted the 
title of" Antichrist" and who would replace the worship of Christ with that of 
Dionysus, invoked the culture of the ancient Greeks to effect his purpose. Since 
this is so, one is justified in raising the question as to whether he correctly under-
stood the Greeks. 
Despite the fact that the studies offered here are not concerned with the 
answer to that question they may serve as a sort of prolegomenon to the search 
for an answer as well as a stimulus to the individual's own coming to terms with 
Nietzsche's conclusions. Not only will the reader find in the following essays 
numerous divergences from Nietzsche's understanding of the Greeks, but he will 
often encounter agreement with or anticipation of Nietzsche's views in the most 
unlikely quarters. The truth is that there is probably not a single important idea 
in Nietzsche's works which has not at one time or another been advanced by a 
predecessor. Yet the recognition of such a fact by no means diminishes his 
originality, for in the case of his works the whole is indeed greater than the parts. 
While one cannot speak of a "system" in connection with his philosophy, it is 
characterized by a unity provided not merely by a pervading ethos but also by 
what Bertrand Russell, one of his most penetrating and hostile critics, concedes 
to be "the consistency and coherence of his doctrine."2 
2 Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 760. 
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It is highly significant that a classical philologist like Hugh Lloyd-Jones, heir 
to the rigorous scholarly tradition of a Wilamowitz, should, exactly a century 
after the publication of The Birth of Tragedy, espouse a view of Nietzsche in many 
ways diametrically opposed to that of his great German predecessor. Professor 
Lloyd-Jones' essay, "Nietzsche and the Study of the Ancient World" (Ch. I), may 
well serve as an introduction to our subject in general as well as to the specialized 
discussions of the succeeding chapters. 
For the most part, the chapters which follow deal with the theme of the 
volume in chronological order, beginning with Nietzsche's relationship to one 
of the most important of the Church Fathers. Thus in his essay, "Plato in the 
Thought of Nietzsche and Augustine" (Ch. 11), Robert M. Helm demonstrates 
that, while Augustine and Nietzsche generally agree in their understanding of 
the Platonic philosophy, they radically disagree in their evaluation of it. (Augus-
tine's and Nietzsche's essential agreement regarding the historical Plato, we may 
observe in passing, provides a striking contrast to Hamann's and Nietzsche's 
radical divergence regarding the historical Socrates, as we shall see later in Ch. 
VIII.) In her thoroughly documented study, "Aristotle in the Thought of Nietz-
sche and Thomas Aquinas" (Ch. III), Hedwig Wingler shows how both thinkers 
concur in rejecting the rationalistic content of Aristotle's philosophy, but disagree 
fundamentally as to what should take its place and as to the usefulness of the 
Aristotelian logic. 
Nietzsche ordinarily holds creativity and the active life to be superior to 
knowledge and the contemplation of truth. Yet his own visionary experience 
"6000 feet beyond man and time" in the woods of Lake Silvaplana would seem to 
belie that judgment. In his comparative psychological study of Dante, the 
Aristotelian Christian, and Nietzsche, the neo-pagan antagonist of Christianity, 
entitled "Between Inferno and Purgatorio: Thoughts on a Structural Comparison 
of Nietzsche with Dante" (Ch. IV), Eugen Biser calls attention, among other 
things, to the striking parallel between Dante's vision of the Circle ofHeaven-
"the Celestial White Rose" -and Nietzsche's sudden illumination regarding the 
idea of"eternal recurrence." Not only the parallel concerning the content of the 
visions, but also the similar circumstances under which the two men experienced 
their mystical visions are underscored. 
Although the essays of Kurt Weinberg and Peter Heller both deal with 
Nietzsche's relationship to French culture, they approach their subject from 
different angles, and thus supplement each other. Professor Weinberg, who is 
chiefly concerned with aesthetics, makes it clear in his study, "The Impact of 
Ancient Greece and of French Classicism on Nietzsche's Concept of Tragedy" 
(Ch. VI), why the German philosopher's theory of tragedy thoroughly justifies 
his dictum that "the nature of the French is much closer to the Greeks than the 
nature of the Germans," at least in so far as that nature is reflected in the French 
neoclassical drama. Professor Heller, on the other hand, approaching his subject 
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from the standpoint of social philosophy in the chapter entitled "Nietzsche in His 
Relation to Voltaire and Rousseau" (Ch. VII), illuminates the paradox that 
Nietzsche felt an affinity both for Voltaire, the advocate of high culture and 
sophisticated civilization, and for Rousseau, the advocate of a return to nature. 
This central problem of nature and civilization in Nietzsche's thought will emerge 
again in connection with his relationship to nineteenth-century Decadence (cf. 
Ch. XIV). 
Nowhere perhaps are the manifold possibilities for diverse, yet viable inter-
pretations of the classical tradition more evident than in the case of the dia-
metrically opposed views of Socrates which we encounter in the case of Hamann 
and Nietzsche. In the chapter, "Socrates in Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia and 
Nietzsche's The Birth <if Tragedy" (Ch. VIII),James C. O'Flaherty calls attention to 
the fact that the conception of each of these seminal German thinkers springs from 
his basic epistemological position. Karl Schlechta, in his essay, "The German 
'Classidst' Goethe as Reflected in Nietzsche's Works" (Ch. IX), explicates the 
reasons for Nietzsche's final rejection of Goethe's (and Winckelmann's) con-
ception of classical antiquity. Professor Schlechta emphasizes the central role 
which metaphysics and a concern for "style" played in the development of 
Goethe's classicism. In dealing with the other great exponent of Weimar Classi-
cism, Friedrich Schiller, Helmut Rehder notes in his study, "The Reluctant 
Disciple: Nietzsche and Schiller" (Ch. X), the close parallel between that poet 
and Nietzsche. Thus he writes: "Nietzsche ... in spite ofhis repeated declarations 
of faith in Goethe, manifested a fundamental sentiment and structure of mind 
which linked him to the beliefs and precepts of Schiller." 
In the past far more scholarly ink has been expended on Nietzsche's influence 
on others than on the influences which shaped his own thinking, especially on 
those arising from within the German tradition to which he was immediate heir. 
In a richly documented study, "Nietzsche and the Tradition of the Dionysian" 
(Ch. XI), Max L. Baeumer traces the genesis and development of this important 
concept in the more than a century preceding The Birth of Tragedy. In so doing, 
Professor Baeumer examines the concept in the writings of such diverse thinkers, 
scholars, and poets as Winckelmann, Hamann, Herder, Novalis, Holderlin, 
Heine, Creuzer, Bachofen, Schelling, and others. As a result, a rare and revealing 
perspective on Nietzsche's philosophy is gained. Ralph S. Fraser's study, "Nietz-
sche, Byron, and the Classical Tradition" (Ch. XII), traces the complex relation-
ship of these two ardent, but dissimilar Graecophiles through the various stages 
of Nietzsche's attitude toward the English poet, ranging from uncritical youthful 
admiration to a final, more realistic appraisal. It is interesting to note that, 
although Nietzsche admires the French tragedians of the seventeenth century for 
adhering to the dramatic unities, and therefore for their ability "to dance in 
chains" (cf. Chs. VI, VII), he is nevertheless critical of Byron for doing so in 
dramas such as Manfred. 
Introduction xv 
Heinrich Heine, with his distinction between "Hellene" and "Nazarene" and 
with his emphasis on Dionysus as the "savior of the senses" and the "divine 
liberator," is clearly a forerunner of Nietzsche's philosophy. It is Sander L. 
Gilman's thesis in the chapter "Parody and Parallel: Heine, Nietzsche, and the 
Classical World" (Ch. XIII) that, despite Nietzsche's initial quarrel with Heine 
over the nature of Greek myth and over Heine's style, Nietzsche's later "aware-
ness of the parallels between his fate and that of Heine led to ... total identification 
with the poet." 
According to Mark Boulby, "it can be demonstrated that, especially in 
Nietzsche's later years, his manipulation of Roman and Greek material is some-
thing of a touchstone of his relationship to the so-called Decadent Movement." 
In discussing this relationship as well as his relationship to Stefan George, Boulby 
stresses the antithetical nature of Nietzsche's notion of the "classical" -namely, 
the paradox of the will, which is seen both as the source of order and of chaos. It 
is precisely Nietzsche's conception of the paradoxical will, Professor Boulby 
contends, that separates him from the Decadents (see Ch. XIV: "Nietzsche and the 
Finis Latinorum"). In the course of these studies the problematic character of 
Nietzsche's idea of nature has already come to light in another context (cf. Ch. 
VII). 
Two of the contributions to the present volume relate Nietzsche's ideas 
concerning Greek culture to different areas of contemporary aesthetics. In The 
Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche states that "the highest goal of tragedy and art in general 
is reached" when "Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, and Apollo finally 
the language of Dionysus." Marcus Hester, in his study "The Structure of 
Tragedy and the Art of Painting" (Ch. V), throws light on the complex relation-
ship which results when this communicatio idiomatum of the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian takes place. Analyzing the relationship in terms of contemporary 
aesthetic theory, Professor Hester shows how Nietzsche's ideas may be fruitfully 
extended to art criticism. In the concluding chapter, "Nietzsche and the Death of 
Tragedy" (Ch. XV), Walter Kaufmann argues that Nietzsche was in error with 
regard to the reasons for the demise of Attic tragedy, and, further, that his 
followers are wrong in their conception oftragedy in our own time. "Neither in 
Athens nor in our time has tragedy perished of optimism; its sickness unto death 
was and is despair." A voiding the cliches of traditional criticism, and taking a 
fresh look at the representative dramas of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, 
Professor Kaufmann sees adequate reason to invert Nietzsche's scheme and to 
consider Aeschylus rather than Euripides as the genuine optimist among the 
Greek tragedians. 
Although five of the present essays were originally written in German (none 
has appeared previously in English) it was deemed best to render them into 
English, as well as the quotations from Nietzsche and others, in order to reach the 
widest possible readership in this and other English-speaking countries. Peter 
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Heller translated his own essay into English; the remaining four were read and 
approved by the author in each case. The book addresses itself not only to special-
ists in literature and philosophy but also to the general reader who seeks a better 
understanding of Nietzsche's place in the history of Western thought. 
31 July 1974 James C. O'Aaherty 
* 
Preface to the Second Edition 
With the exception of two paragraphs appended to Chapter VIII, which were 
part of the original article on which the chapter was based, changes in this edition 
have been limited chiefly to the correction of errors. Attention should be called, 
however, to the fact that the last paragraph of chapter XV, by Walter Kaufmann, 
was not excerpted from his book, Tragedy and Philosophy, but was added to that 
chapter in the first edition, a fact which was not then noted. The editors have been 
most gratified by the positive reception of the volume both at home and abroad. 
I July 1979 James C. O'Flaherty 
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I 
Nietzsche and the Study of the Ancient World* 
HUGH LLOYD-JONES 
The late Eduard Fraenkel (1888-1970) once remarked to me that the most 
powerful factor in the difference of outlook between Wilamowitz and his own 
generation was the influence of Nietzsche. I remembered his remark when, 
looking back at the end of a study of early Greek religion and thought undertaken 
in terms of the concept of dike, that term which can mean •~ustice," but can also 
mean "the order of the universe which the gods maintain,"1 I found the turning-
point in the modern understanding of early Greek thought to be the publication 
just a hundred years ago of Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy. 
In Germany, the importance of Nietzsche's influence upon classical studies 
has been recognized a good deal more clearly than it has been in English-speaking 
countries. Notably, Karl Reinhardt, who had perhaps the finest feeling for 
poetry and the most sensitive understanding of the Greek intellectual world 
among Wilamowitz' pupils, grew up under this influence;2 Nietzsche's friend 
Paul Deussen was a habitue of his father's house. Many German and Italian 
scholars have been more or less aware ofit. In English-speaking countries scholars 
have been less willing to recognize it, at least until lately. 
This is largely due to the unfortunate prejudice which for most of this century 
has prevented most American and English people from recognizing the immense 
importance of this writer; a comparable case is that of Wagner. That prejudice is 
due largely to the evil work of Nietzsche's sister, a Nazi before the Nazis, who 
took over all his papers and did her best to credit him with her own detestable 
opinions; it was also fostered by the excessively strong language in which Nietz-
* This is the text of a lecture given at Wake Forest University in November 1972 and later re-
peated at various other centers. I am painfully aware that some parts of it will seem elementary to 
srudents of Nietzsche and other parts to classical scholars; but I have decided to print it in the form in 
which it was delivered. It was published in a slightly modified form in The Times Literary Supplement 
(21 February 1975), pp. 199-201. I would like to thank Professors James O'Flaherty and Heinz Wenzel 
for their encouragement, and Professor Rudolf Kassel for useful criticisms. 
1 The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). 
2 See Uvo Holscher, Die· Chance des Unbehagens: 3 Essais zur Situation der klassischen Studien 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965), pp. 31 f. 
2 HUGH LLOYD-JONES 
sche's fatal vanity and his natural resentment at the neglect he suffered led him to 
express himself. 
In our time there is no excuse for such a misconception of Nietzsche; Karl 
Schlechta's edition of 1954-56 began the necessary task of a proper publication 
of the vast mass of material in the Nietzsche-Archive at Weimar, and now the 
splendid complete edition of Colli and Montinari3 has come half way to a satis-
factory completion of the work. In America Walter Kaufmann's pioneer study 
has made it easier for the reader to do justice to Nietzsche;4 from different points 
of view, R. J. Hollingdale and Arthur Danto5 have supplemented his work. 
There is ground for hope that even in English-speaking countries the general 
reader may come to realize how impossible it is to understand the origins of 
existentialism, and other movements now prominent, without taking account 
of this formerly proscribed writer; how great a part of the advance in under-
standing the workings of the human mind popularly ascribed en bloc to Freud 
properly belongs to Nietzsche; and how Nietzsche's reservations about language 
point forward to the linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
It is generally known that Nietzsche in his mature philosophy took the 
motive force of all human activities to be the will to power and saw the only 
hope of improvement in the future in the procreation of more specimens of a 
superior type of human being, the Obermensch. On the surface that sounds akin 
to Nazi doctrines, and Elisabeth Nietzsche told Hitler that he was what her 
brother meant by an Obermensch. She lied. First, Nietzsche made it abundantly 
clear that he regarded racial purity as a delusion, and thought the highest human 
types resulted from a racial mixture; we can now know that he often spoke with 
special admiration of the Jews. Secondly, when Nietzsche spoke of power, he 
meant much more than the strength that can achieve physical or political domi-
nation. In its highest manifestations, he thought, the will to power produced 
great saints or great artists; his favorite example of the Obermensch was not 
Napoleon, but Goethe. The educated reader is nowadays aware that Freud's 
view that the erotic instinct is the mainspring of human behavior made it fatally 
simple for people to make fun of Freud by taking as literal the meta-language 
which he had to use in order to expound his theory. Thus when Freud says that 
an infant is in love with his mother he is using not ordinary language but a meta-
language. In the language of ordinary life his statement is absurd, so that people 
who neglect the distinction can make fun ofhim. But nowadays educated readers 
will not do this in the case of Freud; and there is no reason why they should do it 
in the case of Nietzsche. 
3 WKG. For key to abbreviations see p. xvii above. 
4 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1950). 
5 R. J. Hollingdalc, Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy (Baton Rouge: The Louisiana State 
University Press, 1965); Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965). 
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Nietzsche is commonly regarded, even by people who know how much 
people like his sister have misrepresented his real views, as a dangerous subverter 
of established ethics. He himself is partly to blame, for he often uses language 
that gives color to this notion; it recalls to Dodds,6 for instance, the arguments 
of the immoralist Callicles in Plato's Gorgias. Yet as Kaufmann has pointed out, 
Nietzsche is not an immoralist, except in the sense that he criticizes modern 
notions about morals. From the moment when, as a schoolboy, he came in 
contact with the views of Darwin, Nietzsche rejected the belief in God. He thus 
denied the existence of a divine sanction for morality; and being strongly opposed 
to a distinction between spirit and matter, he rejects abstract notions of the good 
like that of Plato. He is concerned to base a relativist ethics upon a realistic 
psychology. But that does not make him an immoralist. His superman is no more 
overbearing than Aristotle's megalopsych. The passions, he holds, should be 
subordinated to the will to power; but they must not be weakened or repressed, 
but sublimated by the controlling action of the will. Courage is the supreme 
virtue, and pity is looked on with suspicion; but generosity is commended, and 
the power to be pursued is not power in the sense of arbitrary dominion over 
others. Instinctual reactions are favored, but instinct must be controlled by reason. 
Unlike Kant and Hegel, but like most great philosophers, this man of genius 
was not a professional philosopher. But he was for ten years a professor in an 
important university; and he was by training and profession a classical philologist, 
and from an early age he showed a very marked aptitude for that subject, one 
which in Germany in his time and for long before and long after was of central 
importance to the whole culture of the nation. In the formation of his philosophy 
he was influenced by many modern thinkers, including, for example, Spinoza 
and Hume, Kant and Hegel, Darwin and Lamarck, Schopenhauer and Wagner. 
But his impetus towards philosophy derived initially from his study of the ancient 
world, and not only ofits philosophy but still more of the religious and intellectual 
climate in which those philosophies developed. 
Like many original thinkers, Nietzsche found himself at odds with the 
members of his own profession. His first book was savagely attacked by some of 
them and condemned in conversation by others;7 and after ten years he resigned 
his chair to concentrate upon philosophy. These facts, and also the nature of their 
own training, have caused some of his interpreters to write as if Nietzsche had 
only drifted into classical philology by mistake, and to ignore the part played by 
the influence of Greek antiquity in the formation of his opinions. That, I think, 
is a mistake. 
I am no philosopher, but a classical scholar, and much of what I have to say 
is concerned with The Birth of Tragedy; but I think it unfortunate that so many 
6 E. R. Dodds, Plato, Gorgias (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 387 f. 
7 See below, pp. 7 ff. 
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people begin the study of Nietzsche by reading this, or by reading Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. The overheated tone of the former work and the biblical and 
prophetic manner of the latter are not calculated to reassure the skeptically or 
empirically minded reader. But Nietzsche is in many ways a skeptic and an 
empiricist. He detested Hegel, he finally rejected Wagner, and he purified himself 
from the influence of the latter's music by listening repeatedly to Carmen. 
Correspondingly, he often writes in very different style, sharp, elegant and crisp. 
"Only a genius," he said, "can write clearly in German." Nietzsche certainly 
survives the test. What makes his philosophy difficult to understand is his habit 
of stringing together separate aphorisms or disconnected paragraphs; that is why 
it is hard to get a general view of his philosophy till you have read all of him. 
Still, it is a delight to read him; he is one of the greatest writers of German prose, 
and might be considered a greater writer than any philosopher since Plato. 
To understand Nietzsche's criticisms of the classical philology of his time, 
and also the importance of the subject in his own formation, one must take 
account of the history of classical studies in Germany, and indeed in Europe. In 
modern times there have been two revivals of interest in the ancient world. The 
first arose in Italy during the late middle ages and reached its climax there during 
the fifteenth and in France during the sixteenth century; its impetus was finally 
exhausted by the wars and superstitions of the early seventeenth century. The 
second originated late in that same century, reached a high point in Germany 
late in the next, and maintained great vigor until 1914; since then, its impetus has 
been declining under the pressure of the wars and superstitions of our own time. 
Despite the progress in Greek studies made by individuals like Politian and the 
great French scholars of the sixteenth century, the first renascence was largely 
concerned with Greek civilization in its Latin dress. The second concentrated 
far more upon Greek; and with its beginning, Greek literature for the first time 
reentered the bloodstream of European civilization in an undiluted form. 
Before the second renascence, classical philology had seldom been anything 
but a secondary pursuit. Men used it to perfect some other skill; they were first 
divines, lawyers or doctors, and only in second place classical scholars. Nietzsche 
rightly noted8 that a new era dawned on 8 April 1777, when Friedrich August 
Wolf, entering the university of Gottingen, insisted on being set down as "stu-
diosus philologiae." 
Yet at its beginning the second renascence was, like the first, a movement of 
men eager to make use of the ancient world to illuminate the modern. German 
classicism had its links with the universities; yet it was not an academic but a 
literary movement. Winckelmann was in a sense a great scholar, but he was less 
concerned with art history than with art itself; Lessing and Goethe made serious 
and sustained efforts to become familiar with the ancient world, but did so not for 
8 WKG, IV-1, 90. 
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the sake of scholarship but for that of literature and art. During the early stage of 
this second renascence, even professional scholars had something of this attitude. 
Johann Gottfried Hermann was a close student ofKant, and interpreted Aristotle's 
Poetics in the light of Kantian aesthetics; he and W olf9 were both in touch with 
Goethe, and helped him in his Greek studies. Karl Otfried Miiller's history of 
Greek literature is a learned book which the general reader as well as the scholar 
can enjoy and admire. The link between the two worlds is seen most clearly in 
the person of Wilhelm von Humboldt, eminent both as scholar and as statesman 
and prominent among the founders of that University of Berlin which was to 
provide Europe with the pattern of a modern education. 
But philology could not remain unaffected by the vast development of 
historical studies that marked the nineteenth century. In the early decades the 
older type of literary scholarship, personified by Hermann, came into conflict 
with the newer type, making use of the findings of archaeology, epigraphy, and 
the new science of comparative linguistics, personified by Karl Otfried Miiller, 
August Bockh, and Friedrich Gottlieb W elcker. On the whole the victory 
rested with the latter; what was now called the science of the ancient world, 
Altertumswissenschaft, was dominated by the historical outlook. Not all the 
scholars of this period lost touch with literature. We can remark, for instance, the 
link between romanticism and the new growth of a historical sense; the new 
historical writing, rich in cultural and social detail, owed a debt to the romantic 
novels of Scott, as Ranke, for example, was well aware. to But it was now that 
scholarship became separated from literature, and indeed from other departments 
of life. Seduced by the example of the natural sciences, whose results seemed so 
easily to be expressed in concrete terms, scholars showed an increasing appetite 
for facts collected for their own sake and an increasing pride in "production"; 
specialization was carried to an extreme degree, and the new historicism came to 
despise, as sentimental and superficial, the classicism of the age of Goethe. Of 
course by no means all scholars of the new type were dull or dry; but in the new 
climate dullness and dryness throve. By 1869, when Nietzsche began his profes-
sorial career, the seond renascence was showing distinct signs of a decline. 
Born in 1844, Nietzsche was educated at Schulpforta, by far the most famous 
classical school of Germany, which had educated Ranke and-four years after 
Nietzsche-Wilamowitz, as well as countless classical philologists of note. In this 
strict establishment, in the face of the keenest competition, Nietzsche won high 
honors; and he maintained his progress after entering the University of Bonn in 
1864. At the end of his first year, the famous quarrel between Otto Jahn and 
9 See the references to the two men in the index of Ernst Grumach's Goethe und die Antike: Eine 
Sammlung (Potsdam: E. Stichnote, 1949). 
10 Sec H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Romantic Movement and the Study ef History: John C(!/Jin Memorial 
Lecture delivered before the University of London on 17 February 1969 (London: Athlone Press, 1969), 
pp. 13 ff. 
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Ritschl 11 ended in the departure of the latter to Leipzig, and Nietzsche was among 
those who followed him. Nietzsche might have been expected to side with Jahn, 
whose strong aesthetic sense came out in his famous life of Mozart and in his 
pioneer studies in Greek art, rather than with Ritschl, whose claim to fame lies 
in his immense services to the study of early Latin, particularly Plautus. But in 
fact Nietzsche attached himself to Ritschl, for whom, as he noted, philology 
meant the attempt to understand an entire civilization. Ritschl was so much 
impressed by Nietzsche's work that in 1869 he secured his appointment, at the 
age of 24, as Professor Extraordinarius at Basel; he became full professor a year 
afterwards. 
Karl Reinhardt, who cannot be accused of prejudice against Nietzsche, has 
written that "the history of philology has no place for Nietzsche; his lack of 
positive achievement is too great." 12 It is true that his contribution to detailed 
scholarship is comparatively small; but when we remember that he gave up his 
chair at thirty-five, he must be acknowledged to have made himself a place in 
the history of the subject, even if we think only in terms of concrete achievement. 
His early work on Theognis (1864) 13 is interesting chiefly on account of the 
resemblance of this poet's uncompromisingly aristocratic outlook with Nietz-
sche's own. His doctoral thesis14 advanced the investigation of the problem of the 
sources of the second-rate compiler Diogenes Laertius, on whom part of our 
knowledge of the history of Greek philosophy unfortunately depends. More 
interesting, from the point of view of Nietzsche's own development, is his work 
on Democritus; 15 but we should hardly read it now ifit were by another author. 
On the other hand, the three articles on Greek rhythmic16 contain a statement of 
the case against believing in a stress accent in Greece that is referred to with 
approval in Paul Maas' standard manual on Greek metre. 17 A distinct contribution 
to learning is made by Nietzsche's work on the fictitious contest between Homer 
and Hesiod preserved in an ancient life of Homer; 18 his guess that the work 
depended on the Mouseion of the late fifth-century sophist Alcidamas, ridiculed 
11 For an excellent brief account of the quarrel, see Alfred Korte, Die Antike, II (1935), 212 f. 
Nietzsche's letter to Rohde of8 October 1868 shows that the attack on Jahn in Die Geburt der Tragodie 
that so angered Wilamowitz (cf. Erinnerungen, 1848-1914 [Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1928], p. 129) had 
been provoked by Jahn's unfavorable criticism of Wagner. Korte. p. 216 f., shows how strongly 
Wilamowitz sided with Jahn in the quarrel with Ritschl's supporters. 
12 In a lecture on "Die klassische Philologie und das Klassische," given in 1941; see Vermiichtnis der 
Antike: Gesammelte Essays zur Philosophie und Geschichtsschreibung, ed. Carl Becker, 2nd ed. (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), p. 345. 
13 MusA, I, 209 f. 
14 MusA, II, 33 f.; cf. I, 299 f. 
15 MusA, II, 85 f. 
16 MusA, II, 279 f. 
17 Paul Maas, Greek Metre, trans. Hugh Lloyd-Jones (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), sec. 4, p. 4. 
18 MusA. II, 369 f. 
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by Wilamowitz in 1916, was confirmed when]. G. Winter published a Michigan 
papyrus in 1925.19 It is more interesting to note that in this study we see the 
origins of Nietzsche's important observation of the significance in Greek life of 
contests and competitions. This is emphasized in the history of Greek culture of 
Jacob Burckhardt, 20 a senior colleague of Nietzsche in the University of Basel; 
and though Burckhardt always kept his distance from Nietzsche, and later came 
to mistrust him, it seems certain that this feature ofhis work was due to Nietzsche's 
influence. The lecture notes published in the Musarion edition of Nietzsche's 
works in 192021 are highly interesting to students of the origins of his philosophy, 
or of the general contribution to the understanding of Greek thought which I 
shall come to presently; but they contain little positive establishment of concrete 
facts. In that respect, Nietzsche has rather more to his credit than Reinhardt's 
judgment would imply; Reinhardt, who himself was denied by some colleagues 
the title of philologist, may have been afraid to claim too much for him. But 
Nietzsche's own achievement in professional scholarship is trivial in comparison 
with his general contribution to the understanding of Greek life and thought. 
The main elements of this arc present in The Birth of Tragedy, published in 
I 872. This work was greeted with derision by most of his professional colleagues. 
Soon after publication it was bitterly attacked in a pamphlet entitled Philology 
of the Future, with allusion to Wagner's "Music of the Future," by a doctor of 
philology four years Nietzsche's junior and like him an alumnus ofSchulpforta. 
This was Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, destined to become the most 
celebrated Greek scholar of his time. Nietzsche was defended in an open letter to 
a Swiss newspaper by no less a person than Richard Wagner, and in a pamphlet 
no less bitter than that of Wilamowitz and bearing the unfortunately chosen title 
of Afterphilologie by his friend and contemporary Erwin Rohde, destined in the 
1890s to bring out a study of Greek beliefs about the soul that is one of the land-
marks in modern classical scholarship; then Wilamowitz returned to battle in a 
second pamphlet. The firm of Olms has lately reprinted all this literature inside 
one cover.22 It makes distressing reading; the over-excited tone and utter lack of 
humor of all parties to the dispute-it is significant that the most moderate of them 
was Richard Wagner-is the kind of thing that makes foreigners despair of the 
19 Transactions of the American Philological Association, 56 (1925), 121 f.; M. L. West, Classical 
Quarterly, 17 (1967), 433 f. believes that the papyrus comes from a manuscript of Alcidamas; G. S. Kirk, 
ibid., 44 (1950), 149 f., E. R. Dodds, ibid., 46 (1952), 187 f., and G. L. Koniaris, Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology, 75 (1971), 107 f., think lines 15-23 come from Alcidamas; R. Renehan, ibid., 85 
f., thinks that "we must either accept the entire papyrus as a fragment of Alcidamas or pronounce it an 
obscure piece of Greek of unknown authorship" (ibid., p. 104). 
20 See especially Griechische Kulturgeschichte iv, 84 f., rpt. in Gesammelte Werke, VIII (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1962), 84 f. 
21 MusA, II, 3 37 f. 
22 Der Streit um Nietzsches "Geburt der Trajiiidie," ed. K. Grunder (Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1969). 
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whole German nation. The condemnation of his book by older, more established 
scholars may have distressed Nietzsche more. Usener, the great authority on 
Greek religion, pronounced its author "dead from the point of view of scholar-
ship"; and Nietzsche's own teacher, Ritschl, was more polite but hardly less 
severe.23 On the other hand, Rohde in a letter of 12 January 1873 claims that 
Jacob Bernays recognized in the book ideas that had long been in his mind. 24 This, 
if true, is highly significant, for Bernays had a more penetrating intelligence than 
either Usener or RitschJ. 25 
Considered as a work of scholarship, The Birth of Tra~edy has many failings. 
As Wilamowitz saw, it contains some annoying mistakes in scholarship; and the 
author even leaves out several facts which might have been used to support his 
thesis.26 That thesis, that tragedy originated through a synthesis of Apollonian 
and Dionysian elements, is as a statement of fact to say the least unprovable; and 
the defectiveness of the arguments confidently asserted to prove it is rendered 
doubly infuriating by the over-confident and hectic tone in which it is written. 
Nietzsche failed entirely to control the two intellectual passions which at that 
period of his life had taken possession of him, the passion for Schopenhauer and 
the passion for Wagner. The later passion was not simply for Wagner's music, but 
for his critical writings, so that Nietzsche took over from his hero the notion that 
Wagnerian opera was in a real sense a revival of Greek tragedy. In consequence, 
the importance assigned to music in the emergence of tragedy is quite out of 
proportion. Wilamowitz rightly pointed out that the very different music of 
ancient Greece was always kept in strict subordination to the words. Later 
Nietzsche came to regret that he had ever added to the original fifteen sections 
of the book the ten sections about Wagner with which it concludes. 
Nietzsche's Apollo and Dionysus bear an obvious resemblance to the notions 
of idea and will in the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Later, when Nietzsche had 
abandoned his Schopenhauerian dualism in favor of a monistic position, he 
would have operated with Dionysus only. The manner in which the two elements 
became interfused, and the whole functioning of the Dionysian, are described in 
over-heated tones not calculated to appeal to the judicious reader; and the 
23 See Charles Andler, Nietzsche: Sa vie et sa pensee (Paris: Editions Bossard, 1920--31), II, 59. 
24 See ibid.; cf. Nietzsches Briefwechsel mit Erwin Rohde, ed. Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche and Fritz 
Scholl (Leipzig: lnsel Verlag, 1923), p. 273. 
25 On Bernays, see A. Momigliano, ''.Jacob Bernays," Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 32, No. 5 (1969), 17. 
26 It is astonishing that Nietzsche does not mention Aeschylus' trilogy about Lycurgus, in which 
the devotees of Dionysus seem to have clashed with those of Apollo, led by Orpheus; see Karl Deich-
graber, Giittingische Gelehrte Nachrichten, 8 (1938-39), 231 f. for critical discussion; the fragments are on 
pp. 25 f. of Hans Joachim Mette, Die Fragmente der Tragiidien des Aischylos (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1959). See in particular fragment 83 (the texts with evidence for the clash between the two cults) and 
fragment 71, the wonderful fragment describing Dionysiac revelry which is preserved by Strabo X, 3, 
16. 
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assertion that tragedy was killed by an alliance between Euripides and Socrates, 
grounded as it is on a belief in a community of opinion between these two persons, 
which is wholly unacceptable, leaves the book wide open to attack. Its author 
himself later became dissatisfied with it; in 1886 he wrote that he should have 
done what he had to do "as an imaginative writer."27 Yet with all its appalling 
blemishes it is a work of genius, and began a new era in the understanding of 
Greek thought. 
Through Nietzsche's writings runs a vein of criticism of the view of the 
Greek world taken by the old classicism, much as he preferred its attitude to 
antiquity to that of the new historicism. Behind the calm and dignity praised by 
Winckelmann, Nietzsche saw the struggle that had been needed to achieve the 
balance; he saw that the Greeks had not repressed, but had used for their own 
purposes, terrible and irrational forces. Nietzsche, and not Freud, was to invent 
the concept of sublimation, so important in his mature philosophy. Nietzsche saw 
the ancient gods as standing for the fearful realities of a universe in which mankind 
had no special privileges. For him what gave the tragic hero the chance to display 
his heroism was the certainty of annihilation; and tragedy gave its audiences 
comfort not by purging their emotions but by bringing them face to face with 
the most awful truths of human existence and by showing how those truths are 
what make heroism true and life worth living. In comparison with such an 
insight, resting on a deeper vision of the real nature of ancient religion and the 
great gulf that separates it from religions of other kinds, the faults of Nietzsche's 
book, glaring as they are, sink into insignificance. 
Reinhardt28 says that Nietzsche did not discover the Dionysian element in 
Greek thought, for archaeologists, whose work he had neglected, knew about it 
before. He might have added that the investigation of the whole problem of the 
irrational did not begin with Nietzsche. Its origins may be seen in the now for-
gotten but perhaps still instructive controversy stirred up by the symbolistic 
theories of the Heidelberg professor Creuzer; his book on Dionysus appeared in 
1809 and his Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Volker, besonders der Griechen in 
1810-12. Reinhardt might have inquired whether in Basel Nietzsche had become 
acquainted with Bachofen, whose work might well have influenced him. 
According to Reinhardt, Rohde would have written his great book Psyche 
without the influence of his early friend. Perhaps that is true; perhaps the spirit of 
the time made it inevitable that the anthropologically minded scholars of the 
Cambridge school should approach Greek antiquity in the light of Durkheim's 
teaching; and that the course of classical studies should be transformed by the 
great movement that culminates, or seems to us to culminate, in The Greeks and 
the Irrational of E. R. Dodds. 29 But the man who first set this in motion was 
ZI In his introduction to the reprint of that year. 
28 See n. 12 above. 
29 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, r 9 51). 
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Nietzsche; and by that alone he acquired an importance in the history of philology 
far greater than that which his positive discoveries of fact could have won him. 
More significantly still, Nietzsche's writings show an unprecedented insight into 
the nature of divinity as the Greeks conceived it. The scholars of modern times 
who have best apprehended this are Reinhardt himself and Walter F. Otto. 
Anyone who shares the view of Nietzsche's importance in the history of 
scholarship which I have put forward must accord some interest to the criticism 
of scholarship and scholars which are scattered through his writings, particularly 
those of the early period. We see these criticisms beginning to take shape in the 
notes for a course entitled "Introduction to Philology," which Nietzsche deliv-
ered in the summer of 1871. This remarkable document may be read in the 
Musarion edition;30 the criticisms of contemporary practice which it implies arise 
naturally out of the subject-matter, and lack the almost waspish sting they carry in 
Nietzsche's later writings. Above all, Nietzsche insists that the philologist must 
love his subject; in listing the three requirements of philology: a bent for teaching, 
"delight in antiquity" ("Freude am Altertume"), and pure desire for knowledge, 
he clearly gives special consideration to the second. Modern classical education, 
he ruefully remarks, is designed to produce scholars; how different that is from 
the purpose of the Greeks themselves! There is something comic, he says, about 
the relation of scholars to the great poets.31 The most important thing, and the 
hardest, is to enter into the life of antiquity and to feel the difference. He warns 
against overspecialization, and insists that the acquisition of knowledge is a means 
and not an end; in defiance of the spirit of his time, he pleads for concentration on 
the real classics, which have a permanent value. In a magnificent passage he insists 
upon the essential simplicity of the Greeks; they are "naiv," he says, and this word 
connotes both simplicity and depth. 
In the essay on the future of German cultural institutions of 1872, 32 Nietzsche 
attacks philologists as being unable to teach their pupils art and culture. In the 
essay of 1874 on the uses and disadvantages of history, very similar arguments are 
directed against historians. The four Untimely Meditations, published between 
1873 and 1876, were originally to have numbered eight. The fifth was to have 
been entitled "We Philologists"; a number of the notes collected for it have 
appeared in the Colli-Montinari edition. 33 
30 MusA, II, 337 f. 
31 Nietzsche would have enjoyed the poem of Yeats that begins, "Bald heads, forgetful of their 
sins." 
32 WKG, III-2, 133 f. 
33 WKG, IV-1, 87 f. The merit of having translated a selection from these notes and of having 
drawn attention to their importance belongs to William Arrowsmith, "Nietzsche on Classics and 
Classicists," Arion, 2 No. I (Spring, 1963), 5-18 and 2, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), 5-27. His brief intro-
ductions to them are admirably vigorous, but devote too much of their limited space to the negative 
side of Nietzsche's attitude. Nietzsche's views on this topic have to be considered in their historical 
context and in some detail. Otherwise there is danger of their being invoked to give a charter to 
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From this early date in his career, Nietzsche, more than any German writer 
of his time, condemned the vulgarization and brutalization of many elements of 
German life and culture which acquired such frightening momentum from the 
foundation of the Empire in 1871. He was now beginning to emancipate himself 
from Wagner's influence; and the more he did so, the more scathingly he attacked 
the crude and stupid nationalism which saw in the triumph over France con-
vincing evidence of the superiority of German culture. He saw that this affected 
science and scholarship, just as much as it affected trade, commerce, and tech-
nology. Dominated by the prevailing materialism, scholars had become fatally 
ambitious to emulate the positive and concrete achievements of natural science. 
The passionate devotion to antiquity that still marked German scholarship had 
become mechanized; and most members of the vast learned profession that had 
been created were devoted to the accumulation of facts for their own sake. So far 
as it concerns-German classical scholarship, Nietzsche's criticism finds a striking 
parallel in Housman's inaugural lecture given at Cambridge in 191 I .34 Yet what 
Nietzsche says about his own profession is only a part of his criticism of German 
culture in general. 
The preference accorded to classical studies, he says in "We Philologists," is 
due to ignorance of the rest of antiquity; to false idealization of the humanity of 
the Greeks, who were really less humane than Indians or Chinese; to the arrogance 
of schoolmasters; to the tradition of admiration of the Greeks inherited from 
Rome; to prejudice for, or against, Christianity; to the belief that where men 
have so long dug there must be gold; to aptitude and knowledge derived from 
philological studies. In sum, it derives- from ignorance, false prejudice, wrong 
inferences, and professional interest; he speaks also of escapism, "Flucht aus der 
Wirklichkeit." The grounds for this preference have one by one been removed, 
and one day people will notice this. Many philologists, he thought, had drifted 
into the profession without being really suited to it. Such people were unfit to 
teach others, because they had no real conception of the object of their study; if 
they could grasp the real nature of antiquity, they would turn from it in horror. 
He accused scholars of lack of respect for antiquity, excess of respect for one 
another, having ideas above their station, sentimentality, and loose rhetoric. 
Classical culture, he said, was for the few; there ought to be special police to stop 
people from being bad scholars, as there ought to be a special police to stop people 
from playing Beethoven badly. He thought people would get more out of the 
subject if they began the study late in life. He quotes with approval Wolfs 
remark that people who are not scholars may understand the ancients better, if 
they have a real affinity with them, than people who are. The most notable 
people who wish to write about the classics, but who lack the ability or the industry to equip themselves 
to do so competently. 
34 Published under the absurd title "The Confines of Criticism" by the Cambridge University 
Press, 1969. 
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products of our study of the ancient world, he said, are not scholars, but Goethe, 
Wagner and Schopenhauer; later in his life, he might have said Goethe, Leopardi 
and himself. 
What comment can be made on these criticisms? It is easy to see that Nietz-
sche became dissatisfied with philology partly because it gave no scope for his 
philosophic and prophetic mission. The Birth of Tragedy turned out to be not a 
work of scholarship, but an imaginative construction; and Nietzsche was right 
when he finally took the advice of Wilamowitz and gave up his profession. But 
to say that hardly disposes of Nietzsche's criticisms. It must be recognized that 
many other persons, by no means prejudiced against the subject, have held that, 
at the time when Nietzsche began his professorial career, philology was passing 
through a difficult period, when one wave of inspiration had become exhausted 
and the next had not yet gathered strength. 
In the event, philology made a remarkable recovery, thanks to the great 
generation of Nietzsche's contemporaries. With the example of Mommsen to 
guide them, and by an immense tour-de-force of comprehensive learning, men 
like Eduard Meyer, Hermann Diels, Eduard Schwartz, Friedrich Leo, and above 
all Wilamowitz broke down the barriers between specialized compartments of 
the subject. Wilamowitz in a lecture at 'oxford35 once said that as Odysseus in the 
underworld had to give the ghosts blood before they could speak to him, so the 
philologist had to give the spirits blood-his own-before they would reveal 
their secrets. By the astonishing vitality of his teaching and writing, and with the 
aid of his colleagues, Wilamowitz was able for a time to put off the crisis of 
philology. But throughout his lifetime the dangers indicated by Nietzsche were 
drawing nearer. 
During the 1920s Werner Jaeger tried to institutionalize the now evident 
reaction against historicism by proclaiming the need for a "third humanism" in 
the wake of the two revivals of interest in ancient culture of the past. Philology 
was not to renounce the burden of comprehensive learning imposed on it by the 
nineteenth century; how could it, without degenerating into mere belles-lettres? 
But it was to publish its official divorce from history; and while it went about its 
business, it was to keep reminding itself that it was all the time reflecting on its 
purpose. So Jaeger rewrote the intellectual history of the Greeks from the stand-
point of culture conceived as education, and produced one of the most respected, 
and one of the dullest, learned books of our century. 
Bruno Snell in a famous review of Jaeger36 truly said that the business of 
philology is not to proclaim new humanisms, but to investigate and present 
35 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Mi:illendorff, Greek Historical Writing, and Apollo: Two Lectures 
Delivered before the University ef Oxford, June 3 and 4, 1908, trans. Gilbert Murray (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1908), p. 25. 
36 Giittingische Gelehrte Anzeigen, 197 (1935), 329 f., rpt. in Gesammelte Schriften (Gi:ittingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966) pp. 32 f. 
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antiquity with honesty and truth. The self-conscious attitude recommended by 
Jaeger has fortunately not caught on. But to do in our time what Snell demands is 
not easy. Unless the noble conception of the unified study of the ancient world as 
a whole is to be abandoned, a large labor force is needed; and in the nature of 
things most of these laborers must be mere technicians. Can we do without them? 
Nietzsche was prepared to sacrifice the concept of antiquity as a whole, and 
to concentrate attention on the really creative period of Greek thought. Wilamo-
witz asked, "What can we do for philology?"; Nietzsche preferred to ask, "What 
can philology do for us?" To the classicists, with whom Nietzsche's standpoint 
has so much in common, the ancients had supplied a pattern, an ideal standard of 
excellence; for the historicists with their relativistic outlook no such thing could 
exist. Even those who do not accept the notion of an ideal pattern may feel that 
we must get from antiquity what we can; and in modern conditions, which have 
notably reduced our labor force, that is what we are being forced to do. Even in 
modern conditions, and in our new awareness of the dangers of historicism, we 
cannot renounce the idea of Altertumswissenschaft as a unity; if only as an ideal 
notion, it must still be kept in mind. But scholarship involves a subject as well as 
an object; and if our studies are to enhance the value of life, we must ask the 
questions which will yield the most interesting results. Often the people who ask 
those questions arc those who, like Nietzsche, are not restricted by narrowly 
professional limits. Such people have to guard against reading back into the 
ancient world the things they want to find in it. All generations have to some 
extent done that, as, when we look into the past of scholarship, hindsight easily 
reveals. At least we can be quick to suppress movements which are still looking 
for what our predecessors wanted to discover, and instead look for those things 
in the past-real things to the best of our ability-which our own position in 
history makes it possible and desirable for us to find. That can be done, ifit can be 
done at all, by him who is willing to enter in imagination completely into the life 
of the past, while carrying back with him as little as possible of the mental 
furniture of the present. In the past, we can find working models of culture and 
civilization that may be of value to us when we make our own experiments. The 
main value of historical scholarship is that it can furnish such models to those who 
can make profitable use of them. Nietzsche himself was such a one. Ernst How-
ald37 rightly says that Nietzsche owed nothing to philology, but much to antiqui-
ty; and in a few pages of The Twilight of the Idols, written in I 888, the last year of 
his activity,38 Nietzsche speaks ofhis debt to the ancients in a tone of open-minded 
detachment. He acknowledges a debt to Sallust, who he says awoke his feeling for 
37 Ernst Howald, Nietzsche und die klassische Philologie (Gotha: F. A. Pcrthes, 1920), p. 1. Brief as 
it is, Howald's lecture is necessary reading for anyone seriously interested in the subject. It well deserves 
to be reprinted. See also the literature quoted by Marcello Gigante in the course of his excellent remarks 
about Nietzsche in La parola de/ passato, 156 (1974), 15 ff. 
38 WKG, Vl-3, 148 f. 
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style and for the epigram as a stylistic medium, and to Horace; the sketch for this 
chapter in the notebooks adds Petronius.39 To the Greeks, he says, he owes no 
such definite impressions; he repeats what he has written earlier, that the Greeks 
are more remote from us than the scholars of his day believed. We may well 
wonder whether he was altogether true to his earlier self at this point; but one can 
understand his wish to avoid the all too easy self-identification with the Greeks 
of so many of his contemporaries. His skepticism about Plato extends to style as 
well as matter; Plato, like a true decadent, wrote in too many different styles, a 
judgment in which he fortifies himself by quoting "the most refined judges of 
taste of antiquity" -an odd way of referring to Dionysius of Halicarnassus. His 
relief from Plato has always been Thucydides; Thucydides, and also Machiavelli's 
Prince, have always been close to him because of their unconditioned will to take 
nothing for granted and to see reason in reality. Thucydides, who for Nietzsche 
incarnates all those Sophists whom he much preferred to Socrates and Plato, is 
the great summation, the last revelation of that strong, strict, hard factuality 
which lay in the instinct of the early Greeks. Plato, he says, is a coward in the face 
of reality. 40 
Next, with the German classicists in mind, Nietzsche rejects all attempts to 
see in the Greeks beautiful souls, golden means or other types of perfection. Their 
strongest impulse was the will to power, and all their institutions arose from 
safety regulations, to protect themselves from the potentially explosive matter 
lying all around them. The inner tension in a Greek state burst out in ruthless 
external enmities; strength was a necessity, and so was realism. 
He himself, Nietzsche claims with pride, has been the first to see the signifi-
. cance of Dionysus; Burckhardt saw at once the importance of his discovery. He 
pours contempt on the matter-of-fact, rationalistic explanation of Dionysiac 
mysteries given by Creuzer's learned antagonist, Christian August Lobeck. 
Goethe would not have understood the mysteries; therefore Goethe did not 
understand the Greeks. They signified eternal life, the eternal return of life, a 
triumphant Yes to life beyond death and change; true life as the continuance 
through generation, through the mysteries of sexuality. The key to the concept 
of tragic feeling, misunderstood by Aristotle, was given him, he claims, by the 
psychology of orgiasm. Tragedy-and here he is correcting his own early 
treatment-is far removed from the pessimism of a Schopenhauer; it is above all 
an affirmation of life. Its purpose is not to free us from terror and pity nor to 
purge us by allowing us to discharge these feelings, but by means of them to 
allow us to participate in the eternal delight of being, that delight which incor-
porates also the delight of annihilation. 
39 WKG, Vlll-3, 436. 
40 It must have been in unconscious memory of this remark that I wrote: "The first important 
failure of nerve was that of Plato." The justice of Zeus, p. 136. 
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It is not hard to see that in the formation of philosophy designed to meet the 
needs of his own time Nietzsche made use of the work of many modern thinkers. 
The influence upon him of classical antiquity receives less attention in most 
current manuals; even the exhaustive study of Charles Andler,41 who pain-
stakingly lists every conceivable influence upon Nietzsche's thought, hardly does 
it full justice. It would, I think, have been better apprehended if it had been 
easily resolvable into the influences ofindividual philosophers. Thus the love-hate 
relationship with Socrates which Nietzsche often mentions has received much 
attention; yet this is not positive but negative. The truth is that in building his 
philosophy Nietzsche used not so much the doctrines of any individual ancient 
thinkers, not even that of Heraclitus, whose thought seems to provide several 
striking parallels, as the religious and ethical attitude held generally in Greece 
down to the fifth century, and expressed, with variations, by many Greek poets, 
historians and thinkers. The influence of Greek ethics upon Nietzsche's ethics is, 
or should be, obvious. Equally undoubted, in my view, is the influence of the 
early Greek world outlook upon his philosophy. The Greek universe was god-
controlled, but not anthropocentric; the gods granted men occasional favors, but 
ruthlessly held them down in their position ofinferiority; it was in the face of this 
that heroes showed their heroism. Nietzsche's theory of tragedy contains the 
essence of his whole metaphysic; so that the Greek influence on this can hardly be 
disputed. An important difference is that the Greeks, unlike Nietzsche, believed 
that gods controlled the universe. But, as modern experience has shown, a meta-
physic like that of Nietzsche is not necessarily atheistic. 42 
4 1 See n. 23 above. 
42 Dr. Peter Walker, Bishop of Dorchester, draws my attention to the influence of Nietzsche upon 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who even finds in Nietzsche's Obermensch "many of the traits of the Christian 
made free, as Paul and Luther described him." Andre Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Theologian of Reality, 
trans. Robert McAfee Brown (New York: Macmillan, 1971). p. 285. 
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Plato in the Thought of Nietzsche and Augustine 
ROBERT M. HELM 
On an August day in the year 386, Aurelius Augustinus, his last defenses 
against Christianity crumbling under the onslaught of a child's voice and a 
passage of Scripture, felt the weight of sin lifted from him and found the love for 
God which was to become the dominant passion of his life. 
In August of 1886, with the publication of Jenseits von Gut und Bi:ise, Friedrich 
Nietzsche pronounced his judgment on that earlier day in Milan: "The passion 
for God .... There is sometimes an Oriental ecstasy worthy of a slave who, 
without deserving it, has been pardoned and elevated-for example, in Augus-
tine, who lacks in a truly offensive manner all nobility of gestures and desires." 1 
In the fifteen centuries separating Augustine's conversion from Nietzsche's 
contemptuous evaluation of it, the Platonic Christianity espoused by the Saint 
of Hippo had exercised an enormous influence on the institutions which shaped 
the values of the Western world. Nietzsche, from the earliest years of his young 
manhood, had dedicated himself to a radical reordering of those values. 
He brought to the task a critical mind and a formidable arsenal oflearning. 
Despite the savage and often unfair attacks on him by his fellow philologists, he 
had confidence in his own scholarship and did not hesitate to assail traditional 
Christian writings on the ground of philological inadequacies not unlike those 
of which he had been accused by his opponents: 
The philology of Christianity. How little Christianity educates the sense of 
honesty and justice can be seen pretty well from the writings of its scholars: they 
advance their conjectures as blandly as dogmas and are hardly ever honestly per-
plexed by the exegesis of a Biblical verse. Again and again they say, "I am right, for 
it is written," and the interpretation that follows is of such impudent arbitrariness 
that a philologist is stopped in his tracks, torn between anger and laughter, and keeps 
asking himself: Is it possible? Is this honest? Is it even decent? ... 
1 J, pt. 3, sec. 50. (For key to abbreviations seep. xvii above.) Unless otherwise noted, all transla-
tions from Nietzsche are those of Walter Kaufmann in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, The Modem Library 
(New York: Random House, 1968), The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1954), or (with R. J. 
Hollingdale) The Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). 
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In the end, however, what arc we to expect of the after-effects of a religion that 
enacted during the centuries of its foundation that unheard-of philological farce 
about the Old Testament? I refer to the attempt to pull the Old Testament from 
under the feet of the Jews-with the claim that it contains nothing but Christian 
doctrines and belongs to the Christians as the true Israel, while the Jews had merely 
usurped it. And now the Christians yielded to a rage of interpretation and interpola-
tion which could not possibly have been accompanied by a good conscience. 2 
17 
In view of Augustine's importance as a prime architect of Christian thought 
and his vulnerability to charges of arbitrary interpretation of classical philosophy 
and the Scriptures, it is curious that Nietzsche's writings contain so little in the way 
of direct attack on him. Certainly Nietzsche had a full measure of the love of 
intellectual combat which he attributed to the Greek poets and philosophers, and 
he was seldom really at his best polemically until he could identify the ideas with 
which he was in conflict with a flesh-and-blood adversary. 
Two reasons may be suggested for his reluctance to challenge Augustine 
directly. In the first place, although it is clear that he had strong objections to the 
sort of Hellenic-Jewish synthesis which reaches full development in Augustine's 
writings, Nietzsche must have regarded the Augustinian fusion simply as the 
inevitable result of a revolution in thought that had its origins centuries earlier 
in post-Periclean Athens. 
In the second place, Nietzsche's failure to cross swords with Augustine in 
any serious way may have been due in part to the low opinion he had of him as a 
man. It is clear from his statements about himself and the ambivalence of his 
attitude toward Socrates that Nietzsche enjoyed jousting with adversaries 
sufficiently worthv of his steel to be honored with an enmity not unmixed with 
reverence. He thought Augustine merely a "Christian agitator," one of a clever 
but "unclean lot,"3 an incomplete man: 
In an age of disintegration that mixes races indiscriminately, human beings 
have in their bodies the heritage of multiple origins, that is, opposite, and often not 
merely opposite, drives and value standards that fight each other and rarely permit 
each other any rest. Such human beings of late cultures and refracted lights will on 
the average be weaker human beings: their most profound desire is that the war they 
are should come to an end. Happiness appears to them, in agreement with a tran-
quilizing (for example, Epicurean or Christian) medicine and way of thought, pre-
eminently as the happiness of resting, of not being disturbed, of satiety, of finally 
attained unity, as a "sabbath of sabbaths," to speak with the holy rhetorician Augus-
tine who was himself such a human being. 4 
A more suitable antagonist, from Nietzsche's point of view, was Plato, heir 
to Socrates, assimilator into Greek thought of foreign ideas, and forerunner of 
2 M, sec. 84. 
3 A, sec. 59. 
4 J, sec. 200. 
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Augustinian Christianity. Acknowledging in Plato the nobility that he could 
not find in Augustine, Nietzsche includes him in a select list of "royal and 
magnificent hermits of the spirit"5 whom he recognizes as his honored teachers: 
I, too, have been in the underworld, like Odysseus, and shall be there often yet; and 
not only rams have I sacrificed to be able to speak with a few of the dead, but I have 
not spared my own blood. Four pairs it was that did not deny themselves to my 
sacrifice: Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, Pascal 
and Schopenhauer. With these I must come to terms when I have long wandered 
alone; they may call me right and wrong; to them will I listen when in the process 
they call each other right and wrong. Whatsoever I say, resolve, or think up for 
myself and others-on these eight I fix my eyes and see their eyes fixed on me. 
May the living forgive me that occasionally they appear to me as shades, so 
pale and somber, so restless and, alas, so lusting for life-while those men then seem 
so alive to me as if now, after death, they could never again grow weary of life. But 
eternal aliveness is what counts: What matters "eternal life" or any life! 6 
He finds in Plato a full measure of the Greek love of combat, "an over-
whelming craving to assume the place of the overthrown poet and to inherit 
his fame."7 Plato's artistic achievements are attributed to his desire to show that 
he is a greater myth-maker, playwright, and orator than any of his predecessors, 
and his triumph is crowned by his final repudiation of the arts in which he has 
sought and achieved success through sheer love of a good fight. 
If Plato's pleasure in conflict and contempt for pity earn him Nietzsche's 
respect, they do not acquit him of complicity in the corruption of the West. It is 
Plato, after all, who provided the literary vehicle for Socratic rationalism and 
who, under Socrates' influence, advocated a proscription of the tragic art which, 
for Nietzsche, represents the fullest flowering of the Greek spirit. In Nietzsche's 
eyes, a great piece of philosophic mischief took place in the prison cell where 
Socrates drank the fatal draught. "The dying Socrates," he observes, "became the 
new ideal, never seen before, of noble Greek youths: above all, the typical 
Hellenic youth Plato, prostrated himself before this image with all the ardent 
devotion of his enthusiastic soul."8 With the conversion of Plato to Socratism, 
the natural development of philosophy was summarily arrested. "It is no idle 
question," Nietzsche says, "whether Plato, ifhe had remained free from Socratic 
enchantment, would not have found a yet higher type of the philosophic man, 
which type is forever lost to us. "9 
If youth was responsible for Plato's initial commitment to Socratism, the 
5 Ibid., sec. 204. 
6 Mixed Opinions and Maxims, sec. 408. 
7 Homer's Contest (see Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche, p. 36). 
8 GT, sec. 13. 
9 MA, Book I, sec. 261. Werke: Diinndruckausgabe, ed. Alfred Baumler (Leipzig: Kroner, 1930), 
II, 213 (author's translation). 
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specific shape ofhis own thought was, in Nietzsche's view, formed at a somewhat 
later period: 
Every philosophy is the philosophy of some stage of life. The stage of life at which a 
philosopher found his doctrine reverberates through it; he cannot prevent this, 
however far above time and hour he may feel. Thus Schopenhauer's philosophy 
remains the reflection of ardent and melancholy youth-it is no way of thinking for 
older people. And Plato's philosophy recalls the middle thirties, when a cold and a 
hot torrent often roar toward each other, so that a mist and tender little clouds form 
and under favorable circumstances and the rays of the sun, an enchanting rainbow. 10 
Nietzsche had a classical scholar's familiarity with Plato's writings. Augus-
tine, clearly better acquainted with the thought of the Neo-Platonists than with 
that of Plato himself, seems, nevertheless, to have read some of the dialogues. The 
two men are substantially in agreement concerning the effects of his philosophy 
on the classical mind in rendering it susceptible to Christianity. Their attitudes 
toward its influence, however, are markedly different. 
Augustine holds that if Plato were alive and could be asked whether a man 
who could persuade the world of the high truths of Platonic philosophy would 
not be worthy of divine honors, he would reply that "being the bearer and 
instrument of God on behalf of the true salvation of the human race, such a man 
would have earned a place all his own, a place above all humanity."11 Jesus the 
Christ is, according to Augustine, the man in whom the Platonic promise is 
fulfilled. 
For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the age that Plato brought to an end was 
greater than the one which he brought into being. Socratic dialectic and· Euripi-
dean drama, in which cold, calculating reason replaces Dionysian instinct and 
frenzy, find their fulfillment in a new art form created by Plato. Deprecating 
tragedy, along with all the other arts as imitation of imitation, Plato tried to 
create a mode of artistic expression which would rise above what is commonly 
taken for reality and represent directly the realm of Ideas: The result was the 
dialogue, a mixture of all the literary and dramatic styles and forms which had 
gone before it and, in fact, the model of the novel, "which may be described as 
an infinitely enhanced Aesopian fable, in which poetry holds the same rank in 
relation to dialectical philosophy as this same philosophy held for many centuries 
in relation to theology: namely, the rank of anci/la." 12 A result in literature and 
philosophy has been, in Nietzsche's view, the substitution of a spirit of optimism 
for a true sense of tragedy. 
He regards the presence of Socratism in Plato's philosophy-the optimistic 
•0 Mixed Opinions and Maxims, sec. 271. 
11 Augustine, Of Trne Religion, 3.3, Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. and trans. John Burleigh 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), p. 227. 
12 GT, sec. 14. 
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and utilitarian identification of badness with ignorance-as an alien intrusion for 
which Plato himself was really too high-minded: "Plato did everything he could 
in order to read something refined and noble into the proposition of his teacher-
above all, himself. He was the most audacious of all interpreters and took the 
whole Socrates only the way one picks a popular tune and folk song from the 
streets in order to vary it into the infinite and impossible-namely, into all of his 
own masks and multiplicities in a jest, Homeric at that: what is the Platonic 
Socrates after all if not prosthe Platon opithen te Platon messe te Chimaira." 13 
Noble intent was not enough. Under Plato's influence, classical thought 
strayed farther and farther from the original forms it had taken in the works of 
the great Greek tragedians and the pre-Socratic philosophers. In the last analysis, 
indeed, Nietzsche regards Plato rather than Socrates as the real turning point in 
the history of Western thought: 
With Plato something quite new begins, or, as can be said with equal justice, since 
Plato, philosophers lack something essential in comparison with that republic of 
geniuses from Thales to Socrates. Whoever wishes to express himself spitefully 
about those older masters may call them one-sided and their epigones, with Plato at 
the head, many-sided. It would be more accurate and unprejudiced to conceive the 
latter as philosophic mongrel characters, the former as pure types. Plato himself is 
the first grand mongrel character and distinctly stamped as such, both in his per-
sonality and in his philosophy. Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitean elements are 
joined together in his ideology; it is, therefore, no typically pure phenomenon. As a 
man too, Plato intermingles the traits of the royally reclusive, all-sufficient Hera-
clitus, of the gloomily compassionate and legislatorial Pythagoras, and of the 
psychologically proficient dialectician Socrates.14 
Nietzsche judges all post-Platonic philosophers to be such hybrid characters. 
They are founders of sects which oppose the older Hellenic culture. The pre-
Platonic thinkers, in whose ranks Nietzsche, in this context at least, includes 
Socrates, were true Greeks, types of the philosopher who "guards and defends 
his native country." 15 After Plato, on the other hand, the philosopher "is in exile 
and conspires against his fatherland." 16 
One reason for the alienation is, in Nietzsche's view, to be found in the 
assimilation by Plato and his successors of elements from a variety of cultures. A 
principal difference between Augustine and Nietzsche lies in their evaluation 
of this process. 
Augustine, concerned to find the hand of God moving in the Greek world, 
welcomes every evidence that Platonic philosophy may have been influenced by 
13 J, sec. 190. 
14 Nietzsche, Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen, sec. 2, Friedrich Nietzsches Werke, 
I, 268 (author's translation). 
15 Ibid., p. 269. 
16 lbid. 
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the revealed truth given through the Jews. In De Doctrina Christiana, he rejects 
the theory that Jesus may have learned from Plato. Appealing to the authority 
of Ambrose, he asks whether the great Bishop did not, "when he had considered 
the history of the pagans and found that Plato had traveled in Egypt during the 
time of Jeremias, show that Plato had probably been introduced to our literature 
by Jeremias so that he was able to teach or to write doctrines that are justly 
commended."17 Discovering that Plato was born too late to have met the 
prophet and too early to have read the Septuagint translation, Augustine still 
maintains in De Civitate Dei that Plato could have become familiar with the 
contents of the Jewish Scriptures through conversation or by delving into 
literature. 18 
The description of the creation of the heavens and the earth in the first book 
of Genesis is compared, as one instance of this apparent influence, with Plato's 
account of the uniting by God of earth and fire, the latter element being located 
in the heavens. Augustine speculates, with equally questionable plausibility, that 
the inclusion of two other elements, air and water, may have been based on the 
verse: "the spirit of God was stirring above the waters." Air is identified with 
spirit in popular Greek thought, his reasoning goes, and so Genesis could have 
been the source of Plato's elements.19 
Augustine finds in the Scriptures an idea consonant with Plato's definition 
of a philosopher as one who loves God, and he sees in Plato's writings a recogni-
tion of the God of the Old Testament: 
... the most palpable proof to my mind that he was conversant with the sacred 
books is this, that when Moses, informed by an angel that God wished him to 
deliver the Hebrews from Egypt, questioned the angel concerning the name of the 
one who had sent him, the answer received was this: "I AM WHO AM. Thus shalt 
thou say to the children of Israel: He who is, hath sent me to you," as though, in 
comparison with Him, who, being immutable, truly is, all mutable things arc as if 
they were not. Now, Plato had a passionate perception of this truth and was never 
tired of teaching it. Yet, I doubt whether this idea can be found in any of the works 
of Plato's predecessors except in the text: "I AM WHO AM, and you shall say to 
them: He who is hath sent me to you." 20 
In spite of his low opinion of Christian philology, Nietzsche shows little 
inclination to challenge Augustine's interpretation of Plato's thought on philo-
logical grounds. Like Augustine, he sees abundant evidence of foreign influence 
in Platonic philosophy, and he is critical of the Semitic flavor which Augustine 
17 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 2.28, trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts 
Press, 1958), p. 64. 
18 Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 8. 1 I. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Augustine, The City of God, 8.11, trans. Gerald G. Walsh, ct al. (New York: Image Books, 1958), 
pp. 16o-61. (All references to The City of God hereinafter cited are to this edition.) 
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values. Maintaining that Christianity inherited a megalomania from its Jewish 
background, he nevertheless continues: ". . . on the other hand, Greek moral 
philosophy had already done everything to prepare the way for and to make 
palatable moral fanaticism even among the Greeks and Romans-Plato, the 
great viaduct of corruption, who first refused to see nature in morality, who had 
already debased the Greek gods with his concept 'good,' who was already marked 
by Jewish bigotry (-in Egypt?)"21 
No overall prejudice against Jews need be read into such observations as 
this, and indeed, Nietzsche characterizes himself as a foe of anti-Semitism. In his 
writings, he praises the early Hebrew ethos and frequently expresses his admira-
tion for the Jews as a people. Moreover, even his criticisms of the Jewish elements 
in Platonism and Christianity, though scathing enough, usually show more 
restraint than his attacks on his fellow Germans. Nevertheless, he does see non-
Hellenic influences, in particular those with Jewish origins, as destructive of the 
vigor and purity of the older Greek culture. After Socrates, these innovations 
become, in his opinion, an ineradicable source of corruption. Plato is an "in-
stinctive Semite and anti-Hellene,"22 and a Stoic "is an Arabian sheik wrapped 
in Greek togas and concepts."23 Late in his career, defecting from his earlier 
identification of Socrates as the last of the truly Greek philosophers, he accords 
this distinction to the Sophists. "When Socrates and Plato took up the cause of 
virtue and justice," he says, "they were Jews or I know not what."24 Christianity 
is only a continuation of "the fight that had already begun against the classical 
ideal and the noble religion. " 25 It is "Platonism for 'the people.' " 26 
Both Augustine and Nietzsche find the principal significance of Socrates 
and Plato in the emergence of morality as the dominant element in philosophy. 
"To Socrates," Augustine says, "goes the credit of being the first one to channel 
the whole of philosophy into an ethical system for the reformation and regulation 
of morals. "Z7 
Nietzsche, although recognizing the presence of a moral element even in 
pre-Socratic metaphysics, maintains that with Socrates and Plato, morality 
ceases to be a matter of instinct and becomes a self-conscious rational discipline, 
conveniently provided with an ideal, if fictional, metaphysical foundation: 
In praxi, this means that moral judgments are tom from their conditionality, 
in which they have grown and alone possess any meaning, from their Greek and 
Greek-political ground and soil, to be denaturalized under the pretense of sublima-
21 WM, sec. 202. 
22 Ibid., sec. 19 5. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., sec. 429. 
25 Ibid., sec. 196. 
26 J, "Preface." 
v Augustine, The City of God, 8.3, pp. 146-47. 
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tion. The great concepts "good" and "just" are severed from the presuppositions to 
which they belong and, as liberated "ideas" become objects of dialectic. One looks 
for truth in them, one takes them for entities: one invents a world where they are at 
home, where they originate. 
In summa: the mischief has already reached its climax in Plato-and then one 
had need to invent the abstractly perfect man as well:-good, just, wise, a dialec-
tician-in short, the scarecrow of an ancient philosopher: a plant removed from all 
soil; a humanity without any particular regulating instincts; a virtue that "proves" 
itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd "individuum" in itselfl Unnaturalness of 
the first water.-
In short, the consequence of the denaturalization of moral values was the 
creation of a degenerate type of man-"the good man," "the happy man," "the 
wise man." -Socrates represents a moment of the profoundest perversity in the 
history of values. 28 
23 
In so corrupting morality, Plato is seen as having had necessary recourse to 
the holy lie, originally a priestly prerogative, and, Nietzsche is careful to point 
out, an Aryan rather than a Semitic one. The holy lie, in promoting a concept 
of good and evil divorced from such natural predicates as "useful," "harmful," 
"life promoting," "life retarding," and the like, necessitates a claim to authority 
here and hereafter as a source of powerful sanctions for the enforcement of an 
unnatural rule of conduct. To provide that authority and those sanctions, the 
holy lie posits God, an afterlife, conscience, morality, and revealed truth. 
It may be noted that Plato, in the Republic, justifies a lie for pious ends in 
defense of a social stratification not too much at variance in form, at least, with 
that favored by Nietzsche himself. It is presumably with this in mind that 
Nietzsche cites Plato as an authority for the value of "a real lie, a genuine, resolute, 
'honest' lie."29 He does not hesitate, however, to brand the Republic as an in-
stance of the sort of cold-blooded, reflective Aryan influence30 responsible for 
the pia fraus, which is, iri such a context, "more offensive to the free spirit, who 
has 'the piety of the search for knowledge' " 31 than the impia fraus because it 
results in "the worst mutilation of man that can be imagined presented as the 
'good man.' " 32 
The holy lie, in support of an unnatural moral system, must be distinguished 
form the legitimate lie of the artist, which Nietzsche defends, for: 
... art, in which precisely the lie is sanctified and the will to deception has a good 
conscience, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than is science: 
this was instinctively sensed by Plato, the greatest enemy of art Europe has yet 
28 The Will to Power, sec. 430. 
29 GM, "Third Essay," sec. 19. 
30 WM, sec. 142. 
31 J, sec. rn5. 
32 WM, sec. 141. 
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produced. Plato versus Homer: that is the complete, the genuine antagonism-there 
the sincerest advocate of the "beyond," the great slanderer oflife; here the instinctive 
deifier, the golden nature. To place himself in the service of the ascetic ideal is there-
fore the most distinctive corruption of an artist that is at all possible; unhappily, also, 
one of the most common forms of corruption, for nothing is more easily corrupted 
than an artist. 33 
Whether it does or does not really rest on a lie, a universal ethical system 
goes hand-in-hand with the claim that there is an absolute truth. Here again, 
Augustine and Nietzsche agree substantially in their interpretation of Plato's 
thoughts but differ sharply in their evaluation of it. 
According to Augustine, the philosopher, as seen by Plato, is engaged in "a 
hunt for happiness which ends only when a lover of God reaches fruition in 
God,"34 and he praises the Platonists, "who acknowledged the true God as the 
author of being, the light of truth and the giver of blessedness. " 35 
Similarly, Nietzsche speaks of "the Christian faith, which was also Plato's, 
that God is truth, that truth is divine."36 Plato is asserted to have "wanted to 
employ all his strength-the greatest strength any philosopher so far has had at 
his disposal-to prove to himself that reason and instinct of themselves tend 
toward one goal, the good, 'God.' " 37 As contrasted with Augustine's whole-
hearted approval of the spirituality and theocentricity he saw in Platonic philoso-
phy, however, Nietzsche's attitude toward Plato's "invention of pure spirit and 
the good" is one of incredulity. "How could the most beautiful growth of 
antiquity, Plato, contract such a disease?" he asks. "Did the wicked Socrates 
corrupt him after all? Could Socrates have been the corrupter of youth after all? 
And did he deserve his hemlock?"38 
Certainly, Augustine's theory of knowledge is Platonic in character. While 
acknowledging the claims of sense experience and an instrumental use of reason 
in the conduct of practical affairs, he stresses the final goal of liberation from the 
senses and the attainment of the wisdom and happiness which result from con-
templation directed toward a supernatural end. Plato's mathematical entities are 
reflected in Augustine's treatment of the ideal geometrical figures by which 
mutable and imperfect circles and lines are judged, while principles not unlike 
Plato's r1.pxr1.i provide the standards by which specific aesthetic and ethical 
judgments are made. Moreover, Plato's comparison of the sun with the Idea 
of the Good in the Republic finds its counterpart in Augustine's treatment of God 
as the light by which the nature of intelligible things is made evident to the 
33 GM, "Third Essay," sec. 25. 
34 Augustine, The City of God, 8.8, p. 156. 
35 Ibid., 8.5, p. 151. 
36 GM, "Third Essay," sec. 24. 
37 J, sec. 191. 
38 J, "Preface." 
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intellect, "just as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie about it in this corporeal 
light. " 39 In his earlier writings, he seems to have entertained sympathetically the 
Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence, but it is apparently repudiated in De Trini-
tate. 40 
Nietzsche, while rejecting the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, is not impervious 
to its attractiveness as contrasted with the attempt to derive explanatory principles 
from naive reliance on sense data: 
Conversely, the charm of the Platonic way of thinking, which was a noble way of 
thinking, consisted precisely in resistance to obvious sense-evidence-perhaps among 
men who enjoyed even stronger and more demanding senses than our contempo-
raries, but who knew how to find a higher triumph in remaining masters of their 
senses-and this by means of pale, cold, gray concept nets which they threw over 
the motley whirl of the senses-the mob of the senses, as Plato said. In this over-
coming of the world, and interpreting of the world in the manner of Plato, there 
was an enjoyment different from that which the physicists of today offer us-and 
also the Darwinists and anti-teleologists among the workers in physiology, with 
their principle of the "smallest possible force" and the greatest possible stupidity.41 
Plato's real difficulty, as Nietzsche sees it, lies in the fact that a philosophy 
based on morality makes Truth an absolute good and the search for it an uncon-
ditional duty. However, a search for that Truth sufficiently honest and diligent to 
satisfy the moral imperative must at last lead to the denial that any such goal can 
be attained and thus to intellectual nihilism. 
According to Nietzsche, we must examine the whole question of truth from 
a different standpoint. It is not, as Plato supposed, something absolute and 
unchanging and neither are the men who seek it: 
What separates us most thoroughly from all Platonic and Leibnizian ways of 
thinking is: we believe in no eternal concepts, eternal values, eternal forms, eternal 
souls: and philosophy, so far as it is science and not legislation, to us means only the 
broadest extension of the concept "history." From etymology and the history of 
language we take the view that all concepts have evolved [sind geworden ], many are 
still evolving: and moreover in such fashion, that the most general concepts, being 
the.falsest, must also be the oldest. "Being," "substance," "absolute [Unbedingtes]," 
"sameness," "thing"-: at the first and earliest period, thought devised for itself 
these schemata, which in fact contradict the world of becoming most thoroughly, 
but which seemed to correspond to it as a matter of course, given the obtuseness and 
all-the-sameness [Einerleiheit] of consciousness as it began in the lower animals .... 42 
39 Augustine, The Trinity, 12.15.24, trans. Stephen McKcnna (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1963), p. 366. 
40 Ibid. 
41 J, sec. 14. 
42 Nachgelassene Werke, 1882-88, sec. 21. Trans. George A. Morgan in What Nietzsche Means 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 243. 
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The changing and partial character of knowledge does not, in Nietzsche's 
view, entitle us to think in fragmentary fashion. A system of thought with some 
sort of wholeness is as appealing to him as to any other philosopher, but the 
wholeness must be a product of organic growth and not of deliberate rational 
construction. "Such dogmatic men as Dante and Plato," he says, "are farthest 
from me and perhaps thereby most fascinating: men who dwell in a trimly built 
and firmly believed house of knowledge. " 43 
Nietzsche's preference for a dynamic as opposed to a static conception of 
knowledge is reflected in his wholehearted approval of empirical method and his 
distrust of scientific concepts, which seem to him to imply a Platonic view of 
knowledge: 
Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever 
wholly equals another, and the concept "leaf' is formed through an arbitrary 
abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions; 
and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides the 
leaves which would be "leaf" -some kind of original form after which all leaves 
have been woven, marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled 
hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the 
original form. 44 
Nietzsche's regard for mathematics and logic as sources of knowledge is 
considerably lower than Plato's. They are, to be sure, useful disciplines for a 
variety of practical enterprises, but, far from revealing the nature of reality, they 
actually obscure it. Perfect circularity, a purely fictitious product of thought, 
could never, in Nietzsche's view, be legitimately thought of as having greater 
reality than an approximately circular object of experience. Knowledge in the 
Platonic sense is impossible, for there is no intelligible absolute Being to be 
known. 
Augustine's acceptance and Nietzsche's rejection of a Platonic transempirical 
reality have their inevitable corollary in their differing evaluations of Plato's 
conception of nature and man. Augustine regards Plato as committed in the 
Timaeus to a doctrine of creation not too much at variance with his own theory 
of creatio ex nihilo: 
Surely, in matters which the mind of man cannot penetrate it is better simply to 
believe what God tells us, namely, that the soul is not co-eternal with God but was 
created out of nothing. To justify their refusal to believe this, the Platonist~ have 
been content with the argument that nothing can be everlasting unless it has existed 
eternally. What, however, Plato himself expressly stated is that the world and those 
gods whom God put in the world began to be and had a beginning, although they 
43 NachgelasseneWerke, sec. 55. Cited by Morgan. 
44 Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" (see Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche, 
p. 46). 
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will have no end, since the will of the all-powerful Creator will keep them in exis-
tence forever. 45 
27 
Augustine draws attention to a statement by Plato that God was filled with 
delight at the completion of His creation, like an artist pleased with his work. 
This does not, Augustine holds, necessitate the attribution to the Creator of any 
sense of discovery or recognition of novelty, and he denies that Plato places God 
in time. "For, not in our way does God look forward to the future, see the present, 
and look back upon the past, but in a manner remotely and profoundly unlike 
our way of thinking."46 
In his discussion of Plato's doctrine of creation, Augustine points to a further 
instance of the subordination of metaphysics to morality: "Even Plato says that 
the best reason for creating the world is that good things should be made by a 
good God. It may be that he read this scriptural passage or learned it from those 
who had, or, by his own keen insight, he clearly saw that 'the invisible things' of 
God are 'understood by the things that are made,' or, perhaps, he learned from 
others who had clearly seen this."47 
Augustine again has recourse to Plato in his treatment of questions about 
human souls. For both thinkers, the soul is immaterial and substantial. With some 
revision, Augustine appropriates Plato's arguments for its immortality. Rather 
than holding, with Plato, that the soul is in its own right the principle of life and 
thus cannot die, he maintains that it derives its being and essence from God and 
that, being grounded in the Divine Life, the individual soul has life as its own 
essence and so is not subject to death. In Platonic fashion, the soul is also declared 
to be indestructible because it is capable of apprehending indestructible truth. 
Augustine suggests that his own view of souls as direct creations of God is 
not incompatible with Plato's position: "Of course, when Plato taught that the 
lesser gods, made by the Supreme God, were the makers of the mortal part of all 
other animals, he knew that the immortal part came from God; therefore, he 
maintained that the lesser gods were responsible not for our souls but only for 
our bodies. " 48 
Augustine uses Plato's declaration in the Timaeus that animal life is essential 
to a perfect and beautiful universe49 as an argument against the Platonists' 
contention that souls are placed in bodies as punishment for sins occurring in some 
state of pre-existence. He nowhere commits himself to any theory as to when 
souls come into existence, and most of his speculation on the origin of individual 
souls is concerned with the question of whether God creates each soul individually 
45 Augustine, The City of God, 10.31, p. 197. 
46 lbid., 11.21, p. 227. 
47 Ibid., p. 228. 
48 Ibid., 12.27, p. 266. 
49 Plato, Timaeus, 41c. 
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or whether all souls were originally created in Adam's. His interest in the subject 
is, perhaps, more theological than philosophical, though he would certainly 
draw no sharp distinction between the two disciplines. 
In contrast to Augustine, Nietzsche holds distinctly anti-Platonic views of 
nature and man. The world is in no way dependent upon a god or gods: 
And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my 
mirror? This world: a monster of energy without beginning, without end; a firm, 
iron magnitude of force that docs not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend 
itself but only transforms itself; ... a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, 
eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, 
with an ebb and a flow of its forms; ... this, my Dionysian world of the eternally 
self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, ... do you want a name for this world? A 
solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most 
intrepid, most midnightly men?- This world is the will to power-and nothing besides' 
And you yourselves are also this will to power-and nothing besides!50 
In Nietzsche's world-view, there is no immutable unconditioned, rational 
reality lying behind the world of change. Reality is itself the becoming which 
Plato mistakenly tries to transcend, and "the world has no goal, no final state, and 
is incapable of being. " 51 "This beautiful world history is, in Heraclitean terms, 
'a chaotic pile of rubbish.' " 52 
His rejection of a Platonic universe does not commit Nietzsche to atomistic 
materialism, which he dismisses as "one of the best refuted theories there are."53 
His own view of the nature of things is, indeed, far removed from the usual 
mechanistic formulations of classical materialism. As for the world constructed 
by the speculative imagination of the scientist, it too is suspect, as resting on 
essentially Platonic foundations: 
The truthful man, in the audacious and ultimate sense presupposed by the faith 
in science, thereby affirms another world than that of life, nature, and history; and 
insofar as he affirms this "other world," does this not mean that he has to deny its 
antithesis, this world, our world? ... It is still a metaphysical faith that underlies our 
faith in science-and we men of knowledge of today, we godless men and anti-
metaphysicians, we, too, still derive our flame from the fire ignited by a faith mil-
lenia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato's, that God is truth, that truth is 
divine. -But what if this belief is becoming more and more unbelievable, if nothing 
turns out to be divine any longer unless it be error, blindness, lies-if God himself 
turns out to be our longest /ie?54 
so WM, sec. 1067. 
51 WM, sec. 1o62, p. 546. 
52 Notes (1873), 6.334 f. 
53 J, sec. 12. 
54 GM, "Third Essay." sec. 24 (quoted from Die Frohliche Wissenschaji, sec. 344). 
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Nietzsche summarily rejects the theory of the creation of the world which 
Augustine attributes to Plato. "We need not worry for a moment about the 
hypothesis of a created world," he says. "The concept 'create' is today completely 
indefinable, unrealizable; merely a word, a rudimentary survival from the ages of 
superstition; one can explain nothing with a mere word."55 
As for the conception of the soul "as something indestructible, eternal, 
indivisible, as a monad, as an atomon: this belief ought to be expelled from 
science!" Nietzsche says, but he goes on to add: "Between ourselves, it is not at 
all necessary to get rid of'the soul' at the same time, and thus to renounce one of 
the most ancient and venerable hypotheses-as happens frequently to clumsy 
naturalists who can hardly touch on 'the soul' without immediately losing it. 
But the way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and 
such conceptions as 'mortal soul,' and 'soul as subjective multiplicity,' and 'soul 
as social structure of the drives and affects,' want henceforth to have citizens' 
rights in science. "56 
To the Platonic view of immortality, Nietzsche opposes his own doctrine 
of eternal return, one of the most significant and, at the same time, most puzzling 
features ofhis philosophy. Seen from one standpoint, the theory seems to suggest 
little more than an unending recurrence based on the questionable notion that, 
given a world limited in extent but unlimited in duration, any event must be 
repeated an infinite number of times: 
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force and as a 
certain definite number of centers of force-and every other representation remains 
indefinite and therefore useless-it follows that, in the great dice game of existence, 
it must pass through a calculable number of combinations. In infinite time, every 
possible combination would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be 
realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its 
next occurrence all other possible combinations would have to take place, and each 
of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same 
series, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the 
world as a circular movement that has already repeated itself infinitely often and 
plays its game in in.finitum.57 
Nietzsche insists that this concept is not merely mechanistic. It may not be 
immediately obvious, however, why he describes it as "this highest formula of 
affirmation that is at all attainable"58 or why his outlook underwent a change not 
unlike that associated with experiences of religious conversion when, walking 
in the woods by the lake ofSilvaplana in 1881, he stopped by a pyramidal rock 
55 WM, sec. 1066. The word translated as "indefinable," reportedly illegible in the manuscript, is 
rendered as "undefinierbar" in German editions. 
56 J, sec. 12. 
57 WM, sec. 1066. 
58 "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," Ecce Homo, sec. 1. 
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and found himself overcome by a conviction that all things must return. The 
exhilaration this revelation produced in him would seem an inappropriate 
response to a vision of a senseless universe repeating a meaningless history 
throughout a time without beginning and without end. 
From the popular point of view, Nietzsche acknowledges, such a prospect 
would be all but unendurable. No ordinary man could cheerfully will his own 
return and the recurrence of everything that happens to him during his lifetime. 
If this "hardest idea"59 is to be borne, one must be prepared to revalue all his 
values, assert the will to power, accept uncertainty and strive for the creation of 
the Superman. If, like Zarathustra, a man can see himself as a maker of his own 
destiny rather than as a pawn of fate, he can affirm the values of his life and joyfully 
will to live again and again throughout eternity. 
The precise nature of the theory of recurrence has been the subject of con-
siderable speculation. Nietzsche's aversion to discussing such matters in traditional 
metaphysical terms frustrates any attempt to arrive at a clear concept of time and 
eternity which could safely be attributed to him, and it is possible that his view 
may be more complex than would seem to be indicated by the quasi-mechanistic 
formulation of a finite world in infinite one-directional time. In any event, the 
real significance of the concept lies not so much in the recurrence itself as in the 
realization of it by one who has the sort of experience which overwhelmed 
Nietzsche as he stood by his pyramidal rock "6ooo feet beyond man and time. "60 
In being able to will his own return, one brings eternity into the present moment. 
"That everything recurs" ·Nietzsche says, "is the closest approximation of a world 
of becoming to a world ofbeing."61 The doctrine thus reconciles as ideals "the two 
most extreme modes of thought-the mechanistic and the Platonic."62 
Platonic influence is clearly evident in Augustine's treatment of virtue, 
derived from classical sources, but interpreted in Christian terms: 
As to virtue leading us to a happy life, I hold virtue to be nothing else than perfect 
love of God. For the fourfold division of virtue I regard as taken from four forms of 
love. For these four virtues (would that all felt their influence in their minds as they 
have their names in their mouths!) I should have no hesitation in defining them: that 
temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved; fortitude is love 
readily bearing all things for the sake of the loved object; justice is love serving only 
the loved object, and therefore ruling rightly; prudence is love distinguishing with 
sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it. The object of this love is not 
anything but God, the chief good, the highest wisdom, the perfect harmony.63 
59 WM, sec. 1059. 
60 "Thus Spoke Zarathustra," Ecce Homo, sec. I. 
61 WM, sec. 617. 
62 WM, sec. 1o6r. 
63 Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, IS, trans. R. Stothert in Basic Writings of Saint 
Au.11ustine, Whitney J. Oates, ed .• (New York: Random House, 1948), p. 331. 
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Nietzsche too, though his ethical outlook is quite different from Augustine's, 
occasionally discusses virtue in terms of four qualities. In Morgenrote, they are 
given as "Die guten Vier / Redlich gegen uns und was sonst uns Freund ist; tapfer 
gegen den Feind; xro}Jmutig gegen den Besiegten; hofiich-immer: so wollen uns 
die vier Kardinaltugenden. " 64 In Jenseits von Gut und Bose, a somewhat different 
set of virtues is proposed: "Und Herr seiner vier Tugenden bleiben, des Mutes, 
der Einsicht, des Mitgefiihls, der Einsamkeit. " 65 
Nietzsche's view of Plato became more acerbic with the passage of time. In 
Gotzen-Diimmerung, or Wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert, written near the 
end of his active life, he expresses a strong preference for Roman literature over 
Greek and sums up his earlier objections to Plato in a surprisingly bitter passage: 
For heaven's sake, do not throw Plato at me. I am a complete skeptic about 
Plato, and I have never been able to join in the admiration for the artist Plato which 
is customary among scholars. In the end, the subtlest judges of taste among the 
ancients themselves are here on my side. Plato, it seems to me, throws all stylistic 
forms together and is thus a first-rate decadent in style: ... To be attracted by the 
Platonic dialogue, this horribly self-satisfied and childish kind of dialectic, one must 
never have read good French writers-Fontenelle, for example. Plato is boring. In 
the end, my mistrust of Plato goes deep: he represents such an aberration from all 
the basic instincts of the Hellene, is so moralistic, so pre-existently Christian-he 
already takes the concept "good" for the highest concept-that for the whole 
phenomenon Plato I would sooner use the harsh phrase "higher swindle" or, if it 
sounds better, "idealism," than any other. We have paid dearly for the fact that this 
Athenian got his schooling from the Egyptians (or from the Jews in Egypt?). In 
that great calamity, Christianity, Plato represents that ambiguity and fascination, 
called an "ideal," which made it possible for the nobler spirits of antiquity to 
misunderstand themselves and to set foot on the bridge leading to the cross. And 
how much Plato there still is in the concept "church," in the construction, system, 
and practice of the church.66 
Augustine and Nietzsche are alike in having a polemic rather than an exposi-
tory purpose in their references to Plato. Both see in him a challenger of earlier 
pagan values and a foreshadower of Christianity. Both suppose him to have been 
strongly influenced by Semitic views, probably acquired in Egypt. Both char-
acterize his philosophy as having an essentially moral orientation. Both offer 
interpretations of Plato's epistemological and metaphysical positions which, 
though strikingly similar, point up with clarity the difference between the two 
men in their attitudes toward the fabric of Western thought. All in all, Nietzsche 
accepts so much of the Augustinian portrait of Plato that he can hardly accuse 
64 M, sec. 5 56, Nietzsches Werke in Zwei Bdnden, ed. Gerhard Stenzel (Salzburg: Verlag "Das 
Bergland Buch," 1950), II, 542. 
65 J, sec. 284. Stenzel, p. 8 17. 
66 "What I Owe to the Ancients," G, sec. 2. 
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Augustine of any great philological impropriety in his treatment of Platonic 
thought without laying himself open to the same charge. 
In all fairness, it should be recognized that Nietzsche acknowledges the sort 
of distortion inherent in his representation of Plato: 
Every society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to caricatures-at least 
in imagination-and, as it were, to starve them. Such a caricature is, e.g., our 
"criminal." Within the aristocratic order of values, the Jew was reduced to a carica-
ture. Among artists, the "philistine and bourgeois" became caricatures; among the 
pious, the godless; among aristocrats, the man of the people. Among immoralists it 
is the moralist: Plato, for example, becomes a caricature in my hands. 67 
Perhaps it was inevitable that, in the course of Nietzsche's career, the Plato 
whom he originally honored with his respect would be seen more and more as a 
scapegoat to be loaded with the sins of Christendom. In the last analysis, though 
they had quite different purposes, his portrait of Plato is little different from that 
painted by Augustine. But the elements of caricature present in both cannot 
diminish the value of the tribute implicit in the fact that two thinkers of the 
stature of Augustine and Nietzsche, separated by fifteen hundred years and 
looking at the world from almost diametrically opposed points of view, could 
nevertheless agree in acknowledging Platonic thought to be the key to any true 
understanding of the Western mind. 
67 WM, sec. 374. 
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Aristotle in the Thought of Nietzsche and Thomas Aquinas 
HEDWIG WINGLER 
TRANSLATED BY TIMOTHY F. SELLNER 
Among other things Nietzsche's dictum, "God is dead," 
would say to us: There is no "ultimate meaning," and 
"behind" the world there is no "authentic being" of the kind 
of "Unmoved and Self-Subsisting Being" which Aristotle 
sought in his Metaphysics. There is no Purposive Will to 
which everything is teleologically related. 
-Hermann Wein, Positives Antichristentum (1962) 
Clearly it is any being as being whose principles we are 
trying to explain. 
-Aristotle, Metaphysics, E I (trans. Richard Hope) 
From the end of the eighteenth century on, interest in Aristotle had been 
growing steadily due to the fact that great value had been placed on his writings 
as documents illustrating the development of philosophy. Important editions of 
his works were being published, and it was the historical consciousness of the 
flourishing field of classical philology in particular which manifested a preference 
for Aristotle, who, in addition to his concern for the principles of systematization 
and analysis, had also to a certain extent made use of the historical method in his 
writings. 
Thus it is not at all unusual that Friedrich Nietzsche, at a time when he was 
still studying classical philology at the University of Leipzig, should prepare a 
seminar lecture ( I 867) on the lists of the writings of Aristotle stemming from the 
period of classical antiquity, and that he should express the intention in 1868-
never carried out-of writing a dissertation entitled "de Aristotelis librorum 
indice Laertiano," which would thus have been an elaboration of the seminar 
lecture. On the other hand, he writes in another letter from the same year: "My 
field of criticism now encompasses, among other things, almost all of Greek 
philosophy, with the exception of Aristotle .... " 1 
1 HKG (Bri~fe), II, 264. (For key to abbreviations seep. xvii above.) 
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In Nietzsche's lectures in Basel from the years 1869 to 1879 Aristotle is 
treated within the framework of the usual topics in the field of classical philology;2 
the only thing which could be considered unusual is Nietzsche's special treatment 
of the Pre-Socratics during his academic years. Also within the realm of the 
expected is his demand for a "precise interpretation of Aristotle and Plato" 
within the academic profession, at a time (1871) when Nietzsche, the classical 
philologist, was competing-unsuccessfully, as it turned out-for the professor-
ship in philosophy at his University in Basel. This professorship was then given to 
RudolfEucken, whose appointment prompted Nietzsche to write in a letter the 
following ironic remark: " ... our new philosopher is going to deliver his inaugu-
ral address on the 'obvious' theme: 'The Significance of Aristotle for the Present 
Age.' " 3 
But in spite of this conventional ranking of Aristotle with Plato, Nietzsche 
did not possess an edition of Aristotle in the original Greek, whereas it can be 
shown that he most certainly read a number of the dialogues of Plato in the 
original. Aristotle, it would appear, was an author whose works he scarcely got 
around to reading thoroughly in the original, even though he resolved to do so 
on a number of occasions. 
On the other hand, two works from the secondary literature are especially 
important. The first is the History of Materialism (Geschichte des Materialismus) by 
Friedrich Albert Lange, with which Nietzsche had been acquainted from the year 
1866 on. Lange influenced Nietzsche to reject the purely historical approach to 
the Greek philosophers and, instead, to study them for their "contemporary" 
value.4 The second work is The Philosophy of the Greeks (Die Philosophie der 
Griechen) by Eduard Zeller, which Nietzsche, however, used mainly as a source. 
In addition, the collection of fragments published in 1863 by Valentin Rose 
under the title Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, which was known by Nietzsche 
from I 866 on, must also be mentioned as one of the primary sources ofNietzsche's 
knowledge of Aristotle. 
The numerous references to Aristotle-partly in Greek, partly in German-
which are to be found in the lecture manuscripts can be traced directly to the 
secondary literature, which was generously utilized by Nietzsche, above all 
during the period when he was in Basel. In other respects, the list of sources 
2 See Johann Stroux, Nietzsches Professur in Basel (Jena: Frommann, 1925) and esp. GOA, XVII-
XIX. 
3 HKG (Briefe), III, 104, 167. 
4 See esp. Hermann Josef Schmidt, Nietzsche und Sokrates (Meisenheim am Gian: Hain, 1969), 
p. 306; Fr. A. Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart (Iserlohn: 
Baedeker, 1866, rpt. 1873, 1876); Eduard Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen (Tu bingen: Fues, 1844-52), 
vols. I-III. There are no visible traces of Nietzsche's use of Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of 
Famous Philosophers, in connection with Aristotle, though this is a book which is important for Nietz-
sche's reckoning with tradition in other cases. 
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compiled by the editors of the Large Octavo Edition is quite inadequate, above 
all for the three Philologica volumes, which comprise Nietzsche's manuscripts on 
classical philology and the philosophy of the ancients, and especially the manu-
scripts of the lectures in Basel. Here the critical edition of Coili and Montinari 
will, for the first time, provide greater clarity and precision, since the practice 
followed and the criteria used by the editors in the selection of references for the 
Large Octavo Edition are dubious. 
I am indebted to Curt Paul Janz in Basel, who is certainly the best authority 
on Nietzsche's life, for a valuable personal communication concerning Nietz-
sche's work on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Janz has recently published an article con-
taining a list of the university lectures and of the reading material used by 
Nietzsche at the "Paedagogium," the Gymnasium in Basel, where it was his 
obligation to teach classical languages concurrently with his duties as a professor 
at the University. Thus it is logical to assume that he read "selections from the 
Gorgias of Plato and the Rhetoric of Aristotle" with his pupils in the Summer 
Semester of1874 at the Gymnasium.5 During the Winter Semester following this 
Nietzsche lectured on the "Rhetoric of Aristotle" at the University. Consequently, 
it can be shown that he worked with the Greek text of the Rhetoric, even ifhe did 
continue to rely on secondary material-here, for example, on Friedrich Blass' 
History of Rhetoric (Geschichte der Beredsamkeit)-for his treatment of the theme. 
In any case, however, the lectures and fragments of his literary remains reveal 
everywhere that Aristotle was on his mind or that he encountered him in his 
work, and even in his published papers he deals at length with him. 
Nietzsche frequently passed judgment on Aristotle's literary style-for 
example, by saying that "the bare bones" were at times all too visible.6 In the 
same vein he writes: "In the case of Thucydides the pleasant sensation with which 
one moves a lock with a key: a laborious yielding by degrees, but well-ordered 
and continually coming closer to its goal. With Aristotle one sees the bare bones." 
In his lecture on the "History of Greek Literature" (in the winter of 1874 and 
summer of 1875) we find a rather long passage on Aristotle asa writer, containing 
the following evaluation of the extant works, in which Nietzsche shows himself 
to be thoroughly aware of the difference between the extant systematic works and 
the lost dialogues: ". . . never again has there been such abstinence from all 
charites. No flesh, no life; no concern with effect-one hears the rattle ofbones."7 
Nietzsche became acquainted with Aristotle by way of classical philology, 
5 The quotation is from Hans Gutzwiller, "Friedrich Nietzsches Lehrtatigkeit am Basler Paeda-
gogium 1869-76," Basler Zeitschrifi, 50 (1951), 180. The essay by Janz, who directed my attention to the 
article above, has just appeared. See "Friedrich Nietzsches akademische Lehrtatigkeit in Basel 1869-
1879," Nietzsche Studien, Ill (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974), 192-203. The reference to Gutzwiller appears 
on p. 192. 
6 WKG, IV-4, 367; the quotation following is from WKG, IV-1, 118 f. 
7 GOA, XVIII, 77; the passage following, GOA, IX, 81 (spring, 1870). 
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and in his lectures during the period ofhis professorship at Basel he refrained from 
almost all criticism and personal opinion in philosophical matters. Nevertheless, 
it was not long before he began to ridicule what he called philological "hod-
carrying," including his own work in the field: "Most of the 'burning issues' of 
classical philology are rather insignificant in the face of the central issues, which, 
to be sure, arc perceived only by a few. How unimportant is the question of the 
sequence of the Platonic dialogues! How fruitless is the question of the genuine-
ness of Aristotle's works!" 
Nietzsche's relationship to Aristotle belongs to the larger theme of the 
former's preoccupation with classical antiquity. It has been shown that even in 
his philological lectures (and this is even more true for the writings which were 
not limited by his academic responsibilities) Nietzsche creates a Hellenism pre-
cisely by refusing to view the heritage of antiquity purely as a theoretical problem. 
In the study of antiquity Nietzsche does not seek history but rather the essence 
of classicism. A good example of this is to be found in his lecture on the study of 
classical philology (summer, 1871). Ernst Howald writes: "Above all it is a 
question of his teleological inclination, which exerts an ahistorical effect, and his 
personification of a people, an approach which is fully and properly discredited 
today .... "8 Related to this is the fact that Nietzsche's argument does not base 
itself on evidence, but merely uses the latter for purposes of ornamentation-an 
embarrassment traceable to Nietzsche's breach with classical philology. 
It is evident that the person of Aristotle was not a main figure in Nietzsche's 
reckoning with tradition; indeed, it is obvious that Aristotle as a figure in philo-
sophical tradition was far less provocative for Nietzsche than, for example, 
Socrates and Plato. It is my thesis that the reasons for this lie less in the philosophi-
cal themes and problems per se (Nietzsche was very much interested in certain 
Aristotelian methods of inquiry and solutions), but rather in the fact that the 
figure of Aristotle and also his "style," in the broadest sense of the word, capti-
vated and held his imagination to a far lesser degree than those of Socrates and 
Plato. 
Nietzsche's reckoning with the content of Aristotle's works takes place 
chiefly in his writings on aesthetics (the critique of culture) and in his critiques of 
morality and scholarship. It is in the realm of aesthetics that Nietzsche's reckoning 
with Aristotle from the standpoint of theme and purpose emerges most clearly. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism ( 1872) there is to be found-
very near the conclusion of the treatise, in order that he once again may make a 
sharp differentiation between an aesthetic and a moral phenomenon-the most 
important observation on Aristotle and "our own aestheticians," by which he 
means the entire tradition with the exception of Richard Wagner: 
8 Ernst Howald, Friedrich Nietzsche und die klassische Philologie (Gotha: F. A. Pcrthcs, 1920), pp. 
13 f., also p. 9. Likewise Karl Schlechta, Der Junge Nietzsche und das klassische Altertum (Mainz: F. 
Kupferberg, 1948). 
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Not since Aristotle has anyone provided an explanation of the tragic effect from 
which one can infer aesthetic states or aesthetic activity on the part of the audience. 
Now pity and fear are to be urged toward a mitigating discharge through the solemn 
events, now we arc to feel ourselves ... elevated and inspired in the sense of a moral 
contemplation of the world; and as sure as I am that precisely this, and only this, 
constitutes the effect of tragedy for countless individuals, just as clearly does it follow 
that none of these, including their aestheticians who give interpretations, have ever 
experienced tragedy as an art of the highest form. Aristotle's catharsis, that patho-
logical discharge which the philologists are not sure whether to classify as a medical 
or moral phenomenon, reminds us of a remarkable idea of Goethe's: "Were the 
ancients also superior to us in that the highest degree of pathos would have been for 
them only aesthetic play-acting, whereas for us the truth of nature must also play a 
role in bringing forth such a work?" This profound ultimate question of Goethe's 
may at present be answered in the affirmative, now that we have experienced with 
amazement in the case of the musical tragedy just how the highest pathos can indeed 
be only an aesthetic performance. 9 
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The famous passage in Aristotle reads: "Tragedy is the imitation of an ... action 
... in such a manner that ... through pity and fear a catharsis of precisely these 
emotions is brought about. " 10 In direct contrast to this Aristotelian interpretation 
stands Nietzsche's interpretation, in which the aesthetic spectator is elevated above 
the pathological-moral process. Nietzsche uses the tragic myth to "sweep over" 
into the metaphysics of art, "without transgressing into the realm of pity, fear, or 
of the moral and sublime. " 11 Except for this, there is little mention of Aristotle 
in this treatise; on the other hand, Nietzsche's continuous polemic against 
Socrates and Plato is of much greater importance, since they rejected tragedy 
because it depicted only that which was pleasant, and not that which was useful. 
In his struggle against the optimistic dialectic and anti-Dionysian tendencies of 
Euripides, Socrates, and Plato, Nietzsche's resistance to Aristotle never comes to 
the point of a direct attack, even though the line of demarcation between his own 
position and that of Aristotle is drawn clearly enough. 
This is also the way Nietzsche came to interpret it later; in the preface to his 
Birth of Tragedy entitled "An Attempt at Self-Criticism" (1886) he states as his 
goal: "to view science through the eyes of the artist, but art through the eyes of 
life .... " To this also belongs another self-interpretation of Nietzsche's, this time 
from the Twilight ef the Idols ( I 888), which, because it seemed so important to 
him, he cites in Ecce Homo (1888) as well. He had, he says, drawn his concept of 
tragedy from Greek drama in order now to understand himself as a tragic philoso-
pher: "Not to be set free from terror and pity, not to purify oneself from a 
dangerous affect by means of a violent discharge-the way Aristotle misunder-
9 W, I, 122. 
'° Aristotle, Poetics, VI, 1449b, 24 ff. 
11 GT (W, I, 131); the passage following, ibid., pp. II, 79. 
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stood it-rather to go beyond the concepts of terror and pity and to be oneself the 
eternal joy of becoming-that joy which also includes the joy in destroying."12 
Nietzsche also expresses disagreement with Aristotle regarding the problem 
ofimitation. Greek tragedy and Italian opera are frankly interpreted as deviations 
from nature: "This is where nature should be contradicted! ... The Greeks go far 
in this direction ... as a matter of fact they have done everything they could to 
counteract the elemental effects of images inspiring fear and terror-but with 
all due deference to Aristotle, they simply did not want fear and pity. Not only did he 
fail to hit the nail on the head but he most assuredly missed it entirely when he 
spoke of the ultimate purpose of Greek tragedy! ... The Athenian went to the 
theater to hear beautiful speeches! ... " 13 In the final analysis it was Nietzsche's own 
era that he had in mind, and even here he is interpreting according to his desire 
for an artists' metaphysics. At that time he admired above all the musical works 
and aesthetic writings of Richard Wagner. "They are definitely the most 
important aesthetic writings we have ... In them everything-problem and 
solution-is experienced, endured, and victoriously achieved; no foolish can-
onizing or swearing by Aristotle, such as we find even in Lessing, intervenes."14 
Nevertheless, Aristotle often serves Nietzsche at a later time, after his enthusiasm 
for Wagner had already ended, by providing a contrast to his own ideas and goals. 
Subsequent to this period of enthusiasm for Wagner, Nietzsche's criticism 
of Aristotle, going beyond that contained in The Birth of Tragedy, concentrates 
on three specific areas. The first criticism is directed at Aristotle the historian. 
Aristotle, Nietzsche says, has incorrectly interpreted Greek tragedy-that is, 
tragedy in its highest form, represented by the figure of Aeschylus-by taking 
into consideration only the drama as practiced by Euripides, and thus sanctioning 
the drama which is designed chiefly to be read. In the case of Aeschylus, he states, 
the chorus and music stood at the very center of the play. Aristotle in his Philis-
tinism considered the work of art a product of artistic insight rather than a result 
of the artistic nature.15 It is the "learned," scientific approach for which Nietzsche 
reproaches Aristotle, in addition to his criticism of Aristotle the historian, and it 
is this approach, he maintains, which continues to foster historical error. We 
ought finally to free ourselves, he says, from "that screech-owl of Minerva, 
Aristotle, who was himself already alienated from that great artistic instinct 
which his teacher Plato still possessed even in his mature period ... , " and we 
ought to study works of art for ourselves. 16 
12 G (W, II, 1032). 
13 FW, Aphorism 80, "Art and Nature" (W, II, 89 f.), with reference to Aristotle's Poetics, VI. 
14 HKG, IV-1, 298 (literary remains from the summer of 1875, with reference to Richard Wagner 
in Bayreuth). 
15 GOA, IX, 45, 67, 80, 212, esp. from preliminary studies to the lectures "Das griechische Musik-
drama" and "Sokrates und die Tragodie" (1869, 1970). 
16 GOA, IX, 267 (literary remains, 1870-71). 
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The second criticism, already expressed somewhat less harshly in The Birth 
of Tragedy, has to do with the catharsis theory. In an important passage we find a 
polemic against Schopenhauer, whom Nietzsche takes to task even more 
harshly at the same time he is refuting Aristotle: "What is tragic?-1 have re-
peatedly put my finger on Aristotle's great misunderstanding in believing that he 
sees the tragic affects to lie in two depressing emotions, in terror and in pity .... " 
It is incorrect, he continues, to view art as a symptom of decay or as serving to 
bring about a decline, "for it is simply not true that through the excitation of 
these two emotions [ namely terror and pity] one is 'purged' of them, as Aristotle 
seems to believe .... This theory can be refuted in the most cold-blooded way, 
namely, by measuring by means of a dynamometer the effect of a tragic emotion. 
The result will be such that only the absolute mendacity of an utter dogmatist 
can misconstrue it: that tragedy is a tonicum . ... " 17 
Nietzsche "put his finger on the great misunderstanding" most definitely 
when he criticized the misinterpretation of fear and pity "from the standpoint of 
the soul of the artist and the writer." 
Are pity and fear really supposed to be discharged through tragedy, as Aristotle 
would have it, so that the spectator returns home more serene and with less passion? 
It is the case with several physical processes, for example with sexual pleasure, 
that a lessening and temporary depression of the drive sets in after the need has 
once been satisfied. But fear and pity are not in this sense needs of certain organs 
which demand satisfaction. And in the long run every drive is in fact strengthened 
through practice in the attainment of its satisfaction, in spite of such periodic 
lessenings. It would be possible for pity and fear in each individual case to be alle-
viated and discharged through tragedy; nevertheless as a whole they could be made 
greater by means of the effect of tragedy, and Plato was entirely right when he 
stated that man becomes through tragedy, on the whole, more fearful and lachry-
mose .... 18 
With that formulation we have arrived at the third point in Nietzsche's 
treatment of Aristotle's aesthetics. Nietzsche, along with Plato, sees tragedy and 
art as a "tonicum," not as a "purgative," as Aristotle does. But while Plato-very 
Socratically, in Nietzsche's view-demands as a consequence his negation of 
tragedy, Nietzsche himself derives precisely from this interpretation his affirma-
tion, not only of art, but also oflife. Just how closely connected the themes of art, 
life, and the critique of metaphysics are for Nietzsche, even at a much later period, 
and to what extent they resemble his earlier works in their mode of expression, 
can be seen from a section from the Antichrist, in which Christianity and Schopen-
hauer are condemned in his discussion of pity. 
17 W, Ill, 828, Aphorism 851 of the so-called Will to Power; cf. also Aphorism 852. 
18 MA, Vol. I, part 4 (W, I, 571, sec. 212). Cf. also HKG, IV-2, 450 (literary remains, 1876). 
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On the whole, pity clashes with the law of evolution, which is the law of selection. It 
preserves what is ripe for extinction .... Pity is nihilism put into practice ... hostility 
to life. Schopenhauer was hostile to life; that is why pity became a virtue for him .... 
Aristotle, as we know, considered pity to be a pathological and dangerous condition 
which one would do well to attack from time to time by means ofa purgative-and 
he understood tragedy as a purgative. As far as the instincts of life are concerned, we 
ought in fact to be searching for a means of giving such a pathological and dangerous 
accumulation of pity as is represented by the case of Schopenhauer (and unfortu-
nately also by our entire literary and artistic decadence from St. Petersburg to Paris, 
from Tolstoi to Wagner) a prick, so that it would burst . ... " 19 
To be sure, it is doubtful whether Nietzsche's "pity" and the "eleos" of Aristotle 
or Christian pity come close to each other at all in this particular sense. I assume 
that they do not. And even Aristotle's use of the term does not amount to much 
more than the placing of scenery on a stage. It nevertheless is clear that Aristotle 
was present in Nietzsche's thinking up to the end, even if his concern was a 
contemporary one, namely to take aim at Schopenhauer utilizing Darwinian 
ammunition. This is not the place to pursue further the extent to which Nietzsche, 
by rejecting the category of utility in art, sets himself apart not only from Aristo-
tle, but also from the theoreticians of the nineteenth century, insofar as this 
century attempted to unite the concept of utility in art with the principle of 
realism. One must not, however, overlook also the other aspect ofhis "liberation 
of art" from nature-is not in Nietzsche's case the liberation of art also a liberation 
from society, the hypostatizing of art as a "culture-creating" force? 
The goal of the coming culture does not lie in this world .... Does not every 
true work of art wrest a confession from us which belies Aristotle's claim fi.e., 
tragedy as imitative representation]? Is it not nature which imitates art? Does she 
not, in the restlessness of her becoming, imitate with stammering and inadequate 
speech that which the artist expresses in pure form? Does she not long for the artist 
to deliver her from her incompleteness?20 
True, this "proposition of Aristotle's" concerning imitative representation is cast 
into doubt by Nietzsche, but instead of discussing it thoroughly he chooses 
rather to use it merely for emphasis and the personification of an opposing view. 
Nietzsche himselfidealized the position of art and did not recognize the dialectical 
tension between projection and reflection in which art also finds itself. In a purely 
formalistic manner he rendered Greek tragedy absolute in the form of a willful 
reconstruction of his own making, completely ignoring the evolution of art and 
of artistic values. 21 He disassociated them both from their social contexts, and 
yet wished to assign a social task to them, namely the creation of culture. In this 
19 A, sec. 7 (W, II, 1168-69). 
2o GOA, X, 320 (ca. 1874). 
21 Concerning the reaction at that time among classical philologists, see Howald, pp. I 5-27. 
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idealistic misunderstanding he is altogether wrong with respect to Aristotle, who, 
in his analyses in the Poetics (Ch. VII, 1450b) as well as in the Metaphysics (1078a, 
31-36), adheres essentially to an inherited concept of artistic creation instead of 
creating his own norms. Aristotle adheres to the concept of artistic practice, which 
at the same time implies for him a social practice. This also becomes clear from 
his catharsis-theory. 
In this way tragedy was thought by Aristotle to make use of fear, depressioni 
and pity in order to bring the emotions of the audience rapidly to a high pitch by 
means of the dramatic action; afterwards the soul was freed of these emotions. 
This is what Nietzsche told his students in Basel without further commentary-at 
least we find none in the final written form of these lectures. 22 But perhaps in 
taking this position Aristotle was merely refl.ecting the state of affairs as it existed 
in his own time. Perhaps this was the task of tragic art. Paul Gohlke has rendered 
plausible a political interpretation of the catharsis-theory by maintaining that 
"cathartic" music and poetry do justice to the demand that something be offered 
to the masses, and thus Aristotle's interpretation of catharsis is congenial to 
notions of democracy. 23 But precisely this interpretation is contrary to the 
standpoint of Nietzsche. Without being in a position to pursue this problem 
further at the present time, however, perhaps I may summarize here: "Aristotle" 
is for Nietzsche one of the collective concepts which he uses in order to place into 
relief and give contour to his own viewpoint in aesthetics and art theory-a 
viewpoint which was in no case always a fixed and constant one. 
In the field of aesthetics Aristotle was for Nietzsche a classical author who 
was so important for tradition that he could not be disregarded. "The desire to 
have some certainty in aesthetics seduced us into worshiping Aristotle; I think it 
will gradually be proved that he knows nothing of art, and that what we admire so 
much in him is only the echo in his writings of the wise discourse of the Athe-
nians. " 24 In the realm of ethics Aristotle likewise represents a traditionally central 
figure who cannot be ignored. The "Aristotelianism of morality" belongs to "all 
these moralities"; along with the Stoics' indifference toward the emotions and 
Spinoza's destruction of the emotions, it is "that lowering of the emotions to a 
harmless level at which they are permitted to gain satisfaction-the Aristotelian-
ism of morality .... "To this critique, which is, so to speak, a comparative history 
of existing moralities there is also to be added his mention of the "Aristotelian 
presuppositions" which, along with the ecclesiastical and courtly moral sanctions, 
was a part of that tyranny against "reason" and "nature" which prevailed during 
the history of "the long subjugation of the spirit." Nevertheless, Aristotle does 
receive praise in his treatment of certain questions dealing with ethical matters, 
22 GOA, XVIII, the lecture entitled "Geschichte der griechische Literatur," Part 3, 1875-76. 
23 Paul Gohlke in the Introduction (p. 17) to his translation of the Poetics of Aristotle (Paderborn: 
F. Schoningh, 1959). 
24 HKG, IV-I, 119 ( 1875). The quotations following are fromj, secs. 198 and 188. 
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especially when it is a case ofbearing witness to the "whole of Greek antiquity" as 
an ideal especially in contrast to Nietzsche's own era and to Christianity. In this 
case Nietzsche uses Aristotle to emphasize his point. 
But Nietzsche is not concerned with the question of which of the existing 
moralities is to be preferred, but rather with abolishing morality as such. Here, as 
we know, he also invokes the name of the Greeks, that is, the Pre-Socratics. " 25 
In his posthumous work "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks," he would 
have Anaxagoras utter the following words when reflecting upon the cosmos 
and also when viewing the Parthenon: "Becoming is not a moral phenomenon, 
but merely an artistic one."26 Apparently Nietzsche had been stimulated in this 
by a statement of Aristotle's, for he continues: "Aristotle relates that Anaxagoras 
answered in the following way the question as to why existence was precious to 
him at all: 'In order to view the heavens and the whole order of the cosmos.' He 
treated physical objects so devoutly and with the same mysterious awe with 
which we stand before an ancient temple .... " 
Whether Nietzsche captures with that the sense which either Aristotle or 
Anaxagoras had in mind is open to question. Ernst Howald has stated with regard 
to Nietzsche's posthumous fragments on Greek philosophy that no matter how 
clever these fragments may be, the completed sections are just as tedious in their 
historic formulation, and that one must observe carefully "how much the view 
of the author toward the diversity of history has been weakened-every one of 
them, Anaximander, Empedocles, and Heraclitus, are all half-Nietzsches. This 
pseudo-history no longer has anything to do with those things which science 
sees in them.''27· Nevertheless, we should regard as important here only the fact 
that Nietzsche also hearkens back to the Pre-Socratics for the purposes of over-
coming morality. The Greeks, Nietzsche says, first began to lose their ingenuous-
ness through Socrates, and "their myths and tragedies are a great deal wiser than 
the ethics of Plato and Aristotle .... " 28 
Nevertheless, in general it is true for the discussion of morality (and to a 
lesser extent for the discussion of aesthetics and science, although not so exclu-
sively) that Aristotle, as a great philosopher of tradition, simply cannot be 
ignored. He is perceived as a "venerable classicist" who has been "rigorously and 
soberly" interpreted through the centuries, and it was Nietzsche's ambition to 
influence the future of his age as greatly as Aristotle had that of his own. The 
relationship between Plato and Aristotle can be compared here to that between 
25For a thorough description of this development in Nietzsche's philosophy. see Karl Schlcchta 
and Anni Anders, Friedric/1 Nietzsche: Vim den verborgenen Anfiingen seines Philosophierens (Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt: F. Fromann, 1962), and my review in English of this book in Philosophy and History, 
German Studies Section I, I (Tiibingen: German Studies, 1968), 42-45. 
26 W, III, 410; the Aristotle quotation is from the Eudemian Ethics, I, 1216a, 11 ff. 
27 Howald, p. 33. 
28 "Wissenschaft und Weisheit im Kampfe," W, 111, 339 (WKG, IV-1, 183 f.). 
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Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, namely, that of the pupil who refutes his former 
teacher.29 In this regard Nietzsche was, so to speak, personally interested in 
Aristotle. 
Nietzsche's criticism of the concept of teleology in previous moralities leads 
to his rejection of morality. Aristotle becomes for him the embodiment of the 
opposite position: "Happiness as the final goal of the individual life. Aristotle and 
everyone! Thus it is the dominance of the concept of purpose which has been the 
ruination of all previous moralists. 'There must be a Why? to life!' (To this 
Schopenhauer even added the concept of the unconscious purpose!) That even 
the rational, conscious life is involved in the development of life without purpose 
-ego. The essence of all activity is purposeless or indifferent in the face of a 
multiplicity of purposes."30 
Nietzsche then proceeds to discuss the theme of science versus philosophy. 
At an earlier time he had already investigated purpose and cause, behavior and 
cognition in terms of their mutual dependence-as a critique of ideology, so to 
speak. An example of this is his criticism of Socrates, the prototype of theoretical 
man, and of his metaphysical illusion "that thought, by means of the clue of 
causality, can fathom the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not 
only of understanding being but even of correcting it. " 31 This theme-the negation 
of rationality and the rejection of a logical basis for knowledge and behavior-
leads directly to Nietzsche's confrontation with Aristotle's concept of science, or 
to put it more clearly, to his image of Aristotle as an embodiment of theoretical 
man in general. 
Also regarding the problem of morality and science Aristotle is, like Plato, 
a key-and this by virtue of Nietzsche's singular method, already mentioned 
several times before, of illustrating his analyses and diagnoses by means of 
historical personages, and even of personifying the results. For both Aristotle and 
Plato, knowledge constitutes the greatest happiness. Nietzsche's own interpre-
tation is to be found in his literary remains: "The greatest happiness, as Plato and 
Aristotle understood it, docs not lie in intuitive understanding (genius of Schopen-
hauer!), rather the source of this happiness lies in the active intellect operating 
according to dialectical principles. This interpretation of the greatest happiness is, 
of course, based on subjective judgments, but for such subjects I am grateful."32 
For to consider knowledge as a means to happiness is, Nietzsche says, a 
"great naivete."33 From this same period we also find similar conclusions-for 
example, that philosophy since Socrates had become moral philosophy, because 
29 GOA, XII, 216 (from 1881-83) and WKG, V-1, 417 (Literary remains from the spring of 1880). 
30 GOA, XIII. 161 f (ca. 1883-84). 
31 GT, W, I, 84. 
32 WKG, V-1, 440 (fragments from the literary remains dating from the period of the Morgenrote, 
1880); cf. M, Aphorism 550 (W, I, 1270). 
33 W, III, 551 (So-called Will to Power. Aphorism 449). 
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philosophers were searching for happiness. "Aristotle conceived of his God as one 
concerned only with pure knowledge, without any feeling of love whatsoever; 
and he himself probably had his best moments when he coldly and clearly (and 
happily) enjoyed the rapturous giddiness provided by the broadest generalities. 
To perceive the world as a system and such a system as the culmination of human 
happiness-how the schematic mind here betrays itself!"34 Also in this context 
falls Nietzsche's criticism of the idea of purpose as a category of ethics as well as of 
science. Once more we encounter a formulation which refers to Aristotle: "We 
have not yet freed ourselves from the logical mania of the ancients: they valued 
nothing more highly than dialectic, and therefore 'intentions,' 'purposes.' " 
The summation of this theme-the transition from the critique of morality 
to that of science-can be gleaned from a passage in which Socrates is viewed as a 
turning-point: "The unbiased view of man is missing in all the Socratics, who 
focus on those detestable abstractions 'the Good' and 'the Just' .... They [ the 
Greeks] lose, through Socrates, their ingenuousness. Their myths and tragedies 
are a great deal wiser than the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, and their Stoics and 
Epicureans are poor in contrast to their earlier poets and statesmen."35 Thus on 
the one hand, Aristotle belongs to those who complete, along with Socrates, the 
transition from philosophy to morality. 
On the other hand, however, Nietzsche does not consider Aristotle to be 
"typically Greek," precisely because he sets himself apart from the "culture and 
art of the Hellenes," and indeed, from the practice of Socrates as well, in that for 
him [Aristotle] "the practical drive of philosophy comes to a standstill," and 
"understanding in itself becomes the goal. ... Only the Peripatetics (and not the 
other post-Socratics) apply their energies to science .... It is one of the great 
attributes of the Hellenes," he says, "that they were not able to transform the best 
of what they had into reflection," while Aristotle is "the greatest man of the 
intellect," and it is for just this reason that he is lacking in depth and simplicity. 
Aristotle, "the first logician," is simply not a genuine Hellene for Nietzsche (a 
notion which is probably intended to exculpate the Greeks), but "half-Mace-
donian." To this he attributes Aristotle's strength in the field of science, for as a 
"Macedonian" he did not share the "antipathy of classical Hellenism to the rigors 
of science (as well as to the rigors of life)." Aristotle symbolizes for Nietzsche the 
ultimate stage of consciousness (reflection) of life. 36 
Such ideas are similar to those in The Birth of Tragedy, where "Socratic man" 
figures as the embodiment of the "theoretical optimist" who "attributes to 
knowledge and understanding the power of a panacea, and perceives error as 
evil in and of itself." Here, too, we find reference to the "powerful illusion" of 
34 GOA, Xlll, 103; the quotation following, ibid., p. 162 (literary remains from 1882-88). 
35 "Wisscnschaft und Weisheit im Kampfe," W, Ill, 339. 
36 GOA, XVII, 351 f. (summer semester, 1871) and GOA, XVIII, 139, 144, and 165 (1875-76). 
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science. Later, when, as a professor in Basel, he was occupied with the history of 
Greek literature and philosophy, he elaborated even further this antithesis 
between the Pre-Socratics as lovers of wisdom and Aristotle as descending to the 
level of pure scholarship. First intimations of this notion are already present 
around 1870--71. "Aristotle, absolute knowledge," is the pithy formulation in 
his literary remains.37 
To be sure, there is one time when Nietzsche "forgets" his criticism of 
Aristotle, namely when he violently attacks the ontology of Parmenides. He 
accuses Parmenides of committing an error in logic by confusing existence and 
essence, "Dasein" and "W esen." Aristotle and Kant are invoked as logicians who 
forbade the drawing of inferences from the concept to being, from essence to 
existence, which Nietzsche immediately uses as a confirmation of the fact that 
knowledge and being are "the most contradictory of all realms. " 38 In this passage 
Aristotelian logic becomes a useful instrument for determining formal errors in 
the process of reasoning. 
Nevertheless, this agreement with Aristotle must not be overrated, for it is 
quickly restricted by Nietzsche when he states: "There is no touchstone to 
discover error which has to do with content and not with form." And as far as 
Parmenides himself is concerned, Nietzsche is of the opinion that "the later 
Greek systems (Aristotle) had conceived of the Elcatic problems too superficial-
ly, "39 that is to say, the "being" of Parmenides cannot be adequately criticized by 
Aristotle's "thought." 
When Nietzsche speaks of Aristotle himself and not of his relationship to 
other authors, his criticism of the Aristotelian concept of knowledge is quite 
central and consistent. As an example we might mention the highly ironical 
section "For Whom Truth Exists."40 It exists namely for those, Nietzsche main-
tains, who, like Aristotle, do not seek consolation and healing in truth. For the 
others, however, who do seek such consolation, there will be disappointment: for 
them there is only the reproach of "cold indifference, barrenness, and inhu-
manity" in the face of science. Here Nietzsche sees very clearly the weaknesses of 
the historicism of historical studies and of the positivism of the natural sciences, 
which latter disciplines were pressing forward to a success that was purchased 
with the loss of the question as to the Why? of life. It is my thesis that Nietzsche 
had the conditions of his own time in mind when he spoke of the contrast between 
philosophy and science embodied in the "pre-Platonic" philosophers, on the one 
hand, and the "scientist" Aristotle, on the other, whom he identifies with 
"absolute" science. Nietzsche himself stands on the side of philosophy; his 
37 GT, W, I, 86; literary remains: GOA, IX, 263 (1870---71). 
38 "Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen," W, III, 389 f.; the quotation following, 
ibid. 
39 GOA, XIX, 129 (Lecture from summer, 1872). 
• 0 M. Book V. Aphorism 424 (W. I. 1220). 
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experience with classical philology as a science, which was held in such high 
regard by the conservative bourgeoisie of the time, was a great disappointment. 
But as I have indicated above, Nietzsche's condemnation of science in general was 
much more a condemnation of the methods of science. 
"In the blind desire to know everything at any price," he maintains, "science 
is pressing on without any selectivity or sense of distinction whatsoever with 
regard to all that is knowable; philosophical thought, on the other hand, is 
always on the trail of things which are most worth knowing, of the greatest and 
most important knowledge,"41 whereby philosophy itself sets the norm for 
greatness. The various "basic epistemological positions" [ materialism, sensualism, 
idealism] are accordingly exposed by Nietzsche on the basis of an ideology-
critique as consequences of value judgments. 
It is not possible here to enter into a discussion of Nietzsche's problematic 
position involving a circle of relativism, nihilism, and axiology. Nevertheless it 
is a central question for Nietzsche's total philosophy, for in the final analysis the 
consequences of Nietzsche's political thought are bound up with his negation of 
the basis for truth and untruth, namely with his negation of the postulate of 
reason, with the result that the "ideologists of inhumanity" profited from his 
glorification of irrationality.42 On the other side stands Aristotle, whose first 
premise of the Metaphysics states: "All men strive toward knowledge by na-
ture .... " These two ideas represent anthropological opposites, the analysis of 
which is itself in need of an ideology-critique. In any case, philosophy as a basic 
science is only to be postulated on a rational basis.43 
For Nietzsche, however, Aristotle can quickly and unceremoniously become 
"Aristotle," a sort of code-name for the prototype of the scholarly and scientific 
man whom he disdained. In a posthumously published preliminary sketch to 
"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth" we read that Wagner "holds sway over the 
religions and the historical disciplines, and yet he is the very antithesis of a 
polyhistor, of a compiling, surveying and ordering talent (such as Aristotle was 
for nature)."44 The editors add here in a note that "Humboldt" was changed to 
"Aristotle" by means of a correction. In the text Wagner had immediately 
previous to this been given the title "Anti-Alexander," which was most certainly 
41 "Die ·Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen," W, III, 364; the quotation in the line 
following, W, III, 547; the so-called Will to Power, Aphorism 580. 
42 C£ especially Georg Lukacs, Die Zerstiirung der Vernunfi (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 
1955); further H. H. Holz in the Introduction to Volume IIl of the Studienausgabe von Nietzsches Werken 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Biicherei, 1968); Hermann Wein, Positives Antichristentum (Den Haag: 
Nijhoff, 1962);Jan Brockman, Strukturalismus (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1971); pp. 29 f. of the latter work 
deal with Nietzsche's relativism. 
4J C£ Erhard Albrecht, "Vom Nutzen des Studiums der griechischen Philosophie," Sitzungsbe-
richte der deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse fur Philosophie, Geschichte, Staats-, 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 1966, No. 5, especially pp. 27 ff. concerning Aristotle. 
44 WKG, lV-1, 285 (summer, 1875); the editor's note is from WKG, IV-4, 395. 
Aristotle in the Thought of Nietzsche and Thomas Aquinas 47 
the reason for crossing out "Humboldt" and arriving at the age in which both 
Aristotle and Alexander flourished, whereby Wagner gained further in stature 
by vanquishing Alexander as the creator of culture and Aristotle as the "ruler 
over the intellectual disciplines." 
There exists yet another special problem for Nietzsche with regard to the 
question of knowledge, namely the problem of logic. In the unmasking of the 
principle of contradiction (or of the excluded middle) in Aristotle's thought, 
Nietzsche offers the opinion that this principle-quite in contrast to the way in 
which Aristotle conceived of it-is not at all the most certain of the principles on 
which all demonstrations are based, but in fact the opposite is true: it is an "imper-
ative for that which should be taken for true." The same reproach is reserved for 
logic as for the ontology of Parmenides, namely, the reproach of setting up 
linguistic hypostatizations as realities, "of conceptualizing a metaphysical world, 
that is to say, a 'real world' (which is, however, a duplication of the world of 
appearances)."45 
Aristotelian logic is criticized because, in overestimating conceptual knowl-
edge, it takes linguistic-logical (grammatical) categories to be categories of 
being: "The conceptual injunction against contradiction arises from the belief 
that we are able to form concepts, the belief that a concept not only designates 
the essence of a thing, but comprehends it as well .... Logic Gust like geometry 
and arithmetic) is valid in fact only in terms of fictitious truths which we ourselves 
have created. Logic is the attempt to understand the real world in terms of an 
ontological scheme which we ourselves have established; or, more correctly, the 
attempt to make the world 'susceptible of formulation' and calculable for us .... " 
Nietzsche saw that knowledge directed toward disposability (prognosis) not 
only brings happiness through understanding, but also power-namely, the 
power to dispose by means of calculation in all empirical and analytic sciences, 
whether those of "nature" or society. His prejudice is the pessimism of power-
he does not see the possibility of control by social power, even of the conclusions 
reached by science. 
One thinker above all was superior in Nietzsche's mind to Aristotle and his 
dual-valued logic, which was only able to speak in terms of an undialectical 
either-or, namely, Heraclitus. The essence of reality as becoming and passing 
away had revealed itself to this thinker. Heraclitus, according to Nietzsche, rejects 
the logic of reason, "and this he does so unhesitatingly in such statements as 
'everything always bears its antithesis within itself,' that Aristotle accuses him 
before the tribunal of reason of the most terrible crime of having sinned against 
the law of contradiction."46 Nietzsche senses that his own standpoint is not 
45 W, III, 537 (WM, Aphorism 516); the quotation following, ibid., 538. On the problem of 
Aristotelian cognitive logic, see E. Albrecht, p. 28. Aristotle approaches all basic questions of episte-
mology from a naturalistic, anti-Platonic standpoint, rather than from an idealistic one. 
46 "Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen," W, III, 370 ( The Aristotle quotation 
is from the Metaphysics, 10056, 20 ff. 
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congenial with Aristotelian logic, but with the dialectical logic of Heraclitus, even 
though his pessimism distinguishes him with regard to the knowability of the 
world from dialecticians of the idealistic as well as the materialistic sort. By 
rejecting the logic of Aristotle he places himself on the side of Heraclitus, whose 
statement of antitheses quite clearly contradicts the principle of the excluded 
middle. But Heraclitus' dialectic docs not lead to such an epistemological nihilism 
as that from which Nietzsche's hostility to science arises.47 
Hostility to science was also characteristic oflong centuries between Aristotle 
and Thomas Aquinas. It was expressly directed against erudition or "polymathy," 
as Aristotle would call it. In Hellenism and above all in early Christianity it 
drew its arguments from the Socratic rejection of natural science in which ethics 
would be ignored. OlofGigon notes in this regard: "The much-discussed hostility 
to learning of early Christian literature [is inseparable] from the old Socratic 
rejection of natural philosophy. " 48 Socrates considered only "the affairs of men" 
to be a suitable theme for critical reflection; on the other hand, one must not, in 
the case of the Pre-Socratics, speak of such a separation of "ethics" and "natural 
philosophy" -and this is true for Heraclitus as well-which is probably one 
reason for Nietzsche's high regard for the Pre-Socratics. Nietzsche first en-
countered cognition as a final goal in the writings of Aristotle, and his rejection of 
it here is vehement enough. If he had read Aristotle in context and not, as he 
doubtless did, collected quotation upon quotation for the purpose of achieving, 
by taking statements out of context, an even stronger emphasis of his own, he 
would then have had a much less clear conscience about branding Aristotle as the 
"absolutizer" of science. For the ethical writings of Aristotle alone, to cite an 
example, would have sufficed to reveal other goals in life than knowledge, and to 
bring about the realization that particularly in the case of Aristotle knowledge is 
not taken to be hostile to life.49 Only when we get to Nietzsche do we first 
encounter this notion. 
The early Christianity of which Gigon speaks, as well as the Middle Ages, 
were acquainted chiefly with Aristotle's writings on logic. Not until about 1200 
did the remaining works of Aristotle gradually become known in Latin transla-
tions from the Arabic and Greek. "Thus by the time that Aquinas began his 
teaching career at Paris the Aristotelian philosophy had become known to the 
medieval Christian world."50 Aristotle was accepted enthusiastically in part, and 
in part his writings were forbidden by the Church-for example, the Metaphysics 
and the Physics in 1210 and 12,5 in Paris. However, the suppression had little 
effect. 
47 Concerning Nietzsche's epistemology, see also Jiirgen Habermas in his concluding remarks to 
Friedrich Nietzsche: Erkenntnistheoretische Schrijien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968). 
48 Olof Gigon, Die antike Kultur und das Christen/um (Giitersloh: G. Mohn. 1966), pp. 54, 66. 
49 Cf. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1216 a-b. 
5° F. C. Copleston, Aq11inas (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pelican Books. 1955), p. 61. 
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In such a way the advocates of Aristotelianism were resisted. Siger of 
Brabant, for example, a contemporary of St. Thomas, was silenced by means of 
imprisonment. He taught that material nature was eternal, not created by God, 
and that the individual soul was mortal. He is truly "Aristotelian" in that he 
sought to emancipate himself from Christian faith by appealing to philosophical 
truth, while Thomas Aquinas saw the problem precisely in terms of the question 
"whether the teachings of Scripture [ of the Gospel] not only can become the 
object of an act of faith, but also of a deductive process analogous to that of 
Aristotelian science." 51 In sharp contrast to this stands this great opponent of 
Thomas Aquinas at the University of Paris, Siger of Brabant, the Averroist who 
advocated the doctrine of double truth, philosophical and theological, and con-
sciously avoided the assimilation of Aristotelian doctrines to those of Christianity. 
Aristotle taught that the world was eternal and that God was not its creator-and 
thus the Aristotelian system seemed to have no place for Christianity. 
Copleston points out that while Bonaventura, who was also a contemporary 
of St. Thomas, considered Aristotle to be a great scholar, he did not feel that the 
latter deserved to be called a "metaphysician."52 St. Thomas' success, in contrast 
to Siger and Bonaventura, resulted from the fact that he was able to come to terms 
with Aristotle effectively. Aquinas took over from Aristotle whatever seemed 
valid to him, and intended to show that those statements of Aristotle which were 
incompatible with Christianity stemmed from false premises. He deals with 
Aristotle much the way Aristotle does with the Pre-Socratics-a builder of 
systems is not interested in his predecessors for historical reasons, rather it is "the 
terms and categories of his own thinking which he ... applies. " 53 
At this point I find it necessary to digress for a moment and to make an 
observation concerning methodology. My examination of Nietzsche's relation-
ship to Aristotle has been conducted strictly along philological lines, taking as its 
basis the sum total of references to Aristotle in the texts of Nietzsche's works 
which have been published up to this time. In so far as they related to his philo-
sophical reckoning with Aristotle, I have classified them according to theme: 
aesthetics, the critique of morality, science and its critique-and then presented 
and interpreted the main passages. (As a consequence of the particular character of 
Nietzsche's lectures in Basel it turns out that, while Aristotle often receives 
mention, he is nonetheless, aside from the exceptions presented and cited above, 
not treated in a very fruitful way with regard to the philosophical part of his 
works.) 
51 R. Guelluy, Philosophie et theo/ogie chez Guillaume d'Ockham (Louvain: E. Nauwclacrts, 1947), 
p. 42. 
52 Coplcston, Aquinas, p. 63. 
53 Werner Jaeger in his review of H. Chcrniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), appearing in the American Journal of Philology, 58 (1937), 
350-56. 
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It is hardly possible, however, to utilize such a method in analyzing Aquinas' 
relationship to Aristotle, and it is certainly not possible within the framework 
of this investigation. Copleston,. in appealing to Etienne Gilson in his great 
work, A History of Philosophy, states as a procedural method that the philo-
sophy of Thomas Aquinas "must be regarded in the light of its relation to his 
theology, ... and it is a mistake to collect the philosophical items from St. 
Thomas's works, including his theological works, and construct a system out of 
them according to one's own idea of what a philosophical system should be .... " 54 
I also concur with Copleston in the question concerning the Commentaries on 
Aristotle when he adds that it "is true to say that the loss of a theological work 
like the Summa Theologica would be a major disaster in regard to our knowledge 
of St. Thomas's philosophy, whereas the loss of the Commentaries on Aristotle, 
though deplorable, would be of less importance .... " In a lengthy section 
Copleston deals with the difficulties which arose for St. Thomas out of his 
attempt to "reconcile" the autonomous, naturalistic system of Aristotle with 
theology. I shall choose two examples, specifically, the concept of authority in 
political theory and the concept of the soul, in order to illustrate some of the 
problems which are bound up with "St. Thomas's utilization of Aristotle/' to 
use Copleston's phrase. Along with Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas sees the social 
nature of man as anchored in his physical needs; the individual is dependent upon 
society. 
Since every community of human beings is directed at a certain necessity oflife, that 
community will be a perfect one which has for its goal the possession by the individ-
ual of that which is continually necessary for the preservation of life. The state is, 
however, such a community. For it is inherent in the nature of the state that every-
thing is to be found in it which is necessary for the preservation of human life .... 
[Aristotle] describes the ends to which the state, according to its nature, has been 
organized: it arose first and foremost for the sake of human life, namely to insure 
that men were able to find enough to live on. 55 
This same argument, that of the spiritual needs of the individual, is also 
invoked by Thomas Aquinas as proof of a supernatural order, and with that he 
goes beyond Aristotle in an essential point. Franz Faller has demonstrated this in 
the relationship of the Commentaries on Aristotle to the other writings of 
Thomas Aquinas, and explained the transposition from a system of secular 
concepts to a spiritual one. 56 St. Thomas first takes up Aristotle's observation that 
54 F. C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1955), II, 306--7 
for this and the quotation following; see also pp. 423-34. 
55 Thomas de Aquino, In octo libros politicorum Aristote/is expositio, Editio Alumnis univ. Laval-
lensis (Quebec: Reprod. Photo-Litho Tremblay and Dion, 1940), p. 13 (Commentarius in Pol. I, 1). 
56 Franz Faller, Die rechtsphilosophische Begriindung der gesellschaft/ichen und staatlichen Autoritiit bei 
Thomas von Aquin (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle, 1954). 
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society is a totality and an organism. The whole exists before the part, and the 
organic body serves as an analogy to the societal "body." St. Thomas continues: 
"In view of its nature and perfection, the whole must unquestionably exist before 
the part .... If the whole man is destroyed, then it is not a hand or a foot which 
remains, but only these parts in a figurative sense, in the sense that the stone hand 
of a statue is also called a hand. Thus, with the dissolution of the whole, the part 
is destroyed as well."57 Faller has described in detail how this conception of the 
state as an organism leads to the question regarding the principle of unity in such 
an organism, and regarding the way St. Thomas locates this principle of unity 
in the concept ofauthority. 58 Law and justice are grounded upon authority. Here 
St. Thomas follows the concept of law and authority which Aristotle developed 
from his concept of the organism: the individual human being must find a place 
within the whole, and this he does according to the law. According to Aristotle, 
the individual cannot exist outside of this law. He recognized in the state a 
community based on authority, that is, the state is defined by authority, and 
authority is the essential element in the community and the state-not only in 
the ethical sense, but in that sense pertaining to the philosophy oflaw,just as it is 
also understood by Thomas Aquinas. Faller states: "Consequently, in so far as one 
acknowledges society and thus also the state to be a legal community, one must 
necessarily arrive at law and authority as the form-giving principle of society 
and of the state." This principle accords with the thought of both Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas. 
But while Aristotle defines political authority with only the citizens of the 
state in mind, and thus in human or temporal terms, for Thomas Aquinas, whose 
gaze is fixed on the church, the temporal legally established authority is super-
seded by divine authority. For St. Thomas human society as a community 
ordained by nature is unthinkable without divine authority, and according to him 
law is of divine origin, just as the state is ordained by God. 59 In terms of church 
history it is an important fact that in Thomas Aquinas' writings-quite in contrast 
to Augustine's City of God, for example-there exists no rigid antithesis between 
the sinful earthly city and the City of God, rather the attainment of a harmonious 
hierarchy was envisaged. 
Aristotle also provides the starting point for Thomas Aquinas with regard 
to his doctrine of the soul. Aristotle maintains that the soul is the form of the body, 
while the body is "substratum and matter." "It is necessary, then," he states, "that 
the soul be a substance in the sense of the specifying principle of a physical body, 
potentially alive. Now substance [in this sense] is act; it will therefore be the act 
57 Thomas Aquinas, Comm. in Pol. 1, 1 (Ed. univ. Lavall., p. 15), on Aristotle's Politics, 1, 1, 1253a, 
20. 
58 Faller, p. 70; also p. 28. The passages in the Politics are from Book l, I, 1252a ff. and Book 
Ill, 14, 1285b, 29 ff. 
59 Especially in De Regimine Principum; in quite the opposite vein, Aristotle's Politics, 1, 1, 125:;i ff. 
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of a body of this sort .... Hence it is unnecessary to enquire whether the soul and 
body be one, any more than whether the wax and the impression made in it are 
one; or in general, the matter of anything whatever, and that of which it is the 
matter."liO 
St. Thomas takes the notion from Aristotle that the soul is the form of the 
body, but he calls it an immortal form created by God. In so doing he contradicts 
Aristotle, who specifically emphasizes that "the spul can neither exist without the 
body, nor can it be a body itself. For it is not a body, but something which is 
bound up with the body." Wilhelm Nestle points out that this particular passage 
was intended by Aristotle as a polemic against the dualistic concept of the Pythag-
oreans as well as of Plato.61 
For Thomas Aquinas the soul is both the form of the body and immortal. By 
virtue of its immortality, it will actually be united again with the body after their 
separation: "It is therefore contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the 
body. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual. Hence the soul 
will not for ever be without the body. Therefore since the soul remains for ever, 
it should be united again with the body, and this is what is meant by rising (from 
the dead]. The immortality of souls seems then to demand the future resurrection 
of bodies. "62 
It has been stressed that Aristotle vehemently denied that the soul lived on 
after death. Copleston enlarges on this: "The human psyche is [for Aristotle] the 
principle of biological, sensitive and certain mental functions, and it is the form 
of the body; but precisely because it is the form of the body it cannot exist in 
separation from the body .... " 63 Here St. Thomas differs in a very basic way from 
Aristotle, "even though Aquinas does not himself make this point very clear. 
Hence it is not true to say that he slavishly reproduced Aristotle's theories, 
however much he may have been infl.uenced by them." At another point Cople-
s ton had stressed "that the synthesis of Christianity and Aristotelianism in St. 
Thomas's thought was in some respects rather precarious ... ,"64 and that the 
Aristotelian philosophy of finality could not as such be taken over by orthodox 
Scholasticism. With regard to both the concept of political authority and the 
anthropological concept of the soul, "natural," Aristotelian truth is overcome by 
the supernatural belief of the Church. 
Etienne Gilson, the great authority on medieval philosophy, has stated very 
60 De anima, 11, 1, 412a, 1 ff.; the passage following, ibid., II, 2, 414a. The first quotation is cited 
from: Aristotle, De anima, in The Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary ef St. Thomas 
Aquinas, trans. Kenelm Foster et al. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 163-64. 
61 Aristoteles, Hauptwerke, ed., trans., introd. Wilhehn Nestle, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Kroner, 1941), 
p. 155, n. r. 
62 Thomas Aquinas, Contra gentiles, IV, 79. 
6 3 Coplcston, Aquinas, pp. 163 and 164. 
64 Copleston, History of Philosophy, II, 424. 
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pointedly that 'whatever metaphysics is to be found in the writings of Thomas 
Aquinas or Duns Scotus is their own, in each case based on the formulations of 
Aristotle, which they take over at their own risk and which derive their signifi-
cance from the concept of esse or of ens infinitum, which Aristotle had not intended, 
and which he would not have understood .... " 65 Gilson -emphasizes the great 
difference between Scholastic theology and that of Aristotle: the latter has a God 
who did not create the world ex nihilo and who never interferes in its affairs in a 
providential way, but who abandons the world to the law of necessity, which can 
only be interrupted by chance, a world in which man is only an ephemeral 
individual. Aristotelian metaphysics was a direct extension of Aristotelian physics: 
"Those thinkers of the Middle Ages who proceeded from the science of Aristotle, 
precisely because they refused to speak as theologians, naturally arrived, like 
Averroes, at the same metaphysics as Aristotle." As E. Albrecht has shown, 
philosophy (in the original sense of science) is subordinate to theology.66 
Thomas Aquinas makes out of Aristotelian philosophy "something rather 
different from historic Aristotelianism" (Copleston). Other scholars, too, in full 
acknowledgement of the impetus toward new approaches which have arisen 
from the rediscovery of Aristotle's writings after 1200-especially the Politics-
have confirmed these findings. Especially instructive are the findings of Lorenzo 
Minio-Paluello, who has examined the Aristotelian tradition in philosophy and 
science and remarked almost with astonishment that the doctor angelicus had 
"written nearly word-for-word, sentence-for-sentence commentaries on the 
Metaphysics, Physics, De anima, Nichomachean Ethics, Politics, De caelo, as well as 
other treatises. But when we look for proof of Aristotle's influence on the 
remaining works of Aquinas, we are surprised to discover what important 
Aristotelian propositions had no influence on his thinking."67 As a matter of 
fact, in much of what St. Thomas "translates" from Aristotle is to be found a 
"direct antithesis to Aristotelianism." An example of this is the discussion of the 
order of creation found in the Summa Theologica as contrasted with the Aristo-
telian "prime mover" of the Physics. 
"The Greek philosopher," Copleston writes, "was concerned with the 
problem of motion, in the wide sense of becoming, whereas Aquinas made the 
problem of existence the primary metaphysical problem. The former asked what 
things are and how they come to be what they are, but he did not raise the 
question why they exist at all or why there is something rather than nothing." 
65 Etienne Gilson in the Appendix to A. Haycn, Der heilige Thomas von Aquin gestern und he,ue, 
trans. Robert Scherer (Frankfurt am Main: J. Knecht, 1954), pp. 114 f. 
66 Gilson, p. 107; Albrecht, p. 26. 
67 Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Die Aristotelische Tradition in der Geistesgeschichte," Aristoteles in 
der neueren Forschung, ed. Paul Moraux (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), p. 321. 
(Original title: "La tradition aristotelicienne clans l'histoire des idees," Actes du Congres de I' Association 
Guillaume Bude [Lyon: Les Belles Lettres, 1958 (1960), pp. 166-85 ]. 
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Copleston underscores the great difference between the two questions and then 
continues: 
In his Tractatus 10.1:ico-philosophicus (No. 644) Wittgenstein stated that "not how the 
world is, is the mystical, but that it is." If the word "metaphysical" is substituted for 
the word "mystical," ~his statement, though it would not be entirely acceptable to 
Aquinas, can serve as an illustration of the difference between the philosophy of the 
historic Aristotle and that of Thomas Aquinas. The change in emphasis doubtless 
owed a lot to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, ... but that there was a change can 
hardly be denied.68 
If one supplies to the question concerning the existence of the world the 
answer that it has no meaning, we have come full circle to Nietzsche. Thomas 
Aquinas answers this question by affirming transcendence, while Nietzsche's 
entire philosophy consists in the struggle to eliminate this transcendence.69 
"Saint" Thomas and the "Antichrist" Nietzsche certainly do have in common, 
however, the fact that they subordinate science and scientific philosophy to 
other modes of dealing with the question of existence. This separates both of them 
from Aristotle's theory and practice of rationality. In the case of St. Thomas, it is 
Christian faith which stands above science; in the case of Nietzsche it is skepticism 
and the denial of veridical knowledge. To this extent Nietzsche embodies the 
antithesis of the Thomistic world-view-not only, in terms of content, as the 
"Antichrist," but also methodologically, as an aphorist in opposition to all 
systematization. Thomas Aquinas strives to surmount reason with faith; Nietz-
sche strives to nullify it-"the destruction of reason."70 And one can read from 
the political history of our century just how Nietzsche's theory of irrationality 
turned into the practice ofinhumanity.71 
6B Copleston, Aquinas, p. 64 f. 
69 F. C. Copleston, St. Thomas and Nietzsche, The Aquinas Society of London Papers, No. 2 
(London: Blackfriars, 1944) inquires into the difference between the two thinkers. Cf. also Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, 98 (W, I, 775): "If we had not remained to some extent 
unscientific beings, what could interest us in science at all! ... cognition would be a matter of indifference 
to a purely cognizant being. We differ from the pious and the believer not in the quality, but in the 
quantity of belief and piety; we are satisfied with less. 
7° C£ the interpretation of Nietzsche in Lukacs, Die Zerstiirung der Vernunft. 
71 Concerning Nietzsche's relationship to fascism, see also H. H. Holz's introduction to the four-
volume Nietzsche-Studienausgabe and Copleston, St. Thomas and Nietzsche, which describe how the 
political failure of the middle-class in the nineteenth century was perpetuated through the glorification 
of Friedrich Nietzsche, its most fascinating representative. 
IV 
Between Inferno and Purgatorio: Thoughts on a 
Structural Comparison of Nietzsche with Dante* 
EUGEN BISER 
TRANSLATED BY CHERYL L. TURNEY AND JAMES C. O'FLAHERTY 
Friedrich Nietzsche, more than almost any other figure of intellectual 
history, continues to provide a stimulus for structural comparisons. This is all the 
more striking, since he emphatically challenges his reader with the admonition: 
"Above all do not misunderstand me!"; and at the same time he is on the alert for 
the one who will "defend and define" him against the misunderstandings which 
nevertheless threaten him. The analogy between the lives of Nietzsche and 
Holderlin-attested by a close relationship of ideas-attracted attention early.1 
In an ingenious sketch from his last productive period, the philosopher Franz 
Brentano, who died after a long Odyssey in Switzerland, even draws a compari-
son between Nietzsche and Jesus,2 while Nietzsche's Russian contemporary, 
Vladimir Soloviev, believed he recognized in the figure of the mentally ill 
philosopher of Basel the contours of the Antichrist. 3 The astonishing correspon-
dence of the lives of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard has repeatedly been emphasized, 
most penetratingly by Karl Jaspers.4 My own Nietzsche book (1962) supple-
* Quotations from the Divin£ Comedy are from the translation of J. A. Carlyle, Thomas Okey, 
and Philip H. Wicksteed in The Modem Library Editions (New York: The Modem Library, 1950); 
the quotation from Dante's Vita Nuova is from the translation of Mark Musa (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1962); the passages from Augustine are from the translation ofF.J. Sheed, Confessions 
of St. Augustin£ (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1942); translations from Thus Spoke Zarathustra are by 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Compass Press, 1966); the longer passages from Nietzsche's 
other works are cited from his Basic Writin.11s of Nietzsche (New York: The Modem Library, 1968). 
1 In this connection see for example Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mytho/ogie (Berlin: 
Bondi, 1919), pp. 251, 282 f. 
2 "Nietzsche als Nachahmer Jesu" in Franz C. Brentano, Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung, 
ed. Alfred Kastil (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1922) pp. 129-32. 
3 The most important documents dealing with this comparison, of which only the essay "Die 
!dee des Obermenschen" (1899), the Lermontow-review of 1899 and "Die Kurze Erzahlung vom 
Antichrist" (1900) may be expressly mentioned, were published by Ludolf Muller in the collection of 
essays, Wladimir Solowjew, Ubermensch und Antichrist: Uber das Ende der Weltgeschichte (Frei burg i. 
Br.: Herder, 1958). 
4 In this connection see Karl Jasper's exhaustive structural and motif comparison in the first of the 
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mented these studies with a parallel treatment of Nietzsche and his Russian critic, 
Soloviev;5 this was after Leo Schestow had compared Nietzsche and Dostoevski 
in his 1924 study of the same name,6 as "twin-brothers," molded by similar 
experiences. Nietzsche's own references to figures of cultural history whom he 
approached with remote sympathy, occasionally with pronounced love-hate, 
lead further along the track of a structural comparison. After Pascal, who first 
springs to mind in this connection, comes Dante. For along with the tasteless 
apostrophe to Dante in The Twilight of the Idols as the "hyena who composes 
poetry among the tombs,"7 there are also such serious sentences as: "Such 
dogmatic men as Dante and Plato are the farthest from me and therefore the most 
attractive."8 This statement attracts attention because it corresponds most 
exactly to the broken structure of relationships which is always to be observed in 
Nietzsche's biography. 9 
Just as none of Nietzsche's friendships endured without a breach, so there 
was no intellectual relationship which did not suffer from a period of critical 
alienation. Even Schopenhauer, whom he initially greatly admired, was no 
exception: 
What he taught is laid aside, 
What he lived will long abide. 10 
In the case of Dante the alienation is incomparably greater. Yet that fact does 
not invalidate either the legitimacy nor the intensity of the relationship. Before 
pursuing this subject and seeking to identify specific parallels, one will do well to 
keep in mind first of all the decisive difference which Nietzsche sees between 
himself and Dante. lt consists originally for Nietzsche, as his reference in Human, 
All- Too-Human shows, in an awareness of the historical distance which separates 
him from Dante and from the direction of art which he represented, since that 
species of art can never, for a sensibility such as Nietzsche's, come to flower again, 
a species "which like the Divine Comedy, the pictures of Raphael, the frescoes of 
Michelangelo, the Gothic cathedrals presupposes not only a cosmic, but also a 
metaphysical significance of the art object."11 Nevertheless, the epochal distance 
lectures published under the title Vernunfi und Existenz (Munich: Piper. 1960), pp. 7-41. Jaspers gave 
these lectures in the spring of 1935 at the University of Groningen, Holland. 
5 "Gou ist tot": Nietzsches Destruktion des christlic/1en Bew,~/Jtseins (Munich: Kosel, 1962), pp. 267 f. 
6 Leo Schestow, Dostojewski und Nietzsche: Philosophie der Tragodie (Cologne: Marean, 1924), p. 9. 
7 G, "Streifziige eincs UnzeitgemaBen," sec. 1. (For key to abbreviations see p. xvii.) 
8 Die Unschuld des Werdens, II, K, 83, sec. 220. 
9 Sec Karl Jaspers' discussion of the limits of Nietzsche's capacity for friendship and his loneliness 
m Nietzsche: Einfiihrung in das Verstiindnis seines Philosophierens (Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & 
Co., 1936) pp. 69-76. 
1° First lines of the quatrain on Arthur Schopenhauer. 
11 MA. I. sec. 220. 
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between the two is only the symptom of an incomparably deeper one which 
has to do with differing modes of thought and which cannot be overcome by any 
return to an earlier mode. Nietzsche emphasizes the difference in the most pointed 
way possible when he reckons Dante along with Plato among the "dogmatic 
men," and in elaboration of this characterization calls him "one in whom the 
Catholic Church is perfectly epitomized."12 
What Dante is reproached with here is elucidated by the critical comparison 
with Zarathustra in Ecce homo, in contrast to whom Dante was "merely a believer" 
and "not one who first creates truth."13 Nietzsche's criticism of Dante reaches its 
climax accordingly in a reproach directed at all immanental systems. The note 
from his posthumous papers which characterizes the "dogmatic men like Dante 
and Plato" as those "who live in a properly built and solidly believed-in house of 
knowledge," already aims in this direction; this is true whether it is constructed 
out of one's own materials or out of the building materials of tradition. In contrast 
to this, what follows praises the incomparably greater strength which is necessary 
to maintain oneself in an "incomplete system, with free unsettled views." The 
greatness of the poet of the Divine Comedy is decisively relativized by the standard 
set here. It is greatness within a given system, but not greatness which, as Nietzsche 
demanded for himself and the future, holds good in the overcoming of systems or 
even in the gaining of the new intellectual vistas which are thereby made possible. 
Nietzsche's feeling of aversion for Dante increases to the point of passion in the 
passage: "I wish Dante went completely against our taste and stomach."14 The 
presumption expressed in The Dawn is that Dante and those intellectually related 
to him had "penetrated into the lusts of power," and that consequently the secret 
oflove remained closed to him. 15 This presumption reveals that more than merely 
a philosophically conditioned aversion is manifesting itself here. With the 
inscription over the gate of hell: "I too was created by eternal love," Dante, 
inspired by a "terrifying ingenuity," committed "a gross blunder" which betrays 
his own alienation. For "over the gate of the Christian Paradise and its eternal 
bliss would, with greater justice, stand the inscription: 'I too was created by 
eternal hate' -supposing that a truth might stand above the gateway to a lie!"16 
On a higher plane of reflection, which Nietzsche attains in a note found in his 
posthumous papers, he concedes: "I believe that whoever has divined anything 
of the most fundamental conditions for any growth in love will understand why 
Dante wrote above his Inferno: 'I too was created by eternal love.' " 17 
Indications of this kind of "meeting one half way" are especially important 
12 Die Unsch11/d des Werdens, I, K, 82, sec. 538. 
13 Ecce Homo, "Also Sprach Zarathustra," sec. 6. 
"Die Unsch11/d des Werde11s, I, K, 82, sec. 473. 
15 M, II, sec. 113. 
16 GM, I, sec. 15. 
17 W, III, 893. 
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in Nietzsche's case, for they allow us to recognize, more reliably than thematic 
correspondences, the abiding affinity present in verbal contradictions. The 
statement that for him "such dogmatic men as Dante and Plato" are the "most 
fascinating" precisely because they are, structurally speaking, at the farthest 
remove from him, also aims in this direction. But this remark reduces his affinity 
with Dante to the level of merely aesthetic interest. The actual relationship is 
incomparably more comprehensive and profound, even though, amid the 
considerable number of negative statements, positive statements worth men-
tioning are scarcely to be found. That fact should not, however, be misleading as 
far as a structural comparison is concerned. What is compared lies as a rule outside 
of the data with which critical self-awareness concerns itself. Therefore it is to be 
more easily determined "from the outside" than by reference to autobiographical 
data. At only one point do Nietzsche's autobiographical writings shed light on 
our problem-admittedly without express reference to Dante. It has to do with 
the initial visionary experience ofhis "Un-Divine Comedy," that ofZarathustra. 
At this point we must examine the positive evidence, before taking up thematic 
motif-comparisons. 
In spite of all that separates them, Dante and Nietzsche are in agreement in 
so far as they created the most personal of their works in each case out of the 
"stuff" of an inspirational experience: Dante, the Divine Comedy; Nietzsche, his 
"son," Zarathustra. As far as the visionary nucleus of the Divine Comedy is con-
cerned, it will suffice to call to mind Romano Guardini's observations on this 
matter. In his essay "Vision and Poetry" (1946) this perhaps most sensitive 
interpreter of the Divine Comedy in the modern period takes the position that a 
visionary experience lies at the basis of the work, even though this assumption is 
only confirmed-except for a hint at the end of the Vita Nuova-by the fact that 
the structure and diction of the work are to be explained more readily with its 
help than without it. Following the concluding sonnet of the artificial early work, 
Dante writes: 
After this sonnet there appeared to me a miraculous vision in which I saw things 
that made me resolve to say no more about this blessed one (Beatrice) until I should 
be capable of writing about her in a more worthy fashion. And to achieve this I am 
striving as hard as I can, and this she truly knows. So that, if it be the wish of Him 
in whom all things flourish that my life continue for a few years, I hope to write of 
her that which has never been written of any other lady. 
On the basis of these autobiographical statements Guardini favors the 
hypothesis that Dante at the height of his mature years- "in the middle of the 
journey of our life" -fell into a crucial entanglement, an aporetic situation such 
as the opening lines ofhis cosmic poem describes (Inferno I, 1-3), a situation which 
was finally clarified by means of a visionary experience.18 Since not only his 
18 The text is cited at the end of the chapter. 
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relationship to Beatrice but also the meaning of life was apparently affected by 
the crisis, the clarifying vision has a double perspective. It is first of all a fulfilling 
re-encounter with Beatrice; the reunion scene which is described in Canto XXIX 
of the Purgatorio is, to be sure, anything but an intimate event. Dante introduces 
Beatrice as queen of a solemn ceremonial procession, stylized as Divine Wisdom, 
surrounded in ranks by redemptive figures, beginning with Christ appearing in 
the image of a griffin, on down to the personified Holy Scriptures and to the 
virtues intertwined in an allegorical round-dance. Yet love enthralled him with 
the same vehemence and ardor he felt at the time when he, still at the threshold of 
youth, first saw the child Beatrice. All the more harsh is the effect created by 
the first words of the Transfigured One, whom a confirmation of the old bonds 
oflove by no means concerns, but rather the ending of the alienation in which the 
beloved has so deeply entangled himself, an alienation so profound that he was 
to be helped only by means of a journey through the three kingdoms of the other-
world, by "a trip around the world," to invoke the words of Heinrich von Kleist 
in his essay on the marionette theater. She reprimands him, reproaches him with 
his erotic aberrations and his entanglement in the folly of illusory images, and 
finally forces him to lift his eyes to her, so that, gazing into her countenance, he 
may comprehend the full magnitude of his misery. Everything in this scene has 
the character of an ecstatic concentration of time. The childish initial experience 
is repeated in the expiatory dialogue of the eyes which, for its part, redeems in a 
painfully rapturous way the promise which was made at that time and since then 
repeatedly broken. 
As a clarifying vision, the sight of the celestial white rose in Canto XXX of 
the Paradiso corresponds to the eclipsing of the meaning of life. What is clarified 
here is not anything of the kind that is usually sought behind the word "meaning." 
But no doubt the whole being of the beholder falls under the spell of an over-
powering experience of light which rescues him from his distraction and over-
comes his deterioration, bringing about the concentration of an existence lovingly 
devoted, lovingly knowing, lovingly reconciled with itself. The following 
verses refer to this: "So there shone around me a living light, leaving me swathed 
in such a web ofits glow that naught appeared to me" (XXX, 49-51). What Dante 
once even gives formal expression to when he speaks thus of the genesis of the 
vision of Paradise: "All its appearance is composed of rays reflected from the top 
of the First Moved, which draweth thence its life and potency" (XXX, 106-8), 
becomes understandable from the event itself: in its greatness the rose therefore 
remains "near," since present in it is nothing objective, but only the goal which 
lies beyond all objects and this side of all that is merely subjective. And it is the 
consummation of that which exists as a whole, experienced in mystical anticipa-
tion, the perfect resolution of the many into the one. About this Dante writes: 
"Near and far addeth not nor subtracteth there, for where God governeth without 
medium the law of nature hath no relevance" (XXX, 121-23). 
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Guardini says of this image, which manifests none of the familiar dimensions: 
"It lies beyond space and time, in the pure present; so there is in it no distance but 
everything is visible everywhere. Of its final meaning we must perhaps say: 
everywhere in the rose its whole form and the complete fullness of its content is 
present."19 Since every individual separateness dissolves in the unifying field of 
this symbol of perfection, it follows for him "that the rose bursts into blossom 
everywhere and each individual beholds it there where it concerns him, that is, 
at the place where he stands. " 20 Applied to Dante, this means that only in so far 
as he is "prepared for the union" is he able "to behold the rose as the inclusion of 
creation and history within the simplicity of the Divine Light. " 21 And conversely, 
lost in the visionary contemplation of perfection, he now "becomes sure of the 
meaning of his own life" and is free from the entanglements in which he found 
himself at the beginning. " 22 
Nietzsche's inspirational experience which led to the writing of Zarathustra 
has no comparable relationship to a "muse" embodying the creative purpose, 
unless one sees it in a compensatory connection with the pitiably shattering 
relationship with Lou Salome. 23 The only record of this relationship is to be 
found in the late, stylized account in Ecce homo. There Nietzsche writes, looking 
back to the genesis of his Zarathustra: 
The fundamental conception of this work, the · idea of eternal recurrence, this 
highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs in August 1881: it 
was penned on a sheet with the notation underneath, "6000 feet beyond man and 
time." That day I was walking through the woods along the lake of Silvaplana; at a 
powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei I stopped. It was then that this idea 
came to m_e.24 
After a few statements characterizing and dating the various stages in the 
origin of the work, in which a reference to the Hymn to Life composed by Nietz-
sche for a text of Lou Salome is inserted, he poses the question: 
Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what poets of 
strong ages have called inspiration? If not, I will describe it.-If one had the slightest 
residue of superstition left in one's system, one could hardly reject altogether the 
idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of over-
powering forces. The concept of revelation-in the sense that suddenly, with 
19 Romano Guardini, Vision und Dicht11ng: Der Charakter von Dantes Giittlicher Komiidie (Tilbingen 
and Stuttgart: Wunderlich, 1946), p. 41. 
20 Ibid., p. 44. 
21 Ibid., p. 46. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul Ree, Lm von Salome: Die Dok11mente ihrer Begegn11ng, ed. Ernst Pfeiffer 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Inscl Verlag, 1970); further, E. F. Podach, Friedrich Nietzsche und Lou Salome: lhre 
Begegnung 1882 (Zurich: Nichans, 1938). 
24 Ecce Homo, "Also sprach Zarathustra," sec. 1. 
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indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, audible, something 
that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down-that merely describes the 
facts. One hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ~sk who gives; like 
lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its 
form-I never had any choice. 
A rapture whose tremendous tension occasionally discharges itself in a flood of 
tears-now the pace quickens involuntarily, now it becomes slow; one is altogether 
beside oneself, with the distinct consciousness of subtle shudders and of one's skin 
creeping down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in which even what is most 
painful and gloomy does not seem something ~pposite but rather conditioned, 
provoked, a necessary color in such a superabundance of light; an instinct for rhyth-
mic relationships that arches over wide spaces of forms-length, the need for a 
rhythm with wide arches, is almost the measure of the force ofinspiration, a kind of 
compensation for its pressure and tension ... 
This is my experience of inspiration; I do not doubt that one has to go back 
thousands of years in order to find anyone who could say to me, "it is mine as 
well."25 
In view of the evident euphoria underlying these self-revelations there are 
those who see Nietzsche's inspirational experience in connection with his disease. 
The chief spokesman for this group is Karl Jaspers, who, especially on the basis of 
his background in psychiatry, and in view of Nietzsche's great initiatory experi-
ence, speaks of the latter's break-through to actual awareness ofhis life's-task, and 
remarks concerning this decisive turning-point in his thought: 
Anyone who reads his letters and other writings in chronological order, keeping 
both past and future in mind and thus consciously observing the temporal relatioi:is 
of the utterances to each other, cannot escape an extraordinarily strong impression 
that Nietzsche underwent at this time the most profound change that he had ever 
experienced. It is revealed not only in the contents of his thinking and in new crea-
tions, but also in the forms which his experience assumes; Nietzsche submerges 
himself, as it were, in a new atmosphere; what he says takes on a different tone; and 
the mood that permeates everything is something for which there are no harbingers 
and indications prior to 1880.26 
Then in an express reference to the course of Nietzsche's illness he writes: 
... the contrast between the attacks and the periods free from them is henceforth 
overshadowed by the more incisive new contrast between the intensified states of a 
creative experience of being and the terrible melancholy of weeks and months of 
depression. In accordance with this is the fact that Nietzsche, while going through 
his mental "desert" between 1876 and 1880, remains spiritually sovereign and in no 
way feels that he has lost ground .... Not until after 1881 does he come to know 
the sudden changes from nothing to something and the relapse into nothingness; 
25 Ibid., sec. 3. 
26 Jaspers, Nietzsche, p. 78 f. 
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thereafter, he not only seizes upon the great affirmation with jubilation, but he 
experiences its necessity with despair during periods when it does not arise. A 
dependable, even state never occurs. The ups and downs are extraordinary. While 
looking back on these years he writes: "The vehemence of my mood-swings was 
frightful during the past years. 27 
To this Jaspers adds the following important observation: 
The various states of mystical light, dangerous shuddering at the boundary, and 
creative inspiration are limited to the years 1881-1884. From 1885 on there is no 
longer any mention of such feelings, experiences of being, and revelations. When 
Nietzsche on a later occasion writes that he is "without hold" and "can easily be 
blown away overnight through a storm" and that his situation is "one of being 
unable to climb up or down, very high, but constantly near danger, without any 
answer to the question, Whither?" (to Gast, '87), this is now said without reference 
to experienced states but rather out of concern for his task, while those earlier 
utterances proclaim the boundary experience he actually lived through. 28 
Jaspers deduces from this that a "biological factor" exerted an unusually 
strong effect on Nietzsche's thought precisely in this decisive phase, even though 
he leaves open as unanswerable the question as to the nature of this factor. With 
unerring diagnostic insight he aligns Nietzsche with those existential thinkers 
whose lives present themselves as control-tests of their thought, and whose 
thought in turn presents itself as an intellectual sublimation of their own existence; 
in so doing Jaspers relegates him, even more precisely, to that group of persons 
for whom disease exerts a decisive influence on the creative process. It is just in 
this regard, however, that Nietzsche again moves into the vicinity of Dante, 
whom the opening lines of the Divine Comedy present in a state of deepest con-
fusion and perplexity: gone astray in a dark forest-canyon, troubled by demonic 
animals, incapable of escaping his critical situation by virtue of his own strength 
and intelligence. The aporetic situation in which Dante finds himself corresponds 
perfectly to the symptoms of a disease. On the other hand, one must view this in 
Nietzsche's case in connection with his personal and professional conflicts: the 
final break with Wagner is followed by a severe illness, which causes Nietzsche 
to resign from his teaching post early in 1879; in the summer of 1881, when 
Nietzsche conceives the idea of eternal recurrence, a suddenly developing crisis of 
a psycho-physical nature precedes the precipitously disintegrating relationship 
with Lou Salome. In both cases inspiration follows crucial shocks so directly that 
one can say of them, to borrow an expression from Dante, that they could find 
succor only through a visionary escape from their accustomed horizons. In spite 
of the similarities, profound differences do of course persist, so much so that at 
times the impression could arise that in juxtaposing Dante and Nietzsche one is 
27 Ibid., p. So. 
28 Ibid., p. 81. 
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comparing the fundamentally incomparable. Nevertheless, the differences 
concern less the points of departure-characterized by astonishing agreements-
than the course and the destination of the journeys. Measured against the model 
of the Divine Comedy, Nietzsche knows no paradise, unless one sees in the idea of 
eternal recurrence a structural counterpart to the white rose of Paradise and its 
circles described by the round-dances of the blessed ones. Nietzsche's journey is 
consciously limited to the two lower regions. For, like Faust, he has pledged 
himself to the task, and envisions the fulfilled repose of peaceful oneness at best 
as a fleeting possibility. When Zarathustra, at the beginning of the Fourth Part of 
the work is sitting before his hut, looking out across the abysses to the sea, his 
animals ask him: " 'O Zarathustra, are you perhaps looking out for your happi-
ness?' 'What matters happiness?' he replied; 'I have long ceased to be concerned 
with happiness; I am concerned with my work.' " 29 And likewise he cries out at 
the end of the entire work:" 'My suffering and my pity for suffering-what does 
it matter? Am I concerned with happiness? lam concerned with my work.' " 30 
Seen in terms of the panorama sketched by Dante, Zarathustra-Nietzsche thus 
ranges himself with the penitents at the foot of the Mount of Purgatory, who, 
bent and groaning under oppressive burdens, mark the place where the poem, 
which is otherwise so completely given over to theory, approaches most closely 
the practical world, indeed even· the world of physical labor: 
As to support ceiling or roof is sometimes seen for corbel a figure joining knees 
to breast, 
which of unreality begetteth real discomfort in him who beholds it; in such 
wise saw I these when I gave good heed. 
True it is that more and less were they contracted, according as they had more 
or less upon them, and he who had most patience in his bearing, weeping seemed 
to say: "I can no more."31 
Finally, landscape-scenery in the background of both works also points to 
the Inferno-Purgatorio mood. The "pyramidal rock not far from Surlei," in the 
vicinity of which the idea of eternal recurrence dawned on Nietzsche, reminds one 
inevitably of the great mass of stone which the other-world travellers saw 
looming up before them at the foot of the Mount of Purgatory. Unexpectedly 
they hear a voice beside them: 
At sound ofit each of us turned him round, and we saw on the left a great m. ,s 
of stone, which neither I nor he perceived before. 
Thither drew we on; and there were persons, lounging in the shade behind the 
rock, even as a man settles him to rest for laziness. 32 
29 z, IV, "Das Honigopfcr." 
30 Ibid., "Das Zcichcn." 
31 Pur.l(atorio, Canto X, 130-39. 
32 Pur.l(atorio, Canto IV, 100-105. 
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The reverse line that leads from the landscape-experience of Dante to that of 
Nietzsche is traced by Kurt Leonhard in his biography of Dante: 
It is well known ... that Dante received some concrete impressions for the sur-
realistic landscapes of the Inferno directly in the valleys of the Alpine foot-hills 
between Verona and Trento just as he had earlier in the mountains of Casentino. On 
the other hand, the Lunidiana could have evoked some of the romanticism of the 
Pur,(!atorio. Do these mountain-terraces, precipitous coasts, coves, stretches of sea 
not belong to the same figurative landscape which were likewise, five hundred 
years later, to serve Nietzsche as a model for the scenery of Zarathustra?33 
Among the multiplying similarities, however, we should not lose sight of 
the decisive and incisive difference, namely, that of the unequal length of the 
journeys. While Dante rises to the heights of the empyrean, Nietzsche does not 
succeed, apart from a fleeting approach, in quitting the environs of the Inferno 
and Purgatorio landscapes. That fact, to mention the basic cause, stems from his 
loneliness. Even his ecstasies arc autistic. Whenever he is elevated it is always 
simply by the bootstraps of his own emotions. The result is that Zarathustra, in 
spite ofhis dancing-songs, his hymnic betrothal to the world ("The Seven Seals"), 
and his discourse on children and marriage, lacks the dimension of love. Quite 
different Dante, who from the beginning is under the spell of the beautiful eyes 
of one who escorts him to the heights of the Paradiso, even though she must 
entrust the beloved on the first two journeys to the guidance of Vergil and, on 
his last ascent, to the guidance of the mystic Bernard. Through these figures 
likewise the love of Beatrice is carrying out its purpose, only now in an altered 
form. It overcomes the force of gravity which clings to him, and which is in-
creased still further by his guilt in life. With its help he traverses the entire range 
of the dimensions of the other world and of the spheres of existence symbolized 
by them. It is no accident that the motif of freedom, which is central in the Divine 
Comedy, is lacking in Zarathustra. The latter work is simply a monologue re-
volving about itself, when measured against this emancipatory statement, born 
of the impulse of love. 
Against the background of these differences, the common elements become 
all the more striking. They involve first of all the point of departure and goal. As 
far as the latter is concerned, we should remember that in the case of Zarathustra 
we have to do with a mere bordering on that which in Dante's case is actually 
attained. As far as the similarity of the initial life-situations is concerned, they 
provide that agreement which Nietzsche himself recognized, and which is 
formally confirmed in a letter written in 1879. On II September of that year 
Nietzsche writes to Peter Gast from St. Moritz: 
33 Kurt Leonhard, Dante Alighieri in Selbstzeugnissen urnl Bilddokumentcn (Reinbek b. Hamburg: 
Rowohlt, 1970). p. 65. 
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I am at the end of the thirty-fifth year of my life, the "middle of life" as it has been 
called for a millenium and a half. Dante had his vision at this age and speaks of it in 
the opening lines of his poem. Now I am in the middle oflife, so "encompassed by 
death" that it can overtake me at any hour; the nature of my suffering compels me to 
think of a sudden death, from convulsions .... As far as that is true, I feel like the 
oldest of men, but also from the fact that I have accomplished my life's work. I have 
contributed a good drop of oil, that I know, and for that I shall not be forgotten. 
Concerning this we should simply note that, barely two years later, the visionary 
experience also occurs, even though certainly not in such a way that it has the 
power to lure him out of the morbid landscape in which he sees himself settled. 
His way proceeds, with one exception, across the inner fields of punishment and 
purification. And that means, to speak plainly, that his thought remains fraught 
with conflict without mounting, like that of Dante's, above the realm of conflicts 
to the realm of resolved contradictions. An impressive document of the near-
approach to the goal of perfection, which I have hinted at as the "exception," is 
the chapter" At Noon" incorporated in the "Fourth and Last Part" of Zarathustra, 
though structurally it is quite foreign to it.34 At the point of falling asleep, his 
consciousness growing dim, Zarathustra experiences here, even though ever so 
fleetingly and darkened by sleep, the anticipation of a great happiness, which 
presents itself to him in a twofold way-as the perfection of the world and as his 
union with it: 
Falling asleep, however, Zarathustra spoke thus to his heart: Still! Still! Did not the 
world become perfect just now? What is happening to me? ... What happened to 
me' Listen! Did time perhaps fly away? Do I not fall? Did I not fall-listen!-into 
the well of eternity? What is happening to me? Still! I have been stung, alas-in the 
heart? In the heart! Oh, break, break, heart, after such happiness, after such a sting. 
How? Did not the world become perfect just now? Round and ripe? Oh, the golden 
round ring-where may it fly? 
The "golden round ring" has a twofold meaning. It is the symbol of eternal 
recurrence, sign of the boundless world, eternally revolving within itself, without 
why or wherefore, devouring itself and giving birth to itself over and over. And 
it is the ring of Zarathustra's betrothal to this perfection which has attained 
complete self-sufficiency. The proximity to the Divine Comedy is, in spite of all 
distance, considerable. Even Dante sees the goal of fulfillment in the symbol of 
the circle, which, to be sure, differentiates itself triadically in the sense of the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity: "In the profound and shining being of the deep 
light appeared to me three circles, of three colors and one magnitude; one by the 
second as Iris by Iris seemed reflected, and the third seemed a fire breathed equally 
from one and from the other."35 
34 Sec Karl Schlechta, Nietzsche, grofler Mittag (Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1954), pp. 67-72. 
35 Paradiso. Canto XXXIII. 115-20. 
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The agreement extends even to the motif of the visionary sleep, except that 
for the Divine Comedy the fruitful moment is not as for Zarathustra that of falling 
asleep but that of awakening. In this sense Dante's guide for the last ascent, the 
mystic St. Bernard, declares: 
But since the time that doth entrance thee fleeth, here let us make a stop, like to 
the careful tailor who to the cloth he hath cutteth the garment; 
and let us turn our eyes to the Primal Love, so that gazing toward him thou 
mayst pierce as far as may be into his shining.36 
The decisive difference appears in the distinction between falling asleep and 
awakening. What Nietzsche merely glimpses as a possibility, disappearing again 
in the.very act of appearing, is vouchsafed to Dante in the form of a possession 
into which one comes at the moment of awakening to it. One can perhaps make 
the distinction clear in connection with Augustine's reflection on the vision 
appearing to him during a conversation with his mother in Ostia shortly before 
her death, in which he touches upon the region of aeterna sapientia, of eternal 
wisdom with the beating wings of his heart (modice toto ictu cordis), an approach 
which is just as fleeting as it is fervent. Looking back on this experience, Augustine 
asks himself: " ... if this could continue, and all other visions so different be quite 
taken away, and this one should so ravish and absorb and wrap the heh.older in 
inward joys that his life should eternally be such as that one moment of under-
standing for which we had been sighing-would not this be: 'Enter thou into the 
joy ofThy Lord?' "37 
What Augustine hoped for only hypothetically, as a temporally unrealize-
able continuation of the ecstatic experience of mystical union, is granted to Dante 
in the timeless moment when he perceives, as in a flash oflightning, the identity of 
the human countenance and the triadic figure of God: 
As the geometer who all sets himself to measure the circle and who findeth not, 
think as he may, the principle he lacketh; 
such was I at this new-seen spectacle; I would perceive how the image con-
sorteth with the circle, and how it settleth there; 
but not for this were my proper wings, save that my mind was smitten by a 
flash wherein its will came to it. 
To the high fantasy here power failed; but already my desire and will were 
rolled-even as a wheel that moveth equally-by the Love that moves the sun and 
the other stars. 38 
36 Paradiso, Canto XXXII, 139-44. 
37 Book 9; this and the following translation are from Sheed, pp. 201, 200, respectively. For an 
interpretation of the Ostia-vision, see the discussion in my book, Theologische Sprachtheorie und Her-
meneutik (Munich: Kosel, 1970), pp. 59 ff., 381~85, which deals extensively with the various motifs of 
the Divine Comedy (pp. 70, 83-87, 386). 
38 Paradiso, Canto XXXIII, 133-45. 
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That is the vision which does not allow the beholder to fall back onto the 
levels already passed, just as its object, the Eternally One, can never retreat again 
behind the multiplicity of commonplace things. Quite different is Augustine, 
who, after a fleeting contact with the realm of wisdom, sinks wearily back into 
the commonplace realm from which he started: "Then sighing, and leaving the 
first fruits of our spirit bound to it, we returned to the sound of our own tongue, 
in which a word has both beginning and ending. For what is like to your Word, 
Our Lord, who abides in himself forever, yet grows not old and makes all 
things new!" 
Upon closer inspection this is also the situation of Zarathustra. Certainly, 
time sinks for him above all, to borrow the expression from the chapter "At 
Noon," into the "well of eternity" (Lowith) so that it appears as if permanence is 
vouchsafed to the moment and the nunc stans_ of an anticipated eternity is at-
tained. 39 Yet this impression is relativized by Zarathustra's concrete experience 
of time. He reaches the goal of the time-transcended moment only in the almost 
timeless moment when he sinks into a sleep, which, as we learn quite incidentally 
·at the end, probably did not last very long. So the contact with a no doubt great 
but finally unassimilated potentiality remains: "Thus spoke Zarathustra and 
arose from his resting-place beside the tree as if from a strange intoxication. " 40 
With this difference is causally connected one of the two individual motifs, 
which may finally be mentioned. It consists in the admonition not to look back, 
known as early as the myth of Orpheus, and also echoed in Jesus' instruction to his 
disciples. "No one who puts his hand to the plow and looks back is fit for the 
kingdom of God," is Jesus' answer to the request of a prospective disciple who 
wished to take leave of his family before the final enlistment as a disciple (Luke 
9:62)-which admonition becomes manifest here, in its positive intention, as an 
absolute commitment, absolute devotion. In Dante's poem the motif emerges 
twice, first in the mouth of Beatrice, who "with the voice of an angel" exhorts 
Vergil, struck by her starry gaze, to come to the aid of the one lost in the forest 
ravine: "My friend, and not the friend of fortune, is so impeded in his way upon 
the desert shore, that he has turned his back for terror; and I fear he may already 
be so far astray, that I have risen too late for his relief, from what I heard of him 
in Heaven."41 
The second and central occurrence of the motif is the word of the angel-
guard at the entrance upon the path of purification, who, with the point of his 
sword, scratches the seven-fold sign of their guilt upon the foreheads of all who 
enter, and imparts the warning on no account to look back: "Then he pushed 
39 Karl Uiwith, Weltgeschichte utul Heilsgeschehen: Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichts-
philosophie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1953), pp. 198 tf., "trans. by Hermann Kesting under the title The 
Meaning of History. 
• 0 Schlechta, Nietzsches gro}Jer Mittag, p. 71. 
41 Inferno, Canto 11, 62---0 3. 
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the door of the sacred portal, saying: 'Enter, but I make you ware that he who 
looketh behind returns outside again.' " 42 Apart from a note in Nietzsche's 
unpublished papers, this motif seems to be lacking. There he writes almost with 
catch-words: "presupposition: bravery, patience, no 'turning back,' no fervor to 
go forward."43 To this he adds in the form of a nota bene: "Zarathustra, con-
fronting all earlier values parodistically, out of his abundance." However, if, as 
this appended note indicates, parody is the means to escape the force that would 
draw us backwards, its antithesis, pity, is from all indications the quintessence of a 
mode of thought and behavior turned backwards and living in retrospection. If 
one follows the line indicated by this conjecture, if one thus seeks the missing 
motif under the pseudonym "pity," one discovers it quickly and indeed at the 
place where the strains of thought intertwined in Zarathustra converge and at the 
same time open themselves to a possible new beginning, namely, in the final 
chapter, "The Sign." Once again there is mention of a stone, fraught with great 
meaning, which immediately calls to mind the "pyramidal rock not far from 
Surlci." Herc Zarathustra gains insight into his "last sin," his bond through pity, 
with the higher men, the representatives of values which he has already tran-
scended and dismissed, who because of this bond hang on him like leaden weights, 
crack his self-will, and thus curb his last upward flight: 
And once more Zarathustra became absorbed in himself, and he sat down again on 
the big stone and reflected. Suddenly he jumped up. "Pity! Pity for the higher man." 
he cried out, and his face changed to bronze. "Well then, that has had its time. My 
suffering and my pity for suffering-what does it matter? Am I concerned with 
happiness? I am concerned with my work ... this is my morning, my day is breaking: 
rise now, rise, thou treat noon!"44 
In sober terms this means that Zarathustra denies himself pity in order to be 
wholly himself, because for Nietzsche pity is the essence of the romantically 
broken, second-hand existence, an existence characterized by unreconciled and 
therefore fatally intervening mediation.45 
With the aim of achieving integral wholeness, this motif touches upon 
another in which there is admittedly only a partial agreement between Dante's 
and Nietzsche's thought. And even this agreement is evident only provided that 
one views the point of comparison as far as Nietzsche is concerned in the context 
of his remark about Lou Salome contained in a letter in which he introduces her 
42 P11rgatorio, Canto IX, 130-32. See my article "Bilder dcr BuBe: Betrachtungcn iiber Dantes 
Purgatorio," in Wort um/ Antwort, 14 (1973), 33-42. 
43 W, III, 896. 
44 In connection with this passage, see H. M. Wolff, Friedrich Nietzsche: Der Weg zum NichL< 
(Bern: Francke, 1956), pp. 209-23. 
45 Details in my study, Thealo,iiie und Atheismus: A11sfo/Je z11 einer theoloj/ischen Aporetik (Munich: 
Kosel. 1972), pp. 27 ff.. 55-64. 
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to Peter Gast as follows: "she is as discerning as an eagle and brave as a lion, and 
yet after all a very girlish child who will probably not live very long. " 46 With an 
inversion of the first terms the same sequence of metaphors reappears in the related 
passage, the speech of Zarathustra "On the Three Metamorphoses. "47 As the 
explanation of the sequence of motifs by Zarathustra indicates, it is pased on a 
hierarchical scheme which leads upward and over the preliminary stages of 
heteronomy and autonomy represented by the metaphors "camel" and "lion" 
to the goal of an unquestionably independent self-consciousness, symbolized by 
the "child." This is a purely anthropological conception to which, in the case of 
Dante, a specifically Christological conception corresponds, a conception de-
termining the fragmentary nature of the correspondence. In Canto XXXI of the 
Purgatorio the wanderer in the other-world sees, reflected in the unveiled eyes of 
Beatrice, the griffin harnessed to the carriage of the Church, which in its dual 
form, the lion-like body and the heavenward-reaching wings, symbolizes the 
Christ, the God-Man: 
As the sun in a mirror, not otherwise the twofold beast was beaming within 
them, now with the attributes of one, now of the other nature. 
Think, reader, if I marvelled within me when I saw the thing itself remain 
motionless, and in its image it was changing.48 
Reflected in Beatrice's star-bright eyes, the chimerical griffin-figure separates 
itself for Dante, as Kurt Leonhard interprets the passage, into the two aspects 
intertwined within it so that at one time the one, at another, the other dominates: 
that of the eagle pointing to the divinity of Christ, and that of the lion symbolizing 
His unconditioned humanity. 49 If one adds the medium of the vision, the reflect-
ing eyes of Beatrice, the original duality finally finds its completeness in a triad, 
albeit by no means composed of equals. What results from this process is certainly 
not like Nietzsche's ui.ldel of ascent, but is rather the opposite, namely, a figura-
tive representation of the condescension in which the incomprehensible mystery 
of the God-Man is translated into the alternating images which are reflected in 
Beatrice's eyes. Moreover, a linkage of motifs follows here in the fact that, 
analogous to the "mirror" of Beatrice's eyes, there also appears among the 
metaphors and images of Zarathustra "the child with the mirror." Zarathustra 
awakens one morning so troubled by the recollection of a dream that he asks 
himself: "Why was I so startled in my dream that I awoke? Did not a child step 
up to me, carrying a mirror?"SO 
46 Letter of I 3 July I 882. 
47 Sec Karl Lowith, Nietzsc/1es Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des G/eic/1en (Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer, 1956}, pp. 28 ff.; also, his Weltgescl1ichte und Heilsgeschehen, pp. 190 If.; further the discussion 
in my study, "Gott ist tot," pp. 171. ff., 239 ff. 
48 Purgatorio, Canto XXXI, 121-26. 
49 Leonhard, Dante Alighieri, p. 130. 
50 Z, 11, "Das Kind mit dern Spiegel." 
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Although the full extent of the agreement becomes clear only in the suc-
cession of the visions-as Zarathustra perceives in the child's mirror the danger 
threatening his doctrine, likewise Dante sees in the frightening images which 
follow the danger to which the Church, overwhelmed by the French monarchy, 
is exposed-nevertheless so much that is common stands out that one can speak 
of a genuine correspondence. As we hardly need to stress, this correspondence 
extends to all of the motif-groups. By virtue of the common element of the 
mirror the highest stage in Nietzsche's sequence of figures parallels so closely 
Dante's configuration that between the two a genuine, though not rationally 
demonstrable, correspondence seems to prevail. Or does the secret structural 
relationship between Nietzsche's atheism and the Christian faith manifest itself 
in a sudden flash of insight? Does even Dante's conception of salvation possibly 
appear here, mirrored in Beatrice's gaze, as the answer to the question which the 
highest of the Zarathustra-symbols, the child, poses, precisely in its unquestion-
able self-sufficiency? 
However risky a comparison of Nietzsche with Dante may appear at first 
glance, nevertheless a series of clear analogies could be adduced pursuant to this 
brief investigation. A detailed comparison of motifs could without doubt expand 
it by a considerable number. But not too much would be gained. For the result 
would likewise be relativized by the circumstance which we should note in 
conclusion; and that is a recognition of the fact that the demonstrated affinity is 
merely of an episodic and transitory nature. It concerns the period of the incuba-
tion and genesis of Zarathustra, and yields thereafter to an increasing divergence. 
In the relationship between Dante and Nietzsche, the contradiction, at least the 
feeling of distance, as indicated by the notice from his unpublished papers cited 
earlier, is definitive. 51 The common element limits itself temporally-to borrow 
Nietzsche's expression in a letter to Peter Gast (11 September 1879)-to "the 
middle of life." Substantively it consists of endurance-and in the creative 
mastery-of the same aporetic situation which Nietzsche in the same context 
describes as a "being encompassed by death," and which impels Dante to utter 
the confessional opening verses of his poetic work: 
In the middle of the journey of our life I came to myself in a dark wood where 
the straight way was lost. 
Ah! how hard a thing it is to tell what a wild, and rough, and stubborn wood this 
was, which in my thought renews the fear! 
So bitter it is, that scarcely more is death. 52 
51 Sec note 8 above. 
52 Inferno, 1-7. 
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MARCUS HESTER 
My purpose is to analyze the structure of tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy and 
show how Nietzsche could have used his insights to develop terms in which one 
could analyze specific paintings. My basic theses thus will come from The Birth of 
Tragedy, though I suggest continuities with later works. To start we must ask: 
What sort of things are the Dionysian and the Apollinian? Are they gods or arc the 
gods only paradigmatic expressions of psychological drives? Nietzsche unfor-
tunately freely changes the terms they qualify. However, "Trieb" in various 
forms occurs significantly. The Dionysian and the Apollinian are basically artistic 
drives, and the Greek gods are only symbols and paradigmatic manifestations of 
these basic drives or energies. The Apollinian is the drive to individuation, the 
drive to set boundaries important in the Greek ethical concepts of balance, pro-
portionality, right limits and the negative concept of hubris. The drive to 
individuation shows itself in plastic delineation and in other visual delineations, as 
in dream images. The Dionysian is the drive to unity and oneness, and its analogy 
is intoxication. The nature of these drives is well developed by others. 1 
Another preliminary which must be emphasized is how freely Nietzsche 
shifts the category or kind of thing he is explaining in tragedy and other arts. 
Apparently he assumed that these dual drives can freely assume different forms 
within and even across categories. 2 As illustrations of such shifting one may cite 
the following: the characters Prometheus and Oedipus are different manifesta-
tions of the Dionysian (GT, sec. 10); Kaufmann suggests that Antigone is A pol-
1 Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1972). 
For convenience, given the many editions of Nietzsche, I shall throughout refer to sections except 
where further specification is necessary. (For key to abbreviations see p. xvii above.) Unless otherwise 
noted, all translations are those of Walter Kaufmann in Basic Writings if Nietzsche, The Modern Library 
(New York: Random House, 1968), The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1954), or (with R.J. 
Hollingdale) The Will tc Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). 
2 Here he is influenced by the concept of the free transformation of the gods. (See GT, sec. 10.) Also 
there is a hint of his later idea that energy, drive or force is able to express itself in different forms. 
Sexual energy as sublimated may flow into apparently non-sexual channels such as artistic creation. And 
a final factor in the free shifting of the kind of thing Apollinian and Dionysian qualify is inherent in the 
use of polar concepts. 
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linian, Cassandra is Dionysian.3 More radical than transformations within the 
category of character are cross-category analogies. There are whole arts which, 
vis-a-vis other arts, are Dionysian or Apollinian. Painting is Apollinian, music 
Dionysian (GT, sec. 1). Yet among examples of an art which is primarily Apol-
linian, for example, painting, there are examples which are Dionysian or Apol-
linian. Raphael is Dionysian. Mozart is probably Apollinian. The Dorian mode 
definitely is Apollinian (GT, sec. 2). An art which is primarily Dionysian with 
respect to other arts may contain examples which are Apollinian with respect to 
other examples. Further, within a medium considered as a whole, both Apollinian 
and Dionysian aspects may be evident. Tone and flow of melody is Dionysian. 
Even instruments are Apollinian (cithara) or Dionysian (flute) (GT, sec. 2). In 
sum, within a single work of art, Nietzsche often cites a Dionysian or Apollinian 
element or character. Within an art there are examples which are Dionysian or 
Apollinian with respect to each other. (Homer is Apollinian, Archilochus is 
Dionysian.) Finally, a whole art is sometimes said to be Dionysian or Apollinian 
with regard to other arts. There is free shifting in comparing aspects, particular 
works and whole genres. Nietzsche gives only the briefest hints about these trans-
formations, and we shall simply have to say that he assumes artistic energies can 
find equivalences within and across categories. Nietzsche does not give any 
explanation of why these equivalences are equivalent, but we must add that no 
one yet can explain these important inter-category and inter-art resonances. In 
this paper I shall explore only a limited number of transformations. With these 
preliminaries aside, I now turn to my main subject.4 
THE STRUCTURE OF TRAGEDY 
In discussing the birth or origin of tragedy, Nietzsche deals with both the 
origin of the elements of tragedy ( elements such as the chorus versus the scene) and 
with the content represented or shown by the elements. (The distinction here is not 
3 Basic Writings ef Nietzsche, p. 47 n. 
4 Because of the free transformation into very different types of things by Dionysian and Apollin-
ian drives, one cannot give a fixed answer to the question of how they are related. Specifically, if one 
is speaking of the Dionysian and Apollinian elements of tragedy, the relation is very different than that 
between Dionysian or Apollinian characters. Characters interact, and t~ action emerges from their 
interaction. The chorus as a Dionysian element, however, discharges itse!f into Apollinian imagery. What 
"Dionysian" or "Apollinian" as adjectives qualify is very important, and when "Dionysian" now 
qualifies one sort of thing and in another context a very different sort of thing (for example, Dionysian 
chorus versus a Dionysian character in Cassandra), the relation of Dionysian and Apollinian must be very 
different. Stated differently, when Dionysian drive transforms itself into a different kind of thing, the 
kind of thing or category of thing has its own inertia which cannot be changed completely by the drive. 
A drive is partially pulled into the orbit of the nature of that in which it is manifest. An adjective 
qualifies a substantive, but it does not destroy the substantive's nature. A Dionysian chorus is a very 
The Structure of Tragedy and the Art of Painting 73 
the usual one of form and content but rather the distinction of structure and 
content). Not only is the Dionysian the source of the chorus as an element of 
tragedy, but the satyr chorus has a Dionysian nature. Likewise, the Apollinian is 
the source of the element of scene, but represented in the scene can be content that 
is Apollinian or Dionysian. Sometimes Nietzsche means a Dionysian or Apol-
linian element or part of tragedy, at other times he means that the content of the 
element is Dionysian or Apollinian in character. However, it will be seen that this 
dual level of meaning can be reconciled. 
By "element of tragedy" I mean a functional part or role in the sense that the 
spectators, chorus and scene are functional parts. The elements of tragedy arc parts 
of the whole which is tragedy. Nietzsche himself occasionally refers to Dionysian 
or Apollinian parts ("Teile") (GT, sec. 9). And typically, being the kind of 
dichotomistic thinker he is, Nietzsche sees all the rich elements which make up 
tragedy (spectator, chorus, music, poetry, dance and image) gravitating into two 
basic parts, parts labeled, of course, Dionysian and Apollinian. "Accordingly, we 
recognize in tragedy a sweeping opposition of styles: the language, color, mobil-
ity, and dynamics of speech fall apart into the Dionysian lyrics of the chorus and, 
on the other hand, the Apollinian dream world, and become two utterly different 
spheres of expression" (GT, sec. 6). Further, Nietzsche immediately begins to 
think of these two parts in terms of a very basic model which I call the self-object 
model. 5 The self is the center of experience, the moving center of its world, a 
point about which the phenomenal world spreads (GT, sec. 5). The objects of this 
center of the world are all sorts of objects of consciousness (varying from "em-
pirische Realitat," to "Vorstellung," "Schein," "Bild," "Traum," etc.). Here 
Nietzsche is influenced by the Kant-Schopenhauer line of thought. Later, speci-
fically in Husserl, the way of expressing this point is to say that all mental acts are 
intentional, that every mental act has its appropriate sort of object, 6 that for every 
noesis there is a noema. 
different sort of thing from a Dionysian character, and the relation of a Dionysian chorus to the Apol-
linian element of scene is very different from the relation of a Dionysian character to an Apollinian 
character. Many Nietzsche scholars assume, falsely I think, that one can specify one sort of relationship 
between Apollinian and Dionysian. 
5 Strictly speaking, there are several self-object models, two being shown below. Further, I realize 
that later Nietzsche rejects the entification of the self, and I use the term here only out of grammatical 
convenience. Later he shifts to what I would call an energy-object model, and that model shows the 
basic structure of the will to power. The energy-object model is anticipated in many ways in the self-
object model, and I am deliberately paralleling the two. Nietzsche later rejects a certain romantic 
flavoring of The Birth of Tragedy and the weak pessimism it occasionally expresses. Also his break with 
Wagner caused modification of the concept of genius and the associated concept of inspiration exam-
ined below. (See J, sec. 188; MA, I, pt. IV, secs. 155, 156, 163-65.) But I think it is important to empha-
size that the self-object model is an anticipation of the basic structure of the will to power-. 
6 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction w Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958), pp. II6 f. 
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We might diagram the structure of the Apollinian self-object model as 
follows: 
Projection 
and empirical world 
Schein des Scheins 
( Reflection of empirical self 
and world in dreams. Homeric 
imagery, etc.) 
In my use of the term "projection" I mean that a basic but categorically imper-
ceptible primordial self causes or projects a lesser, shadowy reality such as an 
appearance, dream image or hallucination. (See note 5.) The empirical self is a 
projection of the primoridal self ("Ur-Eine"), and the world of imagery is a 
reflection of the projected empirical world. It is this basic model, as simplified in 
the next diagram below, which pervades Nietzsche's understanding of the struc-
ture of the tragedy. Further, and very importantly, the basic concepts of Diony-
sian and Apollinian often refer respectively to the self and projected image parts of 
this model and not to represented content. I think this particular sense of Dionysian 
and Apollinian, that is, as respectively the primordial self versus the projected 
world (self-object model), has not been sufficiently emphasized in the Nietzsche 
literature. 
In a state of ecstasy, as in tragedy when the spectators are excited by the 
chorus. the first reflection (empirical self and world) is bypassed or short-circuited, 
so to speak. The spectator forgets his ordinary roles and appearances and also those 
of other spectators. A mystical and unified self emerges which directly discharges 
itselfinto Apollinian imagery (GT, secs. 7, 8). The new and more literal self-object 
model is thus: 
Dionysian element or self 
( chorus and spectator) 
'---A 
Ur-Eme 
Chorus 
,, .. 
and chorus overcome their 
empirical separateness and 
become the mystical, universal, 
non-subjective self (Ur-Eine). as 
exemplified in the non-subjective 
self of Archilochus) 
Apollinian element (scene. 
masked figures. action. etc.) 
Schein des Scheins 
(In origin. Schein des Scheins is 
from empirical world. but its 
empiricalness is forgotten in 
bec:>ming the object of 
Dionysian ecstasy) 
Projection (See text for 
qualifications and other kinds 
of self-object relations besides 
projection) 
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Specifically, in terms of the elements of tragedy, Nietzsche thinks of the satyr 
chorus and the audience as becoming a kind of self through ecstasy-evoking 
devices such as dithyrambic song, music, gesture, dance, and chants. The audience 
is drawn into the ecstasy of the satyr chorus, and the individual members over-
come their individuality in a kind of mystical oneness. They feel identification 
with one another and with the chorus. At the same time, the actor's sense, by 
which he understands the meaning of every gesture, facial expression and full 
meaning of characterization, is developed (GT, secs. 2, 8). A mystical unity, 
equivalent to an expectant and perceptive self, emerges. 
In this magic transformation the Dionysian reveler sees himself as a satyr, and as a 
satyr, in turn, he sees the god, which means that in his metamorphosis he beholds 
another vision outside himself, as the Apollinian complement of his own state .... 
In the light of this insight we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian 
chorus which ever anew discharges itself in an Apollinian world of images. (GT, 
sec. 8) 
Of course, the Apollinian image is the object of attention of this ecstatic group 
self. 7 In the earliest forms, before there was true drama, the spectators provided 
their own private Apollinian images in states of vision and trance. "But now we 
realize that the scene, complete with the action, was basically and originally 
thought of merely as a vision; the chorus is the only 'reality' and generates the 
vision, speaking ofit with the entire symbolism of dance, tone, and words" (GT, 
sec. 8). Later, with the earliest true drama, the revelers focused their ecstatic state 
on an actual masked figure of Dionysus appearing in form and functioning as 
Apollinian scene. Notice that as an element the masked god was Apollinian, but 
the represented content was Dionysian. Dionysus appears in Apollinian form, 
that is, he appears as a visual representation.8 Given the heightened sense of the 
actor, the spectator and chorus understand the god's every gesture and expression. 
And their state of ccstacy, as we shall sec, transforms the clumsy masked figure 
into a new reality. 
The content represented or shown can be respectively Apollinian or Diony-
sian. (I shall return to differences between representing and showing later.) Music 
can show a character which is like the character of Apollo or like the character of 
Dionysus. The image on the stage can represent Dionysus; the content of the 
image is Dionysian even though as an element it is Apollinian. One character in a 
7 I emphasize that "object" here does not mean purpose or thing, but intentional object in the 
sense in which a Bild or image is the object of a state of dreaming. 
8 This does not necessarily mean that Dionysus appears Dionysian-like, so to speak. A Dionysian 
visual representation such as a satyr might be executed so that, though recognizably a satyr, the tone, 
gesture and atmosphere would be Apollinian in restraint, plasticity, etc. Of course, a Dionysian repre-
sentation might also have a Dionysian air or atmosphere, and no doubt the greatest tragedies have this 
multilevel reinforcing of recognizable image, atmosphere and suggestive aura of the image. This 
multilevel reinforcing will be made clearer when the full range of symbolic powers is examined. 
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drama can represent the Dionysian while another can represent the Apollinian. 
And the elements or functional parts of tragedy, of course, can be unified with the 
content. The chorus is after all not only the Dionysian clement but shows Diony-
sian character. The Apollinian clement, unlike the chorus, which is a Dionysian 
element and shows Dionysian nature, is more content-open, so to speak. Any-
thing can be represented, even Dionysus. Nietzsche docs seem to believe the scene 
shows Apollinian content, but not only Apollinian content. 9 The satyr chorus, on 
the other hand, is less content-open. It creates the role of an ecstatic self, involving 
the audience. It sings, chants, and dances Dionysian wisdom or content. It docs not 
articulate Dionysian wisdom in visual representations. The meaning of Apollinian 
and Dionysian as content has been thoroughly and well treated in the literature, 
and thus I return to my main theme of the structure of tragedy. 
The mechanisms by which the self-object model operates are very important. 
Nietzsche clearly believes there is a causal primacy of the Dionysian. There are 
various formulations of this primacy: 1) There is the genuine projective relationship 
(as diagramed). The Dionysian ecstasy at first entirely generates the image. In the 
earliest stages of Dionysian worship, the vision of the god was like private visions 
in dreams, intoxication, sorrow, or ecstasies of cruelty. The Apollinian com-
ponent was private and subjective and caused by the Dionysian ecstasy. (This 
causal primacy is parallel to Nietzsche's later claims that self-conscious motives arc 
a mere result, a causal epiphenomenon of the will to power.) 10 How could one be 
sure that the A pollinian complement of the Dionysian state was true to the ecstatic 
state? How can one be sure that the images of the god are not entirely personal and 
unrelated? Nietzsche holds a version of what I call the automatism thesis. The 
thesis is that when one is in a state of ecstasy or trance, as in sleep, the images more 
truly reflect the true self than do empirical and waking states. This thesis of course 
is later important in Freud, and in surrealistic and automatic art. Nietzsche's 
version is most directly stated here: 
Though it is certain that of the two halves of our existence. the waking and the 
dreaming states, the former appeals to us as infinitely preferable, more important, 
excellent, and worthy of being lived, indeed, as that which alone is lived-yet in 
relation to that mysterious ground of our being of which we arc the phenomena, I 
should, paradoxical as it may seem, maintain the very opposite estimate of the 
value of dreams. (GT, sec. 4) 
Nietzsche no doubt thought that dreams were uninhibited, and thus truer pro-
jections in image of a universal Dionysian self 
Even more directly, Nietzsche clearly means a kind of automatism in this 
description of artistic ecstasy: 
9Nietzsche does not, I think, use the phrase "apolliniscl,e Wwheit," but he does think tragedy has 
Apollinian content as well as Dionysian wisdom. 
10 S('(' WM. secs. 666. 674; GM. II, sec 12. 
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The extreme sharpness of certain senses, so they understand a quite different sign 
language-and create one-the condition that seems to be a part of many nervous 
disorders-; extreme mobility that turns into an extreme urge to communicate; the 
desire to speak on the part of everything that knows how to make signs-; a need to 
get rid of oneself, as it were, through signs and gestures; ability to speak of oneself 
through a hundred speech media-an explosive condition. One must first think of 
this condition as a compulsion and urge to get rid of the exuberance of inner tension 
through muscular activity and movements of all kinds; then as an involuntary 
co-ordination between this movement and the processes within (images, thoughts, 
dcsires)-as a kind of automatism of the whole muscular system impelled by strong 
stimuli from within-; inability to prevent reaction; the system of inhibitions 
suspended, as it were. (WM, sec. 8 r r) 
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The thesis of automatism is clearly stated though it here seems to mean automatic 
correlation between various symbolic realms such as thought, images, desires, 
gestures and movements. Nietzsche was perhaps unaware that this sort of auto-
matism in the correlation of the imagistic, ideational and vascular was a main idea 
of Baudelaire, deriving perhaps from Poe, and influencing the symbolic poets. 11 
We also notice in the passage that artistic ecstasy heightens perceptiveness, and 
sensitive perceptiveness is a receptiveness and not an active projection, and we 
shall shortly shift to this idea. 
It is because of this direct projection that the lyrical poet escapes mere 
subjective reverie in his images. 
The artist has already surrendered his subjectivity in the Dionysian process. The 
image that now shows him his identity with the heart of the world is a dream scene 
that embodies the primordial contradiction and primordial pain, together with the 
primordial pleasure, of mere appearance. The 'I' of the lyrist therefore sounds from 
the depth of his being: its 'subjectivity,' in the sense of modern aesthcticians, is a 
fiction. (GT, sec. 5) 
Archilochus does not just express the private world ofhis subjective reveries. In a 
state of ecstasy the images projected reflect the heart of the world. The self re-
flected is not the empirical self, "but the only truly existent and eternal self resting 
at the basis of things, through whose images the lyric genius sees this very basis" 
(GT, sec. 5). No doubt Nietzsche would say the Dionysian revelers manifested the 
same sort of lack of subjectivity in their visions. To anticipate the analysis of 
symbolic powers: Dionysian ecstasy, in tapping the universal self, releases sym-
bolic powers of dance, music, poetry and gesture which have inter-subjective 
meaning. Unless the image reflected reality it could not be called the complement 
of the Dionysian state. Because of the causal primacy of the Dionysian and because 
of its control of the image, one can speak of "the Dionysian chorus which ever 
11 Charles Baudelaire, Art in Paris: 1845-1862: Salons and Other Exhibitions, trans. and ed. Jonathan 
Mayne (London: Phaidon Press, 1965), pp. 51, 142-43, 155-58. 
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anew discharges itself in an Apollinian world of images" (GT, sec. 8). The image 
is no mere illusion but "the Apollinian embodiment of Dionysian insights ... " 
(GT, sec. 8). 
2) But we must not overemphasize a free and automatic projection, for that is 
only one sort of self-object relation Nietzsche suggests in The Birth of Tragedy. A 
second self-object relation is that the self shapes or forms some material. We know 
Nietzsche, even in his later theory of dreams, conceives of dreams as not just free 
projections, but more as an imaginative embroidering of perceptual cues. Sounds, 
pressure of bed cover, and body positions can be the causes of dreams, though the 
dream state reverses the true cause-effect relationship and makes it seem as though 
the imagistic embroidering is the cause of the physical cue (G, "The Four Great 
Errors," sec. 4; WM, sec. 479). In this imagistic embroidering we should perhaps 
describe the self-object relation as a shaping, parallel to the shaping we conceptual-
ly do with scientific and other concepts. 12 Our expectations, desires, mental sets 
and other forms of our will to power do not have an entirely free hand when the 
object is a physical object or masked figure which has an inertia of its own. There 
is more of a sense of manipulation as mastery of a resistant stuff in the shaping 
relationship. 
With the development of true drama, with the masked figure replacing 
private visions, shaping is a more accurate description than projecting. The 
masked figure is the focus of the Dionysian energy of the ecstatic self, but the 
heightened sensitivity of this expectant self implies that the state is not a complete 
projecting into but a partial reading out of the givenness of the figure. This active-
receptive dialectic of shaping and sensing is of course inherently difficult to clarify, 
and the closest Nietzsche comes to it is I think in his description of Admetus. 
Consider Admetus as he is brooding over the memory of his recently departed wife 
Alcestis, consuming himself in her spiritual contemplation, when suddenly a 
similarly formed, similarly walking woman's figure is led toward him, heavily 
veiled; let us imagine his sudden trembling unrest, his tempestuous comparisons, his 
instinctive conviction-and we have an analogy with what the spectator felt in his 
Dionysian excitement when he saw the approach on the stage of the god with whose 
sufferings he had already identified himself. Involuntarily, he transferred the whole 
magic image of the god that was trembling before his soul to that masked figure and, 
as it-were, dissolved its reality into the unreality of spirits. (GT, sec. 8) 
We notice that the veiled figure must, in form and walk, resemble Alcestis. 
Apparently not just any sort of veiled figure could become the focus of Admctus' 
ecstatic sadness. Ecstatic states develop our perceptiveness to the meaning of the 
given object. The chorus provides something like an ecstatic, expectant mental 
set, but it is a mental set that because of perceptiveness must be sensitively repre-
sented in the image. 
12 See WM, secs. 495,513,602, 605, 6o6. 
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Since the Dionysian energy could not discharge itself in an inappropriate 
image, I suppose Nietzsche would say a dramatist could fail on grounds of char-
acterization, gesture of the actor, logic of the scene, etc. Of course, there are 
Apollinian characters in Apollinian form, as well as Dionysian characters in 
Apollinian form, and a failure of characterization would have to be when charac-
ters did not represent one or both basic artistic drives. There also could be failures 
of suitability of other perceptual aspects of the scene to the meaning of the drama, 
failures we might call failures of sensuous logic. Perhaps sensuous logic is what 
Nietzsche means when he speaks of "a coloring, a causality, and a velocity" 
peculiar to individual arts (GT, sec. 5). But on the active and forming side, Admc-
tus' extremely agitated and intense mental set, his intense desire to see his wife, 
mentally seizes the image of the actor, shapes it and gives it convincingness. (The 
analogies to Nietzsche's later concept of perspectivism, where the most basic 
scientific concepts like the atom are images and shapings responding to our will 
to power, arc striking.) 
Of course, with the introduction of the actual masked figure of Dionysus, 
with the development of true drama, one has the possibility of the artist's control 
of the Apollinian world of imagery. The spectator, excited to a state of ecstasy by 
the satyr chorus, still lends the image reality and convincingness, but the spectator 
ceases to be a complete artist who provides his own Apollinian complement to his 
ecstatic state. The masked figure is not just a space for him to project into. But even 
with true drama ecstasy excites and unleashes artistic powers. Now the artist him-
self, in acts of creation, needs to excite himself into states of ecstasy so that he will 
be able to project and sense the meaning of and determine the adequacy of his 
images. 
Toward a psychology of the artist. If there is to be art, if there is to be any aesthetic doing 
and seeing, one physiological condition is indispensable: frenzy. Frenzy must first 
have enh,mccd the excitability of the whole machine; else there is no art. All kinds of 
frenzy, however diversely conditioned, have the strength to accomplish this: above 
all, the frenzy of sexual excitement, this most ancient and original form of frenzy. 
Also the frenzy that follows all great cravings, all strong affects; the frenzy of feasts, 
contests, feats of daring, victory, all extreme movement; the frenzy of cruelty; the 
frenzy in destruction; the frenzy under certain meteorological influences, as for 
example the frenzy of spring; or under the influence of narcotics; and finally the 
frenzy of will, the frenzy of an overcharged and swollen will. What is essential in 
such frenzy is the feeling of increased strength and fullness. Out of this feeling one 
lends to things, one forces them to accept from us, one violates them-this process is 
called idealizing .... A man in this state transforms things until they mirror his power 
-until they are reflections of his perfection. This having to transform into perfection 
is-art. (G, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," sec. 8-9) 
The artistic energy described here is distinctly more like shaping and mastering 
than like projecting. (Strictly speaking, idealizing is a third kind of self-o~ject 
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relation and is a concept Nietzsche does not clearly articulate in The Birth of 
Tragedy. He does vaguely hint at idealizing in suggesting that Oedipus and Pro-
metheus arc types [G, sec. 10].) There is conscious mastery, control and over-
powering of his material. The artist, like the man who really loves his destiny, is 
able to bring a purposive order and unity into the accidental and meaningless. 13 
Nietzsche unfortunately did not clarify the difference between mastery of a 
representation, where there is an element of correspondence with metaphysical 
reality, and mastery of material. One does not overcome an idea or representation 
in the same way as one overcomes the resistance of matter. 
3) A final version of the self-object model is that the Dionysian self infuses a 
sense of reality into the image. The Apollinian imagistic vehicles as reflections of 
the gods were, apart from their transfusions of conviction and power from 
Dionysian states, becoming unconvincing and hardened into the dogmas of his-
torical religions. Admetus' state dissolves the empirical reality of a veiled figure 
into the unreality of spirits. The actor and masked figure cease to be such. The 
veiled figure is transformed into the world of spirit. The meaning here is that the 
masked figures, scenery, dialogue, etc., of the Apollinian element cease to be 
merely what they are and become parts of the microcosm of the drama. They do 
not thereby become mistaken for empirical realities. Tragedy has this paradoxical 
unreality while yet being a higher reality. It is empirically unreal but metaphysi-
cally real. The sensuous image may be as true as the image of the atom but like any 
image it must be loved as a mere image, that is as a fixed picture of a dynamic and 
evcrchanging reality. "Knowledge and becoming exclude one another" (WM, 
sec. 517). Notice here Nietzsche agrees with Plato that knowledge is of what is 
stable, fixed, though of course he differs with Plato and sides with Heraclitus in 
saying reality is becoming. Nietzsche clearly holds that the image in great art 
reflects Dionysian metaphysical reality in Apollinian form. (The content of 
Apollo also is not foreign to Dionysian wisdom.) 14 
In sum, in the self-object or energy-object relation, Dionysian energy can 
project itself in an Apollinian vision or shape and transform Apollinian scene 
elements. These are only three (with idealizing being a fourth) of the many 
energy-object relations which arc various forms of what later is the will to power. 
The energy-object model evolves from the self-object model and is I think the 
basic structure of the will to power. I do not here attempt to prove that the self-
13 See GM, pt. II, secs. 11, 17 f. 
14 I agree with Danto that: "The radical character of Nietzsche's thought, even in its first signi-
ficant expression, may be seen in the fact that he is indeed prepared to allow that art has no less a claim 
than sense or science to objective truth. But this is because neither sense nor science can make any 
stronger claim to truth than art." Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1965), p. 37. (See the following for discussions of image, appearance and fiction in art and science: 
J, secs. 34, 192. 296; GM, Ill. secs. 12, 25; G, " 'Reason' in Philosophy," sec. 6, "Skirmishes of an 
Untimely Man," sec. 26; WM, secs. 545 t'. 553 f, 618 f.) 
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object model evolves to the energy-object model, for this would, of course, re-
quire extensive analysis of later work. I have only analyzed the early self-object 
model, with hints, mostly in the footnotes, about continuities with later energy-
object models. I agree with Kaufmann that the will to power is a unification of 
various earlier forms of drives. "The will is not a single entity but more like a con-
stantly shifting federation or alliance of drives." 15 Later there are unifying 
functions of the will to power, parallel to Dionysian drive, and there are also 
forming, boundary setting, specializing functions of the will to power, parallel to 
Apollinian drive. Instead of two drives, Nietzsche later speaks of very many 
different forms of the will to power. A dynamic center of energy forms, shapes, 
transforms, dominates, integrates, idealizes, masters, etc. Such acts are various 
kinds of energy-object rclations. 16 My analysis of the structure of tragedy clarifies 
some of Nietzsche's criticisms of Euripides. The chorus ceases to play its role as 
the cause of tragedy. The causal primacy of the Dionysian part of the self-object 
model is destroyed by the new role which Euripides gives the chorus. Music 
ceases to be the substratum which discharges itself in Apollinian imagery. 
SYMBOLIC POWERS 
Nietzsche repeatedly refers to Dionysian ecstasy as exciting all the symbolic 
powers, and it is essential here to clarify what is meant by symbolic powers and 
thus what kind of assertion and truth various elements of tragedy can have. 
In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his 
symbolic faculties .... The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; 
we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called 
into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech but the whole 
pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic movement. Then 
the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward, particularly those of music, in 
rhythmics, dynamics, and harmony. To grasp this collective release of all the 
symbolic powers, man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation 
which seeks to express itself symbolically through all these powers-and so the 
dithyrambic votary of Dionysus is understood only by his peers. (GT, sec. 2) 
We notice the causal primacy of the Dionysian dithyramb, reminding us of the 
causal primacy of ecstatic states originally in private visions and later in trans-
forming the masked figure of Dionysus, a transformation analogous to the trans-
formation of the veiled figure by the grieving Admetus. But to move further, we 
notice that symbolic powers include a rich range of bodily and imagistic expres-
1s WM, p. 381 n. 
16 See the following for the variety of activities which arc the will to power: WM, secs. 602, 605, 
658, 105o;J, secs. 36,213; GM, pt. IJ, secs. 11, 17 f. 
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sion. There is symbolism of lips, face, speech and the whole pantomime and 
gesture of dancing. There is symbolism of music in rhythmics, dynamics and 
harmony. These symbolic powers in a state of ecstasy release still further images of 
symbolic power, specifically of course the symbolic realm of images, the Apol-
linian. Even dreams are "symbolic chains of scenes and images in place of a 
narrative poetic language" (MA, II, pt. II, sec. 194). Nietzsche apparently means 
that acts such as gesturing, dancing, movements of the face have their own kind of 
meaning, and thus they are symbolic; they can be kinds of"assertions." They are 
non-verbal languages, languages which speak in the natural symbolism of gesture 
and bodily movement. The meaning of such symbolic realms can be understood 
only by other Dionysian votaries in ecstatic states. We are reminded of the New 
Testament glossolalia where only others possessed of the spirit could understand 
the strange tongues. Nietzsche here means that Dionysian ecstasy heightens the 
actor's sense by which he knows the meaning of every gesture, movement and 
facial expression. The Dionysian not only releases a full range of symbolism but 
heightens the sense of gesture necessary to understand the symbolism. With the 
freed ranges of symbolism and the heightened actor's sense necessary to under-
stand them, the gestures can be "assertions" which express reality, reality here 
being Dionysian "Ur-Eine." 
When the masked god appeared in Apollinian form on the scene, replacing 
private visions, the full range of symbolic powers of drama was complete. "In the 
light of this insight we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian chorus 
which ever anew discharges itself in an Apollinian world of images .... Thus the 
drama is the Apollinian embodiment of Dionysian insights and effects and thereby 
separated, as by a tremendous chasm, from the epic" (GT, sec. 8). The Apollinian 
definitely introduces a new realm of symbolic possibilities and a new kind of arti-
culation. "That he appears at all with such epic precision and clarity is the work of 
the dream-interpreter, Apollo, who through this symbolic appearance interprets 
to the chorus its Dionysian state" (GT, sec. 10). The visual statement has some 
advantages over symbolism of dance and gesture and music in its clarity, precision 
and beauty. 
The Apollinian appearances in which Dionysus objectifies himself are no longer 
"an eternal sea, changeful strife, a glowing life," like the music of the chorus, no 
longer those forces, merely felt and not condensed into images, in which the 
enraptured servant of Dionysus senses the nearness of the god: now the clarity and 
firmness of epic form addresses him from the scene; now Dionysus no longer speaks 
through forces but as an epic hero, almost in the language of Homer. (GT, sec. 8) 
This passage is especially significant because it tells us what would be lost without 
the Apollinian. The Dionysian no longer speaks just through forces or energies of 
the affective self aroused by ecstasy, but it now speaks in forces condensed into 
images. The Dionysian is still causally basic, but the Apollinian adds a distinct kind 
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of articulation in visual imagery. Without Apollinian articulation, one merely 
feels the value of life in experiencing Dionysian energy. Apollinian imagery and 
representation more clearly state Dionysian wisdom. At the level of felt value of 
Dionysian energy, Dionysian "wisdom" has to be placed in qualifying quotes 
because it is not fully articulated.We recall, however, that visual symbolism tends 
to lose its convincingness and creep into historical dogmas unless infused with a 
sense ofreality, but not entified, by Dionysian energy and ecstasy. 
To sum up, "symbolic powers" seems to mean a full range of natural and 
conventional languages each of which has its own peculiar advantages and kind of 
meaning, the full range of which make various kinds of "statements" or "asser-
tions." I place "statements" and "assertions" in qualifying quotes because there is 
some peculiarity about statements made by dance, facial gesture, body gesture, 
song and image. All these can have their kind of meaning, peculiar to their 
medium, and they give multi-level assertions of Dionysian wisdom. Thus they 
can be "true" in the sense of"asserting" the nature of reality. The highest tragedies 
show in dance, song, poetry, imagery, dialogue and characters the truth of 
Dionysian wisdom. A visual representation, as in painting, can obviously be an 
assertion. Given a system of projection, and given titles and names of art works, 
they make assertions about how things look, and what they were like as based on 
their looks. Likewise in viewing dance we expect to find some meaning in gestures 
and movement. The dance can be an assertion in that sense. Poetry obviously can 
assert truth, and since it is a linguistic art there is less of a metaphor in calling 
poetry statemental or assertive, though of course we have to emphasize that it docs 
not assert like science. Further, there can be meaning in the interactions of char-
acters and events. As Aristotle saw, we even look for meaning in chance occur-
rences when they are in a tragedy.17 Tragedy employs a full range of symbolic 
powers to assert Dionysian wisdom, and the Dionysian state of ecstasy is causally 
basic in releasing these powers which ultimately express the truth of Dionysian 
wisdom. Art is metaphysical in the sense that it employs a full range of symbolic 
powers to "assert" the truth about reality. There arc passages where Nietzsche 
suggests that Apollo is escapist (GT, secs. 1, 4). These lines of thought are later 
rejected as weak pessimism. But there are more passages where the Apollinian is a 
condensation into imagery of Dionysian wisdom, where Dionysian wisdom dis-
charges itself into Apollinian images, where the image is an Apollinian represen-
tation of Dionysus. 
The relation of symbolic powers to the self-object model is this: The Diony-
sian self drives forth all the symbolic powers. The symbolic powers are various 
levels of meaning which represent or show in the various parts (dance, poetry, 
gesture, imagery, music) of tragedy. These layers of symbolic meaning gravitate 
to two parts, the Dionysian self or the Apollinian scene, as shown above. Nietz-
17 Poetics. 1452a. 6-10. 
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schc does not discuss how these different levels of meaning "assert" Dionysian 
wisdom. He docs not discuss how an art which can represent Dionysus in image 
can assert the same meaning as an art (music) which is not representational but 
presumably shows a Dionysian nature or wisdom. The problem here is how arts 
which can represent subject matter harmonize with or mutually assert what non-
representational arts show. Of course, the interrelations of representing, evoking 
and showing are very complex and still problematical. 
THE ART OF PAINTING 
The distinction above between Dionysian and Apollinian as clements versus 
content is helpful in understanding Nietzsche's scattered remarks about paintings. 
In general, of course, music, images and other elements, when experienced in 
themselves, apart from their role in tragedy, must have a very different nature 
than they ha vein tragedy. Apart from the drama or some other combining art, the 
art in question (say music or plastic imagery) naturally ceases to have the sense of 
some special role. When we view plastic images apart from their role in tragedy, 
those images cannot in the same direct sense be the focus ofDionysian ecstasy. The 
Dionysian cannot discharge itself into an image because one does not view paint-
ings normally as a part of a satyr chorus. The normal museum-goer does not work 
himself up or have himself worked up by a satyr chorus in preparation for the 
image of his god. Unfortunately, Nietzsche does not, at least with regard to 
painting, make the transition from the role of a plastic image in drama to the 
nature and rich possibilities of plastic images considered as arts in themselves. To 
be specific, Nietzsche's few discussions of actual Renaissance paintings are, so far 
as I know, entirely discussions of represented content. Representational content is 
the role plastic imagery plays in tragedy, but there are many other levels of sym-
bolization in painting, and Nietzsche has the equipment, so to speak, to discuss 
them. I think perhaps the reason Nietzsche does not make the transition from 
discussing the rich levels of symbolic meaning of parts of tragedy to a similar dis-
cussion of aspects of an art like painting is this: Functional parts such as chorus 
versus scene are relatively isolable. There is certainly a sense in which paintings 
have parts too, but I think the true parallel to what I have heen calling functional 
parts in tragedy, in contrast to content, might be aspects of a painting. Aspects are 
ways we can attend to works of art (for example attending to color or line) even 
though that aspect cannot exist independently as a functional part can. Tragedy 
has a full range of symbolic powers, some easily isolable because of distinct ele-
ments of tragedy. A painting has fewer isolable elements, but it still has a wide 
range of aspects such as subject matter represented, color considered in a color 
scheme, line drawing, etc. There arc here abundant possibilities for the reinforce-
ment of various symbolic realms (say the different realms of brush gesture versus 
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represented subject matter) though the symbolic powers now show themselves in 
aspects of the art work instead of isolable functional parts (such as chorus, music, 
scene, dance, poetry). Nietzsche could, in other words, have shown levels of 
aspects in painting equivalent to levels of symbolic powers which are exemplified 
in functional parts of tragedy. Instead of this, however, he discusses only repre-
sented content of painting, and I shall suggest some extensions of his thought. 
Representational content is only one aspect of painting, and to discuss it alone is 
not enough. 
In extending the above ideas to specific paintings, I must emphasize that 
Nietzsche was not very interested in analyzing specific works of art. 18 A survey 
of Nietzsche's work for references to Renaissance painters such as Raphael and 
Michelangelo will turn up few references to specific paintings. Nietzsche was 
more interested in the phenomenon of artistic creation, more interested in the 
genius of Michelangelo and Raphael as phenomena of culture, than in showing 
how genius leaves its mark in painting. Even the references to specific works, such 
as Raphael's "Transfiguration," use the work mainly to tell us about Raphael. 
Works are looked at in terms of being symptoms or signs of Dionysian genius. 
Thus I realize I am extending Nietzsche's thought beyond his main interests, and 
in these extensions relatively few paintings cited by Nietzsche can be mentioned. 
Further, I only extrapolate the terms in which one could analyze specific paintings. 
I leave actual analyses to art critics and art historians. 
In projecting Nietzsche's ideas to aspects of painting, one can use basically 
two kinds of remarks, those specifically about paintings and acts of painting and 
those about other arts which could have a painting analogue. To extend his com-
ments on other arts to painting would require an examination ofNietzsche's ideas 
of the interrelations of various arts, a subject too large to explore here.19 But the 
simpler task of collecting his remarks about paintings and painting acts will reveal 
the critical possibilities of Nietzsche's thought and at the same time show how 
various aspects of painting could be cues to the nature of the painter's genius, the 
latter possibility, of course, being completely in line with Nietzsche's basic 
intentions and interests. 
The remarks about painting are more often about activities of painting than 
they are about aspects of specific paintings. The important exceptions to this claim 
are discussions of representational content, the first aspect discussed. In discussing 
18 See his denial of this claim: GM, III, sec. 4. 
19 For example, Nietzsche clearly thought certain rhythms and gestures in music or dance could 
be characterized as Dionysian or Apollinian. Perhaps one could transfer these suggestions to brush 
gesture, and then one could discuss how brush gestures of an Apollinian or Dionysian nature reinforced 
or were in tension with subject matter represented. This would enrich the critical possibilities of 
Nietzsche's concepts of Dionysian and Apollinian. A related suggestion is Nietzsche's claim that certain 
tempos were Apollinian and others were Dionysian O, sec. 246). These perhaps also could be transferred 
to brush stroke and other aspects of plastic arts which could have something analogous to rhythms. 
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the second, third and fourth aspects, I have extended hints and suggestions 
Nietzsche makes about creative acts in contrast to actual paintings. 1) Representa-
tional content, in terms of the subjects chosen and the manner treated, can give us 
cues to the painter's philosophy of life or Weltanschauung. Representational 
content, as suggested in the section on symbolic powers, can "assert" in a rela-
tively direct sense a view of life or reality. The discussion of Raphael's "Trans-
figuration" is in terms of representational content, the lower half of the painting 
representing Dionysian wisdom in suffering and the upper half representing 
Apollinian light and beauty (GT, sec. 4). There is the same emphasis on subject 
matter in the later remarks on the Sistine Madonna. Nietzsche speculates about 
what the beautiful maiden on the right is saying to the spectator. He discusses the 
Christ child's eyes in terms of expressing anticipated distress and in terms of being 
the eyes of a man instead of a child (MA, II, pt. II, sec. 73). Further, Nietzsche 
reads Raphael's philosophy oflife from these paintings. Raphael's subjects are too 
sensual for a nay-sayer, he could not be a Christian, he is too Dionysian for that. 
There is a problem here of identifying Raphael's views with the nature of the 
represented subjects, a problem analogous to identifying Shakespeare with any of 
his dramatis personae, and Nietzsche is aware of the problem (MA, I, pt. IV, sec. 
176). The discussion of the Sistine Madonna is called "ehrliches Malertum" and 
shows how Raphael could be honest and paint religious subjects, an honesty 
which suggests Raphael's mocking smiles at the faith of simple viewers. Similarly, 
the discussion ofDiirer's "Knight, Death, and Devil" is in terms of the hopeless 
but determined, hard, iron look of the Knight, a philosophy attributed in this 
instance not to Diirer but to Schopenhauer (GT, sec. 20). 
Nietzsche's discussions of actual Renaissance paintings are, so far as I know, 
all like this in being about the meaning of the represented subject matter and the 
inferences these allow one to draw about the painter's philosophy oflife or illus-
trations of other philosophies of life. Such representational content may be the 
role plastic imagery played in tragedy, but painting considered in itself has to be 
analyzed in terms of richer levels of aspects. Painting can show some further full-
ness of reinforcing symbolic powers, as suggested below. 2) The powerful, 
Dionysian painter always idealizes, he never mirrors. Idealizing consists in seeing 
the essence, the typical, and Nietzsche admired this aspect of Greek art. Treatment 
of detail shows decadence. Idealizing is the confidence to seize the main features 
(G, "Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," secs. 8, 9). Here is an aspect of painting 
Nietzsche could have explored, a level of symbolic power other than representa-
tional content. To make this a critically useful concept, the critic would have to 
know when idealizing had taken place, and that would take knowledge of the 
essence of the thing represented, a rather difficult concept to employ critically with 
any confidence. Ruskin perhaps faces this dilemma in Modern Painters in looking 
for true nature in painting. Further, signs that a painter had idealized, assuming we 
could overcome the problems just mentioned, would not be signs of his view of 
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life so much as signs of his confidence and knowledge of the kind of thing repre-
sented. Idealizing tells us only the view of the nature of what is represented, not 
the painter's views in some more general sense. 3) Power can be shown in domi-
nance of material, and power in the sense of sheer technical mastery, complete 
control of the medium, would be a different aspect of painting which Nietzsche 
could have discussed. Such power would not tell us a painter's views, nor what he 
sees as the essence of some subject. It would simply evidence his mastery of his art. 
Nietzsche clearly realized the role of craft in genius. 20 Power could show in one's 
views, in the boldness in seizing the essence with economical means and in mas-
tery. Raphael's views are almost stated in the subject matter represented, but his 
power is shown in his mastery. Nietzsche definitely shifts to emphasizing mastery 
of means as perhaps a necessary condition of art (MA, I, pt. IV). 4) "All art 
exercises the power of suggestion over the muscles and senses ... " (WM, sec. 809). 
Analogously, "movement is symbolism for the eye; it indicates that something 
has been felt, willed, thought" (WM, sec. 492). There arc two senses in which 
painting can speak through our muscles. We could feel the brush gesture, perhaps 
sensing what making that gesture would be like, and thus perhaps whether it is 
Apollinian or Dionysian. Painters no doubt have more of this sort of sensibility 
than the viewer who has never handled a brush. A second sort of appeal to our 
muscles, or at least to our tactile-kinaesthetic senses, would be more what the 
shapes or forms in the painting felt like. Arc they impending, stable, about to 
collapse, etc.? We might summarize these two senses of speaking through our 
muscles by saying a picture space is sometimes a space to gesture in and at other 
times a space to look into, corresponding to two levels of tactile meaning. In 
summary, we might say that in representations and idealizations a painter states 
views and shows what he considers the nature of the represented subjects to be. In 
mastery and tactile symbolism there is more showing than stating. Body knowl-
edge, so to speak, here manifests itself. These arc four levels on which the Diony-
sian or Apollinian could be involved in forms of representing, idealizing and 
showing. Raphael's Dionysian energy manifests itself in aspects of his painting 
(representation, idealizing, mastery), aspects here being somewhat equivalent to 
elements of tragedy. Nietzsche makes many remarks about Raphael being 
Dionysian, a true Renaissance genius, and I have tried to show how he could give 
these remarks substance in analyzing Raphael's paintings. I have tried to show 
how Dionysian release of a full range of symbolic powers can be seen in many 
aspects of painting. If we developed some of the realms of symbolic powers from 
other arts, Nietzsche would be able to talk about a painting at a plurality oflevels 
of aspects. He could show how Raphael's views, seizing the essence of things, and 
various levels of symbolism of gesture were Dionysian. This would be a more 
adequate discussion of Raphael's painting than any Nietzsche actually gives. 
20 See:J, sec. 188; MA, Vol. I, pt. 4, secs. 145, 155, 156, 163, 164, 165. 
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I give this final suggestion on how to extend the self-object model to the act of 
viewing paintings. Even though the museum spectator before a painting is not in a 
Dionysian state of ecstasy, that spectator has previously experienced or felt the life 
force of overcoming even in the face of death, and a great painting (one which 
articulates Dionysian wisdom) is a visual articulation of these feelings and experi-
ences even though the self is not in that ecstatic state immediately prior to the 
appearance in image. One recognizes a great painting by seeing a visual articula-
tion of life energies one has felt. It works through memory of ecstasy instead of 
actual states of ecstasy. A painting thus is an assertion of metaphysical truth, of the 
reality of life, which rings true to our memories of Dionysian experiences or 
states. Nietzsche does not give these arguments, perhaps because he was not clear 
about the difference between role and content, but he could quite consistently 
give these extensions of his thought. 
VI 
The Impact of Ancient Greece and of French Classicism 
on Nietzsche's Concept of Tragedy * 
KURT WEINBERG 
Only as esthetic phenomena are existence and the universe 
forever justified. (Nietzsche1) 
Nietzsche's views on classical tragedy arc closely linked to his tragic vision of 
life, and informed by an uncompromising aestheticism which precludes all 
judgments about the moral effects of tragedy on the audience. He looks upon 
both life and tragedy from the viewpoint of the artist who experiences the creative 
process which originates in chance but, paradoxically, bears the stamp of an 
inescapable necessity, engendered as it is by forces deeply rooted beneath the 
reaches of consciousness. They are brought to light by the disciplined exercise of 
controls, and subject to the strictures of rhetoric and poetics. The poet and the 
tragic hero alike must consent to their fate which leads to an act of self-destruction: 
amor Jati. The poet, fervently committed to his fate, consents to an orgiastic self-
sacrifice, to his self-denial in an act both intuitive (or Dionysian) and rhetorical 
(or Apollonian, form-giving), for the poet's creative principle is in Nietzsche's 
own term a "sublimation" of erotic energy (W, III, 924). Amor fati commands 
the tragic hero to obey a will to power, a frenzied instinct which, blinding his 
reason, controls him and drives him towards his doom. The poet's creative sub-
limation and the tragic hero's acceptance of his fate, their subsequent redemption 
and purgation, are symbolized by the seasonal immolation and resurrection of 
Dionysus Zagreus who, for Nietzsche, is incarnate in the heroes of tragedies 
enacted during the Dionysian festivals. 
* The present chapter is a considerably expanded version of Kurt Weinberg, "Nietzsche's Paradox 
of Tragedy," Yale French Studies, 38 (1967), 251-66. 
1 Quotations, if not otherwise indicated, refer to the three-volume edition of Nietzsche's Werke 
edited by Karl Schlcchta, which, although not complete, offers the advantage of not having been 
bowdlerized by Frau Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche. (For key to abbreviations, see p. xvii above.) F.O. 
and F.N. = Carl Albrecht Bernoulli, Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschajt, 2 vols. 
Gena: E. Friederichs, 1908). The translations are mine. The epigraph is from (W, I, 40; I, 131). 
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From Heinse to Kleist, Holderlin, Friedrich Schlegel, Schelling and Friedrich 
Creuzer, the figure of Dionysus had obsessed German thought and letters. It had 
led Gottfried Welcker to syncretic speculations on similarities between Dionysus 
and Christ, which Nietzsche shattered by opposing to Christianity's ascetic 
values the frenzies of the Dionysian mysteries, life-asserting even in the trium-
phant acceptance of the necessary destruction of the highest type of individual 
within the never-ending cycle of birth, death, and rebirth in a universe governed 
by the law of the conservation of energy. But Nietzsche went beyond the German 
obsession with the Dionysian. Even in The Birth of Tragedy he had limited its 
impact by counterbalancing it with the Apollonian: in tragedy, the Dionysian 
and Apollonian symbolically combine into a complex Bruderbund, a unity where 
"Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, Apollo however, in the end, the 
language of Dionysus" (W, I, 120). It amounts to a critique of the Wagnerian 
Musikdrama, subversively built into a work that purports to exalt it, and written 
by a former disciple of Wagner who, gradually disenchanted with the master, 
was rapidly progressing toward a passionate rejection of the Germany of the 
Griinderjahre, its coarse Bildungsphilister, and its cultural emptiness. Wagner's 
"total work of art" will ultimately become for Nietzsche the exemplum for 
everything that is amorphous, excessive, pretentious, and (what I would call) 
Heldenkitsch in the newly founded Reich: an uncouth and plebeian mixture of 
genres, the very opposite of classical restraints, bienseances, honnetete, esprit, 
sophrosyne, and aristocratic litotes which distinguish French civilization before 
the advent of Romanticism, and, despite Romanticism, far into the late nine-
teenth century. It is true, Nietzsche's attitude toward Wagner will always be 
ambiguous; his passion for Wagnerian music will never quite die down. Yet, the 
break with Wagner becomes more and more pronounced. In the end it proves 
irreconcilable, after the experience of Bayreuth and Germany's military victory 
over France, the only European country which has achieved that "unity of 
artistic style in all vital expressions of a nation" that, for Nietzsche, is the very 
essence of"civilization" (Kultur; W, I, 140). While the Wagnerian Musikdrama 
and the W agnerians with their boisterous chauvinism and antisemitism are 
Nietzsche's warning examples of vulgarity and barbarity, he upholds the classical 
French civilization of the seventeenth century as an exemplary combination of 
self-restraint, moderation, good taste and elegance-in language, thought, 
manners, and art-which alone qualifies as "civilization." The civilizing lesson 
taught by the court of Louis XIV goes counter to the peasant instincts of the 
Germans from Lessing to the Wilhelmian era who clamor for a return to man's 
first, unpolished animal nature (not unlike Goethe's Baccalaureus, who proclaims: 
"Im Deutschen li.igt man, wenn man hoflich ist" - "In the German language one 
lies if one is polite" [ Faust II, I. 6771 ]). They show little or no understanding for 
the French classical concept of"le nature!," i.e., the inborn natural potential, the 
!?:erm of that accomplished second nature which man attains by undergoing the 
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complex process of a humanistic education. This refining process strips him of 
nai'vete, credulity and brutishness, giving him in the end a persona consistent with 
his status in life, a social mask of manners, language, gestures and ostentation-(in 
the seventeenth century, a gentlemanly virtue and not a vice)-apt to conceal his 
human, all-too-human first nature in its nai:ve ( = native), "sincere" crudity. In a 
word, the aristocratic civilization of seventeenth-century France-a school of 
manners, taste, intellectual rigor, urbane skepticism, and wit whose indelible 
stamp can be found in French civilization even in an age ofRomantic decadence-
serves as the ideal model of an aesthetic ethics with which Nietzsche confronts the 
Philistine and inelegant grossness of his contemporary Germany, the military 
power that overcame the French Army while remaining far behind the cultural 
achievements of the nation it had vanquished in 1871. 
At this point, it would seem useful to see to what extent Nietzsche might 
actually have read French seventeenth-century authors. One wonders, in the 
presence of Carl Albrecht Bernoulli's well-documented claim that "Nietzsche 
never mastered, even approximately, any modern foreign language" (F.O. and 
F.N., I, 154). In Basel, Nietzsche had taken French lessons with a student in 
theology. "It was pretty much a beginners' course; the dictionary was frequently 
referred to. Nietzsche never succeeded in reading a French text off the page, much 
less in following one that was read aloud to him. He often asked his friends to 
translate passages for him that he considered important. Orally, Overbeck ... 
occasionally translated French texts for him on the spur of the moment; Mrs. 
Overbeck, Gersdorff, Mrs. Marie Baumgartner and others did so for him in 
writing" (ibid.). 
What seventeenth and eighteenth-century French authors had Nietzsche 
actually "read" -either in this manner, or in translation? Racine is mentioned six 
times en passant; twice (W, I, 801, and again W, II, 1045) to illustrate Nietzsche's 
theory that music often lags behind poetry, and that a century after Racine, 
Mozart does for music what Racine had done for the drama. A strange compari-
son; while it may apply to the melodious quality of Racine's alexandrines, the 
analogy leaves one perplexed when confronted with the ferocious passions and 
vacillations of Racine's heroines and heroes (e.g., Phedre, Pyrrhus). Corneille 
appears four times in Nietzsche's works, again quite incidentally, as an example of 
classical excellence, worthy of his aristocratic and refined French audience, and-
in the most important passage (which I shall consider in due time)-to elucidate 
Nietzsche's idea of classical self-sufficiency (W, II, 91). Not once does Nietzsche 
quote, refer to, or analyze a single Cornelian or Racinian tragedy. Nor does his 
criticism dwell in any significant way upon other seventeenth-century French 
dramatists. Wherever French classicists are mentioned, their merits are discussed 
in general terms to oppose the virtues of good breeding-a passion for lucidity, 
form, psychology, courtly manners, esprit, and moderation-to the blundering 
barbarity of Germanic "naturalizing" tendencies. For Nietzsche is actually more 
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concerned with the French moralists than with France's playwrights of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In search of a new morality "beyond good 
and evil," Nietzsche finds in La Rochefoucauld's Maximes the potential germ for 
an aristocratically aesthetic ethos, as he had found it in his youth in Theognis. He 
had admired and shared Theognis' hortatory contempt for hoi kakoi-in a literal 
and archaic sense "the ugly," and hence "the villains," the "baseborn" (cf. 
Theognis, Elegeion I, II. 39-52; 847-50; and Nietzsche, W, II, 776). Although 
thoroughly Christian, La Rochefoucauld furnishes Nietzsche with a modern 
parallel to Theognis which, if thought through to its logical extreme, would 
permit the elaboration of an anti-Christian ethos where "good" would equal 
"beautiful" and "highborn," while "evil" would be the equivalent of "ugly," 
"brutish," and "baseborn." La Rochefoucauld's Maximes could be stretched to 
encompass Theognis' morality of fate (in which lineage is fate), goodness being 
arete, the innate virtue of being well born, and evil, the genetic villainy of kakia, 
base birth. 2 Within such a scheme, tragedy could experience a rebirth, mirroring 
the tragic fate of humanity's highest individuals in a celebration transcending all 
modem "Naturalism," transfigured into a ritual governed by the strict restraints 
of the classical genre. An aristocratic ethos would place-as does Racine's poetics 
-verisimilitude above "truth." It would, to use Nietzsche's terms, set "Schein" 
above an immoderate concern with "Sein" or (even worse) with "Werden"-
the modern German disease of historicism. It could modify, in an aristocratic and 
Nietzschean way, Hegel's bourgeois dictum "What is, is good" to read "What is, 
is fated" -pointing back to a classicist sense of magnificence and of noblesse oblige, 
irretrievably lost, it would seem, since the French Revolution. For what is fated 
must be accepted by the hero, and lovingly so, even if it leads to his destruction. 
Originally, Nietzsche's interest in La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyere and 
Vauvenargues was apparently aroused by a rather pejorative judgment of La 
2 In one of Nietzsche's less fortunate aphorisms (W, II, 775 f.), his enthusiasm for Theognis spills 
over into a racist praise of the blond, Aryan Herrenrasse. His attitude is prompted in part by his disap-
pointment with Dr. Paul Ree and Lou von Salome. Howeyer-as we have tried to explain-it is 
mainly to replace the Judaeo-Christian morality of "good" and "evil" by anesthetic ethos of "good" 
. and "bad" ("wellborn" and "villainous"). A number of Nietzsche's inconsistencies can be traced to his 
sermonizing on Herren- und Sklavenmoral, by far the weakest and most outlived part of his philosophy. 
His anti-Jewish outbursts stop short of anti-Semitism. Paradoxically, they have much in common with 
the religious anti-Judaism of evangelical theologians like Erasmus and Luther, although they move 
diametrically in the opposite sense, i.e., that of paganism. They are pirectcd against Judaeo-Christian 
ethics as they derive from the New Testament-not against the Jews as an "inferior race." In fact, 
Nietzsche loves the Old Testament and its vigorous "immoral" Jews. What he rejects is Pauline doc-
trine. His praise for the "blond barbarians" who "conquered the original population ofNorthem and 
Central Europe" does not extend to the "debased" modem Germans and their vulgar chauvinism. The 
key to Nietzsche's paradoxical views may be found in Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), where the author stresses that totalitarianism is by its very nature 
"anti-nationalist.'' 
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Rochefoucauld's Maximes in a letter by Rohde, dated 24 November 1868. 
Ironically, Frau Cosima Wagner (who had once given him Montaigne's Essais 
as a Christmas present) was among those who most enthusiastically stimulated 
Nietzsche's growing regard for those French authors whom he later used as 
weapons against Wagner and the W agnerians. Whatever little Nietzsche may 
have read in La Rochefoucauld and Pascal, in particular, had left a lasting impact 
on his thought, and even more so on the formal aspects of his work. For it was, 
no doubt, the compact form of Pascal's Pensees, La Bruyere's Les Caracteres, La 
Rochefoucauld's and Vauvenargues' Reflexions et Maximes-perhaps more than 
Lichtenberg and Paul Ree-which determined the mature Nietzsche's choice of 
the aphorism as his favorite vehicle of expression. 
Pascal becomes Nietzsche's prime example of the most terrifying facets of 
the Christian faith, a faith which "resembles a perpetual suicide of reason" (W, 
II, 610). Pascal occupies the first place among all Christians owing to a combi-
nation of fire, spirit, and integrity (W, I, 1139); he is "the most instructive victim 
of Christianity" (W, II, 1088), and its "most admirable logician" (W, III, 589). 
At one point, Nietzsche speaks ofhim in nearly passionate terms: "Pascal whom I 
almost love, since he has taught me infinitely much; the only logical Christian," 
he admits in a letter to Georg Brandes, dated Torino, 20 November 1888. Among 
the moralists of the seventeenth century, Pascal is the one who truly obsessed 
Nietzsche's mind; his name occurs fifty times in Nietzsche's work (not to mention 
his correspondence). The name of La Rochefoucauld, whom he prefers to all 
others, and whom he admires for his passionate refusal to be duped by his own 
potential rationalizations, for his gentlemanly pessimism and natural nobility, 
occurs only seventeen times in his writings (although some aphorisms can be 
traced back to the Maximes). 3 His predilection goes next to Fontenelle' s incorrup-
tible intellectuality and stylistic urbanity. Vauvenargues' polite stoicism goes 
somewhat against his grain. La Bruyere's Les Caracteres repels Nietzsche; as 
he sees it, it partakes of its author's middle-class baseness. And Rousseau is 
Nietzsche's prototype for "modern" man-half idealist, half canaille. 
This bird's eye view may suffice to give an idea of Nietzsche's cursory but 
surprisingly concise knowledge of seventeenth and eighteenth-century French 
moralists. It is not that of a scholar, concerned with minute details that might 
serve as a basis for cautious conclusions. It is, on the contrary, that of a bold 
thinker who, founding his thought on the most sketchy "readings," sometimes 
blunders in details but who intuitively reaches remar~ably keen and accurate 
insights of a general nature. For Nietzsche, at heart a somewhat reluctant Pla-
tonist, is interested in universal rather than in particular ideas. And from his 
unscholarly and fragmentary, yet precise knowledge, he abstracts universals 
which contrast the age of Louis XIV with that of Wilhelm II, classicism (i.e., 
3 W. D. Williams has done so in his Nietzsche and the French (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952). 
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civilization) with romanticism (barbarity), an era of restraint and self-sufficiency 
-ahistorical by definition-with the romantic drive toward boundlessness, the 
infinite, and historical histrionics. What exactly arc these universals, which, in 
turn, will allow us to focus on the Nietzschean concept of tragedy as a genre and 
as a cosmic law, governing the stage as a world, and, metaphysically seen, the 
world as a stage for the tragic sense oflife? 
Classicism simplifies, omits detail, assimilates thought, plots, and myths 
without concern for "historical accuracy," shows qualities of hardness, coldness, 
and the unavoidable logic of fate which is grounded in the irrational. Periods of 
classicism represent those very brief moments of perfection and ripeness towards 
which human history slowly ascends in its ever repeated cycles of maturation and 
decline. In Nietzsche's description, the classicist artist has regained that innocence 
and self-sufficiency which is symbolically marked by the last stage in the three 
metamorphoses of Zarathustra's first speech (Von den drei Verwandlungen). The 
classicist author is indeed-like the child in the Zarathustra parable-an incarna-
tion of Nietzsche's Obermensch: 4 he has successfully overcome the "camel's" 
burden of heaviness, slain the dragon "thou shalt" with the "lion's" "I will" and 
has reached, beyond that, the "child's" innocence and liberation from the past. 
In his creative self-sufficiency, he strangely combines elements of Jacob Burck-
hardt's man of the Italian Renaissance with those of the playwrights and moralistes 
of the court of Louis XIV. (1) A classicist author must vanquish his potential 
repressions; he must allow all his contradictory talents, emotions, and desires to 
participate in his creative efforts, but in such a way that "they all move under one 
single yoke" -an image for formal control under the aegis of les contraintes, the 
restraints imposed upon the artist by the requirements of genre, style, level, taste, 
the "Aristotelian" unities, the alexandrine, etc. (2) A classicist author must (and 
actually can only) come at the right moment (a) to bring about the culmination 
of a particular type of literature, art, and politics; and (b) to mirror in his work the 
totality of a nation, a civilization at a time when this totality is still intact (for 
example, in the case of both (a) and (b), Corneille, Racine, Poussin, La Roche-
foucauld). (3) A classicist dramatist must write his plays without self-consciously 
attempting to reconstitute with scholarly accuracy the historical scene of the 
classical model he imitates. (4) The classical author must bring things to an end 
and move beyond them, he must conclude rather than look back. His mind must 
move forward rather than "react" -boldly transposing classical situations into 
the language and world of his day. (5) The classical author must say "yes," in all 
4 The concept of the Vbermensch offers many disturbing and confusing aspects. The contradictions 
involved in this concept seem to resolve themselves, in part at least, if one integrates the Obermensch 
into Nietzsche's cyclical idea of history (the Eternal Return): he would then mark those cyclical returns 
of culminating points in the history of Man which coincide with periods of "classicism" (e.g., Attic 
civilization, the age of Augustus, the Italian Renaissance, the seventeenth century in France). 
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instances; he must say "yes" even when he voices hatred, spite, negation Gust as 
Racine, for example, depicts the passions of Phedre, Nero, and Roxane, without 
passing moral judgment on his characters). Finally, (6) "moral perfection," in the 
Christian sense of the word, stands in absolute contradiction to everything 
classical (W, III, 516). For Nietzsche, these conditions coincided in the great men 
. of sixth century (B.C.) Greece, as well as in those of the Italian Renaissance and of 
seventeenth-century France. Classicism is the art of the mask: "Always in dis-
guise," is its formula: "the greater a man's superiority, the greater is his need of 
the incognito" (W, III, 445). The mask is our best defense against the temptation 
of naturalism which Lessing and Shakespeare were unable to resist: "The rigorous 
restraints which the French dramatists accepted regarding the unities of action, 
place and time, style, versification, and syntax, the choice of words and thoughts 
was as important a school" [ as the fugue for music and Gorgian figures for Greek 
rhetoric]. There is "no other means to rid ourselves of naturalism" -the lowest 
and most primitive anti-art form-"Schein," illusion, being the highest and most 
civilized result of artistic endeavor (W, I, 577 f.). French classical tragedy is the 
"only modern form of art" which has shown European poets the way out of 
"naturalizing" crudeness (W, I, 578). Combining the Dionysian violence of 
passions with the classical restraints of Apollonian form, which the French 
classical dramatist imposed upon his work, he paralleled what Nietzsche had 
characterized as the Greek poet's ability "to dance in chains" (W, I, 932). Goethe 
alone among all German poets had understood the allegorical universality of 
classical art, and of tragedy in particular: "no new topics and characters but the 
old, well-known ones in continuously renewed attempts at revival and trans-
formation: that is art such as the mature Goethe understood it, such as the Greeks, 
and also the French, exercised it" (W, I, 581). The same aphorism condemns 
German literature after Lessing, with its struggle for "liberation" from all 
classical restraints: "Yes, they stripped themselves of the 'irrational' fetters of 
French and Greek art, but imperceptibly they accustomed themselves to finding 
irrational all fetters, all restraints-and thus art is moving towards its self-dissolu-
tion, while, in the process, ... touching upon all phases ofits beginnings [in crude 
naturalism] ... : it interprets, in its decline, its origins, its becoming" (W, I, 580). 
In Ecce Homo, "classical" and "German" are polemically contrasted as a contra-
diction in terms (W, II, 1083). By their very nature, "the French are closer to the 
Greeks" than the Germans ever were (W, I, 579). Nietzsche, the specialist of 
Greek prosody, goes so far as to assert that the quantifying principle which 
governs French syllabic verse far better approximates the Greek hexameter than 
do the emotionally stressed rhythms of German metrics (W, III, 1227). Here 
again, the affectively neutral versification of the French, with its relatively equal 
flow of syllabic verse, stands for a climax of refinement, which is contrasted with 
the "naturalizing" trends of the German meters' imitation of emotional tensions. 
Nietzsche's ever-repeated parallel praise of the ancient Greeks and the French of 
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the seventeenth-century, to the detriment of unrestrained German barbarity 
(e.g., W, II, 725), strangely contradicts Elizabeth Butler's somewhat mechanical 
thesis, according to which Nietzsche (like other great Germans) was under the 
spell of "the tyranny of Greece over Germany." 
To choose only one among the numerous equations of Greek civilization 
with that of the age of Louis XIV: "Comparison of Greek civilization and the 
French in Louis XIV' s times. Determined belief in oneself A leisure class who 
make things difficult for themselves and who are steadily conquering them-
selves. The power of form, the will to form oneself. Eudaemonism as an avowed 
goal. Much strength and energy behind formal essence. The enjoyment of the 
spectacle of life which is seemingly so easy. -The French looked upon the Greeks 
as though the latter were children" (W, III, 431). 
It would become tedious to repeat Nietzsche's frequent analogies between 
ancient Greece and the age of Louis XIV, his constant reiterations of the superi-
ority of French seventeenth-century civilization over the barbarian dissolution of 
formal restraints in German art and literature since Lessing. I shall turn instead to 
one major argument, Nietzsche's exaltation of myth over history, as a key to an 
understanding of his insistence (1) on Hellenic and French classical values, and 
(2) on tragedy-as a genre, as an aristocratic way oflife, and as a law governing 
the universe. 
All art is, for Nietzsche, an overcoming of things as they are. It is the will to 
conquer "becoming," to etcrnalize (W, III, 896). Since art perfects being by 
overcoming it, tragedy docs not (as Schopenhauer suggests) teach resignation. 
"The representation of terrifying and problematic things is itself an instinct of 
power and magnificence in the artist .... Art says 'yes,' Job says 'yes' " (W, III, 
784). The opposite of classical soundness, of good taste, of aristocratic values 
resides in a "sense of history": "The sense of history: an ignoble sense" (W, II, 
687), is characterized by its "servilely plebeian curiosity" (ibid.). "Our great 
virtue of having a sense of history" stands in "a necessary opposition to our good 
taste" (W, II, 688). In a word, the sense of history is a modern disease (W, II, II 13) 
which is closely linked to the rise of that other modern sickness, Romanticism, 
which Goethe had already diagnosed ("Classical is what is sound, romantic that 
which is sick" - "Klassisch ist das Gesunde, romantisch das Kranke," (Maxime 
863). The very spirit of Romanticism is ghostly and ghoulish, Totenerweckung, 
"ressurrection of the dead" (W, I, 218, 1122). Modern man in his lack of self-
sufficiency needs history as a substitute for life; having no predetermined role, 
no persona imposed upon him by a caste, he is a protean voyeur and an actor 
constantly in search of a part to play. He vicariously masquerades in disguises 
which are furnished him by history, "the storeroom of costumes" (W, II, 686). 
History with its need to destroy illusions is the very opposite of art, the creator 
of illusion (W, I, 252): it exorcises all healthy instincts (W, I, 239). While histori-
cism, even in Hegelian dialectics, sees things in the perspective of a linear pro-
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gression, myth is cyclical, constantly renewing itself, eternal. The whole modern 
concept of progress is absurd, for "all that is essential in human development took 
place in primeval times," before the dawn of history (W, I, 448). The historical 
disease, like Romanticism, is above all a German affliction: "We Germans are 
Hegelians, even if there had never been a Hegel, since we ... instinctively attribute 
a deeper meaning and a richer value to becoming, to evolution, than to that which 
'is'" (W, II, 226 f.). 
An attitude of this nature was alien to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
France: "Corneille's Frenchmen, and still those of the Revolution, seized upon 
Roman antiquity in a manner for which we are lacking in courage-thanks to 
our superior sense of history. And Roman antiquity itself: how violently and, at 
the same time, how naively did it take possession of everything good and superior 
in the still more ancient Greek antiquity!" (W, II, 91). Corneille and his con-
temporaries feel at ease in their century. Instead of empathizing their way into a 
mentality far removed in time and history, they assimilate ancient Rome and 
Greece to their own needs. Racine's and Corneille's ancient Romans and Greeks, 
their Trojans, Huns, biblical Jews, medieval Spaniards, and modern Turks are 
naturalized subjects of Louis XIV, indistinguishable in manners, speech, and 
gestures from la cour et la ville-and yet, they are more Roman and more Greek, 
etc., than for example, Wagner's Meistersiinger are medieval, in spite of the 
latters' historically more accurate attire. For art is not based on (often far-fetched) 
"originality," or on the "realism" of portraiture; it is founded upon the verisimili-
tude of an illusion (Schein) which uses typical rather than atypical characters. For 
the seventeenth-century French, its foremost principles were, and for Nietzsche 
still are, the conventional ones of "imitation" and "invention" -in the classical 
sense of these words: the "imitation" of great models taken from antiquity (in 
myth, tragic plots, and poetics), which demands in turn the strict observance of 
rules (three unities, alexandrines, five acts), and limits "invention" to the domain 
of embellishments (rhetorical devices, imagery, schemata verborum, etc.). For 
Nietzsche, convention "is the condition of art, not its hindrance" (W, III, 754), 
and tragedy, in particular, is predicated upon the most basic of human con-
ventions: upon language, both as verbal expression and gesture. Not in a confused 
laisser al/er does the classical dramatist attain his ends but rather by rigidly con-
trolling "invention" -in the traditional sense: the "finding" of, the "coming 
upon" striking images, rhythms, sound and rhyme patterns within the narrow 
confines of traditional plots, metric forms, and genres. His freedom resides in 
contraintes, in his ability to "dance in fetters," to vanquish self-made difficulties 
while covering them up with "the deception of facility" (W, I, 932). In so doing, 
he conforms in his own way to the same rules of artistic artificiality which govern 
the acting of the dummy-like hero of Greek tragedy (or the stylized protagonist 
of French classical drama). All art is serious play and as such is stylization: in the 
strictest meaning play-acting, pcr-:forming, representing; in short, histrionics or 
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hypocrisy (literally, the "playing of a part," Greek hypocrisis). 
. Hypocrisy, mimicry, an unconscious but infinitely artful cunning is the very 
law by which organic life seduces, for the sake of its own reproduction, the 
improvement and the evolutionary outstripping of the species. In this sense, the 
psychology ofNietzsche's Dionysian ideal of the actor-the polar opposite of the 
nineteenth-century artist who, in his schizophrenia, vicariously acts out his own 
fantasies in the characters of his novels and plays ("Madame Bovary, c'est moi!") 
-provides an insight into the physiology of deception, the sprezzatura, one might 
say, by which all organisms seem to plot the triumph of the strongest individuals 
over the mediocrity of their race. 
The paradox of art as a sexual device of Nature, the procreative and fer-
tilizing stimulus provoked by enticing colors, perfumes, sounds, and rhythmic 
movement as organic functions of plant and animal life demonstrate to what an 
extent beauty as dissimulation, as play-acting, as hypocrisy, reaches far beyond 
man and human consciousness: "Dissimulation increases, according to the as-
cending hierarchy of living things .... It seems to be absent from anorganic 
Nature: [there] power [is pitched] against power, quite crudely so-ruse begins 
with the world of organic beings; already plants are masters of ruse .... Cunning 
multipled a thousand times belongs to the essence of man's rise ... problem of the 
actor, my Dionysos-ideal ... " (W, 111, 578). One and the same type of energy or 
"will to power," a physiological and psychological drive for intoxication, blindly 
animates and metamorphoses all living things. It attains its goals by devious 
means, by sham and deception: From plant to animal and man, all sexual activity 
takes place through a triumph of art. Not Nature, but productive and sexual 
fantasies, set in motion by the illusion of beauty, lead to procreation as well as to 
the creation of works of art. In man's unique case, "it is one and the same energy 
that is spent in the conception of art and in the sex act" (W, III, 924). For the very 
existence of art, "one physiological preliminary is indispensable: intoxication," 
and "above all the intoxication of sexual excitement, great cupidity, strong 
emotions." Idealization is no more than "a rape of things, a manner of forcing the 
dominant features into the open by way of that intoxication which is a feeling of 
increased energy and exuberance" (W, II, 995). The artist's creative instinct is 
closely related to "the distribution of semen in his blood" (W, III, 870). An inquiry 
into his psychology would involve a critique of his play instinct as "a pouring 
out of energy, the enjoyment of change" and of willful transformation, a curious 
pleasure taken in "impressing one's own soul upon foreign matter," the artist's 
boundless selfishness, the kind of "instincts he sublimates" (W, III, 867). Intoxi-
cation as a phallic experience constitutes the heightened feeling of power which 
brings about artistic creation. It is that inner need which drives the artist, "to make 
of things reflexes ofhis own perfection" (W, II, 995). 
Against the esthetics of "disinterested contemplation, by means of which 
the emasculation of art tries today ... to give itself a clean conscience" (W, II, 598), 
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against Kant's and Schopenhauer's assertion that the contemplation of art 
neutralizes sexual desires, Nietzsche suggests that Stendhal comes closer to the 
truth with his contention that art is "a promise of happiness." All theorists of art, 
from Aristotle to Schopenhauer, have failed to see the essential aspects of the 
esthetic experience because, rather than envisaging art from the creative artist's 
viewpoint, they have always looked at it from the spectator's perspective. Nietz-
sche, turning to the psychology of the artist, points bluntly to the myth of 
Pygmalion (W, II, 845 ff) as a key to the understanding of the motives behind 
artistic creation. Far from being disinterested, the creative instinct takes its impetus 
from a heightening of sensual appetites and a state of intoxication. With "the 
divine Plato," Nietzsche holds that "all beauty excites the procreative powers: 
this precisely is its property, from the most sensual to the most intellectual and 
spiritual" things on the ladder ofbeing (W, II, 1003). The desire for art and beauty 
"is an indirect longing for sexual thrills which the procreative instinct communi-
cates to the cerebrum" (W, III, 870). Just as situations which are transfigured and 
enhanced by our sexual and emotional fantasies will reflect our own vitality, so, 
inversely, ifwe come into contact with objects which rank high on our personal 
scale of sensual values and which, accordingly, show "this sort of transfiguration 
and enhancement, then our animal existence responds with an excitement of 
those spheres where such states of pleasure are imbedded-and a mixture of these 
very delicate dispositions for animal enjoyments and desires is the esthetic con-
dition" (W, III, 535; cf. II, 995; III, 755). It can only be found in persons who are 
endowed with an excess of "procreative vigor" in which "always inheres the 
primum mobile" (ibid.). In short, as Freud himself acknowledges, the Freudian 
concept of "sublimation" preexists in Nietzsche's psychology of the esthetic 
experience, and so does the word itself. It originates in Human, All-Too-Human 
(1879), with Nietzsche's realization that "there is no unselfish action, nor is there 
such a thing as disinterested contemplation: both are but sublimations ... " (W, 
I, 447). The creative act overpowers the artist, turning him into its mere tool: The 
paternal patterning "Apollonian" and the maternal, matter-providing "Dionysian" 
(cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals) take possession and dispose of him 
with .the violence of natural forces majeures, "whether he is willing or not: com-
pelling him, on one hand, to become a visionary, on the other, to orgy. Both 
conditions are present in normal life too, only more weakly, as dream and 
intoxication" (W, III, 788). These latter, too, "unleash in us artistic powers which 
are at variance: dream releasing the power to see, to connect things in logical 
sequence, to create poetry; intoxication endowing us with the gift of mimicry, 
passion, song, dance" (ibid.). Rimbaud in 1871, and Nietzsche in 1872, inde-
pendent of each other, enunciate the same truth about the lyrical poet as a quasi-
passive instrument, a voice and mime ("Je est un autre") in the hands, as it were, 
of a creative power that works through him (Rimbaud to P. Dcmeny, 15 May 
1871; and The Birth of Tragedy, W, I, 38; I, 40). 
100 KURT WEINBERG 
"All perfect doing, to be exact, takes place unconsciously and is not willed" 
(W, III, 746). For Nietzsche, the will to power is "not a being, not a becoming, 
but a pathos-the most elemental fact to begin with, from which as a consequence 
'becoming' and 'producing' result" (W, III, 778). Since pathos, passion, implies 
passivity, a suffering, in a way a maternal state, the difference between "com-
mitting" one's actions and "enduring" them as they arise spontaneously from 
the blind "will to power" is, to say the least, negligible. In Nietzsche's world, 
where consciousness falsifies all values by rationalizing them, and where the 
individual never senses the true role he plays within the overall plans of the 
species, one does not "do": one is "being done, at every instant! Mankind has at all 
times confused the active and the passive: that happens to be its eternal gram-
matical blunder" (W, I, rn96). Wherever our ignorance begins and our vision is 
blocked, we "place a word, e.g., the word 'I,' the word 'do,' the word 'suffer': 
those, perhaps, arc the horizons of our knowledge, but they are no 'truths' " 
(W, III, 863). In the very separation of the concept of "action" from that of 
"suffering," Nietzsche sees a misunderstanding which is rooted in language itself, 
and hence in consciousness: language and thought, in their stumbling manner, can 
only proceed by way of "distinctions," and only distinguish or categorize by 
positing "pairs of opposites" where, in truth, seeming opposites occur organically 
intermingled as a complex and, as it were, hermaphroditic unity. "Acting" and 
"suffering" are simultaneously present in artistic creation, in the Apollonian-
Dionysian polarity and duplicity ofpoiein-for Nietzsche (the classical philolo-
gist) not merely a "making," but as in Hesiod a "bringing into existence" ( Works 
and Days no; Theogony 161, 579 etc.), in Andocides a "begetting" (1.124; 4.22), 
and in Plato literally a "conceiving" of children (Symposium 203b). Artistic 
creation wholly depends on a sexual stimulation which, in the final analysis, is 
identified by Nietzsche as an excess of procreative strength, an overflowing and 
sublimation of the will to power: "Without a certain overheating of the sexual 
system, a Raffael is unthinkable," and "music making, too, is a way of making 
children" (W, III, 756). 
Nietzsche's erotic concept of poetry (in the broadest sense, as a "making of 
works") affords remarkable insights into the psychology and physiology of the 
artist as "the maternal type of man" (W, II, 25 r), who is "constantly pregnant" 
(W, II, 243), and far beyond that, on the cosmic level, into the self-creating nature 
of"the universe as a work of art giving birth to itself' (W, III, 495). The problem 
which, from the outset, intrigues Nietzsche, in retrospect is formulated by him in 
these terms: "How far does art reach into the innermost recesses of the world? 
And do there exist, apart from the 'artist,' other artistic powers?" To the second 
question, he unhesitatingly answers "yes." As to the first, he elaborates: "The 
world is nothing else but art!" And once more he passionately affirms the superi-
ority of art over philosophy: "There is something contrary to nature in wisdom 
that is revealed by its hostility to art: to ask for knowledRe where illusion alone gives 
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deliverance, salvation-this indeed is perversion, the instinct for nothingness!" 
(MusA, XIV, 324): words which echo the major thesis of The Birth ef Tragedy and 
"The Pathos of Truth," one of five prefaces for unwritten books presented in 
r872 as Christmas gifts to Cosima Wagner: "Art is mightier than cognition for 
it wills life, and cognition attains as its ultimate goal-destruction" (W, III, 27r). 
Aisthesis, sense perception, establishes the link between art and science; it 
facilitates the understanding of the artful workings of the organic and the anor-
ganic world. Like artistic production and receptivity for art, all worthwhile 
knowledge is fully dependent on the subtlety, vigor, and alertness of the senses: 
"Today our science reaches exactly as far as our determination to accept the 
testimony of our senses" (W, II, 958). To be meaningful at all, the "realm of 
concepts" cannot be absolutely severed from "the world of the senses"; nor can 
the identity of "being" and "thinking" be abolished (W, Ill, 394). In the final 
analysis, all true cognition-in its anthropomorphic relativity-amounts to no 
more (and no less) than an esthetic experience: it cannot transcend the organic 
prison walls of the human senses. To the mind of the ancients, the esthetic 
experience rated above all other forms of knowledge. The sense of taste in 
particular, as the most subtle tool of touch and testing, for them was so closely 
related to the idea of "wisdom" that "the Greek word which designates the sage 
etymologically belongs to sapio l taste, sapiens the one who is tasting, sisyphos 
the man with the keenest taste; an acute feeling out through tasting, a significant 
aptitude for distinguo by the palate: this was the specific art of the philosopher, 
such as popular consciousness saw it" (W, III, 363 f.). Where taste, sensuality, 
wisdom, and knowledge are said to be interrelated, esthetics has clearly conquered 
the epistemological scene, and the object of its inquiry, no matter what the 
domain, will be art, that very force which, for Nietzsche, in all organisms 
stimulates life and excites its reproduction: "Art and nothing else but art: Art is 
that great power which alone makes life possible, the great seducer of life, the 
great stimulus for life" (W, III, 692). Wherever art, i.e., the will to power, com-
mands, it works through "agents" that only "act out" whatever it wills while 
they arc under the impression that they are acting of their own accord, at their 
own discretion. Psychologically seen, "the concept of 'cause' is the sensation of 
power we experience in the exercise of our so-called [free] 'will';-our notion 
'effect,' the superstition that this feeling of power is the power itself which 
moves ... " (W, III, 775). When, as in Nietzsche's thought, the entire universe 
determines like an organism the functions of even the smallest of its parts by the 
animating and destructive force of a blind will to power, haphazardly, and 
without the benefit of a guiding Hegelian Weltgeist (that obligingly would 
become conscious of itself in the cataclysms of "world" -i.e., "human" -
history) then there can be no such things as "moral" or "immoral" acts; then 
"free" and "spontaneous intentions" and the concept of"action" itself must needs 
be relegated to the world of imagination and fiction (W, III, 612). In such a 
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scheme, nothing would remain of the mystery of the universe but the dual and 
pulsating lust and rhythm of a permanent self-creation and self-destruction in 
great things and small, a constant metamorphosis of the "actor," the mask, while 
the play and the role would essentially stay the same in the eternal return of the 
life cycle. On the largest scale, the universe itself would perform in eternal 
repetitions (and rehearsals) the parts of Nietzsche's Dionysian actor: "Dionysian 
universe of eternal self-creation, eternal self-destruction ... this world is the will 
to power and nothing else! And you are yourselves that will to power-and 
nothing else!" (W, III, 917). 
Life, in all its manifestations, would then be one infinite and eternal pathos-a 
suffering, a fate, a moira-personifying itself in countless "actors" on all ranks of 
its hierarchy. The theater, as a dark mirror to life, would then show the tragic 
hero as a sufferer at the hands of a power that wills and acts through him, and over 
which he exercises practically no control whatsoever. A determinist view of this 
magnitude, organic rather than mechanistic, would also lead to an idea of the 
"drama" and to a "poetics" in some ways different from Aristotle's. It is then not 
surprising that Nietzsche should deplore what he considers to be one among a 
number of errors in Aristotle's rather insensitive interpretation of the nature of 
"drama" in general, and of the tragic hero in particular. A casual footnote in 
The Case ef WaRner (W, II, 921 ), in fact, calls into question the Aristotelian views 
of tragedy, pointing out that the Doric word drama by no means designated 
"action"; instead, it meant a hieratic event, a sacred "story"; the oldest drama 
enacted the holy legend on which the local religious cult was founded. Substance 
is lent to Nietzsche's hypothesis by more recent commentaries on the extended 
Attic form of"drama," dramosyne, "sacred service," 5 "ceremony" (Inscriptiones 
Graecae 112 1358, ii, 34, 40: 4th century B.C.). Aristotle himself explains that 
Doric dran, the root of "drama," meant the same as Attic prattein (i.e., "to go 
through," only later "to achieve," "to accomplish," "to effect," etc.; Poetics 3.6). 
Nietzsche suggests that by mistranslating dran as a doing, the German classical 
philologists-who, ever since Wilamowitz-Mollendorff's violent attacks on The 
Birth of Tragedy (Zukunftsphilologie!) have observed a hostile silence-are guilty 
of spreading misconceptions on the character of tragedy. What Nietzsche seems 
to imply is that dran and prattein alike express a "bringing about," an "effecting" 
which is its own end and has no moral connotations. It turns the subject through 
whom it works into a sufferer, not into a "free" agent. Instead of spontaneously 
acting, the tragic hero in the end recognizes that he is and has been no more than a 
plaything in the hands of a fate to which he consents (amor Jati), and which coin-
cides with those uncontrollable forces that through his immolation, his con-
sciously accepted sacrifice, fulfill themselves. Here again, Nietzsche's contention 
seems to be borne out by the derivatives of prattein: praxis, the mythological 
5 Cf. Hjalmar Frisk, Griechisches Etymolo,gisches Worterbuch (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1954), I, 416. 
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event (and not action) which according to Aristotle (Poetics 6.8), rather than the 
hero's character, is to be acted out through the hero's persona; pragma (pl. pragmata) 
-misleadingly translated as actus, "act(s)" -in the language of the theater: the 
principal divisions of the play (in Latin, originally, the role of the actor), means 
primarily "events," "circumstances," i.e., happenings rather than actions (cf. 
Herodotos 1.207; Thucydides 1.89; 3.82); while in Euripides' Helena (286), 
pragmasin "by circumstances" is expressly contrasted with ergoisi "by acts." 
Whatever the merits of Nietzsche's reinterpretation of the concept of 
"drama," he makes short shrift of the meaning which, since the Renaissance, 
classical scholars have read into the Aristotelian idea of mimesis as the purported 
"imitation of an action," for he sees in it the representation of suffering, passion, 
pathos (pl. pathe), which befall the hero by a fatality that he cannot escape, and 
against his conscious will. Thus Nietzsche resolves in an ironic and tragic coinciden-
tia oppositorum the age-honored antinomies of praxis "action," pathos "incident," 
"accident," "chance," and pathe "suffering," "misfortune." He can conclude: 
"Tragedy had in mind great pathos scenes-action, as it were, was precluded from 
it (fin time l situated before the beginning and [in space] behind the scene") (W, II, 
921)-words which could stand as a gloss to Boileau's: "Ce qu'on ne doit point 
voir, qu'un recit nous !'expose" (Art poetique 3, 51)-but which ultimately touch 
upon what Nietzsche considers as the essence of tragedy: those poignant pathos 
scenes (Aristotle, Poetics 14, 9) where the tragic hero, suffering from an excess of 
tensions which explode into "action," moves toward his doom without con-
ciously becoming a "culprit," a "sinner." 
This idea, a major theme, a leitmotif, the esthetic foundation underlying 
Nietzsche's entire work, is expressed as early as 1864 in the student essay Primum 
Oedipodis regis carmen choricum: "The Greeks thought differently from us about 
the tragic effect; it was brought about by way of the great pathos scenes ... where 
action meant little but lyricism everything ... " (HKG, II, 375). With the excep-
tion of the seventeenth-century French, no modem playwright has understood 
what Nietzsche elsewhere (and without reference to the French) calls "the 
awesome Gorgon-head beauty of the classical" (W, III, 159), which destroys the 
tragic hero without "adequately" relating his misfortune to any "guilt" -for 
there is such a thing as "pure, innocent misfortune" (W, I, 1065). 
Christianity, in particular in its Northern manifestations, where it has lost 
contact with its Mediterranean origins, has falsified all psychological values: it 
has abolished the innocence of suffering by causally linking it with the concepts of 
"sin," "justice," "punishment"; it has branded as "sinful," "suspect," and 
"seductive" all great emotions of overflowing lust and strength, such as haughti-
ness, pride, voluptuousness, triumph, self-assurance, temerity, self-love; it has 
sanctified meekness and made it desirable; it has distorted the meaning oflove by 
interpreting it as altruism and, in doing so, demanded unselfishness, the forsaking 
of the "self," the "ego," its alteration (the true significance of "altruism"); it has 
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made a punishment of life itself, a temptation of fortune; it has condemned the 
passions as diabolical, man's trust in himself as godlessness. Christian psychology, 
as Nietzsche sees it, is a psychology of inhibition, a walling-in against life-out of 
fear oflifc's tragic sense (W, III, 519 f.). "The doctrine of[the free] will was, on 
the whole, invented for the purpose of punishment" (W, II, 976; III, 822). Against 
the Christian exorcism of human passions by the frail dogma of the "free will," 
Nietzsche's depth psychology affords abysmal insights into the blind "will to 
power" which is impersonal and disposes of the individual, allowing-if one 
accepts these premises-equally terrifying apprehensions about the obscure 
forces which drive certain Cornelian and Racinian heroes to their orgies of 
destruction and self-immolation. For Nietzsche asks questions such as: "whether 
all conscious willing, all conscious aims, all valuations arc not mere means by 
which something essentially different must be effected than what might appear 
within consciousness" (W, III, 901). Man is at the same time much more and much 
less than an individual; it is impossible for him "not to be possessed by the qualities 
and preferences of his parents and ancestors .... Provided that something is 
known about the parents, a conclusion is permissible as to the child" (W, II, 738). 
No traits of character, however small, are insignificant. Nor do they occur as a 
matter of chance. Everything in a "personality" obeys the iron law of an ineluct-
able determinism which organically extends into the past and into the future of 
mankind. "On the whole, everything is worth exactly as much as one has paid 
for it . ... 'Heredity' is an erroneous notion. For what someone is, his ancestors 
have paid the price" (W, III, 552). If one applies Nietzsche's views to French 
classical tragedy, even such monsters of "will power" as Corneille's Horace, 
Polyeucte, Auguste, and Attila appear to be guided by an instinctive "will to 
power" prepared by the preceding generations: their generosity, their sense of 
honor, their terribilitas, their religious or political fervor then seem no longer 
matters of choice but predestined, the unique and only form which their inescap-
able fate can take. They represent rare culminating points where mankind, after 
decades or centuries of blind elaboration, produces its healthiest and strongest 
exemplars in whom it attains perfection: the end toward which in ever returning 
cycles the human race moves in its tireless and unconscious efforts to overcome 
itself. And yet, they are nothing more than incarnations of Nietzsche's Dionysian 
actor who consents to a tragic fate over which he has no control and which is 
acting through his mask, his persona, his person. 
There is no escape for the individual from the fatal chain of mankind; "every 
human being is himself a piece of fate" (W, I, 905). Inexorably, Nietzsche demon-
strates the utter vanity of everyone else's and his own attempts to break through 
the prison walls of fate and to seek his personal salvation: "You are yourself that 
invincible moira; in you the entire future of the human world is predestined; little 
does it avail you if you shrink from yourself in horror" (ibid.). From the lowest 
cell to the universe itself, all existence su_ffers the will to power, in the final analysis, 
Impaci of Ancient Greece and French Classicism on Nieizsche's Concept of Tragedy 105 
a permanence of tensions and of constant changes. On the cosmic scale: "The 
world subsists, without becoming, without perishing. Or rather: it is becoming, 
it is perishing, but without ever having begun to become or ended perishing-it 
persists in both conditions .... It feeds on itself: its excrements are its nourishment" 
(W, III, 703). On the human scale: the same cycle; in the strongest exemplars, in 
the type of the tragic hero, a frail balance: a tension of power quanta, each striving 
for greater intensity, for usurpation; all competing with each other, and pro-
ducing in the subject a rapid change, a pendulum movement of violent passions, 
an imperious desire for the total possession or (if this should prove impossible) for 
the total destruction of the coveted object; in other terms, an insatiable appetite 
for an absolute ascendency which, feeding on itself, corresponds to a maximum 
of pleasure or a maximum of repugnance, but which is not identical to a plati-
tudinous, plebeian, Darwinian "instinct of self-preservation," nor to a sense of 
"order" or to a devotion to "lawfulness." 
Racine's Pyrrhus, Hermione, Neron, Agrippine, Roxane, Athalie (among 
others} do not pursue "happiness" but absolute power over the objects of their 
persecution, in a spirit of total and passionate commitment, at the risk of their own 
immolation, and as prisoners tied to the pendulum swing of their alternating 
emotions. In so doing, they blindly obey their chameleon-like instincts, "they 
change, but they do not evolve," to use Nietzsche's terms which, however, do not 
specifically refer to Racine's characters (W, III, 725). "Every instinct is a type of 
despotism" and establishes its "own perspective" (W, III, 903; cf. II, 571), and 
since "all instincts arc unintelligent," no instinct proceeds from a utilitarian view-
point (W, III, 909). The life of the instincts is explained by Nietzsche as "a struc-
ture and a branching out" of that basic and thoroughly subconscious form of 
will, the will to power, whose commands are promptly rationalized by con-
sciousness: "To the strongest of our instincts, to the tyrant in us, submits not 
only our reasoning but also our conscience" (W, II, 638). 
When all is said, the conscious exercise of our will amounts to a delusion, a 
rationalization of dark instinctive forces which dispose of us on all levels of our 
being. Whatever we may take for our "activity" is at heart only something that 
comes to pass by way of our existence, and that we are fated to do. It is no more 
than a passing, a passion that we undergo; both literally, a happening, and etymolo-
gically (German: Geschehen "event," Geschick "fate," Geschichte "history" -all 
stemming from the same root}, an event that by fate and historically is bound to 
come into being through and by our existence: paradoxically, an "act" of ours 
that we must sujfer to be performed by us. 
Man is what he is by a higher and innate necessity, and to speak of him "as he 
ought to be is as absurd as: a tree as it ought to be" (W, III, 671). In this sense, 
every human being is a unique and prodigious phenomenon (W, I, 287); and yet, 
he but exists as a necessary link in a sequence, "concretized out of the elements 
and influences of things past and present. . . . He cannot be held responsible: 
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neither for what he is, nor for his motives, nor for his actions, nor for their effects" 
(W, I, 479 f.). The entire history of the human emotions amounts to "the history 
of an error, the error of responsibility which rests upon the error of the freedom 
of the will" (ibid.). Nietzsche never tires of repeating that man is totally without 
responsibility for his actions and innocent of their consequences (W, I, 513; I, 544; 
I, 709; I, 908; I, 912 f.; etc.). The doctrine of responsibility is founded on the 
naive assumption that "only the will can be causal, and that a person must know 
that he actually willed in order to be entitled to believe in himself as a cause" 
(W, III, 745). We are as little responsible for the things we do while we are awake 
as we are for our dreams (W, I, 1098 f.). If for Friedrich Schlegel "the historian is 
a prophet turned backwards" (Athenaums-Fragmente), for Nietzsche (as for the 
ancients), the past is like the voice of the Pythia, darkly but infallibly foreboding 
the future: "The judgment of the past is always an oracular response" (W, I, 251). 
In this manner, the fatality incarnate in Racine's Phedre, as well as her 
guiltlessness for the persecution she suffers at the hands of Aphrodite (Venus), are 
forecast and, as it were, subsumed, right from the very first scene of the play, in 
Hippolyte's portentous line: "La fille de Minos et de Pasiphae" (Phedre I.i.36). 
Similarly, in La Thebai'de, the recurrent words sang and nature (naissance,famille, 
race) and denature foreshadow the inescapable doom of the unfortunate children 
of Oedipus who bear as little responsibility for their existence as does their father 
for his incestuous marriage with Jocasta or for the death of Laius. "No one is 
responsible for his deeds, no one for his nature" (W, I, 48 1). In speaking of 
morality where all is a matter of predestination, one would risk making a mockery 
of the very spirit of tragedy, which Nietzsche defines in these terms: "To under-
stand the world from the viewpoint of sufferinR: that is the tragic essence of 
tragedy" ("das ist das Tragische in der Tragodie"; W, III, 338). Would not 
"moral" actions depend on the triumph of reason over excessive passions and 
desires? Yet, any attempt to distinguish between "reason" and "passion" would 
amount to a misconstruction of both: for reason is no more than "a relationship 
between different passions and desires" (W, III, 648). 
All intentions, all actions, as it were, are amoral, since all reasoning about 
underlying motives and emotions-as we have seen-turns out to be a fabric of 
rationalizations. In fact, "the healthier, the stronger, ... the more enterprising a 
man feels, the greater his amorality" (W, III, 919); any rise in vitality inevitably 
brings with it "an increase in amorality" (W, III, 583). In what precisely consists 
the preeminence of any great civilization, e.g., the Renaissance in Italy, over a 
barbarian state of affairs? "Always in one thing: the great quantum of frankly 
admitted amorality" (W, III, 572). The higher species of man differs from all lower 
ones not for reasons of greater moral distinction but because of a more refined 
esthetic organization which lies beyond "good" and "evil," enabling the higher 
men to "see and hear infinitely more and to think while they are seeing and 
hearing" (W, II, 176). For Nietzsche as for Baudelaire (whom he depreciates), 
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esthetics and bourgeois morality are diametrically opposed, ideal beauty and 
greatness incompatible with the meekness of a "virtue" which allows the secret 
showings of criminal fantasies in the theater of the mind but with feigned 
indignation shrinks from the admission of criminal fantasies, out of hypocrisy, 
cowardice, and the fear of being caught. "All great men were criminals, not in a 
miserable sense .... Crime and greatness belong together," proclaims Nietzsche 
(W, III, 521 f.)-always speaking from the viewpoint of esthetics and tragic 
knowledge, and somewhere in the neighborhood of Baudelaire's ideal beauty 
("Ce qu'il faut ace coeur profond comme un abime/ C'est vous, Lady Macbeth, 
ame puissante au crime," etc.). 
Seen in the perspective of life and its stimulation, the ascetic values of 
"virtue" diminish man: "One is a thoroughly small type of man if one is only 
virtuous" (W, III, 603); "a virtuous man: a lower species" (W, III, 604)-in fact, 
a living lie, a denial of human reality. Modern man in his worm-like, purely 
economic and social existence is striving for an even smaller meaning oflife, for 
smaller risks, lesser dangers, perfect security. "Has not the self-diminution of 
man made irresistible strides since Copernicus?" (W, II, 893). In order to enjoy 
"security," men have declared their equality (W, I, 892). Greatness in man 
results from the free reins he gives to his senses, the free play of his appetites, and 
from "the still greater power that knows how to employ in its service these 
monsters" (W, III, 528): the amoral, ancestral, and tragic will to power-for "the 
only power which exists is equal in kind to [this] will" (W, III, 473). All great 
works and deeds which were not swept away by the ages-were they not, asks 
Nietzsche, "in the deepest sense, amoralities?" (W, III, 920). Morality itself, when 
seen from the only valid perspective, from the viewpoint of the tragic heightening 
of life, is not truly a "moral" force but merely one tool among many used in the 
economy of vitality: in the service oflife itself, the apparent opposites of "good" 
and "evil" do not appear as absolutes, they merely "express power-degrees ef the 
instincts, a temporary hierarchy by means of which certain instincts are kept 
under control" (W, III, 615). 
The heroes and heroines of Greek and Racinian tragedy, driven by hybris 
and violent passions to their own immolation, live in a state of tension, pathos, 
insecurity. They approach with every step they take their imminent fall. Idealiza-
tions of the great criminal in his utter isolation, they are examples of a hard, cold, 
and tragic greatness which, for sentimental nineteenth-century man in his quest 
for material comfort and security, had lost its meaning. For the Greeks, even 
"theft, as in Prometheus' case, even the massacre of cattle as the expression of a 
mad envy, as in Ajax' case" could have dignity: "In their need to ascribe dignity 
to crime ... they invented tragedy" (W, II, 132). The ethical background of 
tragedy is seen, in The Birth of Tragedy, in the ''justification of human evil" (W, 
I, 59). In this sense, the pathos of tragedy is the life-asserting pathos par excellence 
(W, II, n29), the very opposite of the will- and life-denying pessimism of 
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Schopenhauer: it accepts and gives meaning to the dual necessity of becoming 
and of annihilation. "The depth of the tragic artist consists in the ability of his 
esthetic instinct to see at a glance the farthest consequences, and not myopically 
to stop at the nearest point: he is capable of accepting the economy of the whole 
on the largest scale, which justifies, and not merely justifies, thefemful nature of evil 
and all that is questionable" (W, III, 575). 
Life is illogical, hence unjust (W, I, 471; cf. I, 443; I, 229). To Aristotle's 
catharsis, Nietzsche opposes the csthetic enhancement oflife by an art form which 
cannot be explained in moral terms (W, I, I 31). The purpose of tragedy is not to 
move the spectator to fear and pity; it is to awaken in him the "poetic state" -a 
thought which is echoed by Valery (Variete V, 138). To sec in tragedy a purgative 
which releases a state of depression is to misunderstand its tonic effect, the stimulus 
it provides for life: the festive spectacle of human suffering "ignites pleasure (i.e., 
the awareness of strength)" (W, III, 753; III, 828 f.; cf. I, 571; etc.). 
Nietzsche's Dionysian concept of tragedy as a tonic to life, an intoxication for 
the senses, in the final analysis is not so far removed from (and considerably more 
palatable than) that ofTertullian and Thomas Aquinas-who advise the believer 
to abstain from the sin of visiting theaters on earth, all the more to enjoy in after-
life the edifying and eternal spectacle of the damned roasting in hell (W, II, 794). 
Nietzsche's theories on the guiltless and fated misfortune of the sacrificial tragic 
hero, in the end, replace all Leibnitzian and post-Leibnitzian Theodicees by a 
Tyrannodicee which amounts to an esthetic justification of human evil and 
injustice. 
Finally, Nietzsche's perennial exaltation oflife over intelligence, his distrust 
of reason and "virtuous" intentions seems to present an unexpected twist by 
which his abandoned Lutheran faith takes its revenge for its long inhibition. It 
turns out to be a variation on a traditional Augustinian theme: the corruption of 
man's original state of nobility by the knowledge of "good" and "evil." By 
leaving the noumenal for the phenomenal, ethics and consciousness for esthetics 
and aisthesis, intellectual knowledge for the intuition of the instincts, in short by 
substituting what N. 0. Brown, modifying the meaning of a well-known 
Freudian term, has so aptly named "polymorphous perversity" for an illusory 
morality, Nietzsche's road to the recovery of a tragic and Dionysian innocence-
as in all apocalyptic schemes of the nineteenth century-leads for modern man 
"down and out," through nihilism. 
VII 
Nietzsche in His Relation to Voltaire and Rousseau * 
PETER HELLER 
I. HOMMAGE A VOLTAIRE 
What does Voltaire mean to Nietzsche? The first edition of the first volume 
of Human, All-Too-Human, published in 1878, was dedicated to the memory of 
Voltaire in honor of the hundredth anniversary of his death. And to this solemn 
dedication the author added, with some pathos, that "this monological book" 
would not have been given to the public at this time if the proximity to 30 May 
r 878 had not given rise to the all but irrepressible wish to render personal homage 
at the proper moment "to one of the greatest liberators of the human spirit."1 
Moreover, Nietzsche had planned originally to include an epilogue which would 
have repeated his intention to set up an "electric current" leading across a century 
* The following essay is a revised and modified English version of pp. 277-99 in Von den erstm 
und letzten Dingen: Studien und Kommentar zu einer Aphorismenreihe van Friedrich Nietzsche (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1972) reproduced by permission of the publisher. I do not pretend to exhaust the 
subject of Nietzsche and Voltaire, let alone the topic of Nietzsche's more problematic relationship to 
Rousseau, which leads directly into his perennial debate with Romanticism (see ibid., 299 ff.). The 
scope of the present essay thus excludes some major aspects of Nietzsche's struggle with Rousseauism. 
(Nor have I sought to determine whether or to what extent Nietzsche deals at all with Rousseau's texts 
rather than with an image of Rousseau.) For some further suggestions, see W. D. Williams, Nietzsche 
and the French (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), a book with which I found myself in agreement in many 
respects after having arrived at my own conceptions quite independently. A rather biased dissertation on 
Nietzsche 11nd Rousseau by Herbert Gerhard Kramer (University of Erlangen [Borna-Leipzig: Noskc, 
1928 ]) became available to me only after completion of this essay. Further references: see index to 
Von den ersten ,md letzrm Dinger, under "Voltaire" and "Rousseau. 
1 WKG, IV--.1., unnumbered title page. (For key to abbreviations sec p. xvii above.) For English 
versions of Nietzsche's texts I am greatly indebted to Walter Kaufmann's translations: The Birt/, ef 
Tragedy and Thr Case of Wagner (New York, 1967); On th,, Genealogy ef Morals; Ecce Homo (New York, 
1969); Beyond Good a11d Ev,/ (New York, 1966); The Will to Power (together with R. J. Hollingdale; 
New York, 1967) all published by Random House (Vintage); and The Portable Nietzsche (New York: 
Viking, 1958) as well ,is to the-far less reliable-translations of Human, All-Too-Human, I (Helen 
Zimmern); H,mw,1, All- Too-Human, II (Paul V. Cohn); The Dawn qf Day U- M. Kennedy); and The 
joyful Wisdom li.c Cny Science] (Thomas Common); contained in The Complete Works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964). However, I have felt free to adapt 
and to modify existi1,:~ translations in keeping with my own interpretation of the original texts. 
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from a deathbed to the birthplace of new freedoms of the spirit (WKG, IV-2, 
576). Similarly, the continuation of Human, All-Too-Human, the Mixed Opinions 
and Maxims, were meant to conclude with another homage to Voltaire in order 
to pay him his "last honors" (WKG, IV-4, 301). 
All of this suggests Nietzsche's worship of Voltaire, a sense of affinity, and an 
ambition to be Voltaire's heir, to succeed Voltaire, and to replace him. The 
retrospective of Ecce Homo summarizes characteristic features of this relationship: 
One will find the book [that is: Human, All-Too-Human] clever, cool, possibly 
toughminded and mocking. A certain intellectual temperament in keeping with 
nobility of taste seems to assert its predominance in a constant struggle against a more 
passionate subterranean current. In this connection it makes sense that it was actually 
the celebration of the centennial of Voltaire's death which the book pleaded, as it 
were, as its excuse for coming out as early as the year 1878. For in contrast to all who 
wrote after him, Voltaire was, above all, a grandseigneur of the spirit-precisely what 
I am. The name of Voltaire on one of my writings-that was truly progress-a 
progress on the way toward myself. (K, 77, 359) 
However, this is what Nietzsche's former friends denied from the start, and 
their denial was endorsed by most of the German disciples of Nietzsche and by 
the bulk of German Nietzsche scholars. Perhaps Cosima Wagner made the 
beginning. She herself was of French descent. She contributed to Nietzsche's 
closer acquaintance with French literature.2 Long after the break with Wagner, 
Nietzsche continued to admire her as the foremost judge ("[die] erste Stimme") 
in questions of taste (K, 77, 322), much as he admired her high degree of culture. 
Extremely irritated by Human, All-Too-Human, Cosima Wagner suggested 
to Nietzsche's sister, in an epistle attacking the author, that Nietzsche was 
basically ignorant in matters concerning French literature and that he scarcely 
knew even Voltaire (WKG, IV-4, 63). The sister-Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, 
the chauvinistically teutonic llama, destined to become the editor of Nietzsche's 
works and the chief of the Nietzsche archive-reassured the Germans concerning 
Human, All-Too-Human: "the content ... , the ideas developed in the book have 
nothing in common with Voltaire" (GB, III, 584). This assertion fitted in with 
the standard ideology of the Germanists who ignored Lessing's acknowledgments 
of Voltaire's merits as a writer, but endorsed Lessing's excessive attack on French 
Neoclassicism as well as his specific aversion to the character of Voltaire, and 
combined these prejudices with a worshipful respect for the true (Weimar) 
classicism, and with a Romantic and nationalistic hostility toward the French 
Enlightenment. The result was a proud and carefully cultivated ignorance 
maintained, so to speak, on principle-not merely with respect to Voltaire-and 
a strong conviction that what should not be, cannot be. This attitude might well 
account for the fact that even Bertram, the author of a sensitive and distinguished 
2 See Williams. p. 8. 
Nietzsche in His Relation to Voltaire and Rousseau III 
study on Nietzsche, felt constrained to explain away Nietzsche's positive relation 
to Voltaire. 3 
And yet this kind of polemic against a Germanistic misinterpretation is too 
pat and constitutes, in turn, a simplification of a more complex reality. To be 
sure, Baumler, a considerable Nietzsche scholar-and at the same time the 
proclaimer of a Nietzsche for National Socialists-expressed his own tendency 
and bias when he asserted that Nietzsche's attacks on German culture were 
merely tendentious ("sind Tendenz") much as the entire book (Human, All-Too-
Human) served the expression of a tendentious bias (K 72, II, 339). Nonetheless, 
the name of Voltaire might be merely something like an advertisement for 
Nietzsche's own brand of Enlightenment, and indeed for an enlightenment 
characterized by tendencies contrary to those of the older Enlightenment of the 
eighteenth century. For even in Human, All-Too-Human, where Nietzsche 
declares that we must carry forward the flag of the Enlightenment bearing the 
names of Petrarch, Erasmus and Voltaire (WKG, IV-2, 43), we may suspect that 
the antagonists of the Enlightenment who seem to come to Nietzsche's mind in 
this historical context, notably Luther and Rousseau, have greater relevance for 
him than his presumable allies. 
However, let us first confirm our impression of a positive relationship. 
Nietzsche's letters testify to the fact that he esteemed Voltaire in the phase of 
Human, All-Too-Human. On the occasion of his visit to Geneva in April 1876, he 
tells his friends that he offered "echte Huldigungen" to Voltaire, the first object 
of his worship, whose house in Ferney he visited (WKG, IV-4, 20 f.). In the fol-
lowing winter, which he spent in Sorrento, he reports with reference to the circle 
gathered there around Malwida von Meysenbug: "We have read a great deal of 
Voltaire. "4 Moreover, there is other evidence, both from an earlier and a later 
period. 
3 See Ernst Bertram. Nietzsche (Berlin: Bondi, 1918). Voltaire, a convinced Deist who, if religion 
consists of the faith in a god, was, after all, more religious than Nietzsche (or Bertram?), appears in this 
book only as the "spider of skepticism" ("Spinne Skepsis," p. 54). Nietzsche's "Voltairetum" is said to 
constitute "an intentional contrast to a religious nature" and consequently serves the true, religious 
essence of Nietzsche e contrario as a "perspective on God" (p. 144). Or: when Nietzsche says Voltaire, 
he really means "the Goethean type" ("den Typus Goethe," p. 189). Or again: in devaluating Shake-
peare and expressing esteem for French Neoclassicism (including Voltaire), Nietzsche merely imitates 
Napoleon; for he wants to be Napoleonic in his tastes (p. 214). Yet ultimately the Greek principle in 
Nietzsche conquers the skeptical principle: Eleusis will triumph over Fcrney (p. 348). For that perspec-
tive must not be admitted under which Nietzsche found the French and especially Voltaire more 
Greek than the Germans (including Goethe, that late convert to classicism, which went against his 
original bent; see WKG, IV-2, 182 If. and below p. 114. Rather, Bertram wishes to invoke a mysterious 
paradox and the breakthrough of secret wellsprings in Nietzsche's innermost being when-at some 
point in MA-"suddenly the voice of Herodotus" is heard in the midst of Voltairean talk ("mitten 
zwischen Voltaire"; Bertram, p. 356). 
4 See Nietzsche's letters to Franz Overbeck, Sorrento, December r 876; and to Marie Baumgartner, 
Sorrento, 27 January 1877. HKG (Briefe) IV, 317,327, as well as WKG, IV-4, 27. 
112 PETER HELLER 
Nietzsche became acquainted with the Histoire de Charles XII in school as 
early as 1861 (when he was 17). Among hisjuvenilia (up to and including 1864) 
there is an unpublished manuscript of thirteen pages concerning "Voltaire's life 
,md personality" and "Voltaire as a philosopher," and there are excerpts from 
Hermann Hettner's History of French Literature in the XV!Ilth Century (HKG, II, 
458). Mahomet, a drama which, surprisingly, is recommended in Human, All-Too-
Human for repeated reading, Nietzsche recommends even in 1881 to his sister in 
Paraguay for "reading in company" (GB, V/2, 446). A quote from Zadig ("II 
maudit !es savants et ne voulut plus vivre qu'en bonne compagnie") Nietzsche 
takes down in his notebooks in 1 876. And one can assume that he does not merely 
quote the Voltairean "cultiver son jardin" -in contrast to Rousseau's "return to 
nature" -(GB, V/2, 699) but that he has actually read Candide. Above all, as one 
might expect, he seems to be fascinated by Voltaire's letters. 5 
Beyond all this one gains the impression that Nietzsche generally inclined 
toward an imitatio of Voltaire and a mythical self-identification with Voltaire. 
The quote "II faut dire la vcrite et s'immoler" (WKG, IV-1, 201) points in this 
direction; as does the "Ecrasez l'infame!" at the end of Ecce Homo; 6 and-in the 
phase of Human, All-Too-Human--the quote of a statement made by Goethe to 
the effect that Voltaire was the "general source of light" (WKG, IV-3, 408; see 
Goethe's conversations with Eckermann, 16 December 1828). It is as if Nietzsche 
wanted to exchange at one point his earlier paternal model, Schopenhauer,7 by 
honoring Voltaire-an author frequently quoted by Schopenhauer-as his 
father's true father, and thus as his own grandfather. For Nietzsche does claim now 
that he had always distrusted Schopenhauer's system as distinct from "the live 
incarnate Voltairean Schopenhauer," to whom his own Romantic and meta-
physical vagaries, such as the fourth book of the World as Will and Idea, became 
unintelligible (WKG, IV-3, 381 f). 8 Later on, Nietzsche claimed that Schopen-
5 Lettres cl1oisies ed. Louis Moland, 2 vols. (Paris: Gamier freres, 1876); WKG, IV-4, 327. See also 
Aphorisms 140 and 159 of The Wanderer and his Shadow. "It seems probable that [Nietzsche] read Voltaire 
mainly in German. His library contained Sdmrliche Schrifren (a 1786 translation), Zaire, Lettres Choisies 
(both in French) and Der Geisr aus Voltaires Schrifren (an 1827 selection)," Williams, p. 89; sec also ibid., 
pp. 7, 9. According to Bernoulli, Mrs. Overbeck translated for Nietzsche some essays from Sainte-
Beuve's Causeries du Lundi, including "The Letters of Mme de Graffigny or Voltaire in Cirey." "Mme 
du Chatelet. Continuation of Voltaire in Cirey." "Mme de Latour-Franqueville and Jean Jacques Rous-
seau," as well as essays on Fontenelle, Montesquieu, Diderot, Vauvenargues, Mlle de Lespmasse, and 
Beaumarchais. These translations were published in 1880 by Nietzsche's publisher E. Schmeitzner in 
Chemnitz under the title "Menschen des XVIII. Jahrhunderts." Carl Albrecht Bernoulli, Franz 
Overbeck 1md Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschafi Qena: Eugen Diederichs, 1908), I, 444. 
6 See also the aphorism in MA quoted below, p. 117; and below, p. 113. 
7 Concerning the conception of Schopenhauer as a father-figure and as the prototype of a teacher 
and educator, cf. the fictitious frame and the role of the Schopenhauer-figure in Nietzsche's lectures 
"On the Future of Our Educational Institutions" (K, 71, 391-527), as well as the essay on "Schopen-
hauer as Educator" in U. 
8 Similarly, he also notes earlier: "The live Schopenhauer has nothing in common with the 
metaphysicians. He is essentially a Voltairean; the fourth [book is) alien to him" (WKG, IV-3, 353). 
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hauer-like Nietzsche himself?-had been seduced by the Romantics in his 
youth. He had turned away from his "best instincts." Yet au fond he was a 
Voltairean, mentally and viscerally ("mit Kopf und Eingeweiden"; K, 82, 240), 
an opinion which, to be sure, does not prevent Nietzsche from continuing to 
characterize and to reject Schopenhauer as a Romantic. 9 
Given the assumption that Nietzsche's positive relationship to Voltaire 
develops as imitatio within and out of his relationship to Schopenhauer, one is 
tempted to look for intimations of this development even in the earlier Nietzsche 
who is still loyal to Schopenhauer. Perhaps Nietzsche's annoyance at the preten-
sion of David Friedrich Strau8, 10 the old "philistine of culture" affecting stylistic 
grace and ease and the attitude of the esprit Libre in order to assume the role of a 
German Voltaire (K, 71, 63-66), may be an early symptom of a similar ambition 
on the part of Nietzsche. More striking is a slip of mind of the fully developed 
Voltaire redivivus in a note which reads: "1778 finished the manuscript [i.e., of 
Human, All-Too-Human]" (WKG, IV-4, 41), and thus shifts the date of the 
completion of Nietzsche's own work back to the year of Voltaire's death. An 
anonymous gift from Paris presented by an admirer, the bust of Voltaire accom-
panied by the words 'Tame de Voltaire fait scs compliments a Frederic Nietzsche" 
(GB, IV, 7), was, at any rate, in harmony with the intent of the author: "I was 
quite moved .... The fate of the man who remains subject to nothing but partisan 
judgments, even after a hundred years, stood before my eyes as a terrifying 
symbol: Against the liberators of the mind men arc most implacable in their 
hatred and most injust in their love" (GB, III, 585). And finally one might even 
point out that in mentioning his preference "for a large, comfortable, scholarly 
easy chair," Nietzsche observes more than once that the French refer to this piece 
of furniture as "un Voltaire" (GB, IV, 248; see GB, V/2, 649). 
II. THE "GRANDSEIGNEUR OF THE SPIRIT" 
Yet the most important questions cannot be answered by observations of 
this sort, least of all in the case of Nietzsche. For Nietzsche himself was to suggest 
that he expressed his appreciation of a man and conferred distinction on him by 
opposing him. Nor would Nietzsche's tendency to self-identification with a 
given figure necessarily preclude opposition. What does Nietzsche admire in 
Voltaire? What is he interested in? And what are his disagreements with Voltaire? 
9 See also K, 74, 113. The last step in the demolition of the imitatio of Schopenhauer which, to be 
sure, does away also with the imitatio of Voltaire, may be suggested by K, 78, 66 where Schopenhauer 
is said to be merely one of those Germans who arc "always late" and dependent on influences "from 
abroad": "Schopenhauer-Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire." For the note suggests that Schopen-
hauer merely combined influences of Buddhism and Romanticism with influences from Voltaire. 
10 A note in WKG, IV-2, 487 (numbered 22(72); cf. WKG, IV-4, 436) seems to allude to the Six 
Lectures on Voltaire (Voltaire: Sechs Vortrage) by David Friedrich StrauB. 
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Nietzsche admires Voltaire insofar as Voltaire impresses him as noble and as a 
free spirit: Voltaire appears to have succeeded in combining nobility of mind with 
freedom of thought, to be, in short, a "grandseigneur of the spirit," and thus a 
unique exception among intellectuals. 
Voltaire is noble as a poet: the last representative, as Nietzsche sees it, of a 
severely disciplined artistic tradition. Neoclassical art was bound by strict and 
compulsory rules-comparable to the discipline of counter-point and the fugue, 
or the rules of classical rhetorics. It was restricted in terms of the unities of action, 
time and place, as well as with respect to style, structure of verse and syntax, 
selection of vocabulary and admissible ideas. And thus art was enabled to pass 
beyond a "naturalizing" stage, "to learn to walk gracefully on narrow paths" in 
order to attain "the greatest suppleness of movement," and to produce the 
"semblance" (Schein) of freedom, which is the "highest result" of a logical, a 
"necessary" development in art (WKG, IV-2, 182 f.). 
After Voltaire, Nietzsche writes, the French 
suddenly lack the great talents who would have continued to lead the development 
of tragedy from constraint (Zwang) to that ultimate semblance of freedom. Later 
on, following the German model, they also took the leap into a kind ofRousseau-
istic state of nature, and experimented. One need but read Voltaire's Mahomet from 
time to time in order to realize what was lost to European civilization once and for 
all through that crumbling away of tradition. Voltaire was the last of the great 
dramatists who tamed with Greek measure a multiform mind and heart equal to the 
mightiest tragic thunderstorms. He was capable of what no German has achieved 
as yet. because the French are far more akin in temperament to the Greeks than are 
the Germans. (WKG, lV-2, 183 f.) 
What is noble is the classical Greek ideal of contained strength which the 
French approximated and realized in some measure, while the later Goethe 
merely longed for it: "Art, as Goethe later on understood it, and as it was practiced 
by the Greeks and indeed by the French as well" (WKG, IV-2, 186). 11 
It is not a mere accident if Nietzsche develops one of his central notions of 
culture and art from one of Voltaire's incidental remarks. In the course of a 
brilliant apology of the French language-in which he contrasts the ease of 
rhyming and composing verse in Italian with the difficulty of this art in French-
Voltaire arrives at the aperc;:u: "vous dansez en liberte et nous dansons avec nos 
chaines." In the context of Nietzsche this notion recurs in the definition and 
praise of the highest form of art and culture as a dance in chains; a conception 
11 See also, WKG, IV-2, 1 86: The later Goethe "lived ... in art as in the memory of true art." At 
the same time it is worth noting that the ideal of art which Nietzsche associates with Voltaire also 
reflects the somewhat.fin de siecle ideal of Gautier's poem "L'Art" (in Emaux et Camees) of which Nietz-
sche said on his journey to Sorrento that it corresponded to his own views. See Charles Andler, 
Nietzsche: Sa vie et sa pensee, 4th ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), II, 266 f. 
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which, in a sense, also designates Nietzsche's ultimate goal and ideal, that is, the 
playful freedom or freedom to play attained by the most nearly perfect men or 
supermen. 12 
Even a seemingly trivial note, "Voltaire said: 'if Homer's admirers were 
sincere, they would confess that they are frequently bored by their favorite' " 
(WKG, IV-1, 103), points to the same theme which will increasingly occupy 
Nietzsche's mind. Even in Beyond Good and Evil, when he is discussing what we 
owe to our vulgar historical sense, to that semi-barbarian attitude toward our 
physical existence, desires and appetites which opens up for us "accesses in all 
directions" such as a noble age could never allow, Nietzsche observes: 
Thus-to give an example-we can once more enjoy Homer: perhaps this is our 
happiest advantage that we can savor Homer. The men of a noble [aristocratic] 
culture-c.g., of the French seventeenth century, as represented by St . .Evremond, 
who objects to Homer's "esprit vaste," or even by Voltaire who represents the 
fading away of this epoch-could not easily assimilate Homer and would hardly 
permit themselves to enjoy him. (K, 76, 147 f.) 
And in this context Nietzsche also varies the dictum of Voltaire concerning the 
"great Barbarian" Shakespeare (WKG, IV-2, 184). For thanks to our barbarian 
taste, we will no more allow ourselves to be disturbed in the enjoyment of 
Shakespeare by the disgusting exhalations and the proximity of the English 
rabble in which Shakespeare's art and taste dwell, than, for example, on the 
Chiaja of Naples where we go our way with our senses awake, enchanted and 
willing, though the sewer smells of the plebeian quarters fill the air (K, 76, 148). 
To be sure, this suggests a crucial area in Nietzsche's problematics. He himself 
enjoys Shakespeare: "we accept precisely this wild abundance, this intermingling 
of the most delicate, the coarsest, the most artificial, with a sense of secret intimacy 
and heartfelt familiarity-we enjoy him as the very refinement of art which has 
been reserved especially for us" (K, 76, 148). Nietzsche himself shares "our great 
virtue of historical sense," even though this virtue may be necessarily opposed to 
"good taste, or at least to the best taste," in opposition, that is, to the artistic 
imitation of those "moments and marvels when a great force stopped volun-
tarily" this side of the immeasurable, the excessive, the boundless. For "measure 
is alien to us" and our "thrill is the thrill of the infinite, the unmeasured. Like a 
rider on a galloping horse panting ahead in its course, we drop the reins before the 
infinite, we modem men, we semi-barbarians, and find our bliss only where we 
are most in danger" (K, 76, 149). 
We shall come back to this contradiction between noble and barbarian 
taste, between Voltaire and Shakespeare, or between Voltaire and Rousseau. At 
12 Sec Aphorisms 140 and 159 ofS; WKG, IV-4, 327; cf. WKG, IV-2, 232 f.; and Ochlcr's Nietzsche-
Register, (K, 170) under "Tanz"; as well as Voltaire's letter to Deodati de Tovazzi, ferney, 24January 
1761. 
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this point, let us continue merely to trace the relationship between Nietzsche and 
Voltaire. Nietzsche's provocative admiration for Voltaire is not restricted to the 
cpigone of neoclassical tragedy so unappealing to a modern taste. According to a 
more easily acceptable judgment of Nietzsche's, Voltaire is "also the last great 
author [ Schriftsteller] who, in the treatment of prose speech, possesses a Greek car, 
the artistic conscientiousness, simplicity and grace of the Greek" (WKG, IV-2, 
184). Moreover, Nietzsche is impressed with Voltaire's elegance, desinvolture, and 
controlled aggressiveness-notably with the manner in which Voltaire deals with 
his opponents, e.g., in a letter to Frederick the Great or in five lines concerning 
his literary opponent Piron. Nietzsche speaks in this connection of the "most 
terrible revenge" which requires the ability to wait until one has an entire hand of 
truths so that the fulfilment of revenge coincides with the exercise of justice 
(WKG, IV-3, 297; see IV-4, 342). 
Finally, Voltaire was "one of the last men ... who were able to unite supreme 
freedom of spirit and an entirely unrevolutionary cast of mind without being 
inconsistent and cowardly" (WKG, IV-2, 184). And this observation establishes 
a connection between the nobility of an aristocratic style in art and life, and the 
nobility of the elitist, individualistic free spirit, the intellectual, who is the pro-
tagonist of Human, All-Too-Human. Voltaire thus appears to anticipate one of 
Nietzsche's perennial ideals: namely, a synthesis of aristocratic civilization and 
spiritual freedom. Indeed, supreme intellectual and spiritual freedom cannot 
belong to those who are enslaved, nor to the rebels and revolutionaries who 
protest against their own inner or external enslavement. The ultimate freedom of 
mind can only belong to the truly free man. It is, according to Nietzsche, the 
prerogative of the fewest. And even in his art and life-style, the free man must 
have gained that supreme suppleness of motion which, as we learned above, can 
only be attained through mastery and the overcoming of self-imposed fetters 
and restraints. In the same sense the later Nietzsche will say: "I understand by 
'freedom of spirit' something quite definite: being a hundred times superior to 
philosophers and other disciples of 'truth' in severity toward oneself, in sincerity 
and courage, in the unconditional will to say 'no' where it is dangerous to say 
'no' ... " (K, 78, 326). And in this manner Nietzsche again seeks to distinguish his 
ideal as sharply as possible from any kind of slave rebellion in the name of the 
modern egalitarian principle or the instincts of the herd. 
III. THE ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY 
What is decisive is the juxtaposition (or confrontation) of Voltaire and 
Rousseau, of the aristocratic free spirit ("quand la populace se mele de raisonner, 
tout est perdu" (WKG, IV-2, 295) and the "masked man of the rabble" (GB, IV, 
341)-and consequently, in the phase of Human, All-Too-Human, to rescue (as 
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Nietzsche sees it) the spirit of true enlightenment from the confusion with its 
opposite: the egalitarian and plebeian, the optimistic and irrational faith in human 
nature and in the advent of utopia as a quasi-automatic and natural consequence of 
the destruction of civilization by revolution: 
A Delusion in Subversive Doctrines. There are political and social dreamers who 
ardently and eloquently call for the overthrow of all order, in the belief that the 
proudest temple ofbeautiful humanity will then rear itselfimmediately, almost ofits 
own accord. In these dangerous dreams there is still an echo of Rousseau's super-
stition, which believes in a marvellous primordial goodness ofhuman nature, buried 
up, as it were; and lays all the blame for that burying-up on the institutions of 
civilization, on society, the state, and education. Unfortunately, it is well known by 
historical experiences that every such overthrow reawakens into new life the wildest 
energies, the long-buried horrors and extravagances of the remotest ages; that an 
overthrow, therefore, may possibly be a source of strength to an effete humanity, 
but never a regulator, architect, artist, or perfecter of human nature. It was not 
Voltaire's moderate nature, inclined toward regulating, purifying, and reconstruct-
ing, but Rousseau's passionate follies and half-lies that aroused the optimistic spirit 
of the Revolution, against which I cry, "Ecrasez l'infamc!" Owing to this the spirit of 
enlightenment and progressive development has long been scared away; let us see-each 
ofus individually-if it is not possible to recall it! (WKG, IV-2, 309) 
According to Nietzsche's view in Human, All-Too-Human, the Enlighten-
ment was corrupted by and since Rousseau by being amalgamated and tainted 
with revolutionary substance: 
All the half-insane, theatrical, bestially cruel, licentious, and especially sentimental 
and self-intoxicating elements which go to form the true revolutionary substance, 
and became flesh and spirit, before the revolution, in Rousseau-all this composite 
being, with factitious enthusiasm, finally set even "enlightenment" upon its fanatical 
head, which thereby began itself to shine as in an illuminating halo. Yet, enlighten-
ment is essentially foreign to that phenomenon, and, if left to itself, would have 
pierced silently through the clouds like a shaft oflight, and thus only slowly trans-
figuring national customs and institutions as well. But now, bound hand and foot to 
a violent and abrupt monster, enlightenment itself became violent and abrupt. Its 
danger has therefore become almost greater than its useful quality ofliberation and 
illumination, which it introduced into the great revolutionary movement. Whoever 
grasps this will also know from what confusion it has to be extricated, from what 
impurities to be cleansed, in order that he may then by and within himself continue 
the work of enlightenment and thus squash so to speak after the event the spirit of 
the revolution at its point of origin, and undo its effect. (WKG, IV-3, 292) 
In the same sense Nietzsche's own book was recommended-in a notice 
written in 1879 by Peter Gast, the intimate friend of Nietzsche, at the request of 
Nietzsche's publisher, Schmeitzner. To be sure, this advertisement went contrary 
to Nietzsche's intentions. Nor did he know who had written it. Even so, it is 
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worth noting what Gast emphasized: as in his earlier writings, Gast pointed out, 
Nietzsche was again concerned with the "problem of culture." However, Human, 
All- Too-Human, enlarged this concern beyond a national sphere to global civili-
zation, in the spirit of a "philosophy" which extends and expands the mentality 
of the older Enlightenment and refutes the "spirit of reaction" that manifested 
itself in Rousseau and continues to manifest itself in the ever more apparent 
machinations and movements instigated by the spirit of Rousseau. To be sure, 
Gast adds that Nietzsche's criticism of Schopenhauer's doctrines concerning "the 
saint and metaphysics" should be understood similarly on the bases of Nietzsche's 
enlargement of the critical mind of the Enlightenment. However, the intent of 
Gast's notice is unmistakable. With reference to the Thoughts out ef Season (an 
earlier work of Nietzsche), he emphasizes the fact that Nietzsche's concept of 
(German) culture is conceived in a spirit which differs entirely "from the manner 
of certain subversive spirits ( Umsturzgeister) of the past [i.e., the eighteenth] 
century ... to whom one can trace certain social movements of our own time" 
(WK G, IV-4, 71 f.). In short: Gast underlines Nietzsche's anti-socialistic tendency. 
In full agreement with the opposition to socialism, but from an opposite 
standpoint, Nietzsche's publisher and the spiritus Jamiliaris of Nietzsche, whom 
the publisher hired to do the job, thus emphasized an ideological intention which 
the Marxist critic, Georg Lukacs, was to claim as the primary motive, cause and 
purpose of all of Nietzsche's work: the struggle against socialism. 13 
It is true that Nietzsche was innocent of, and annoyed about, this advertise-
ment for his works which the publisher attached in an appendix to the first sequel 
to Human, All-Too-Human (the Mixed Opinions and Maxims). He wrote to 
Schmeitzner: "I am already objectionable to people. Is it in your interest as a 
publisher that I should also become ridiculous in their eyes? To me one is as much a 
matter of indifference as the other. I merely ask whether you will derive an 
advantage from this" (WKG, IV-4, 71). He fears that people might think he 
shared the responsibility for the "Verlags-Reklame" and that they might laugh at 
his "vanity." Furthermore-though he adds that the summaries of content are 
"well made" -he remarks to Schmeitzner: "From this 'appendix' I learn what 
you think of me-and I have my own second thoughts (Hintergedanken) about 
that" (WKG, IV-4, 72). Also, one might object that the publisher was merely 
trying once more in the course of the year 1879 to attract attention to Nietzsche's 
book which had been a "miserable failure." (For according to the records, after 
the Easter book fair they had sold only 120 copies instead of the rooo copies which 
the publisher had expected to sell.) Schmeitzncr said he wanted to sound off on 
behalf of Nietzsche's writings ("Larm for Nietzsches Schriften schlagen"). Thus 
he sent, for example, Nietzsche's book as well as Wagner's essay on "Publikum 
13 See his essay on "Nietzsche als Begriinder des lrrationalismus der imperialistischen Periode" in 
Die Zerstiirung der Vernunji (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1955). 
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und Popularitat" ( which contained an attack on Nietzsche) to the anti-Wagnerian 
music critic Eduard Hanslick in the hope of arousing "a useful scandal" (WKG, 
IV-4, 77). And hence the anti-socialistic appendix to Nietzsche's book might have 
been written with the thought of exploiting a prevalent climate of opinion. For 
after two attempts on the life of Kaiser Wilhelm I, a law had been promulgated 
in 1878 against the excesses of the Social Democrats. Nonetheless it is obvious 
that the tendency emphasized by Schmeitzner and Gast does correspond to one 
aspect ofNietzsche's work. And this suggests in turn that the basic thesis ofLukacs 
might not be quite as untenable as it appears to be in view of his obviously unten-
able caricature of Nietzsche's universe of thought-which has all the characteristic 
of a deliberate distortion for the purpose of propaganda in the simplistic spirit of 
Vulgiir-Marxismus. 
What is Rousseauism for Nietzsche? A revolutionary and radically utopian 
egalitarianism. According to the later Nietzsche, Rousseauism is a modern 
derivative of the Judaeo-Christian ethics of the herd, the continuation of the 
rebellion of the slaves in the domain of morals, inspired by the ressentiments of the 
weak, ill-favored, low-born, ignoble mass, by a plebeian compulsion toward 
equalization, toward levelling, and thus the precursor of revolutionary and 
radically egalitarian socialism. For by socialism Nietzsche understands the con-
sistent radicalization in the practice or utopia of an egalitarianism which would 
reduce one and all to the same level. However, it is obvious that the disbelief in 
equality pervades all domains of Nietzsche's thought, if we bear in mind that 
Gleichheit in its literal and metaphorical meanings encompasses equality, same-
ness, identity, conformity, uniformity, likeness, equivalence, etc. The most 
abstract and perhaps the most comprehensive expression of Nietzsche's disbeliefin 
Gleichheit may be his denial of the principle of identity, or indeed of any kind of 
identity, in favor of the Heraclitean flux of becoming. And one could certainly 
claim that Nietzsche's polemic against Gleichheit (equality, uniformity) in the 
socio-political realms is analogous to his resistance against Gleichheit (equality, 
equivalence) as a principle of ethics, and to his rejection of the deified principle of 
identity "I am who I am," as well as to his denial of gleiche Dinge (that is, to the 
assumption of objects which are equal or the same in all respects), and conse-
quently to his conception of truths as a species of fictions (for "truths," or allegedly 
true statements generally, assume the possibility of making valid generalizations), 
etc. And consequently a Marxist-that is, an ideologist who, on the basis of his 
doctrine, will admit as the true movens of all human behavior none but the social 
factors-might well claim that the true, the primary motif and motive of 
Nietzsche's thought was the rejection of equality in the social domain, and hence, 
its antisocialistic tendency-while all else in Nietzsche's thought is to be regarded 
as an epiphenomenon or superstructure. And yet it would be arbitrary to claim 
that Nietzsche denied uniformity in all realms because he abhorred socialism as an 
attempt to impose uniformity on all men or as the levelling-down of humanity. 
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And the attempt to represent Nietzsche's entire work as an expression of his anti-
socialism would be likely to lead to distortions and to the neglect of some of the 
most essential and most interesting of Nietzsche's positions and movements of 
thought. Indeed, this would be the case even if one could argue convincingly that 
the antisocialistic tendency-though a minor and derivative motif in terms of 
Nietzsche's own explicit statements on the subject (which, incidentally, also 
include a few positive remarks)-was, in fact, a hidden or unconscious power 
inspiring Nietzsche's thought; and if one conceded what is obvious to all but some 
Marxists, namely, that the presence of an antisocialistic tendency does not per se 
afford a criterion with regard to the validity or invalidity ofNietzsche's ideas. Yet 
to come back to Nietzsche's struggle against Rousseau, it does seem to us now 
that this relationship, which, by the way, is by no means purely polemical (see, 
for example, K, 73, 268), betrays a higher degree of interest and even of intimacy 
than Nietzsche's relation to Voltaire. 
IV. CONCERNING ROUSSEAU'S IMPACT 
Thus Nietzsche-to begin with a random example-observes in the phase of 
Human, All-Too-Human that Rousseau "naturalizes," like Epicurus in his style or 
Wagner in his music. That is to say, he keeps the strings of his bow less taut in 
order to abandon himself to nature. And yet he attains only that "nature" which 
has become part ofhis inheritance, which has been cultivated in him by habit, and 
thus became instinctive. And it is in keeping with this condition that Rousseau's 
conception of nature does not designate a primal state but describes a cultural 
"mythology of nature" (WKG, IV-2, 501). To be sure, Nietzsche's observation 
characterizes the very tendency toward naturalizing which, according to his view, 
the neoclassical style in art sought to overcome. And we recall that he praised the 
victory over naturalism as a triumph of art in connection with the recommenda-
tion of Voltaire's tragedies. Nonetheless it is clear that Nietzsche also recognizes 
the advantages of, and even the necessity for, regressive relaxations. For as he 
observes with a view to the emancipated intellectual, even the most reasonable 
man is occasionally in need of"nature," that is to say, he must regain his "illogical 
basic attitude toward all things" (WKG, IV-2, 47). 
Nietzsche fully acknowledges the impact of Rousseau: The "mythical 
Rousseau" whom people had invented ("erdichtet") on the basis of a mythical 
exegesis of Rousseau's writings and in keeping with hints provided by the author 
(for he and his readers were continually at work on this idealized figure) was one 
source of that current of "ethical reawakening" which "flowed through Europe 
since the end of the eighteenth century." The other source of this moral current, 
Nietzsche observes, was the restoration of the Stoic ideal, whose original pro-
claimers, one might add, were also naturalizing (though in a different sense from 
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Rousseau), for they also proclaimed a mythical, virtuous, and reasonable pan-
cosmic Nature. However, in Nietzsche's view, the resurrection of the great Stoic 
Roman ideal ("[die] Wiederauferstehung des stoisch-gro8en Romertums") was 
the achievement of the French, whereby they continued the labor "on the task 
of the Renaissance in the worthiest fashion." For starting out with the imitative 
recreation of classical forms, they went on with marvellous success to recreate 
classical characters and thus gave-so far-"the best books and the best of human 
beings" to modern mankind (WKG, IV-3, 288 f.). 
A confluence of Rousseau and of the classical French is held responsible by 
Nietzsche for the renovation of German Bildung (culture). The "moralism of 
Schiller" as well as Beethoven's "moralism in the form of musical sound" ("it 
is the eternal praise of Rousseau, of the classical French, and of Schiller") are 
derived from the same sources. Indeed, the "grandfathers" of the "deutscher 
Jungling," the proverbial German youth and his "German virtue" so frequently 
invoked in German national literature, are to be sought for in Paris and in 
Rousseau's native city of Geneva (WKG, IV-3, 289 f.). 
Praise and censure, praise and satire are scarcely to be separated from one 
another in this context. In its effect upon the Germans that "moral reawakening" 
inspired by Rousseau and the stoically classical French brought about "only 
disadvantages and regressions" as far as the "insight" into "moral phenomena" 
is concerned. For German moral philosophy-together with its French, English 
and Italian derivatives-was merely a "semi-theological attempt and attack on 
Helvetius, a rejection of the hard-won freedom of perspective and of the pointers 
in the right direction" which that theoretician of a doctrine of morality based on 
egoism and its sublimation "had finally brought together and expressed well" 
(WKG, IV-3, 290).14 
A series of motifs is sounded here; but it is difficult to decide what value 
Nietzsche assigns to Rousseau and to his impact in this context. Would it not have 
been more beneficial to men to follow the path indicated by Helvetius rather 
than to experience that "moral reawakening?" Or was the moral awakening-
even though it diminished intellectual insight into the moral phenomena-a gain 
with respect to the heightening of the human potential, a profit, so to speak, in 
terms of man's illogical basic position and attitude? And if so, was the moral 
awakening a gain only insofar as it was patterned on the reawakening of the noble 
Roman spirit which appeared in the guise of idealized Nature? Or was it a gain 
also insofar as that moral awakening was inspired by the more barbarian and 
plebeian ideal of Rousseau? 
It seems appropriate at this point to recall the fact that Nietzsche's essay on 
Wagner which preceded Human, All-Too-Human had contained among other 
14 See also, WKG, IV-3, 414: "Retrogression in ethics in comparison to the last century-Hel-
vetius. From thereon downwards Rousseau, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel." 
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things an expression of sympathy for what Nietzsche called the Faustian man of 
Rousseau-for his "avid hunger for life," his "discontent and longing," his 
"intercourse with the demons of the heart," his determination not to accept its 
compromises, conventions, restraints, nor the "arrogant [social] castes" nor the 
"dominance of pitiless wealth," of priests and miserable systems of education, all 
of which conspire to squash and deform the oppressed. And in the same context 
Nietzsche had acknowledged the power emanating from this mythical man of 
Rousseau-a force "which has urged and continues to urge men onward to 
violent revolution. For in all socialistic tremors and earthquakes, it is still the man 
of Rousseau who moves, like the old Typhon under the Aetna," and readies the 
souls of men to form "terrible resolutions," but who will also call forth the noblest 
and rarest qualities from their depths (K, 71, 234 ff.). 
Surely, this perspective of thought and sentiment continues to exist as a 
possibility even for the Nietzsche of Human,All-Too-Human. And consequently 
even the antisocialistic tendency is not maintained as constantly or as unam-
biguously as it seemed to us previously. The considerations for and against 
Rousseau are included in the dialectic of Nietzsche, which centers on the question 
how to enlarge and to ennoble, to increase and to intensify, to maximize, to 
heighten the potential of man. Rousseau's type of man seems to have access to 
elemental potentialities which arc lacking in the mere intellectual, the man of 
cognition and insight, or even in the civilized representative of an aristocratic or 
noble culture. Nietzsche is at no point an adherent even of the mythical Rousseau, 
let alone of a demythologized Rousseau-not even in the sympathetic passages 
quoted from Thoughts out of Season, even less so in Human, All- Too-Human, and 
least of all in his later works. But neither does he wish to renounce the barbaric 
advantages which are connected in his mind with the Rousseauistic reaction and 
regression. As in the case of the Protestant Reformation (which Nietzsche regards 
as a regressive reaction against the vital, humanistic and enlightened spirit of the 
Renaissance), 15 the powerful impact of revolutionizing primitivisms, of protests 
in the name of the suppressed-and of all that has been suppressed, oppressed or 
repressed by civilization-should accrue ultimately to the benefit of mankind by 
producing an enrichment of man's potential. A movement of reaction is to be 
turned into a movement of progress-not by the victory of the destructively 
regressive tendencies, but by way of a process in which the regressive forces are 
assimilated, suspended and overcome. For the progress in human self-realization 
is to take place, after all, in the direction of a noble culture which would prove its 
strength, rank, and abundance also and especially in its capacity to assimilate and 
to subjugate barbaric and elemental forces and to render them productive; much 
as such a superior culture would also be capable of utilizing pathological ten-
dencies. 
15 This is true of Nietzsche ever since the reversal recorded in MA, in contradistinction to the 
early-Wagnerian-Nietzsche of GT and U (see my Von den ersten und letzten Din~e11, pp. 272-77). 
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Indeed, Rousseau is to Nietzsche of great interest, and almost a model, 
precisely with respect to the exploitation of the pathological. For "men like 
Rousseau understand how to use their weaknesses, defects, and vices as manure 
for their talent. When Rousseau bewails the corruption and degeneration of 
society as the evil results of culture, there is a personal experience at the bottom 
of this, the bitterness of which gives sharpness to his general condemnation and 
poisons the arrows with which he shoots; he unburdens himself first as an individ-
ual and thinks of getting a remedy which, while benefiting society directly, will 
also benefit him indirectly by means of society" (WKG, IV-2, 361). 
This implies a criticism of Rousseau; but it also implies a justification of 
Rousseau, and indeed a self-justification of Nietzsche, who is surely aware of the 
fact that he himself knows as well how to "sow and reap harvest" on a soil 
fertilized by "personal defects" (WKG, IV-2, 361), and that he too is compelled-
and able-to tum his own sickness to productive use. Moreover, by generalizing 
this personal experience, Nietzsche arrives at the opinion that cultural progress 
consists in a successful assimilation of pathological elements, in "Veredelung 
durch Entartung," an "ennoblement through degeneration." The individuals 
who are less stable and less firmly bound because they are insecure and "morally 
weaker" are also prone to experiment and to try new things. And thus they have 
occasionally a liberating effect and may succeed in inoculating something new 
into the stable body of their culture which, to be sure, must be strong enough to 
accept and to assimilate the new ingredient (WKG, IV-2, 191 f.). 
Like Luther, Rousseau thus appears to represent to Nietzsche a conjunction 
of the primitive and the pathological, of elemental and pathogenic regression. 
And with regard to both elemental primitivisms and pathological deviations (or 
the inoculation of pathogenic substance), Rousseau and his works-or should we 
say, a myth of Rousseau?-constitute a phenomenon significant in terms of 
Nietzsche's own "elemental" and "decadent" tendencies. Hence it is not alto-
gether surprising if Nietzsche was more preoccupied with Rousseau than with 
Voltaire. He had originally intended to conclude the sequel to the first volume of 
Human, All-Too-Human with another homage to Voltaire. Instead, he concluded 
with an aphorism in which there is no mention of Voltaire, while Voltaire's 
opponent, Rousseau, appears as one of the live spirits of the dead, whom Nietz-
sche claims that he must ever consult and confront (WKG, IV-3, 170). 
It might be objected at this point that we have gained altogether too much by 
the enlargement of our knowledge concerning Nietzsche's relation to Rousseau. 
How do we distinguish between Nietzsche's positive self-identification with the 
model of Voltaire-which may serve ultimately also to suspend and to overcome 
this very model-and the negative but more intense, more passionate self-identifi-
cation of Nietzsche with his opponent or enemy, Rousseau? Can one help but 
suspect here and elsewhere in Nietzsche that if we would bring together all his 
thoughts and opinions on the subject at hand in order to gain optimal under-
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standing, we might still be unable to say what he really thinks, since every 
thought seems to provoke a counter-thought, every opinion seems to elicit its 
contrary? And perhaps the uncontradicted or one-sided positions of Nietzsche and 
the idiosyncracies, which we find in his work, were allowed to stand because 
Nietzsche's course as a thinker was cut short too soon; because he lacked time and 
opportunity to arrive at a still more encompassing self-contradiction? Like an 
instrument which responds all too easily, Nietzsche appears to vibrate with a 
multiplicity of vibrations, and to find accesses everywhere, not merely by virtue 
of a somewhat detached historical sense but by virtue of a sensibility which is 
constantly irritated and impelled to imitative and, indeed, to histrionic empathy. 
In keeping with his own concept of our age of comparison, Nietzsche seems 
compelled to attempt not merely to understand, to compare, and to judge all 
things, but to enter by way of an emotional experiment into all feelings, and in a 
sense, to re-experience all things. 
In a most comprehensive sense he strives to re-integrate the many-headed 
crowd which dwells within him. He will ultimately desire precisely the strength 
to extirpate and to eliminate without pity, with the "cruel" injustice of a 
"healthy" sense of vitality which, for the sake of self-assertion, must set limits. 
But again and again the synthesis will threaten to disintegrate. The suppressed 
voices within will not allow themselves to be silenced. The later Nietzsche con-
fronts the "dividuum," 16 which is his own self, with an abrupt dictatorial gesture 
and speaks against enfeebling multiplicity in a very loud voice. But perhaps he 
does so also because the counter-voices have become louder, in turn, and more 
disparate and dissonant; thus he feels compelled to shout them down. Perhaps he 
does so because the threat of disintegration into chaos has become ever more 
acute. And consequently one also feels tempted to repeat with regard to Nietz-
sche: "Ce grand esprit, c'est un chaos d'idees claires," a remark by Faguet17 
concerning Voltaire, which would reveal, in turn, an affinity between Nietzsche 
and the opponent of Rousseau. And yet, proportionate to the chaos in Nietzsche 
there is always Nietzsche's ever-renewed, never-surrendered attempt to over-
come this chaos. And in this context the above-mentioned aphorism should be 
quoted, which reveals-in keeping with the relative moderation characteristic of 
Human, All-Too-Human-Nietzsche's attempt to derive a synthesis and unity of 
heightened and all-encompassing humanity by way of a discussion and confronta-
tion with divergent representatives of Occidental tradition: 
16 To this conception of man as "dividuum" (MA, Aphorism 57) compare also Nietzsche's view of 
man as "dissonance" incarnate (K, 70, 189 f.) or as a conjunction of "several spheres" (WKG, IV-1, 
257). Nietzsche deals again and again with this multiplicity of selves within the self-a theme popu-
larized later on as (modern) man's schizophrenic state, e.g., in Hesse's Steppenwolf, the poetry of 
Gottfried Benn, etc. 
17 Quoted in Voltaire: Oeuvres philosophiques (extraits) (Paris: Classiques Larousse, n.d.), p. 1o6. 
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I, too, have been in the underworld, even as Odysseus, and I shall often be there 
again. Not sheep alone have I sacrificed that I might be able to converse with a few 
dead souls, but I have not spared my own blood. Four pairs did not reject my 
sacrifices: Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and Rousseau, 
Pascal and Schopenhauer. With them I must come to terms when I have long 
wandered alone. I will let them agree and disagree with me, and listen to them 
when, in proving me right or wrong, they agree and disagree with one another. In 
all I say, decide, or think out for myself or for others, I fasten my eyes on those eight 
and see their eyes fastened on mine. (WKG, IV-3, 169 f.) 
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It would be tempting to trace, by way of analogy and contrast, the connec-
tions which tie together the members of each of these pairs in Nietzsche's mind; 
e.g., Pascal and Schopenhauer, the Christian and the atheistic proclaimer of an 
ascetic pessimism, (see K, 78, 666; 83, 396); or Goethe and Spinoza, the quasi(?) 
pagan and the intellectualized or spiritualized pantheist (see K, 78, 44, 235). Why 
Plato and Rousseau? Because one prefigures Christianity while the other intro-
duces the secularized, modern, massively popular after-effect of Christian faith 
(K, 83, 407)?18 Or perhaps because both-the aristocrat and the plebeian-are 
connected with each other by the fact that they disagree with each other on a 
matter which is essential to Nietzsche. In a note of summer 1879, Nietzsche 
observes that Plato and Rousseau are in opposition to each other regarding 
"culture": "Plato says if we lived among natural men (savages), we would 
embrace even the Athenian criminal (as a civilized being). He is right, against 
Rousseau" (WKG, IV-3, 453). 
V. THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIZATION 
This brings us back to an issue so central to the later Nietzsche that it keeps 
alive his interest in the antagonism between Voltaire and Rousseau, both of 
whom he will, in turn, confront with his conception of culture and civilization-
though in other respects his regard for Voltaire seems to have become rather 
qualified and Rousseau is treated increasingly as the pure villain. Why is it then 
that the antagonism between Voltaire and Rousseau concerning their evaluation 
of civilization causes the later Nietzsche to emphasize his respect for Voltaire and 
to proclaim with a passion his contempt and hatred for Rousseau's alleged ad-
vocacy of a "return in impuribus naturalibus" (K, 77, 129 f)? 
The later Nietzsche strives to the point of frenzy to conjure up the ideal 
18 For Rousseau and Rousseauism as plebeian offshoot and heir to Christianity, see below p. 126. 
and K, 78, 52 f., 671; for a summary of some aspects of Nietzsche's concepti.;n of Plato relevant in the 
present context, cf. my Von den ersten und letzten Dingen, 292. 
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image of the most comprehensive human being. Consequently he too seems to 
demand-not only, but among other things-a return to nature. All the more he 
feels compelled to disarm the catastrophic suspicion that he, Nietzsche, could 
agree at all with that pathological, inferior, sick, effeminate, histrionic Rousseau, .. 
a man inspired by the ressentiments of the weak, preaching morals-like Luther-
out of a desire for vengeance, and glorifying his need for revenge as a moral and 
religious duty, that Blasebalg of morality, that rabble rouser, that modern hybrid 
between idealist and canaille. 19 
In their simple, bare outlines, the major positions in the conflict between 
Voltaire and Rousseau, as Nietzsche sees them, are as follows: Voltaire loves, 
praises, defends culture and civilization as a triumph over the state of nature, the 
natural bestiality, the rapacious animal nature of man. Rousseau, moralist on the 
basis of ressentiment, wants to give the oppressed a good conscience in their 
rebellion by contending that injustice, cruelty, corruption are inherent in the 
state of civilization and culture, and by proclaiming his utopia as the state of 
nature. Nietzsche repeats at this point the views he expressed in Human, All-Too-
Human. However, his position has grown more complex because he is now 
criticizing both points of view with reference to the value of civilization. In 
opposition to Voltaire's estimate, Nietzsche opposes Kultur to Zivilisation. He 
reformulates the problem of civilization which, he claims, was left unsettled in 
the conflict between Rousseau and Voltaire. Nietzsche wants man to become 
more natural-but not at all in the sense of Rousseau (or in the sense which he 
attributed to Rousseau). For man is to become less trusting, more skeptical, 
stronger, more confident in himself and more self-reliant, and indeed amoral like 
Nature herself. And this amoral nature of his he will not gain via a return to some 
idyllic past or by a revolutionary abolition of civilization. He can only attain his 
amoral nature by going forward. Only in a distant future will he perhaps make 
the conquest of his own nature which, from the very outset of his history, he 
denied. For precisely in the aboriginal state, the morality and barbaric artifice of 
error, deception, and illusion dominated the primitive mind. Nietzsche wants 
man to become-in the future-amoral like Nature herself. And with this he 
stands in opposition also to Voltaire who, contrary to Rousseau, believed man 
was growing ever more perfect the greater the distance he gained from nature.20 
The wishes and ideal images of the later Nietzsche grew increasingly more 
ambitious. To give an example: he dreamt of a type who would combine Napo-
leon-the reawakener of the true man, the soldier who resuscitated the struggle 
for power-and Goethe, who conceived of a Western culture that would inherit 
all the accumulated treasures of Humanitiit, all the civilized, enlightened, refined 
humanity and humane sentiments evolved in the course of civilization (K, 78, 78). 
19 Cf., for example, K, 77, 171, 265; 78, 68 f., 234, 239, 501 f. 
2° Cf. with respect to this entire issue K, 78, 74 f., 88 f. 
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And Nietzsche would intensify this synthesis and have it increase ever more in 
strength and virtu to a degree where it would become all-embracing. 
As Nietzsche sees it, domestication, ennoblement, refinement, sublimation 
conflict with the need for the intensification, vitalization, animalization of man 
(K, 78, 89). And therein lies the problem of civilization and culture which, to be 
sure, would deserve to be dealt with extensively in relation to Nietzsche's own 
dual-ideal of vitality and nobility, an ideal that finally reaches a point where it 
turns into a kind of sublime monstrosity, a maximal conjunction of ruthless 
vitality and transcendent spirituality . 
. However, though the later Nietzsche contradicts Voltaire's views as well as 
those of Rousseau, he nonetheless admires Voltaire's struggle against Rousseau to 
the point almost of confessing his own solidarity with Voltaire: "The fight began 
around 1760-the citizen of Geneva and le seigneur de Perney. From that moment 
on, Voltaire becomes the man of his century, the philosopher, the representative 
of tolerance and unbelief (till then he had been merely un bel esprit). Envy and 
hatred of Rousseau's success impelled him forward 'to the heights'" (K, 78, 75). 
It is important to realize that even the later Nietzsche does not object to 
civilization as such and that he certainly relished himself the mitigations, refine-
ments and subtleties, the intellectual and spiritual joys of the civilized state, which 
he claimed were so highly appreciated by Voltaire. He shares Voltaire's contempt 
for "narrowmindedness even in the form of virtue, for lack of delicacy even 
among monks and ascetics" (K, 78, 74). He did not reject refinement and spiritu-
alization as such, but he rejected civilization as enfeeblement, as "domestication of 
the animal" -especially in a moral sense (K, 78, 89). Indeed, insofar as civilization 
does not contribute to the moral improvement of man (in Nietzsche's pejorative 
sense of that term), this is a point in favor of civilization (K, 78, 260). For what 
Nietzsche fears above all is a moralization and a levelling of intensities in favor of 
moral norms which will result in "intolerance against the boldest men and 
keenest spirits" (K, 78, 89). Nietzsche's ideal, possibly a conjunction of opposites, 
is to fuse and to unite the maximum of animal drive and stamina with the highest 
degree of cultural energy: since, after all, cultural energy and intensity are fed 
only by that animal driving force. 
The later Nietzsche sympathizes with Voltaire, insofar as Voltaire still con-
ceives of the comprehensive "umanitd in the Renaissance sense" and retains an 
appreciation for Renaissance virtues, that is: for virtu free of Moralin, free of the 
moral poison (K, 78, 74). Indeed, Nietzsche claims now that the higher degree of 
admitted immorality constitutes the superiority of culture over the lack of culture, 
which is why all high points in the history of human development-including 
the society of Voltaire-appear to the eyes of moral fanatics as the climax of 
corruption (K, 78, 501 f.). Nietzsche sympathizes with Voltaire, insofar as 
Voltaire appears versus the plebeian Rousseau as the "missionary of culture," the 
aristocrat, the representative of the victorious social classes and of their sense of 
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values (K, 78, 75) not because Nietzsche agrees with the ideology of these social 
castes but because he wants to side with the strong, the noble, the men of a fine 
race and of good breeding, and against the sick, the weak, the tshandalah. And 
finally: he admires Voltaire because in Voltaire an uncommon health, ease and 
abundant facility are as unquestionable as in the case of Rousseau the predomi-
nance of mental disturbance and the rancune of the sick and ailing man (K, 78, 75). 
VI. THE OVERCOMING OF VOLT AIRE 
Indeed, even in the last year of his sanity, Nietzsche will quote Voltaire-
notably the Anti-Christian who mocked the "immortal soul that spent nine 
months between excrements and urine," and said of Christ, even on his death-bed: 
"Do not speak to me of that man."21 Nonetheless, the impression remains that 
Nietzsche's admiration for Voltaire has waned. True, he docs claim, even in 
r887, that it is a "criterion for judging a man's worth whether he affirms Voltaire 
or Rousseau." And since Nietzsche himself now likes to assume the attitude of 
the aristocratic immoralist, he is pleased with symptoms of amoral vitality to 
be found in Voltaire. Hence one may take it to be a compliment to Voltaire if 
Nietzsche refers to him with Galiani's couplet: "Un monstre gai vaut micux/ 
qu'un sentimental ennuyeux."22 Yet he says in the same context: "Voltaire is a 
magnificent, a brilliantly witty canaille," and thus suggests that he no longer 
considers Voltaire to be noble, although he will_ acknowledge him as the literary 
advocate of nobility. It is as if Nietzsche now tolerated and patronized M. Arouet 
after the model of the higher French aristocracy. For "Voltaire is possible and 
bearable only in the context and on the basis of an aristocratic culture which can 
afford the luxury of spiritual canaillerie" (GB, IV, 340 f.). 23 
Or is this to take too seriously the semi-humorous letter in which this passage 
occurs? The later Nietzsche who deletes the dedication to Voltaire in the second 
printing of Human, All-Too-Human (1886), considers himself "a few centuries 
ahead of Voltaire in matters of enlightenment" (K, 78, 66). However, the process 
of overcoming Voltaire, that is, Nietzsche's attempt to claim for himself the 
position of the man of Enlightenment and of the grandseigneur of the Spirit, and 
thus to become the new Voltaire who supersedes the older Voltaire, sets in as 
early as Human, All-Too-Human. Nietzsche himself suggests this in the retro-
spective quoted above: "The name of Voltaire on one ofmy writings-that was 
progress-toward myse[f ... " And he adds: "On closer inspection, one will 
21 WKG, Vlll-2 [1970], 10, 325. 
22 Occasionally, Nietzsche also attributes these lines to Voltaire; sec K, 78, 28, 66. 
23 Similarly, Nietzsche also speaks of Voltaire's "kind of play-acting for the benefit of society" 
(K, 83, 392). 
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discover [in Human, All-Too-Human] a merciless spirit that knows all hideouts 
where the ideal is at home-where it has its secret dungeons and ... ultimate 
safety." And obviously, this merciless spirit is of quite a different cast than the 
spirit of Voltaire. 
Perhaps some more conclusive proof for this contention is needed. The fact 
that the original epilogue to Human, All-Too-Human was not even included in 
the first version of the first volume may mean little in itself. Somewhat more 
striking is the circumstance that the name of Rousseau appears in the concluding 
aphorism of the first sequel to Human, All-Too-Human, I, and that this concluding 
aphorism of the Mixed Opinions and Maxims replaced a final homage to Voltaire 
(which should have found its place in an extended version of Aphorism 407). And 
yet this last tribute to Voltaire was probably deleted because the solemn irony of 
its conclusion would have betrayed all too clearly the intentions of the new Vol-
taire. 
Aphorism 407 of the Mixed Opinions and Maxims reads as follows: "The 
Glory of All Great Men.-What is the use of genius, if it does not invest him who 
contemplates and reveres it with such freedom and loftiness of feeling that he no 
longer has need of genius?-To make themselves superfluous is the glory of all 
great men." At this point the eliminated lines would have been inserted: "Let us 
name once more at this juncture the name of Voltaire. What will be his future 
highest honor, to be rendered to him by the freest spirits of future generations? His 
last honor ... " (WKG, IV-4, 301). Evidently, the last honor to be rendered to the 
spirit of Voltaire would be the proof that his model had been surpassed. Now 
Voltaire's spirit could be finally put to rest to enjoy the calm of oblivion. For he 
had finally succeeded in making himself superfluous. 
Nietzsche's claim to have overcome and superseded Voltaire, and conse-
quently, to have gone beyond the spirit of the old Enlightenment, occurs in 
Human, All-Too-Human in conjunction with the notion that the modern mental-
ity represents a higher stage of culture: e.g., Voltaire could still observe in a spirit 
of mockery that he was grateful to Heaven for the institution of marriage and the 
church, which had provided so well for our amusement. But for us, Nietzsche 
claims, all mockery on these subjects has been exhausted ("diese Themen [sind) 
zu Ende gespottet"). All contemporary witticisms directed against these insti-
tutions are belated and come too cheap. For the "higher the cultural level of a 
man," the larger the range of topics which become unavailable as objects for 
mockery. Hence we are living now in "the age of seriousness," in which "the 
differences between reality and pretentious appearance, between what a man is 
and what he wishes to represent" should no longer be an object for jokes. For the 
"feeling for these contrasts ... has quite a different effect once we seek for under-
lying causes." "The more thoroughly anyone understands life, the less he will 
mock, though finally, perhaps, he will mock at the 'thoroughness of his under-
standing'" (WKG, IV-2, 205 f.). 
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Actually, Nietzsche himself was not beyond publishing some rather cheap 
witticisms on the subject of marriage, e.g., "The Unity of Place and the Drama. -If 
married couples did not live together, happy marriages would be more frequent" 
(WKG, IV-2, 276). Or, "Some husbands have sighed over the elopement of their 
wives; most about the fact that no one was willing to elope with theirs" (WKG, 
IV-2, 275). Yet these occasional and somewhat contrived lapses into mockery 
seem less characteristic of the author of Human, All-Too-Human than his intention 
and program to leave aside irony, mockery, laughter, and to value only the kind 
of spirit which is allied with seriousness, to esteem only the scarcely perceptible 
spiritual smile, 24 and thus to establish his seriousness in the place of V oltairean 
mockery as the dominant stylistic principle of the new Enlightenment. Indeed, 
who could ignore the keynote of irredeemable seriousness even-or especially-
in the later Nietzsche, though he will wear and sanctify the crown of laughter 
in the name of Zarathustra! 
Nor is this to claim that Nietzsche's observation is purely subjective. The 
Enlightenment in our age of strict and increasingly specialized sciences does differ 
in spirit from the semidilettante, sociable and playful esprit of the eighteenth-
century philosophes by virtue of an unrelenting seriousness which has been ele-
vated to the dignity of a method, by a thoroughness quite devoid of humorous 
relief, such as was scarcely cultivated in previous ages. And Nietzsche may be 
right that even in the critique of moralia, the "play" with thoughts which were 
once esteemed as bold sallies and paradox.es has turned into "seriousness."25 
Nonetheless this characterization of Nietzsche's attitude-while it does 
correspond to one facet of his character-is altogether too unambiguous and too 
undialectical to do justice to the dividuum or multiple self of this author. For 
among other things, Nietzsche is also addicted to mockery; and what is more, he 
would like to look upon all existence as an eternal comedy.26 With a view to the 
Jews-to Heine, to Offenbach-the later Nietzsche claims that ingenious buf-
foonery, or rather, buffoonery raised to the level of genius ("geniale Buffonerie") 
is "the supreme form of spirituality" (K, 83, 406). And he himself would have 
been quite capable of deriding the German lack of humor which characterizes 
his own aphorism concerning the age of seriousness and its heavy-handed censure 
of the mocking and superficial Frenchman Voltaire, which is quite in keeping 
24 Cf. MA, Aphorisms 186,372,553; Mixed Opinions and Maxims, Aphorism 276; S, Aphorism 173. 
25 Thus Voltaire and Helvetius, arbiters of taste and esprit pronouncingjudgment on the audacities 
of Fontenelle, read in his Dialog11es of the Dead as paradoxes of a somewhat dangerous sort the very ideas 
which are being proven to us by solid science (K, 74, 108). 
26 For pertinent quotes see Karl Joel, Nietzsche und die Romantik (Jena and Leipzig: Diederichs, 
1905), 125 f. According to Joel's reading of Aphorism 240 of MA, Nietzsche does conceive the contem-
porary age as the age of seriousness; but he suggests that the future may well belong to laughter, and 
consequently a "carnival in the grandest style," the most spiritual of high spirits and carnival laughter, 
may be in its incipient stage of preparation even now (pp. 125, 133). 
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with a well-worn German cliche. 27 What is more, the very seriousness of thor-
ough knowledge which is to distinguish the new Enlightenment from the 
Enlightenment of Voltaire, is to create the prerequisite for an all-encompassing 
sense for the human comedy and-ultimately-for the comedy of our universe 
which is, in essence, pure play freed of all morality, goal, meaning or purpose. 
After all, Nietzsche's philosophy does culminate in a notion of creative play, 
much as he sees the ultimate stage of wisdom represented in the image of the 
innocently creative child at play. 28 And even the free spirit of Human, All-Too-
Human has learned by virtue of his thorough genetic knowledge that in regard to 
their origins all human affairs deserve to be treated with irony, although he 
concludes that, in view of this pervasively ironical state of human affairs, irony is, 
in fact, quite superfluous (WKG, IV-2, 214). And the same esprit libre also knows 
that the most thorough knowledge will only enlighten him concerning the 
genesis of human errors and will teach him only that man is inevitably caught up 
in deceptive perspectives of mere semblance. That is why the "serious" free 
spirit will finally be inclined to make fun of only one thing: namely, of the 
"thoroughness" of his own knowledge and insight (WKG, IV-2, 205 f.). But 
this one thing, in turn, includes all others; and thus it is the hope of the later 
Nietzsche that the most radical insight and desperate seriousness of knowledge 
without hope, a most comprehensive doubt and skepticism, a profoundly 
traumatic insight, will give rise to Olympian laughter and the Dionysian dance. 
Even in Mixed Opinions and Maxims Nietzsche characterizes the progress in 
free thinking by observing that Voltaire's dictum "croyez moi, mon ami, I' erreur 
aussi a son merite," which in his days expressed a daring thought, is reduced to an 
"involuntary naivete" when judged in the light of our present insights (WKG, 
IV-3, 18). For having realized that man has developed all he treasures on the basis 
27 Cf. also Nietzsche's polemic against excessive seriousness as uglification: One deforms things 
by taking them seriously (see Joel. p. 105; also K, 74, 215 (Aphorism 327): against taking things seriously as 
an expression of the prejudice of the "serious beast" vis d vis all "gay science"; K, 82, 90: "There is too 
much seriousness in the world." As with many other things, Nietzsche also advocates a transvaluation 
and reversal with regard to seriousness and mirth: All that was taken seriously and weighed heavily 
hitherto is to be taken lightly henceforth. Yet the "great seriousness" will only "begin" with this 
lightness and serenity (K, 77, 374). The 628th Aphorism of MA (Seriousness in Playing) may be con-
sidered a first step toward this transvaluation. 
28 1 am indebted to the comprehensive discussion of the pervasive relevance of this motif and of 
Nietzsche's philosophy of play in an-as yet unpublished-study by Richard Perkins (graduate 
student in the Department of Philosophy at The State University of New York at Buffalo). Perkins 
traces the thematic configuration from an essay on "Fatum und Geschichte" (HKG, II, 59), which 
Nietzsche wrote when he was seventeen years old, to the last year of Nietzsche's sanity. Characteristic 
for the early Nietzsche are the reference to Heraclitus, who compared the cosmos or cosmic force to a 
child at play (in the 24th section of GT) and the sections on Heraclitus in Philosophy in the Tragic Age 
of the Greeks (secs. 5 to 9). The best known passage in the mature works of Nietzsche is to be found in the 
speech "On the Three Metamorphoses" in the first book of Zarathustra. 
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of errors, we would have to say: "croyez moi, la verite," believe me, my friend, 
even the truth has its merits! (WKG, IV-4, 256). As Nietzsche suggests in the 
26th Aphorism of Human, All-Too-Human, the older Enlightenment-though it 
brought about a historical approach and perspective29-must be corrected in an 
"essential" respect. What we need now is a genetico-historical insight, analysis, 
critique: a retrograde movement of the intellect. For only by way of a just 
appreciation and evaluation of archaic-notably: religious-errors (some of 
which greatly benefited mankind in the past), will we finally suspend and over-
come these archaic errors. The Voltairean free thinker of the eighteenth century 
was incapable of such insight. He could confront the power of ancient errors-
e.g., as represented by the church-only with defensively aggressive mockery. 
According to Nietzsche, the typical protagonist of the old Enlightenment 
could engage in the struggle for liberation only on a somewhat superficial level. 
He remained bound to the ancient errors, notably to Christian morality. And 
this is indeed the "essential" respect in which Nietzsche believes that he has left 
Voltaire far behind. Beginning with Human, All-Too-Human, Nietzsche will 
engage increasingly in a polemic against Christian ethics and its derivatives, the 
ethics of pure humanity and pure virtue. In The Dawn he still disguises his convic-
tion of superiority in the form of a quasi-objective observation: "The more men 
became emancipated from [religious] dogmas, the more did they seek the 
justification, as it were, for this emancipation in a cult oflove of humanity; not 
to fall short in this respect of the Christian ideal, but to exceed it, if possible, was a 
secret ambition of all the French free-thinkers, from Voltaire to Auguste Comte" 
(K, 73, II7). The critical edge is more apparent in a paragraph from The Gay 
Science in which Nietzsche discusses the errors to which mankind owed the 
promotion of science, among them Voltaire's faith "in the absolute utility of 
cognition ... , notably in the most intimate nexus between morality, knowledge 
and happiness" (74, 66). And this very faith he will later scorn utterly, e.g., as 
subordination of the free-thinker's quest for truth to the morality ofhumanitarian 
love of man: "Oh Voltaire! Oh humanity! Oh nonsense!" Concerning Voltaire, 
who goes about his quest for truth in a fashion that is "all-too-human" or all-too-
humane ("ii ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien"),30 Nietzsche now exclaims: 
"I bet he will find nothing!" (K, 76, 47). 
Generally Nietzsche holds: "Much as it was progress on the part of our 
fathers when finally religion as a pose offended their taste" -and this progress 
included "hostility" and Voltairean bitterness against religion (and everything 
else that formerly belonged to the gestures of free-thinkers)-it is the symptom 
of a further progress on our part that our taste can no longer tolerate even "the 
29 Also in this connection Nietzsche may be thinking of Voltaire and his achievements as a his-
torian. 
30 Voltaire: Epitre a un homme ( 1776). 
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solemn word and formula of virtue," that the pose and gesture of morality offend 
us, that puritan litanies, "moral sermons," square respectability will not har-
monize with the "music in our conscience" and "the dance in our spirit" (cf. K, 
76, 141). 
In one of his last works, at the very end of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche applies 
Voltaire's "Ecrasez l'infamc!" -that is to say, Voltaire's battle-cry in the fight 
against the church and the clergy-to that "morality" which, as Nietzsche puts it, 
by virtue of its conception of"the good man," sided with "all that is weak, sick, 
a failure, suffering of itself-all that ought to perish," a morality which conse-
quently subverted "the principle of selection." This application of Voltaire's 
motto amounts to a transvaluation of Voltaire's anathema, or indeed to its per-
version in the service of the new-anti-moralistic-Enlightenment as advocated 
by the later Nietzsche. And a· similar, though less extreme transformation takes 
place in Human, All-Too-Human, where Voltaire's favorite curse-directed 
especially at the privileged and repressive rule of the Catholic hierarchy and the 
clerical party, and destined to become a slogan of liberal democratic Jacobins-is 
made to function as a slogan directed against the left, against the ideology of 
Rousseauistic, egalitarian, socialist demagogues, and opposed to the uprising of 
the enslaved masses (see WKG, IV-2, 309). 
From Nietzsche's point of view these transvaluations are quite justified. 
Ultimately, he regards the moralisms of Christianity and of a secularized humani-
tarianism in the name of the weak and all-too-many or the revolutionary 
ideologies of liberals, Jacobins and Socialists as links in a single continuum. All 
belong to the anti-elitist, anti-aristocratic, anti-individualistic mentality and 
tradition of rebellious slaves. However, his own position-as a free aristocratic 
individual, convinced of the prerogatives of a superior elite-Nietzsche regards as 
being in keeping with the essential position of Voltaire. He thus could persuade 
himself that he merely continued Voltaire's struggle with greater consistency, in 
a different context and under other auspices. Even the author of Zarathustra will 
compare himself to Voltaire. Proudly, he assures Peter Gast: "I am one of the 
most terrible opponents of Christianity and have discovered a mode of attack of 
which even Voltaire did not have an inkling" (GB, IV, 173). No doubt, Nietzsche 
is right. And yet these bragging pronouncements of superiority in a struggle in 
which he remained, after all, both the murderer and the victim, seem feebler in 
their very insistence than the earlier, more restrained and more complex state-
ments which characterize the skepticism of Human, All-Too-Human. 
VIII 
Socrates in Hamann' s Socratic Memorabilia and 
Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy* 
' JAMES C. 0 FLAHERTY 
Earlier I had occasion to compare the versions of Socrates presented by 
Hamann in the Socratic Memorabilia and Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy. 1 In 
the present article I propose to take another look at the same problem but from a 
different point of view. For a comparison of the differences in the two portraits of 
Socrates feature by feature raises the more fundamental question of the reasons 
for the differences. In the more than a century intervening between the publi-
cation of Hamann's and Nietzsche's treatises on Socrates there appeared, to be 
sure, other important interpretations of the life and work of the Greek philoso-
pher (especially by Hegel and Kierkegaard) but it is particularly instructive to 
compare the Hamannian and Nietzschean versions for reasons which will become 
obvious in the following remarks. 
I am aware that in raising the epistemological question I am proceeding in a 
manner which Nietzsche would disallow, for, in his own words in The Will to 
Power, he was "deeply distrustful of the dogmas of epistemology."2 Further, as 
Karl Jaspers says: "Epistemology, conceived as an attempt critically to analyze 
man's cognitive faculty, is simply an object of Nietzsche's contempt."3 This atti-
*This chapter is a reprint, slightly edited, of a Sektionsreferat which was read at the Fourth Inter-
national Conference of Germanists in Princeton, August 1970. See Dichtung, Sprache und Gesel/schaft: 
Akten des IV. Internationalen Germanisten Kongresses in Princeton, ed. Victor Lange and Hans-Gert Roloff 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Athenaum Verlag, 1971), pp. 554-61. For the complete study, of which the present 
chapter is a summary version, see my article "The Concept of Knowledge in Hamann's Sokratische 
Denkwiirdigkeiten and Nietzsche's Die Geburt der Traiodie," Monatshefte, 54 (1972), 334-48. Unless 
otherwise indicated, all translations are my own. 
1 See "Socrates in Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia and Nietzsche's Birth ef Tragedy," in Philomathes: 
Essays in the Humanities in Memory ef Philip Merlan, ed. R. B. Palmer and R. G. Hamerton-Kelly (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1971) pp. 3o6-29. Parenthetical references in the present text by page number only 
arc to:J. G. Hamann, Siimtliche Werke, ed.JosefNadler, II (Vienna: Herder, 1950). (For key to abbrevi-
ations see p. xvii above.) 
2 The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 
1967), sec. 410, p. 221. 
3 Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding ~f His Philosophical Activity, trans. C. F. Walraff 
and F.J. Schmitz (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1965), p. 288. 
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tude is, of course, quite consistent with his view that the theory of knowledge is 
always in the service of a set of values, and is therefore special pleading. Hamann, 
on the other hand, remains within the mainstream of the Western philosophical 
tradition by virtue of taking the question of cognition seriously. He was a cultural 
revolutionary, but instead of breaking with the Christian tradition, as in the case 
of Nietzsche, he attained to such radically new perspectives within that tradition 
that, in his hands, it seemed to undergo a metamorphosis into something new 
and strange. 
It is interesting that both Hamann and Nietzsche managed, for opposite 
reasons, to become an offense to the conventionally minded. First, we should note 
that for Hamann sexuality is involved in all veridical knowledge, and that 
abstraction is the castration of such knowledge. 4 Th~re is neither space nor 
occasion to go into the details of the Hamannian epistemology (one which, 
paradoxically, in striving for simplicity becomes fairly complex, involving as it 
does his idea oflanguage). Suffice it to say that his theory of knowledge is derived 
from the Biblical concept of knowing as knowing sexually. Since the rationalist 
inevitably becomes an abstract thinker, it follows that he also becomes in the 
Hamannian view eunuchoid. Thus, in the Aesthetica in nuce Hamann inveighs 
against rationalistic philologists and critics like Michaelis and Lessing: 
You desire to rule over nature and yet you stoically bind your hands and feet in 
order to be able to sing in a falsetto voice all the more movingly about the diamond-
hard chains of fate in your miscellaneous poems. If the passions are members of 
dishonor, do they therefore cease to be instruments of manhood? Do you understand 
the letter [ of the Scriptures] better than that allegorical chamberlain of the Alex-
andrian church [ Origen) who made himself into a eunuch for the Kingdom of 
Heaven's sake? The prince of this age makes the greatest mutilators of themselves 
his favorites .... (208) 
In the Socratic Memorabilia itself the doctrine of knowledge as involving eros 
is not explicit but implicit. Hamann accepts the homosexuality of Socrates, tending 
to excuse it on the grounds of the "pagan age" in which he lived ( 67). This fact is 
epistemologically indifferent in itself. However, Hamann then proceeds to 
generalize about friendship thus: "One cannot feel a lively friendship without 
sensuousness, and a metaphysical love sins perhaps more grievously against the 
nervous fluid than does an animalistic love against flesh and blood" (68). In 
speaking of an ideal or "metaphysical love," he introduces the element of under-
standing, hence moves with this idea onto epistemological ground. Later he cites 
approvingly Alcibiades' remarks concerning Socrates' teaching: "Alcibiades ... 
compared his parables to certain sacred images of the gods and goddesses which 
were carried, according to the custom of that time, in a small case, on the outside 
of which only the form of a goat-footed satyr was visible" (80). The form which 
4 See my "Hamann's Concept of the Whole Man," German Quarterly, 45 (1972), 258---01. 
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the wisdom of Socrates assumed was such as to suggest sexuality, for the "goat-
footed satyr" is an unambiguous symbol of the erotic. The ambivalence of man's 
nature-that he is at the same time a spiritual and a crudely physical creature-is a 
paradox which the ancients understood well and expressed cleverly in their myths 
until the rationalists arose and condemned such irrationality: "Through the 
cleverly devised myths of their poets, the heathen were accustomed to such 
contradictions until their Sophists, like ours, condemned such things as a parricide 
committed against the first principles of human knowledge" (68). 
If the doctrine of abstraction as castration is only implicit in his Socratic 
essay, Hamann makes it quite explicit in the Wolken: Bin Nachspiel Sokratischer 
Denkwurdigkeiten ( 176 r). Thus he writes: 
In these latter days the eunuch [i.e., the Enlightener as "der Verschnittene"] may 
no longer say: "Behold! I am a dry tree!" Such a confession would appear modest, but 
would not be honest. In the case of Socrates, on the other hand, it was quite honest; 
nevertheless, it appeared immodest to expose the weakness of his cognitive faculties 
without making use of the apron of fig leaves or coats of skins .... (97) 
That Hamann here employs a metaphor which equates the Socratic ignorance 
with the pudenda is unequivocal evidence of the role of sexuality in knowledge. 
Nietzsche's covert epistemology shows a marked affinity with Hamann's 
in regard to sexuality. For also in Nietzsche's conception genuine knowledge 
springs from sexuality or, to use his term in The Birth of Tragedy, from "Orgias-
mus" (GT, sec. 21; cf. "Musikorgiasmus," ibid.). In employing this term Nietz-
sche obviously has in mind that aspect of the human psyche which expresses itself 
in the collective excitement of the Dionysian rites. (It is to be strictly distinguished 
from "Orgasmus.") This kind of knowledge is, of course, the wisdom ofDiony-
sos, the rival of Apollo for the hearts and minds of men. One might expect then 
that Apollonianism would be the true conceptual opposite of the Dionysian 
mode. As far as artistic creativity is concerned, this is the case. The Apollonian 
and the Dionysian modes of creativity are basically at odds with one another, but, 
when they are reconciled, they succeed in producing the greatest of all works of 
art: Attic tragedy, which was "equally Dionysian and Apollonian" (GT, sec. 1). 
If, on the other hand, one looks closely at the conceptual framework of Nietz-
sche's treatise from the standpoint of the idea of cognition which underlies it, the 
matter is quite different. For in that case das Apollinische turns out to be not a mode 
of knowledge at all, but is no more than "the beautiful illusion of the dream 
worlds" ("der schone Schein der Traumwelten"; GT, sec. r) or, to be more 
specific, it is "der Schein des Scheins." Hence, as illusion of illusion the Apol-
lonian mode cannot, by definition, be knowledge. 5 
5 See my "Eros and Creativity in Nietzsche's Birth ef Tragedy," Studies in German Literature ef the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Festschriftfor Frederic E. Coenen, ed. Siegfried Mews. UNC Studies 
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The genuine antithesis of "Orgiasmus," on the other hand, is Socratism, a 
thoroughgoing rationalism relying exclusively on logic or dialectic. Nietzsche 
makes it quite clear that Socratism produces knowledge, but of an aesthetically 
inadequate and unfortunate kind. Thus, it is important to note that he tacitly 
assumes two modes of knowledge, not three as the case would be, if Apollonianism 
were true knowledge. However, he slips on occasion and quite inconsistently 
equates it with Socratism. It was just this epistemological antithesis which was so 
fateful for Greek tragedy: "This is the new antithesis: the Dionysian and the 
Socratic; and Greek tragedy as an art form perished as a result ofit" (GT, sec. 12). 
Socratic rationalism is not a deviant form of Dionysian knowledge but is a 
radically different mode. Like the latter it is simply a given fact of experience. 
Strangely enough, Nietzsche later on finds a term for Socratism, namely, 
"decadence." (He uses the French term consistently to relate Socratism to the 
nineteenth-century literary movement by that name, especially to Baudelaire 
and Wagner). This identification is of little use, however, since it raises more 
questions than it answers. 6 As for Nietzsche's use of the idea of castration else-
where, it generally has ethical relevance only: it is significant in connection with 
his idea of the "good," and is a metaphor for the effect of Christianity on the 
normal healthy instincts of the human being. 7 
It is surely an eloquent testimony to the central importance of Socrates for 
Western culture that both Hamann, the ardent defender of Christianity, and 
in the Germanic Languages and Literatures. No. 67 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1970), p. 8 5. That the Socratic mode of knowledge is not simply an extension and refinement of the 
Apollonian is evidenced by the fact that Socrates is alleged to have seen in the tragedy of Aeschylus and 
Sophocles "etwas recht Unvemiinftiges, mit Ursachen, die ohne Wirkungen, mit Wirkungen, die 
ohne Ursachen zu sein schienen ... " (GT, sec. 14). In the dramas of Euripides, on the other hand, the 
precise relation between cause and effect is carefully observed (GT, sec. 14). It follows then that the 
tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles must be, despite the presence of the Apollonian element, essen-
tially irrational and that of Euripides essentially rational Further evidence that Apollonianism does not 
play a genuine epistemological role or that it is dispensable from the standpoint of knowledge is 
indicated by the fact that, in the course of time, it becomes completely subsumed under the category of 
the Dionysian. Cf. Walter Kaufmann,. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 129. 
6 See "Eros and Creativity in Nietzsche's Birth ef Tragedy," pp. 98-100. 
7 Cf Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, secs. 383 (p. 207), 204 (p. 122), 248 (pp. 143-44), 351 
(p. 192). On two occasions, to my knowledge, Nietzsche tends to understand castration as episte-
mologically significant. Thus he writes in GM apropos of asceticism: "Den Willen aber iiberhaupt 
eliminicren, die Affekte samt und sonders aushangen, gesetzt, daB wir dies vermochten: wie? hieBe 
das nicht den Intellekt kastrieren?" (GM, sec. 12); again in. criticism of German classical education he 
writes: "Nur auf einem ganz kastrierten und verlogenen Studium des Altertums kann unsere Bildung 
sich erbauen" (MusA, I, 95). Only the latter quotation has purely epistemological significance, for the 
former is set within a consistently axiological framework. As_ Walter Kaufmann says, "Nietzsche 
never worked out an entirely satisfactory theory of knowledge, and most of the relevant material 
remained in his notebooks and did not find its way into a more coherent presentation in his published 
works." Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, p. 177. 
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Nietzsche, the archenemy of that faith, should have opened their respective 
literary careers with treatises on the Greek philosopher. The portraits presented 
in the two works are, however, so different that one might well question whethJr 
they were written about the same historical figure. It is not my task in this study 
to judge which of the two images presented accords more with the facts about the 
historical Socrates. It is rather my purpose to examine the chief differences which 
characterize the two accounts and to attempt to explain such differences as far as 
possible on the basis of the epistemological assumptions of the two writers. 
Before considering the specific differences between the two versions of 
Socrates, however, we should take note of their similarities, for these also are 
illuminating. First, both works are indictments of their age: the Socratic Memora-
bilia (1759) is an attack on the prevailing Aiifkliirung and The Birth of Tragedy 
( 1872) on the contemporary materialism and philistinism of the nineteenth 
century. Both are personal confessions of faith, Hamann's in Christianity, and 
Nietzsche's in a revived pagan Greek religion with Dionysos as the chief deity 
and with Richard Wagner as its high priest. Strangely enough, in both works 
Socrates is seen as a forerunner of Christ (but for very different reasons). Both 
Hamann and Nietzsche reject the Winckelmannian notion of the Hellenic spirit 
as characterized essentially by "edle Einfalt und stille GroBe." Both writers 
attack the rationalistic philologists and historians of their day. Finally, the two 
treatises are written in a prose which is often metaphorical, even poetic, the 
opposite of the learned jargon of the schools, and both works bristle with allusions 
which call for a commentary. Undoubtedly it was these similarities which help 
explain why Nietzsche could write to his friend Erwin Rohde in 1873 that he had 
been "very edified" by reading Hamann. 8 
The very fact that these two works reveal so many opinions held in common 
by their authors, makes the differences all the more striking. First, it should be 
noted that the Hamannian Socrates is the prototypal man of faith. After Ha-
• "Sodann Iese ich Hamann und bin sehre [sic] erbaut: man sieht in die Gebarzustande unsrer 
deutschen Dichter- und Denker-Cultur. Sehr tief und innig, aber nichtswiirdig unkiinstlerisch." GB, II, 
394. (Nietzsche is here unaware of the masterful, but hidden, artistry of Hamann's prose. Sec especially 
Sven Aage Jorgensen, "Zu Hamann's Stil," Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschrift, Neue Folge 16 [1966), 
347-87.) Although he had probably not read Hamann before writing The Birth of Tragedy, we know that 
he read him shortly thereafter from his reference to the Sokratische Denkwiirdigkeiten in Die Philosophie im 
tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen (1873), where, in discussing the lost works of classical authors, he cites the 
Magus as his Gewahrsmann. (See W, III, 142). It is interesting to note that Friedrich Ritschl, in his letter to 
Nietzsche of 14 February 1872 dissociating himself from The Birth of Tragedy, confesses that in his youth 
he had flirted with the ideas of Schelling and the "spekulativen Phantasien des tiefsinnigcn 'Magus des 
Nordens,'" thus evidently seeing Nietzsche's book under the aspect of those thinkers (GB, III, 142). 
Ritschl makes it quite clear that this was a road he could not travel. Rose Pfeffer says in her recent 
book, Nietzsche: Disciple of Dionysus: "In 1873 Nietzsche read Hamann at the suggestion of his friend 
Ritschl ... , " but this is not the import of the letter cited above (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University 
Press, 1972), p. I 13. However, it is possible that Ritschl's remark aroused Nietzsche's interest, in which 
case Miss Pfeffer's statement would be, in a broad sense, correct. Whatever the cause, Die Philosophie im 
tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen clearly reflects, even to the borrowing of a felicitous phrase ("philoso-
phischen Heroismus"), the Hamannian influence. 
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mann's conversion to evangelical Christianity in 1758, his newly won religious 
faith so offended a close friend, Johann Christoph Berens, that he called on 
Hamann in Konigsberg in the company of the young Privatdozent Immanuel Kant 
in an attempt to re-convert his erring companion to the principle; of the Auf-
kliirung. The Socratic Memorabilia was Hamann's answer to that attempt. Since the 
Socratic ignorance had become a sort of talisman for the Aufkliirer, and since a 
believing Christian could logically relate it to the Pauline doctrine of man's 
ignorance of God outside revelation, it became the main weapon in Hamann's 
arsenal: "The ignorance of Socrates was sensibility ("Empfindung"). But between 
sensibility and a theoretical proposition is a greater difference than between a 
living animal and its anatomical skeleton" (73). Thus, a conviction of one's 
ignorance does not arise from discursive reasoning, i.e., it is not a deduction, but 
is something which one senses, which one feels with complete sincerity to be true. 
One should not, however, make the mistake of thinking that such Emp-
.findung is an illusion. It is no more an illusion than the conviction that we exist or 
that the phenomenal world around us exists: "Our own existence and the exist-
ence of all things outside us must be believed, and cannot be determined in any 
other way" (73). The influence of Hume's epistemology on this formulation is 
immediately obvious. Many years later Hamann wrote to Jacobi: "I was im-
mersed in Hume when I wrote the Socratic Memorabilia, and my statement that 
'our own existence and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and cannot 
be proven in any other way' stems from that fact."9 Thus, the Hamannian 
Socrates is made into a man of faith, and therefore an enemy of all attempts to 
probe the mystery of existence by means of dialectic. At the beginning of his 
treatise Hamann had laid down the proposition that "to dissect a body and an 
event into its primary elements means attempting to detect God's invisible 
Being, His eternal power and Godhead" (64). 
For Hamann, Socrates' maieutic approach to knowledge is further evidence 
of his anti-speculative tendency: "Socrates was, therefore, modest enough to 
compare his theoretical wisdom with the skill of an old woman who merely 
comes to the aid of the mother's labor and her timely birth, and renders assistance 
to both" (66). Apparently it was Hamann's conception that a Socratic procedure 
simply leads the interlocutor to a realization of the intuitive (not the rational) 
wisdom latent within him. In Nietzsche's treatise, on the other hand, maieutics is 
mentioned only once, and then in a philosophically indifferent context (GT, 
sec. 15). Perhaps Nietzsche tacitly agrees with the Hamannian idea that the 
maieutic method is evidence of an antitheoretical bias, in which case Nietzsche 
would, of course not emphasize it. 
If Socrates is the prototypal man of faith for Hamann, he is the opposite for 
9 Hamanns Briefwechsel mit Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Vol. V of Johann Georg Hamanns, des Magus 
im Norden, Leben und Schriften, ed. C. H. Gildemeister (Gotha: Perthes, 1867), p. 506. 
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Nietzsche. Moreover, it is precisely the Socratic confession of ignorance which 
Nietzsche links with excessive rationalism: 
The strongest endorsement of this new and unheard of esteem for knowledge and 
critical insight Socrates expressed when he realized that he was the only one who 
confessed to himself that he knew nothing. While on his critical wanderings through 
Athens, engaging in conversation with the greatest statesmen, orators, poets, and 
artists, he met everywhere with the presumption of knowledge. He recognized with 
astonishment that all those celebrities had no proper and firm conception concerning 
even their profession and that they practiced them only out of instinct. (GT, sec. 13) 
Opposed to the Hamannian Socrates of feeling and faith is, thus, the Nietzschean 
conception, namely, that Socrates is the spokesman for "this new and unheard of 
esteem for knowledge." To drive his point home Nietzsche says further that 
"Socrates is to be characterized as the perfect type of the non-mystic, in whom, as 
the result of a supcrfetation, the logical powers arc as excessively developed as 
instinctive wisdom is in the case of the mystic" (GT, sec. 13). Socrates' confession 
of ignorance constitutes, in the Nietzschean view, an indirect confession of faith 
in reason. Thus, throughout The Birth of Tragedy he accentuates his view of 
Socrates as the arch-rationalist with such phrases as the following: "the antagonist 
ofDionysos, the new Orpheus" (sec. 12); "the foremost and supreme Sophist, the 
mirror and quintessence of all sophistical strivings" (sec. 13); "the dialectical 
hero of the Platonic drama" (sec. 14); "the mystagogue of science" (sec. 15); "the 
prototype of the theoretical optimist" (sec. 1 5; cf. sec. 18). 
The Nietzschean Socrates has such complete confidence in the power of 
thought that he believes all that is amiss with human life and even the universe 
itself may be recognized and corrected by means of reason. In this he is the model 
for theoretical or Alexandrian man. We have noted above that for Hamann the 
attempt to penetrate the mystery of existence by means of reason "means at-
tempting to detect God's invisible Being, His eternal power and Godhead." 
Accordingly, the Hamannian Socrates is not guilty of such hubris. But the 
Nietzschean Socrates definitely is, for he is committed above all to the firm belief 
"that thought penetrates, by means of the clue of causality, into the deepest 
abysses of being, and that it is not only able to comprehend being, but is even 
able to correct it" (GT, sec. 15). Intellectuals, who invariably look to Socrates as 
their model, will therefore easily cherish an optimistic belief in "a revision of 
the world by means of knowledge." 
Despite the fact that the antithesis of instinct and reason as coequal powers of 
the human mind is basic to The Birth of Tragedy, an inconsistency in Nietzsche's 
treatment of reason arises when he deals with the historical effects of Socratism. 
On the one hand, Socrates is the irresistible destroyer of high culture on an epochal 
scale. Such destructive power is not surprising, since Socrates is represented as a 
"demonic power," even "a divinity" (GT, sec. 12), whose influence on future 
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generations is like a shadow cast by the evening sun, growing ever larger (GT, 
sec. 15). This vast power of a Socrates accords with the basic conceptual frame-
work of Nietzsche's essay. On the other hand, a difficulty arises when one also 
notes that the same Socrates serves as the prototype of the cerebral, hence sickly 
and feckless individual, "the eternal starveling, the 'critic' without pleasure and 
power, the Alexandrian man, who is basically a librarian and proofreader, 
miserably blinding himself with the dust of books and typographical errors" 
(GT, sec. 18). The true nature of the intellectual is revealed most fully, however, 
in his reaction to the orgiastic frenzy which periodically seizes Dionysian man: 
"There are people who, convinced of their own health, scornfully or deploringly, 
turn away, whether as a result of lack of experience or obtuseness, from such 
phenomena as if from 'diseases of the common people.' But such poor souls do 
not suspect how corpse-like and ghostly their 'health' appears when the Diony-
sian throng, glowing with vitality, rushes past them" (GT, sec. I). Nietzsche's 
inconsistent view ofSocratism, that it is a powerful cultural force and at the same 
time helpless before the vital forces of life, is built into his portrait of Socrates. It 
would be unfair to suggest that Nietzsche should have solved the perennial 
problem of"Alexandrian man" in society. However, he seems to be unaware of 
his inconsistency at this point. 
Hamann and Nietzsche cast the Sophists in opposite roles in their accounts of 
Socrates. For Hamann, they are, as we have seen, the adversaries of Socrates with 
whom the philosopher is sharply contrasted. Nietzsche, on the other hand, 
speaks of"the profound instincts of Aristophanes" in identifying Socrates as the 
foremost and supreme Sophist (GT, sec. 13). 
Other differences, which flow naturally from the basic assumptions of the 
two authors, can be mentioned only briefly. For Hamann, the daemon of 
Socrates is the divine afflatus, the source of both artistic creativity and, as a pro-
totype of the Holy Spirit, the source of religious inspiration (75). Thus, the 
influence of the Socratic daemon is essentially positive. In direct contradiction of 
the Hamannian conception is Nietzsche's: the daemon is the hypertrophied 
instinct for logic and criticism, and has an essentially negative function (GT, 
sec. I 3). In the case of the Hamannian Socrates, beauty is conceived as irrational; 
symmetry, harmony, and grace of external form are not its hallmarks (though 
Hamann distinguishes between the Socratic ideal, which is characterized by such 
qualities, and the Socratic actuality, which is not). 
It was Hamann's intention to write about Socrates "in a Socratic manner" 
(61). Consequently it is necessary to analyze the literary form of Socratic Memora-
bilia, its style, etc. in order to grasp fully the Hamannian notion of spiritual beauty 
which manifests itself in unlikely form. One of the leading ideas in The Birth of 
Tragedy, on the other hand, is that beauty must, according to the Socratic ideal, be 
rational ("verstandig," GT, sec. 12). It is to the great discredit of Socrates accord-
ing to this view that he infected Euripides with this notion and, as a consequence, 
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eliminated myth and miracle from drama. In such a way Euripides, under the spell 
of Socrates, succeeded in banishing genuine tragedy from the Greek stage. (Ha-
mann, as we have seen, blames the Sophists, not Socrates, for the demise of myth 
and miracle.) As far as the form of his work is concerned, Nietzsche makes no 
claim that it is written either in a Socratic or anti-Socratic manner. In the first place 
Socrates is not even mentioned until halfway through the treatise, and, although 
he thereafter becomes the central figure, the burden of the work is concerned with 
the origin of the Apollonian-Dionysian tragedy and its destruction by Socrates. 
There is great irony in the fact that the most lyrical and moving passages of the 
book are those which pertain to Socrates, the archenemy of impassioned beauty. 
Although Hamann is not concerned with the aesthetic problem of the demise 
of Attic tragedy, it is true that the Socratic Memorabilia, in so far as it is an account 
of the historical Socrates, is essentially tragic. Indeed it is the tragic aspect of the 
life and death of the Greek philosopher which foreshadows the life and death of 
Christ (82), even though the Savior's death may not be interpreted as tragic. 
Socrates is, of course, the great destroyer of Greek tragedy according to Nietzsche, 
and though he recognizes the tragic element in the death of the philosopher, he 
nevertheless sees the Socratic influence as absolutely inimical to tragedy: "Wield-
ing the scourge of its syllogisms, optimistic dialectics drives music out of tragedy, 
i.e., it destroys the essence of tragedy ... " (GT, sec. 14). Finally, Hamann's 
crude and scurrilous humor borders at times on the sacrilegious, and is in marked 
contrast to Nietzsche's pervasive solemnity. 
It is clear, I think, that the differences between the Hamannian and Nietz-
schean versions of Socrates derive from their contrasting epistemologies. 10 Both 
treatises are concerned with the problem of intuitive versus abstract knowledge. 
Both are in essential agreement with regard to the close relationship of sexuality 
to intuitive knowledge, but their views diverge on the question of the status of 
abstract knowledge. For Hamann, abstraction as castration is a mutilated, hence 
a subordinate kind of knowledge. It cannot really prevail in any earnest contest 
with intuitive wisdom. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, abstraction is a coordinate 
power with intuition. (The curious notion of decadence, which Nietzsche later 
explicitly applies to Socrates, throws no light on the subject ofSocratism, but is 
simply evidence of his feeling of uneasiness about the role in which he had cast 
the philosopher. 11) It is the coequal relationship of the two modes of knowledge 
which sets the stage for the fateful, world-historical struggle between Dionysos 
to The question of the historicity of either Hamann's or Nietzsche's portrait of Socrates has not, of 
course, been our concern in this study. It is interesting to note, however, that the classical scholar Philip 
Merlan maintains that "only the interpretation of Hamann and Kierkegaard, both of whom were 
possessed by an eminent sense of the demonic, does full justice to the demonic element in the Platonic 
(and ... even in the Xenophontic) Socrates." "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy," Journal of the 
History of Ideas, 8, No. 4 (October 1947), 417, n. 33. 
11 C( n. 5. 
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and Socrates. Thus far in the course of Western history Socratic intellectualism 
has generally been triumphant, but Nietzsche anticipated its imminent end: "The 
age of Socratic man is past ... Arm yourselves for a deadly struggle, but believe in 
the miracles of your god!" (GT, sec. 113). Yet the contest could go either way, for 
both antagonists are eternally powerful. There is no such struggle between the 
Hamannian Socrates and his Sophistical adversaries, nor could there be. True, the 
Sophists are deadly enemies of Socrates, but the contest is unequal, for they are 
mainly scheming and contemptible hypocrites. Though the Hamannian Socrates is 
destroyed by a hostile "Welt" (82), his cause must ultimately triumph, because God 
has so willed it. 
If Nietzsche's dualistic epistemology serves him well as a background for the 
portrayal of the cosmic struggle between Dionysus and Socrates, it also poses 
serious problems. Such problems are, to be sure, not strictly within the purview of 
this study. Nevertheless, one of them may be mentioned, since it is of particular 
importance in our own day. In regard to the question of scientific versus humanistic 
values, it would appear that Nietzsche's epistemology, at least as it is manifest in 
The Birth of Tragedy, again sets the stage for a contest in which neither side can ever 
expect the ultimate victory with complete confidence. In other words Nietzsche's 
theory of knowledge legitimizes and sustains both sides more or less equally. 12 In 
such a case, we are left with the permanent rift in modem society which C. P. Snow 
has characterized as the "two cultures."13 According to Nietzsche's thinking, the 
palm may go now to one side, now to the other; the upper hand may be retained for 
centuries by one or the other, but there is no assurance of a permanent victory for 
either. 14 
If one likewise reflects on the implications ofHamann's monistic epistemology 
beyond its use in the Socratic essay, he soon recognizes that it provides no basis for 
the polarization of society into a scientific and a non-scientific culture, for in his 
conception reason is always derivative, hence subordinate to intuitive knowledge 
(which properly involves the whole man of faith and eros). 15 In any society 
in which scientific culture held the balance of power with humanistic culture 
Hamann's conception could only provide for the dethronement of the scientific. 
12 Karl Jaspers says of Nietzsche's theory of knowledge in general: "Nietzsche treats of truth in 
science as though it were an immediate source. If this source is later seen as derived and thus called in ques-
tion, still its independence on its own proper level is not lost nor is it challenged at this point. He decisively 
takes his stand on scientific ground, and it may at first appear that this ground is sufficiently firm to satisfy 
the passion for truth." Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity, pp. 171-72. 
13 The Two Cultures: and A Second Look (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 
see especially pp. 62-63. 
14 Nietzsche appears in Also sprach Zarathustra to harbor the fear that not the "Ubermensch" but "der 
letzte Mensch" may finally inherit the earth. See "Zarathustras Vorrede," 3, 5. For Nietzsche, "the last 
man" has many characteristics of"Socratic man." 
15 For a treatment of intuitive reason or anschauende Vemunft in Hamann's thought, see my "Language 
and Reason in the Thought of Hamann," Creative Encounter: Festschrift for Herman Salinger, ed. Leland R. 
Phelps and A. Tito Alt (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978), pp. 86-104. 
IX 
The German "Classicist" Goethe 
as Reflected in Nietzsche's Works * 
KARL SCHLECHT A 
TRANSLATED BY TIMOTHY F. SELLNER 
Early in the year 1804 that astute and unprejudiced observer, Madame de 
Stael, made the following statement in Weimar, presumably to Bottiger: 
"Ecoutez, ii y un double Goethe, le poete et le metaphysicien. Le poete est lui 
meme, l'autre est son fantome." 
Aside from the fact that there are certainly more sides to Goethe than this, 
for example, the Goethe of the Color Theory and Goethe the morphologist and 
evolutionist, and aside from the fact that, precisely in the case of Goethe, classi-
cistic "metaphysics" frequently not only influenced, but even determined the 
nature of his writings, Madame de Stael is doubtless correct in her observation-
she perceived the main idea and was quick to give it expression with the appro-
priate word: "metaphysics." The classicistic program does indeed have its basis 
in metaphysics. 
To return to Goethe, Karl Reinhardt has pointed out that it is in Goethe 
alone that the ever-reappearing marble contours of the Greek are infused with 
the inner light of a transparent soul. In the case of Nietzsche, there is no evidence 
whatsoever of any such perceptiveness or understanding. 
The classicistic program originates with Winckelmann. His conversion had 
obtained for him a year in Dresden free of obligations, a year which was to be a 
decisive one in his life. The year 1755 saw the appearance of Thoughts on the 
Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture, which was then followed by his 
Letter Concerning Thoughts on the Imitation of Greek Works . ... In the latter work 
Winckelmann allows a hypothetical opponent of his theory to have his say, so 
that he can then give reply in a third small pamphlet, the Commentary on the 
Thoughts on Imitation ... , and Reply to the Letter Concerning these Thoughts. These 
* In view of the fact that chronological sequence plays such a decisive role with respect to this 
question, I have drawn my quotations in the main from the Musarion Edition (MusA; for key to 
abbreviations, see p. xvii above). Both Nietzsche's works and his literary remains, each enclosing seg-
ments of the other, are arranged chronologically in this edition. The text is based largely on the Com-
plete Edition in large octavo (GOA and GOA(2 ]). To the extent that critical editions exist for the 
passages cited, I have used these in making my additions and corrections. 
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three pamphlets comprise a unity and constitute a self-contained system. When 
Winckelmann went to Italy in 1755, he took with him this "system" in its already 
completed form, and even the first of these small pamphlets contains all the 
essential clements of the Germans' veneration of the Greeks. The basic tenor of 
these pamphlets is aesthetic, ethical, and above all, pedagogic. With the zeal of a 
reformer he advocates a rebirth of man in a sense that is almost religious. It is a 
question of the education to an authentic style of life. A kind of mild obsession 
with basic principles expresses itself in philosophical and apodictic fashion. Such 
statements as: "Painting is concerned with things which are not material ... " are 
presented as self-evident propositions. Even before he begins his investigation, 
Winckelmann is already aware of the direction it will take. The serenity of his 
mode of expression, which would have us understand man as living out his 
existence quietly and peacefully as an expression of the divine within himself, is 
not quite able to conceal the presence of a powerful act of creation-creation in 
the sense of a rebirth of the whole man on the basis of aesthetics. The fact that for 
the ancient Greeks man and the divinities were separated by an abyss did not 
seem to bother Winckelmann. His analogies, laden with symbols, are immensely 
elastic-how else, for example, would the classical philologist Nietzsche have 
later been able to compare Richard Wagner with Aeschylus? Even Winckel-
mann's most important work, the History of Ancient Art, is a historical meta-
physics, a self-conceived myth, a dream which he carried with him from the 
North to Rome. 
Still one more factor seems significant to me in determining Winckelmann's 
point of view: the association with his principal acquaintances during the Dresden 
period, Oeser and Hagedorn. Both exerted a lasting influence on Winckelmann-
Oeser as a painter, sculptor and theoretician, Hagedorn as a writer on aesthetics. 
Oeser's taste for the simple, the naive, and the serene had the same power of 
attraction for Winckelmann as it later did for Goethe in Leipzig. And especially 
captivating for both was his unpretentious and concerned manner of teaching. 
With Oeser, doctrine and criticism prevail over the productive powers. He speaks 
of harmony but has no genuine capacity for working with color; he speaks of 
"beauty" and fails to produce that which is "characteristic." Grace and dignity 
become style by means of a kind of dilution of nature. In Oeser was united the 
saccharine sensuousness of a Viennese academician with the ideality of a clear-
headed Saxon; although somewhat languorous when it came to working with 
his hands, he nevertheless possessed a very nimble mind. 
Hagedorn was of a thoroughly kindred spirit. He, too, preferred ideal beauty 
to character, and grace to charm-and more than anything he cherished serenity 
in nature. He, too, saw in the history of art a heuristic principle. Characterized by 
all the weaknesses of an admittedly noble but asthenic personality, his humane 
gentleness felt comfortable only in the realm of the uncommitted and the neutral. 
As one might expect, it is particularly the case with Hagedorn that it is not the 
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eye or direct observation which prevail in the consideration of works of the 
plastic and graphic arts, but the word, elegant rhetoric with all its pretentiousness. 
This is an idiosyncrasy, a character trait peculiar to classicism from which even 
Lessing was not entirely free. 1 
When we recall Oeser and Hagedorn, we are not surprised at Winckelmann's 
close association with Mengs in Rome. He, as well, was an inveterate theoretician 
of metaphysical provenance. To be sure, Winckelmann's deep insecurity in 
matters of aesthetic taste did have a profound effect on the relationship between 
him and Mengs-one need only recall here the mischievous forgery of a work of 
classical antiquity by Mengs in his fresco "Zeus and Ganymede." 2 Nevertheless 
not only Winckelmann, but even Goethe fell victim to this rather wicked little 
scheme. 
It is not at all surprising: the whole thing began with a theory, and all at once 
one found himself on a path leading to an antiquity which had never existed. 
There were no criteria which were convincing in and of themselves; neither did 
the continual references to nature afford any help, for a nature such as this had 
never existed. No amount of discussion could explain away the profound lack of 
creative power; no aesthetics, no pedagogy, no metaphysics was helpful in this 
regard. Even his art-loving friends in Weimar were not able to help. 
We must not overlook the fact that here, too, a fundamental difference exists 
between the founder of the school and the school itself. In contrast to his indus-
trious followers-literary men of all kinds- life and work were one and the same 
for Winckelmann. With a certain degree of necessity his remarkable life flows 
into his doctrine, and the whole pathos of his doctrine is not a little determined by 
his existence. His entire being is but an expression of an inner necessity, a quality 
lacking in his followers. 
Be this as it may, the theory produced an epoch-making misunderstanding. 
Two things stand irreconcilably opposed to each other: Goethe's statement that 
"among all peoples the Greeks dreamed the dream oflife most beautifully," and 
that of Jacob Burckhardt: "Of all civilized people the Greeks are the ones who 
have inflicted upon themselves the bitterest, most deeply felt suffering." 
With this as our background, then, let us now consider the image of Goethe 
in Nietzsche's works. Schulpforta, that famous and rigorous humanistic Gym-
nasium, the pedagogical institution for the training of a middle-class elite, was 
thoroughly permeated with the spirit of classicistic ideals. The study of classical 
languages and intensive reading in the principal representatives of German 
Classicism were of central importance in the curriculum. In contrast to the 
1 Cf No. 14 of his "Antiquarian Letters." 
2 Cf in the excellent and extensive catalogue of the London exhibition, The Age ef New Classicism 
(1972) under "Paintings," No. 198, where the pertinent texts can be found in English translation. At 
this point I would like to thank Professor Judith Janoska of the University of Bern for t!tis very infor-
mative catalogue. 
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majority of German Gymnasien, the study of the former discipline was distin-
guished, of course, by its very rigorous philological requirements. The students 
not only studied Latin and Greek, they actually mastered them as well. Questions 
regarding textual criticism and problems in interpretation were, so to speak, the 
students' daily fare. Thus the educational foundation consisted not only of the 
exemplary understanding of classical antiquity as viewed from the perspective of 
Winckelmann, Goethe, and Schiller, but also of the scientific and critical study 
of the classical languages. This latter study was not so much one of content, but 
primarily one of form. Thus there existed a hiatus of sorts, or a kind of dual-track 
system, which was some years later to receive a great deal of attention from 
Nietzsche. 
The first statement concerning Goethe-of any consequence at least-made 
by Nietzsche during his years at the Schulpforta is to be found in a composition 
of March 1863. Here we read: "Goethe ... the exalted and enveloping spirit of 
the German nation" (MusA, I, 110). In this statement lies concealed an element 
of no small importance: the element of national consciousness. From its very 
beginnings, German Classicism was borne along by the hope for a German 
national rebirth. The return to the Greeks and the disregard for the Roman-
French tradition had always been interpreted as the discovery of a national 
identity. Across the span of two millenia-people were convinced of this-
kindred spirits confronted one another. The appreciation for one's remote 
origins, for a brilliant pre-history involved the understanding of one's own 
present-not the real present, but the one which was thought to lie below the 
surface. It was believed that one's identity as a chosen people was only to be 
found in the remote past. This spontaneous leap out of the continuum of European 
tradition, prepared by Lessing, was not without its remarkable consequences. 
Just as Luther in his own time had hearkened back to the pure word of Scripture, 
appeal was now made to pure human form, a form which had been brought 
forth by Win.ckelmann in his image of the Greeks. With that begins the history 
of the mythologem in German intellectual life extending all the way to Stefan 
George. A special role in this history was always reserved for that which was 
German-a procedure almost always involving violence to historical fact. 
As far as this interpretation of the content of classical literature is concerned-
an interpretation quite in the spirit of the German humanistic Gymnasium-we 
find in Nietzsche's valedictory essay in Latin, "De Theognide Megarensi," the 
following revealing quotation from Goethe: "We are accustomed to giving an 
author's statements of whatever kind a universal interpretation and adapting 
them however possible to our own circumstances" (MusA, I, 230). 
This is a methodical program which leaves nothing to be desired in the 
determination of a subject matter for a universal education-we are accustomed 
to giving statements a universal interpretation, to adapting them however possible 
to our own circumstances. And indeed, this is just the way it was done. On one 
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particular occasion, when a certain passage from the "adapted" version of Sopho-
cles refused to be disposed of in this manner, no less a person than Goethe ex-
pressed the wish that a philologist demonstrate that the passage in question was 
an interpolation. It is possible that the German character could have been helped 
by such exegetical artifices; the reality of the Greek became lost in Germanic 
mists. 
Just to define the limits of our theme: in the spring of 1868, during an inter-
lude in his work, Nietzsche planned a philosophical treatise with the title "T eleol-
ogy since Kant." In the notes for this work he speaks only in passing of Goethe as 
a natural philosopher.3 Goethe the evolutionist does not appear at all-he is 
simply not perceived as such. Classicism is averse to all movement and energy-
it is static. 
On a level with this wilful disregard for the very important non-classicistic 
side of Goethe is a notation in the literary remains on Human, All-Too-Human, l, 
which thus dates from the year 1876 or 1877. Here we read that "Goethe, in his 
Color Theory, ... was wrong." Goethe was, of course, "wrong" in his contro-
versy with Newton. Now while this judgment does correspond to the prevailing 
communis opinio of that time, and to a great extent of the present time as well, it is 
somewhat surprising to find it presented as a self-evident proposition among the 
formulations in a work which contains some very interesting-and for this period 
unusual-rudimentary ideas of a scientific and critical nature. It is not possible to 
speak of"right" and "wrong" as between Goethe and Newton. Goethe speaks of 
qualities infused with feeling and meaning-perceptual qualities, and thus pre-
cisely that which Newton dispensed with as the first step in his scientific pro-
cedure. "Sense" and "meaning" play no part whatsoever, and the question 
concerning their importance is never even raised. 
From the time of his inaugural address ("Homer and Classical Philology") 
at Basel in May 1869, to the year 1872, the conceptual twins "Deutschtum" and 
"Hellenentum," "authentic Deutschtum" and "authentic Hellenentum" predomi-
nate in Nietzsche's mention of Goethe, for they are complementary concepts. At 
the outset he still confines himself in gentler tones to the diction of Winckelmann, 
for example, when he addresses "the passionate admirers of Hellenic beauty and 
noble simplicity." In the address mentioned above, however, "ideal antiquity" 
figures as "the most beautiful flower of passionate Germanic longing" (MusA, 
II, 8). We are, of course, indebted above all to Winckelmann and Goethe for the 
concept of"ideal antiquity." In the lecture which he held in the summer of 1871 
entitled "Introduction to the Study of Classical Philology," he strongly urges 
that one "become intimately acquainted" with the writings of just these two men 
(MusA, II, 343). They alone-occasionally together with Schiller-provide 
access to the sanctuary. "The German spirit" has struggled more forcefully than 
3 Cf MusA. I, 411; 414 If. 
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any other to learn from the Greeks, Nietzsche says, and it has done this through 
the noblest strivings of Goethe and Schiller toward educational development 
(MusA, III, 135). These words are to be found in The Birth of Tragedy from the 
Spirit of Music (1872). That we are dealing here with what is basically a pedagogi-
cal program of national scope can be seen from the fact that both in the prelimi-
nary studies to the lecture series "Concerning the Future of our Educational 
Institutions," as well as in the lectures themselves (held in the early months of 
I 872 under the auspices of the Basel "Academic Society"), Nietzsche apostro-
phizes Winckelmann and Goethe-here and there Schiller as well-as the 
pioneers of a new and decisive understanding of the ancient Greeks. "The 
German character," he says, has attained through them a "level of culture and 
education" no one had thought possible before (MusA, IV, 47). And always it is 
"the Greek homeland" which refreshes and restores the Germans. Here is the 
place of pilgrimage for the German spirit, for the innermost German being, and 
for the best representatives of the German nation. The members of his audience 
as well as posterity in general merely have the task of continuing that which had 
already experienced such a grandiose beginning (MusA, IV, 133). 
Information concerning the methods by which this projected canon was to 
be brought about, or according to which it could have been brought about, can 
be found in a passage from only a few years later (1874-75)-a passage which 
Nietzsche delivered as part of a university lecture entitled "The History of Greek 
Literature." It reads: "We must imagine Plato as an old man in the process of 
revising his rough drafts-just as, for example, Goethe did. Through collation, 
and not without a certain amount of arbitrariness, a complete work is put 
together" (MusA, V, 146). In other words, the unevenness of his earlier, spon-
taneous thoughts is smoothed out, contradictions are eliminated, "a whole" is 
"put in order." One needs closed horizons, and within these a pervasive sense of 
order-in short, and once again, one needs "a whole." 
What this means in reference to Goethe can be illustrated by several passages 
from his posthumously published studies and preliminary sketches to the second 
of the Untimely Meditations, viz, On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life. To 
cite the most important: "A~ a stylized human being, Goethe has ascended higher 
than any other German .... Let one read Eckermann and ask himself whether 
there ever was a human being in Germany who has come so far in such noble 
form" (MusA, VI, 340). And here we come upon a very significant catchword for 
German Classicism: "stylized." True, artists stylized continuously, and this was 
true for their lives as well as their artistic production. But this was not all; what-
ever did not conform to this "style" was condemned, and not infrequently this 
involved one's own powers of spontaneous creation-in poetry, in the plastic 
arts, and also in music. Models were set up and absolute standards were to be 
adhered to; on the other hand, however, support was given to mediocrities who 
submitted to these demands. All this was not accomplished without tremendous 
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cost, for one had lost contact with the concrete reality of the present. This cost had 
to be borne by the generations which followed. Nietzsche recommends that 
Eckermann's "Conversations with Goethe" be read "in order that one remain 
protected in this. way from all fashionable teachings of the legionaries of the 
moment" (MusA, VI, 300). In the treatise which he planned called "Philosophy 
in Distress," Nietzsche blusters at "the tyranny of the press" (MusA, VII, 20), and 
points out emphatically that Goethe was to be furnished only with periodicals 
which appeared serially or in weekly issues-and thus with nothing immediately 
current. That was tedious, and distracted one from elite stylization. 
Nietzsche could not have found a better example for this hymn of stylization 
than Eckermann' s conversations with Goethe, for they provide a classical example 
of classicistic self-description. Goethe speaks like Eckermann, and Eckermann like 
Goethe. All the retouchings and stylizations had the blessing of the Master. The 
notes for the work arose in large part under his supervision, and the elderly 
gentleman spent more than a little time working on their correction. With some 
justification Nietzsche later speaks of "Goethe's feat in idealizing his own life" 
(Human, All-Too-Human, I; 1876-78; MusA, VIII, 244). We have here a treasure 
chest of sayings for every conceivable occasion, and at the same time a carefully 
cultivated terrain surrounded entirely by prohibitory markers. In short, we are 
dealing here with the first Goethe-novel, produced under the aegis of the Olym-
pian himself, in which he gives himself a classicistic interpretation. To what extent 
manipulation took place here-not to say falsification-is clear to everyone who 
compares, for example, Eckermann's description of 23 and 24 February 1823 with 
the notes of Chancellor von Muller from the same two days. Reality and the 
"ideal" stand here irreconcilably opposed at a very critical point. Eckermann 
relates the event as a witness in the first person-this same Eckermann who had 
met Goethe for the first time at the beginning of June that same year. Sapienti 
sat!4 Nietzsche's recommendation of Adalbert Stifter's Indian Summer (Nach-
sommer) arises out of the same misunderstanding (cf. MusA, IX, 245), the only 
difference being that this prose has been diluted to an even thinner broth; the 
"stylization" can no longer be surpassed. 
From about 1874 on a slightly critical tone is introduced into this theme of 
"stylization," a tone which visibly intensifies, however, when reference is 
occasionally made to that which is truly Greek. Nietzsche makes the remark that 
Goethe the man is an example of"the contemplative man in the grand style," but 
not of the active man; the Goethean man was of "a noble gentleness." This 
quotation stems from the third of the Untimely Meditations: Schopenhauer as 
Educator (MusA, VII, 74 and 79). We find an even more radical formulation in the 
preliminary studies to this "Meditation": The "Goethean conception of the 
4 Cf. the splendid analysis by Josef Hofmillet in Wege zu Goethe (Hamburg-Bergedorf: Strom 
Verlag, 1949), pp. 59-78. 
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Greeks is, in the first place, historically incorrect, and moreover, too weak and 
unmanly" (ibid., 145). 
We also have preserved for us from that same period, the years 1874-75, 
certain notes-presumably for a further "Meditation" with the title "We 
Philologists" -which make his position quite clear. Here we read, for example: 
"Misunderstanding of the Greeks ... Goethe-Schiller" or "Our education can 
find edification only in an utterly castrated and mendacious study of antiquity" 
(WKG, IV-1, 195). He even goes so far as to say: "Our attitude toward classical 
antiquity is really the basic reason for the unproductivity of modern culture" 
(ibid., 129). 
What has happened here, and why this change of opinion? Several causes 
can be imagined: the vehement awakening of a critical consciousness with regard 
to the classicistic content of the curriculum of the German Gymnasium, as well as 
in relation to the pedagogical goals of classical philology in general. Such expres-
sions as "the philologist as schoolmaster of the upper classes (Goethe-Schiller)" 
(MusA, VII, 153), provide evidence for this. Even the social factor makes a 
fleeting appearance! Further, the inner confrontation with Schopenhauer and 
Wagner, both of whom were treated as main topics in the Untimely Meditations. 
In contrast to both of these men, Goethe has something soft, gentle, and com-
fortable about him (cf. MusA, VII, 260), which can be said for neither Schopen-
hauer nor Wagner. 
However, I suspect that yet another factor is involved. On 6 May 1872 
Jacob Burckhardt began to lecture for the first time on the "Cultural History of 
Greece." Nietzsche attended these lectures-how often and for how long is not 
known, but his proteges Adolf Baumgartner and Louis Kclterborn each presented 
him with a transcript of them. I am acquainted with both of these transcripts; 
they were written down very conscientiously. Since Nietzsche was still in con-
tinuous communication with Burckhardt during these years, we must assume 
that there was a good deal of talk between them about this particular topic. 
Otherwise how could Nietzsche write the following to his friend Carl von 
Gersdorff as early as the first of May 1872 (thus before the lectures even began): 
"The summer lectures by Burckhardt will be unique: you will be missing a lot by 
not hearing them" (W, III, r 066). These magnificent lectures have long since been 
posthumously published. The image of the Greeks which, with all its details, is 
projected here, stands in stark contrast to the shadowy figures of the German 
dream of Greece prevailing at the time. Personally, I am of the opinion that some-
thing in the way of necessary corrections could have been discovered before that 
time from August Bockh's The Public Economy of the Athenians. 5 
Jacob Burckhardt had already caused Friedrich Nietzsche to do an about-face 
5 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1817). English translation of the title is from the 2nd German edition 
(Boston: Little, 1857). 
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once before, and that was in connection with the evaluation of the victory in the 
war with the French in 1870-71 and the cultural consequences of that victory. 
The letters and notes of Nietzsche from this period, not yet very far in the past, 
furnish unequivocal proof of this change of mind. In this matter, too, it was the 
elder of the two who opened the eyes of the younger. Why not, then, in the case 
described above? The high level of the dispute was assured in any event. 
Even in the rough draft of an essay on "the possibility of a German culture" 
(1873), this question of style is brought up again and again: "Enormous labor of 
Goethe and Schiller to develop a German style" (MusA, VII, 228); and at another 
point: "Attempt on the part of our great writers to arrive at a convention" 
(ibid., 231). 
Is not all of German Classicism such a remarkable attempt as this-an attempt 
apparently arising from the extraordinary notion that style could be created 
merely through proper execution? That captious word "labor" stands in the 
first sentence. What is the vacuum out of which the demand for a "convention" 
arises-for a convention within what specific limits, or even for a convention at 
all? We must assume that they felt themselves to be in a state of oppressive uncer-
tainty and insecurity, where their freedom was a threat. They were afraid in the 
same way that Goethe-according to Nietzsche-had been "afraid" of Heinrich 
von Kleist (ibid.). Actually, this feeling of anxiety is in itself not very surprising; 
they had intentionally disengaged themselves from the entire European tradition 
-the naive, great Wieland, in spite of all his coquetry, is the significant exception 
-and they had rejected the real world, the given world in all its unclassifiable 
details. Where did that leave them then? Presumably, in a literary cloister which 
was surrounded by high ramparts, where fresh breezes no longer penetrated. 
Only the "cultured" were allowed inside, and even they soon turned into "cul-
tural Philistines." They were among their own kind, and the lack of immediacy 
and of any permanent contact with the unpleasant-but vital-outside environ-
ment was compensated for by the conviction that they constituted an elite society. 
They had completely shoved aside the long-overdue reckoning with the natural 
sciences, indeed with critical scholarship in general. One need only think of 
Nietzsche's later efforts to make up for lost time in this area-a nearly hopeless 
undertaking, in view ofhis humanistic provenance. In the first part ofhis Human, 
All-Too-Human, we find the characteristic remark: Goethe sees nature as "the 
best means for pacifying the modern soul" (MusA, VIII, u5). This is nature as 
seen from within the confines of the cloistered walls of classicism. 
The problem of tradition, that is, the problem of assigning the correct place 
to Goethe the classicist in the total history of European culture, occupied Nietz-
sche's mind again and again during these years.6 In the fourth of the Untimely 
Meditations, entitled Richard WaRner in Bayreuth, is to be found a clear formulation 
6 Cf. MusA, VII, 172, 209; WKG, IV-1, 350. 
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of the crucial idea: Goethe is to be interpreted as one of the "last great camp-
followers in the ranks of the Italian poet-philologists" (MusA, VII, 325). Thus, 
for example, his Tasso has its origins in the Renaissance model. 7 The catalogue of 
models and standards of the Renaissance is known to us. It stems from the 
Alexandrian philologists and historians ofliterature, is constructed on the basis of 
canonically interpreted concepts of genre, and still today lingers on in the German 
humanistic Gymnasien. Nietzsche characterizes the philologist-poet in the 
following way: "no new subject matter or characters, but only those we have long 
been acquainted with in everlasting re-animation and transformation." He 
continues: "this is art as Goethe later came to understand it. " 8 In contrast to this 
stand the pithy sentences: "Classical writers ... become classical in terms of their 
capacity to serve as models and be imitated ... , while great writers cannot be 
imitated. In classical writers language and the word are dead; the mollusk is dead 
in his shell." 9 But can we then entirely believe, after such a determination, his 
concluding sentence: "But it is still alive in Goethe"? Much more convincing is 
the statement: "The ideal in Schiller and Humboldt: a false antiquity ... some-
what too glossy, soft, ... refined in manner ... but no life, no real blood" (MusA, 
IX, 448 f.). 
In 1879 the vocabulary applied to Goethe was something like this: modera-
tion, gentleness, level terrain, and harmonious manner of living. He also speaks of 
"Schiller's and Goethe's fields of tender fruit." 10 To be sure, he does not hesitate to 
add that, as a thinker, Goethe embraced the clouds more intimately than was 
proper (MusA, IX, 195). 
From the time of The Dawn (1880-81) on, Nietzsche's mode of expression 
becomes more aggressive once again-he even comes to the point of an outright 
dispute with German classicism in general, with German education, and again 
and again, with Goethe the classicist. This dispute continues-although not 
without interruption-all the way into Nietzsche's final period of creativity. But 
more about this later. 
The attack begins with the statement: "those silly 'classicists' have deprived us 
of all honesty." 11 In reference to German education he says: "boneless generali-
ties ... 'beautiful' in terms of an inferior and dulled sense of taste, which prided 
itself, nonetheless, on its Greek origin. It is but a weak, mild-mannered, silvery 
idealism, which more than anything else wishes to possess the voice and gestures 
of a feigned grandeur-a thing as harmless as it is presumptuous, inspired by the 
heartiest repugnance toward 'cold' or 'barren' reality" (ibid., 170 f.). One has 
the impression that Nietzsche by this time has a good grasp of the main problem; 
7 From the notes to MA, 11; c( MusA, IX, 450. 
8 MA, I; MusA, VIII, 193. 
9 Notes to MA, II; MusA, IX, 451. 
1° Cf. MusA, IX, 54 tf., 90, 242. 
11 M; MusA, X, 152. 
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not infrequently he is overcome with impatience and anger in the face of this sort 
of"niaiserie allemande." In The Twilight of the Idols (1888), he simply concludes: 
"Goethe did not understand the Greeks" (MusA, XVII, I 57). In large parts ofhis 
literary remains from the eighties-later compiled as the so-called Will to Power-
one can find now and again such turns of phrase as, for example, the statement 
that even the noble ardor of such f~iends of antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann 
had something "illicit and almost immodest" about it. 12 Nietzsche is convinced-
with regard to Winckelmann's and Goethe's image of Greece-that some day 
the entire farce was going to be discovered (MusA, XIX, 233); indeed, that "only 
now are we finally learning to laugh" at them (ibid., 245). Thus it seems clear 
enough: his general reckoning can hardly be surpassed in its severity. 
I spoke previously of interludes. First of all, the question of style does, to be 
sure, recede into the background; nevertheless, it continues to remain virulent. 
Furthermore it is narrowed down to the person of Goethe; thus, he, Goethe, "in a 
subtle and artful way entrenched and disguised" his own culture. 13 At the same 
time, however, this was done with such a lack of assurance and resolution that the 
question arises: "In what light will he later appear?" (MusA, XVI, 355). As a 
summation one could take Nietzsche's words from the poem "To Goethe": "The 
immortal is but the symbol ofThee." 14 In regard to the problem of style, Goethe 
is also several times brought face to face with Beethoven. Notes concerning this 
confrontation can be found as early as the period of The Dawn and The Gay 
Science. 15 Beethoven figures in these works as the "untamed mortal"; Nietzsche 
welcomes Goethe's "cautious stance toward music," and even expresses the regret 
that a "music of equal rank" to Goethe had not yet been produced.16 This is a 
frightening thought, when one recalls on the one hand Karl Friedrich Zelter, and 
on the other the rising maestro Peter Gast. What a disastrous misjudgment of 
potencies. in spite of the fact that he had become acquainted with a musician of 
genius in Richard Wagner, and in spite of the fact that he had once done some 
composing worthy of note himself-and what is more, not at all in the "classi-
cistic" style! 
In my opinion, the enduring virulence of the problem of style is related in a 
very fundamental way to Nietzsche's latent quest for disciples. Even with all his 
emphatically expressed pride in his solitude, the hope of attracting like-minded 
followers never died. This hope necessarily required restraint, and this restraint 
in turn led to occasional false conclusions-for example, after his unsuccessful 
endeavors to obtain the love of Lou von Salome, and after his friendship with 
Paul Ree was shattered. These two attain the status of deeply disappointing, and 
12 Cf. MusA, XIII, 265: XIX, 363. 
13 The quote is from the literary remains of the eighties, MusA, XIX, 2o6; XVI, 355. 
14 1882-84. MusA, XX, 107. 
15 1881-82. Cf. MusA, XI, 89, 112; XII, 132. 
16 Cf. also MusA, XVlll, 82, from the literary remains of the eighties. 
The German "Classicist" Goethe as Re_flected in Nietzsche's Works 155 
therefore hated "disciples." And to whom does Zarathustra preach, if not to an 
imaginary group of disciples? The note which had been sounded did not die away 
in vain; they came later, the disciples, and how they looked the part, too! Zara-
thustra went along in the knapsacks of a youthful generation setting out joyously 
on the road to death. Nietzsche states quite correctly in Ecce Homo "that a Goethe 
... would not be able to breathe for a single moment in this gigantic passion and at 
this altitude."17 It only remains for us to say that this Goethe also certainly would 
not have wished to do so; this kind of feeling for style was utterly alien to him. 
Second, and in a way which is parallel to these interpretations, the name of 
Goethe appears from time to time on a list alternating with other great names of 
modem history as well as of German intellectual history. Napoleon, Beethoven, 
Schopenhauer, and Wagner come and go, appear and disappear, and are ex-
changed for other names. Goethe appears in the obligatory contours, divested of 
all specific characteristics. 18 In these works we find something like a chessboard on 
which the above-named, as well as other great names are set up and moved by 
Nietzsche according to the rules which happen to prevail at any given time. They 
are trumpet flourishes in a battle of spectres. But this is reallY, not so new; we have 
already encountered similar things in The Birth of Tragedy. I remind the reader 
here of the juxtaposition of Aeschylus and Wagner, of Socrates and Euripides. 
But not a word, for example, about the fact that Euripides, through Seneca, 
permanently influenced the entire European theatrical tradition. On the contrary, 
in regard to both past and present Nietzsche stuck to the sources, thereby remain-
ing outside the great tradition. And not to mention Socrates! 
In conclusion, I would like to say once again that I have not spoken of the 
whole Goethe, nor even of the whole poet Goethe-neither have I spoken of the 
whole Nietzsche. I have, to the best of my ability, held to the question as stated, 
and such precise questions involve a relatively limited perspective. We necessarily 
see but a single side. 
17 1888. MusA, XX, 255. 
18 Cf.J, 1886; GM, 1887; MusA, XV, 123 f.; from the literary remains of the eighties, XVIII, 82. 
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The Reluctant Disciple: Nietzsche and Schiller 
HELMUT REHDERt 
Not too many decades ago when Thomas Mann had skillfully negotiated the 
transition from the relatively serene satire of Lotte in Weimar (1939) to the stark 
tragedy of Doktor Faustus (1947) some young German critics, rooted deeply in 
their classical tradition, were tempted to argue about the elasticity of Mann's 
power of artistic adaptation: "He is like Schiller but would love to be like Goethe." 
Evidently literary emulation is more than a matter of artistic will and skill; often 
it springs from some unexplored obsession or tradition. For Thomas Mann, as for 
many other writers of his day, Schiller's essays represented the indispensable 
means of self-orientation - books one had to read to be properly initiated into the 
community ofliterature and criticism. But beyond that and below the surface of 
mere learning and academic nomenclature, there is a similarity of thought 
structure, of poetic theory and practice, that reveals a surprising parallel between 
the two writers. The Zauberberg would scarcely have been written without the 
precedence of the Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen. By the same token, Schiller's 
great poems and later plays would not have matured without his Briefe uber die 
aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen. Between the Betrachtungen and the Briefe there 
exists a striking similarity of purpose and even of method: with a degree of dedi-
cation which has rarely, if ever, been equalled, both probe into the cultural 
conscience and responsibility of the writer and come up with an answer of broad 
validity. Steeped in reflection, they reveal the faith of the reformer. The one 
reflects the singularity of personal decision and fate in one writer's-Mann's-
historical and political situation; the other reflects Schiller's stand before the 
timelessness of reason. Defining the position of creative mind ("Geist") between 
such extremes as the aesthetic and the political aspects of art, both works turn out 
to be the most demanding, wearing, consuming books on literary criticism in 
German literature-unbending prerequisites for the genuine understanding of 
their authors' art. 
Thomas Mann's fundamental bondage to Schiller, with all its latent cor-
respondences and disparities, finds further though somewhat indirect support in 
his attitude and sentiment toward the one mind to whom he professed a lifelong 
spiritual indebtedness and infatuation-Friedrich Nietzsche. Throughout his 
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literary career, Mann liberally acknowledged, modified, expanded, reinterpreted 
Nietzsche's philosophy. In his younger years he practically claimed exclusive 
privileges of such interpretation; his last major work grew into an ominous 
"twilight-of-the-gods," a gloomy intertwining of Germany's and Nietzsche's 
decline and fall. Doubtless Mann was aware that Nietzsche, too, in spite of his 
repeated declarations of faith in Goethe, manifested a fundamental sentiment and 
structure of mind which linked him to the beliefs and precepts of Schiller. 
As for Nietzsche himself, the inveterate sceptic and growling solitary, there 
were but few minds for whom he harbored genuine regard-Holderlin, for 
example, and Spinoza, or Goethe, and Socrates. Vastly distinct from one another. 
these men had widely different impacts on human civilization. What they had in 
common was a kind of immunity from illusions, a firm and downright faith and 
will-to-truth that put them in direct touch with reality, a simple and basic "wis-
dom" and an understanding of its forms and functions, and an unqualified 
approval ("Ja-Sagen") of existence. Significantly, Schiller is not among them, for 
obvious reasons. Schiller was a homiletic personality, a preacher and interpreter 
and monologist who would develop doctrines for the conduct of life rather than 
new forms symbolic of life itself. Nietzsche's appraisal of Schiller ranges over a 
spectrum of widely different images-from scorn to deference; in a way, all of 
these images bear a resemblance to the philosopher with the hollow, penetrating 
look. One of them-the "Moraltrompeter von Sackingen"-is so grotesque and 
cumbersome that it requires more effort at explaining than the intended humor 
justifies. Another designation-"unser Schiller" -would even sound a bit 
philistine if it did not reflect the pride of the eager and conscientious student of 
Schulpforta, celebrating the memory of genius lingering in the valley of the 
Saale. Intrinsically, this word echoed Goethe's memorable dictum, from his 
epilogue to Schiller's "Glocke" - "Denn er war unser" -which must have set the 
tone at Schulpforta for the study of Schiller's works under the sensitive guidance 
of Professor Koberstein. It must have been at the "Pforte" that Schiller, the 
eighteenth-century classic, ceased to be an object of mere "Bildung" for Nietzsche 
and became a challenge, a threat, a force, a desirability in his existence-a kind of 
mythical mirror of his own intellectual situation. 
At an early time Nietzsche must have sensed that Goethe's poem provided a 
symbolism of fundamental relevance: it pictured Schiller on that narrow thresh-
old between the material and the ideal, the earthly and the cosmic, which has 
characterized German thinking ever since the days of the Reformation. Schiller's 
image contained a latent paradox in that it had dynamic and static aspects, 
suggesting restlessness suspended and an enormous tension resolved. But it also 
summoned the messianic ambition of the youth to conquer the "resistance of an 
obtuse world" ("Widerstand der stumpfen Welt")-an almost impossible 
challenge that could result, if taken seriously, in a lofty misunion of idealism and 
obstinacy or in a monstrosity composed of aspiration and contempt. Later on a 
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more articulate Nietzsche would cast this symbolism into an almost eschatological 
vision: 
W er viel einst zu verkiinden hat, 
schweigt vie} in sich hinein. 
Wer einst den Blitz zu ziinden hat, 
muB lange Wolke sein. 1 
And behind the image of the future there looms the figure of Dionysos, intimately 
joined to the fate of his mother, Semele, who was consumed by the lightning of 
Zeus. In Nietzsche's writings the connection between lightning and Dionysos 
occurs with increasing frequency. Is it surprising that the young Nietzsche, 
sophisticated in matters of myth, might have suspected that Schiller, in writing a 
dramatic sketch on Semele, his only play on Greek mythology, might be re-
vealing a latent kinship to the Dionysian element even though he is generally 
connected with the opposite stylistic principle, the Apollinian? 
It is not clear what me_dium of poetic expression Nietzsche originally associ-
ated with Schiller's poetic temperament. In his early writings the customary 
praise of Schiller the dramatist is non-existent; after a mandatory report on 
Schiller's plays during the extensive Schiller centennial in Pforta in 1859, Nietz-
sche did not express himself on Schiller's plays or dramatic characters again (as 
he repeatedly did in the case of Shakespeare). Perhaps, he did not feel at ease with 
any of them. For Schiller's critical essays, including those which eventually took 
on considerable significance for his own aesthetic theory, he had occasional if 
caustic comments. No word was lost about Schiller's lyrics: this is surprising and 
perhaps an indication of impatience or unfairness or indifference on Nietzsche's 
part. For it is on the level of the lyrical that Schiller's hymns gained an enormous 
importance for the development of Nietzsche's moral and aesthetic judgment. 
This is not to say that Nietzsche derived any particular insight from the reading of 
Schiller's hymns; quite the contrary. But they seem to reveal a kinship in the 
structure of lyrical temperament between the poet and the philosopher. As a 
choral chant, supported by the strains of Beethoven's music, Schiller's "Hymn to 
Joy" becomes a prime exemplar of the Dionysian experience, projected onto the 
background of the Eleusinian Mysteries: 
1hr stiirzt nieder, Million en? 
Ahnest du den Schopfer, Welt?2 
To the reader of The Birth of Tragedy it may be something of a surprise to find 
1 (The translations in notes 1-6 are by the author.) 
"Whoever is destined someday to proclaim great words, will have to swallow much in bitter 
silence; whoever is destined to kindle the lightning must long be content with being a cloud" (K, 77, 
505). 
2 "Do you sink before him, millions?/ World, do you sense your Creator?" ("An die Freude"). 
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a poem generally considered a late offshoot of the allegorical Baroque tradition-
and hence not without artificiality-re-interpreted by Nietzsche as a token of 
Dionysian ecstasy. Insofar as music is considered by Nietzsche the cohesive, 
unifying, mass-merging medium, he does not hesitate to claim Schiller's well-
known statement concerning the musical mood ("Stimmung") preceding poetic 
expression as Dionysian. It does not really matter whether he is consistent at this 
point. The important thing is that the two stylistic principles or psychological 
drives-the Apollinian and the Dionysian-not be considered as opposite and 
contradictory to one another but rather as correlated and complementary, like 
day and night. In their mutual harmony and coalescence they produced the 
ancient tragedy; their separate pursuits caused its downfall, particularly in the 
reflective reasoning of the Apollinian temperament, the medium of the intellect-
and the intellect is always prone to separate, divide, alienate, destroy. 
Historically, Nietzsche's hypothesis of the psychological interplay between 
the Apollinian and the Dionysian drives is but another stage in the long tradition . 
of complementary concepts attempting to solve the problem of "reality." Ever 
since the "querelles des anciens et des modernes" demonstrated the relativity of 
historical judgment, the question of surpassed standards and outdated models has · 
disquieted literary criticism. These quarrels of criticism are not responsible for 
the birth of romanticism or the genesis of classicism. The age of these concepts and 
what they stand for is as old as human memory and consciousness. Somehow 
they owe their rise to the tendency of the human mind to discriminate and to 
establish characteristics of the "individual," the irreplaceable and unique in 
nature, art, history, justice-and before God. Nietzsche's complement_ary con-
cepts only give a novel, unexpected, expressive twist to an age-old problem 
which, in the eighteenth century, was solved by Wieland or Friedrich Schlegel or, 
in the twentieth century, by Spengler and Worringer. Their "solutions" were 
not real solutions; and often they merely introduced new and interesting per-
spectives to established and traditional outlooks. Behind the Apollinian and the 
Dionysian there still glow the well discussed polarities of the Classical and the 
Romantic or, mutatis mutandis, those of Antiquity and Christianity. The spiritual 
derivation of these concepts· ·i; difficult to determine. It seems unlikely that 
Nietzsche was indebted to Kant's analysis of the Beautiful and the Sublime, in-
sofar as Kant, instead of coordinating or juxtaposing these concepts, assigned 
them to different levels of consciousness. Nietzsche may have derived his ideas 
from Schiller's famous essay on naive and sentimental poetry; he clearly saw 
certain limitations of these notions in literary criticism: while the "sentimental" 
allows manifold applications, the meaning and use of "naive" is strictly limited. 
"Naive" does not denote by any means the simple, initial condition of man at the 
beginning of time and culture-such as was suggested by Rousseau and his 
nature worship. Whenever the "naive" appears in art, as it doe~ in Homer for 
example, it is the manifestation of Apollinian perfection. Indeed, often the 
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"naive" is useless as a stylistic criterion because it will appear as a concealed 
variation of the sentimental. While it is difficult to establish a direct correspon-
dence between Schiller's and Nietzsche's treatises, the two may be viewed quite 
close together in the parallelism of eighteenth-century rationalism and irration-
alism-or of Lessing and Hamann. 
When we apply these distinctions to poetry, more specifically to the lyrics of 
Schiller's philosophical poems and Nietzsche's "Dionysos-Dithyramben," we 
find that a remarkable resemblance of their intellectual physiognomies presents 
itself. We may suspect that both writers found the way to their writings through 
some sort of compensation for the "resistance of the obtuse world." Schiller may 
have been a thwarted diplomat; Nietzsche, a frustrated artist. Schiller's lyrics are 
like a blueprint for a human commonwealth. Expressive and visionary, they 
exhibit a fundamentally abstract structure. Variously described as reflective or 
didactic or demonstrative, they aim to persuade or even to convert. By and large, 
they may be called "Denk-Gedichte"; their main thrust is in the direction of the 
intellect. Still, in direction and degree their cerebral appeal involves a massive 
charge of rhetorics, pathos and emotional tension which. transcending personal 
experience, empties out into a vast system of ideas that now appears as art, now 
as culture, now as religion. The origin of these poems cannot be traced back to 
any one of these fields; it lies in all of them and each o(them in an uncompromising 
struggle between life and mind, "Leben" and "Geist," a struggle which is never 
resolved except by the acceptance of tragedy and the recognition of the heroic: in 
the worlds of both Schiller and Nietzsche, an un-heroic, middle-class society 
seeks a way out of a metaphysical dilemma where Life and Change become 
acceptable only at the risk of timeless knowledge: 
Nur der lrrtum ist das Leben, 
und das Wisscn ist dcr Tod.3 
In a similar perspective, the rich imagery which Schiller developed in his elegy 
on the primeval and its undivided harmony of existence, received its impetus 
from the concepts of "Leben" and "Tod," permeating the theme of his "Gotter 
Griechenlands." 
Was unsterblich im Gesang soll leben, 
muB im Leben untergehn.4 
Thus Schiller's perspective anticipated the concepts of the Dionysian as lite and the 
Apollinian as death, except that in Nietzsche the two no longer share the trans-
cendental viewpoint of Schiller's closing stanza. 
A similar panegyric on Life, at the expense of "Geist," reflection, rationali-
3 "Only in erring is Life and in knowing is Death" ("Kassandra"). 
4 "Whatc-vc-r is to live immortally in the sphere of song must perish in the sphere of Life" ("Die 
Gotter Griechcnlands"). 
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zation, and death is found in Nietzsche's Zarathustra and the poems and fragments 
surrounding it: "Where life grows rigid, laws grow tall and towering"; "You 
perish if you always seek to comprehend the bottom of things" ("Man geht 
zugrunde, wenn man immer zu den Grunden geht"}; "Divine is the art of for-
getting." And it seems significant that the Apollinian image of "Heiterkeit," 
"serenity," which perfects Schiller's concept of the changeless ideal reappears in 
Nietzsche's vision of the inescapable gateway to death: "One is certain of his own 
death; why shouldn't one be serene?" 
On a background such as this the cycle of Nietzsche's "Dionysos-Dithyram-
ben" fulfills a function comparable to that of Schiller's philosophical lyrics. A 
century after Schiller they seem to have arrived at a point where they express the 
suffering of the isolated individual self. Written in the first person, they appear to 
be voicing Nietzsche's personal experiences in the discovery of the notion of the 
Eternal Recurrence; and the ego of the poet, reduced to the function of fool-
"Only a fool! only a poet!"-is unmasked in the role of the intellect that knows 
itself and torments itself: "Knower of selfl Hangman of self!" Behind this 
psychological self-portrait there emerges the mind of modem man, tortured by 
its own consciousness, and yearning to immerse itself wholly in the lust of life. 
Nietzsche's poems are "Denk-Gedichte" no less than Schiller's philosophical 
lyrics; like them they are facing ultimate possibilities of mankind in the realms of 
art, culture, religion. In their intense anti-Christian temper, these poems, like 
Schiller's "Gotter Griechenlands," may even be suspected of having sprung from 
a sublimated Christian ethos or, as Nietzsche himself might have called it, 
"versetztes Christen tum." 
Nietzsche would have been the first to deny most vehemently even the 
possibility of such a thought. His irony would have had a field day. In regard to 
Schiller, he was more tolerant-or indifferent-in this respect. He scarcely 
protested Schiller's commitment to religious problems even though more than 
half of Schiller's plays and many of his poems dealt with spiritual themes. Ob-
viously Schiller's Swabian Protestantism was sufficiently guided by his aesthetic 
empathy to achieve authenticity in religious or clerical matters. All this scarcely 
mattered to Nietzsche although he sharply denounced Wagner for precisely the 
same reasons. On the other hand, as a classical scholar, Nietzsche had no reason to 
restrain himself in acknowledging Schiller's devotion to the classical ideal: his 
preoccupation with the Homeric, Trojan image of the world; his lofty thoughts 
on the first human community; his pilgrimage through the evolution of human 
culture; his faith in the persistence of human values-"die Sonne Homers" -
throughout the history of the human race. Some feel that Schiller too readily 
adopted Winckelmann's conception of an idealized and simplified antiquity to 
suit Nietzsche's taste. Such a view, which blames even Goethe's "classicism" on 
his association with Schiller, is compensated for by the expression of human 
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compassion which Schiller read out of the ancients, as for example his elegy on 
the passing of greatness, the death of Achilles: 
Siehe, da weinen die Gotter, es weinen die Gottinnen alle, 
daB das Schone vergeht, daB das Vollkommene stirbt. 
Auch ein Klaglied zu sein im Mund der Geliebten ist herrlich, 
denn das Gemeine geht klanglos zum Orkus hinab. 5 
Perhaps it was in perspectives such as this that Nietzsche found his own views on 
"das Gemeine" corroborated and his faith in future human perfection, indeed in 
the possibility of the Superman, confirmed and strengthened. Nietzsche did not 
reject Schiller's complex theory of the aesthetic education of man. He approved 
of many views that Schiller held. He approved of his interpretation of the chorus 
in ancient tragedy-as a kind of protective wall maintaining its natural and 
pristine grandeur; unconditionally he defended Schiller's stand against raw 
naturalism; and without reservation he supported Schiller's absolute idealism 
although it was miles removed from his own point of view. "It is not enough to 
practice the good," he wrote, "you must want it and ... receive the godhead into 
your own will. (At this point he was quoting Schiller verbatim!] You must not 
merely want the beautiful; you must be able to do it, in innocence and blindness 
and without Psyche's curiosity." Such words were simple and sincere and 
testified to Nietzsche's ability to project himself into the complexities of Schiller's 
thinking. 
There were other occasions on which Nietzsche exhibited a notable affinity 
with Schiller's views. Those were the moments in which he expressed his notions 
on time. The personal, pathological aspects of time during periods of illness and 
suffering which taxed Nietzsche's patience beyond the tolerable sometimes 
resembled violent outcries: 
Aus deinem Munde, 
du speichclfliissige Hexe Zeit, 
tropft langsam Stunde auf Stunde. 
Umsonst, daB all mein Eke] schreit: 
"Fluch, Fluch dem Schlunde 
der Ewigkeit!"6 
In his human miseries, Schiller must have given vent to his feelings in equally 
convincing though less expressionistic fashion. What concerns us here is the 
5 "Lo and behold, all the Gods and Goddesses weep since the beautiful passes and all perfection 
succumbs. It is great to be even a funeral dirge in the mouth of the loved ones for the common descends 
to the nether-world silent, without even a sound" ("Nanie"). 
6 "From your mouth,/ you spittle-flowing witch of time/ slowly drips hour on hour./ It's useless 
that all my aversion shouts:/ Cursed, cursed be the gorge/ of eternity!" ("Rimus remedium"; W, 11, 
269). 
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manner in which both writers are experiencing the time perspective which Kant 
described as the "inner sense," the medium of consciousness which transcends the 
limits of instinct and the present. For both writers the time perspective becomes 
evident in the theme of waiting: Zarathustra is often portrayed as waiting-for 
his friends, for high noon or deepest midnight, for the fulfillment of his fate, the 
realization of the Eternal Recurrence. For Nietzsche, waiting is merely another 
aspect of loneliness, of empty space, a form of the basic existence of the human 
soul that is left to its own devices at an utter loss of communication. - "Were 
there listening ears?" ... In Schiller's works likewise, waiting and loneliness 
become a matter of extreme urgency. Don Carlos, Wallenstein, Maria Stuart, Die 
Jungfrau von Orleans, Die Braut von Messina-none of these plays can be imagined 
without the theme of waiting, waiting for the decisive act in the decisive hour, 
waiting for the realization of fate. The poem "Erwartung" intensifies the theme 
to such a degree that from now on it becomes a lyrical and dramatic requisite for 
the composition of romantic opera from Weber to Wagner-and to Nietzsche's 
own "Ariadne." 
The time component in individual consciousness leads to another considera-
tion which is of enormous importance in the ultimate evaluation ofNietzsche and 
Schiller: both writers agree in the critique of their age which they unanimously 
denounce as an age of decadence. Latecomers to their respective eras, both voice 
the pathos of the moralist and the reformer. Schiller, imbued with the ideal of 
freedom, which he placed higher than its realization in the French Revolution, 
chose the path of the artist and "aesthetic education" as the sole way to human 
liberation and spiritual independence. On the other hand, Nietzsche, wary of 
human nature, entrusted the future possibilities to man's natural institutions and 
to gigantic slogans, such as the Will to Power, Transvaluation of Values, Eternal 
Recurrence, or the defeat of moral ideologies, Schiller endowed his "artist," 
selective as he had to be, with certain substantial qualities: as the son of his age he 
should be above his age and receive his mandate from the ageless ideal. Strangely, 
in the pursuit of this ideal Schiller seemed to anticipate the image of Nietzsche: 
But not everyone whose soul glows with this ideal was granted either the creative 
tranquillity or the spirit oflong patience required to imprint it upon the silent stone, 
or pour it into the sober mould of words, and so entrust it to the executory hands of 
time. Far too impetuous to proceed by such unobtrusive means, the divine impulse 
to form often hurls itself directly upon present-day reality and upon the life of 
action, and undertakes to fashion anew the formless material presented by the moral 
world. The misfortunes of the human race speak urgently to the man of feeling; its 
degradation more urgently still; enthusiasm is kindled, and in vigorous souls ardent 
longing drives impatiently on towards action. But did he ever ask himself whether 
those disorders in the moral world offend his reason, or whether they do not rather 
wound his self-love? If he does not yet know the answer, he will detect it by the zeal 
with which he insists upon specific and prompt results. The pure moral impulse is 
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directed towards the Absolute. For such an impulse time does not exist, and the 
future turns into the present from the moment that it is seen to develop with 
inevitable Necessity out of the present. 7 
A century later, Nietzsche reflected a fundamentally different cultural 
situation. He was no longer confronted, as Schiller was, with an alternative 
between materialism and idealism. Capital, industry, technology had long since 
replaced the idyllic existence pictured in Schiller's "Glocke." Rousseau, who had 
been Schiller's inspiration, had been pushed aside-and Nietzsche did not regret it 
-and Hegel, Marx, Richard Wagner had taken the place of the revolutionary of 
the mid-eighteenth century. Nietzsche no longer acknowledged the absoluteness 
of a moral law, nor did he understand or appreciate the totality of reason, of a 
system, of the state. In the place of such concepts or idols-"Gotzenbilder," as he 
called them-Nietzsche attempted to establish a relativity of values, or rather of 
emotional contents which uncounted individuals-the masses-sought to express 
in many forms, figures, and moods. The historian of literature and literary criti-
cism will find it provocative to observe how Nietzsche's psychological individ-
ualism evolves from Schiller's concept of the sentimental ("sentimentalisch") and 
its variety of characteristic differentiations. In his poems and plays Schiller often 
placed the common spirit ("Gemeingeist") over the expression of singularity. 
Steeped in the exposition of pathos, tension, and dramatic inexpectancy, Schiller 
was a master in the rousing of psychological shock ("Erschiitterung"). His works 
are filled with countless emotional situations which illustrate his purpose: "den 
tiefen Grund der Menschheit aufzuregen" ("stir up the deep foundation of 
mankind"). Frequently this mood accompanied his serious interest in the reasons 
for human culture, the beginnings of the state, the human commonwealth-a 
problem he shared with other great thinkers of his century. For Nietzsche this 
problem has ceased to be acute. For him, it sank to the bottom of consciousness a 
long time ago and only in rare moments does it rise to the surface again. Those 
are the moments when the ideas of Schiller, almost timeless like myth, stir the 
imagination of his unruly disciple, Friedrich Nietzsche. 
7 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education ef Man, ed. and trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and 
L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), Ninth Letter, p. 59. 
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Nietzsche and the Tradition of the Dionysian 
MAX L. BAEUMER 
TRANSLATED BY TIMOTHY F. SELLNER 
When we speak of the "Dionysian" today, we are referring to the semantic 
context which was given to it by Nietzschc. 1 Modern authors have derived their 
knowledge of the Dionysian from Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of Traiedy, 
published in the year 1872. The Apollonian and Dionysian are herein depicted as 
physiological and psychological phenomena occurring in dreams and ecstatic 
states, whose dual nature as artistic drives is necessary for the further development 
of art. 2 In Nietzsche's later writings and in the criticism of his early work, The 
Birth of Tragedy, included in Ecce Homo (1888) the Apollonian hardly plays a role 
at all. In this latter work we read: "The two decisive innovations3 of this book 
[ The Birth of Tragedy] arc, first, the understanding of the Dionysian phenomenon 
with respect to the Greeks-it gives the first psychological interpretation of it, 
and secs it as the root of the whole of Greek art. The second is the understanding of 
1 Melvin Maddocks, "The New Cult of Madness: Thinking as a Bad Habit," Time lvfagazine, 
13 March 1972, pp. 51-52: "The new cult of madness, the far-out wing of Dionysus, has passed its 
judgment on reason more harshly than Nietzsche could have foreseen, but the time is coming when 
judgment must be passed on the Dionysiacs themselves." Stefan Brecht closes his review of Richard 
Schechner's famous nudity-play Dionysus in 69, a liberated version of Euripides' drama The Bacchae, 
with the remark: "The end of this production presents a Dionysiac spirit in something like Nietzsche's 
sense." Brecht terms the philosophy of the play "Dionysianism": The Drama Review, 13, No. 5 (1969), 
156-69. Norman 0. Brown, Life A_l!ainst Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning ~(History (Middletown, 
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), p. 175: "But the Greeks, who gave us Apollo, also gave us 
the alternative, Nietzsche's Dionysus." 
2 W, I, 21. (For key to abbreviations seep. xvii above.) The newest treatment of the Dionysian in 
Nietzsche's works, Rose Pfeffer's Nietzsche: Disciple ef Dionysus (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University 
Press. HJ72). is based mainly on The Birth of Tragedy and on Nietzsche's concept of the tragic. The author 
confronts Nietzsche's concept of the Dionysian uncritically and equates it with the Faustian m Goethe's 
works. She overlooks Martin Vogel's philologically and historically precise investigation Apollinisch 
und Dionysisch: Geschichte eines genialeu Irrtums, Studicn zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, 
Forschungsunternehmen der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, No. 6 (Regensburg: Bosse, 1966). Vogel provides 
clear proof for the fact that Nietzsche's Dionysus and his antithetical concepts "Apollonian-Dionysian" 
arc completely un-Greek. Also E. R. Dodds, in The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
The University of California Press, 1951), pp. 68-69, rejects the antithesis Apollonian-Dionysian. 
3 The emphasis is Nietzsche's own. 
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Socratism: Socrates as the instrument of Greek disintegration, recognized for the 
first time as a typical decadent" (W, II, n09). In the next section of the book 
Nietzsche asserts that he himself thus became "the first to comprehend the 
marvelous phenomenon of the Dionysian," and on the basis of his innermost 
experience, he had "discovered it to be the only parable and equivalent which 
history possesses." In The Twilight of the Idols he speaks of himself as "the first to 
take seriously that marvelous phenomenon which bears the name Dionysus" (W, 
II, 1030). In this work (1032) he also carries over into his self-criticism of The Birth 
of Tragedy, mentioned above, his own definition of the Dionysian: "The affirma-
tion oflifc even in the face ofits most unfamiliar and difficult problems; the will to 
life, rejoicing in the sacrifice of its highest types to its own inexhaustibleness-is 
what I called Dionysian, this is what I interpreted as a bridge to the psychology of 
the tragic poet" (W, 11, I 110). Just as Nietzsche concludes The Twili~ht of the 
Idols with the remark, "-I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus-," so 
he also asserts of himself in Ecce Homo: "Before me no such transformation of the 
Dionysian into a philosophical pathos existed" (W, II, II n). 
Nietzsche's assertions that he was "the first to comprehend," "discover," and 
"take seriously" the Dionysian, and that he was the first to describe it in its 
"psychological" significance and to have "transformed" it into a philosophical 
system, are intentional rhetorical exaggerations. Winckelmann, Hamann, and 
Herder had already discovered, comprehended, and formulated the concept of 
the Dionysian long before him. Novalis and Holderlin united it with Christian 
elements in the form of poetic inspiration; Heinrich Heine and Robert Hamer-
ling, a much-read novelist in Nietzsche's time, anticipated his famous antithesis 
"Dionysus versus the Crucified One"; and in the research of the German Roman-
tics in the areas of mythology and classical antiquity the antithesis Apollonian-
Dionysian had been employed for decades. Friedrich Creuzer and Johann Jakob 
Bachofcn had written voluminous works in which they placed the Greek, 
Egyptian, and Indian mysteries under the sway of Dionysus, and approximately 
sixty years before Nietzsche, Friedrich Schelling, in the Philosophy of Mytholo~y 
(Philosophie der Mytholoiie) and the Philosophy C?fRevelacion (Philosophie der Offen-
barung), had described the development of the Greek spirit on the basis of his 
concept of a threefold Dionysus and had formulated the concept of the Dionysian, 
in contrast to the Apollonian, as an unrestrained, intoxicated power of creation in 
the artist and the poetic genius. One can grant Nietzsche the primacy he asserts for 
himself only with relation to his "transformation" of the Dionysian into a 
"philosophical pathos," that is, into a rhetorical cliche. He accomplished this so 
brilliantly and propagandized it so effectively, however, that we hardly remem-
ber anything more about the long and significant prehistory of the Dionysian in 
the nineteenth century, or the mighty epiphany of Dionysus4 in early German 
Romanticism. 
4 Cf. Max L. Baeumer, "Die romantische Epiphanie des Dionysos," Monatshtjie, 57 (1965), 225-36; 
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Aristotle had traced Western tragedy back to the dithyrambic myth of 
suffering, and comedy to the glorification of the sexual clement and its tradition in 
divine ritual. 5 While Nietzsche, it is true, does not base his interpretation on that 
of Aristotle, he does proceed from an identical conception in The Birth of Tragedy 
and in his formulation of the Dionysian. In the eighteenth century as well, this 
dual relationship of the god of ecstasy to poetry, which Aristotle had expressed by 
means of his "poets of the dithyramb" and his "poets of phallic hymns," led, in 
the case of Johann Joachim Winckelmann, to an idealized conception of beauty 
drawn from the figures of Apollo and Bacchus, and in the case of Hamann and 
Herder, to the first Dionysian aesthetics and literary criticism. 
In connection with the definition of the Dionysian cited above, Nietzsche 
reproaches Winckelmann and Goethe for not having understood the Greeks, 
since they had found intolerable that particular element "out of which Dionysian 
art grows," that is, "Orgiasm" and "the mysteries of sexuality" (W, II, I03 r ). To 
ferret out "beautiful souls," "tranquil grandeur," and "noble simplicity" among 
the Greeks, he rails against Winckelmann and the classicists, to fall prey to this 
"niaiserie allemand" was something which the psychologist within him ever 
prevented him from doing (W, II, 1029). "For in the Dionysian mysteries and in 
the psychology of the Dionysian state is expressed for the first time the funda-
mental.fact of the Hellenistic instinct-its 'will to life' " (W, II, 1031). In reality, 
Winckelmann had formulated his classical maxim "noble simplicity and quiet 
grandeur" -a fact which remained forever concealed from Nietzsche and the 
proponents of an art and literary criticism based on the psychology of ecstasy who 
followed him-in opposition to the Dionysian, that is, to the "parenthyrsus" of 
"gigantic passions," which were "much too fiery and wild,"6 and in his History o_f 
Ancient Art (Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums) he set up both Apollo and Diony-
sus as the two highest types of"ideal beauty"; Apollo, "the highest conception of 
Ideal Manly Youth, in which the strength of mature years is united with the 
tender form of the most beautiful springtime of youth .... The second type of 
Ideal Youth taken from castrated natures is to be found, united with this Manly 
Youth, in the figure of Bacchus, ... in the most beautiful figures of all times, with 
their fine, rounded limbs, and with the full and bulging hips characteristic of the 
Joachim Rosteutscher, Dir Wiederk11f!fi des Dionysos: Der naturmystische lrrationalismus in Deutsch/and 
(Bern: Francke, 1947). 
5 "It [ the tragedy] arose out of improvisations, just as the comedy did, the former through the 
dithyrambic poets, the latter through the poets of the phallic hymns, such as are still sung in many of 
our cities during religious ceremonies." De arte poetica, 1449a. 
6 Sdmtliche Werke, ed. by Joseph Eiselein (Donaueschingcn: Im Verlagc deutscher Klassiker, 1825), 
I,n 
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female sex. " 7 Winckelmann sees the raging God of Wine as a boyish, dreamy, and 
effeminate catamite, and as the ideal ofboth homosexual and heterosexual beauty: 
The image of Bacchus is that of a beautiful boy, entering upon the threshold of the 
springtime of life and adolescence, in whom the stirrings of passion, like the tender 
shoots of a plant, are just beginning to appear, and who, as between sleeping and 
waking, half submerged in a delightful dream, begins to gather the images of this 
dream and to apprehend himself; his features are full of sweetness, but his joyful soul 
is not yet entirely apparent from his face. ( I 6CHi 1) 
Winckelmann's obviously homoerotic disposition of mind, which also later 
determined his tragic fate, leads him to derive his over-elevated conception of 
beauty from the statues of youths, and he imputes this disposition, in idealizing 
fashion, to the Greeks in the figures of Apollo and Bacchus. "In their contem-
plation of ideal beauty, such as in the representation of the face, as weff as in the 
youthful body structure of a number of gods like Apollo and Bacchus, the artists 
of antiquity elevated themselves to the realm of the ideal." Winckelmann was the 
first, even before Schelling and Nietzsche, to give expression to the aesthetic 
definition of the Dionysian.8 
When Nietzsche demands the development of a new art form from the 
Dionysian "mysteries of sexuality," he is preceded in doing so by Johann Georg 
Hamann. Although it is disguised in a profusion of Dionysian quotations, images, 
and concetti from Horace, Tibullus, and the treatises of the apologetic Church 
Fathers on mysteries, Hamann proclaims in his Aesthetica in nuce, in his Writers and 
Critics (Schriftsteller und Kunstrichter), in the Hierophantic Letters (Hierophantische 
Briefe), as well as in his treatise on mysteries entitled Konxompax, a new poetry 
arising out of the senses and passions, out of the wine-blood-topos of the Graeco-
Roman,Jewish, and Christian mysteries, and out of the Dionysian phallic symbol 
as the mark of the generative "creative spirit."9 In his Aesthetica in nuce Hamann 
7 Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums (1764; facsimile rpt. Baden-Baden and Strasbourg: Heitz, 
1966), pp. 158-60. Cited hereafter by page number in the text. 
8 Winckelmann's Anmerkungen of 17&7 to his Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums are added in the 
form of an appendix to the edition cited in footnote 7; here, p. 36. 
The fact, however, that even the formulation of the Apollonian-Classical ideal is bound up with 
his sexual-psychic attitude, and that even the aesthetic maxim "noble simplicity and quiet grandeur" 
arose out of the antithesis to the Dionysian could very well be a surprising conclusion for many an 
enthusiast of Winckelmann's classicism. ht this regard, cf. Max L. Baeumer, "Winckelmanns For-
mulierung der klassischen Schonheit," Monatshefte, 65 (1973), 61-75. 
9 Johann GeorJ! Hamann. Briefwechsel, ed. Walther Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel, Wiesbaden: Insel, 
1955-59), II, 415. The most important Dionysian quotations in the historical-critical edition of Ha-
mann's works edited by Josef Nadler (Vienna: Herder, 1949-57), are in volume II, pp. 203-4, 336-37, 
409-10, volume III, pp. 141, 217, 215-28; volume IV, p. 376. This is the edition cited in the text. Cf. 
James C. O'Flaherty, "The Concept of Knowledge in Hamann's Sokratische Denkwurdigkeiten and 
Nietzsche's Geburt der TraJodie," Monatshefte, 64 (1972), 334-48. (Cf. also Chapter VIII of the present 
work.) O'Flahcrty refers here and in his article "Socrates in Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia and Nie~z-
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described his "poetry" -using no less than ten quotations referring to Dionysus 
and the mysteries-in the psychological terms "senses and passions," of which 
"the whole wealth of human knowledge and happiness" consists (I, 197). These 
quotations culminate in the powerful challenge to the writers of his time: 
Do not venture into the metaphysics of the fine arts without first having attained 
perfection in the orgies [Latin: which tolerate neither a Pentheus nor an Orpheus] 
and the Eleusinian mysteries. The senses, however, are Ceres, and Bacchus the 
passions-ancient foster-parents of "beautiful nature." [Latin: Appear, 0 Bacchus, 
encircle thy head with clusters of ripened grapes, and Ceres, adorn thy brow with a 
garland of corn ears.] (201) 
The immediate effect of Hamann's Dionysian aesthetic of passion and 
sexuality is difficult to determine. One ofHamann's direct influences can be seen 
in Johann Gottfried Herder. For Herder Dionysus becomes the embodiment of a 
new, ecstatic, dithyrambic poetry, the theory for which he develops in his 
Konigsberg Scholarly and Political journal for the Year 1764 (Konigsberger Gelehrte und 
Politische Anzeigen auf das Jahr 1764), his Fragments Concerning Recent German 
Literature (Fragmente uber die neuere deutsche Litteratur) of 1767, and his Critical 
Forests (Kritische Walder) of 1769. Herder formulates: "The truly dithyrambic 
descends perhaps the farthest of all forms of poetic expression to animal-like 
sensuality in order to attain its heights; it addresses itself only to the eye, the ear, 
and to the sense of taste-it always speaks to the emotions, rarely to the intellect, 
and never to the power of reason." 1° Concerning the supposed state of ecstasy in 
which the first Greek poets were said to have composed their dithyrambs, he 
writes: "Their hymns were full of the animal-like and sensual language of wine, 
and the wine in turn rose to the level of a certain mystical-sensual language of the 
gods" (I, 310). The essence of this poetry, Herder says, is "that extension of the 
soul which consists in the parenthyrsus of intoxication and the contemplation of 
heavenly things" (I, 311). Here Herder gives us the first explanation of literary 
motivation in terms of the psychology of affects to be found in the history of 
German literary theory. What is essential is that Herder looks at this animal-like 
and mystical-sensual Dionysian as the origin of, and touchstone for, a new 
national poetry intoxicated with inspiration. He addresses himself to the poets: 
sche's Birth of Tragedy: A Comparison," Philomathes: Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of 
Philip Merlan, ed. Robert B. Palmer and Robert Hamerton-Kelly (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 
306-29, to the significance of sexuality for Hamann and Nietzsche, especially in connection with their 
concept of knowledge. This is in accordance with the fact that Nict2Sche himself does not mention 
Hamann when he refers to the Dionysian or The Birth of Tragedy, but only for the first time in a printed 
manuscript from the year 1873 entitled "Philosophy in the Age of Greek Tragedy" (W, III, 359), and 
with the fact that he was in the process of studying Hamann's works at this time (W, Ill, 1364). 
10 Herders Sdmtliche Werke, ed. Bernhard Suphan (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877-1913), I, 69. Cited 
hereafter in the text by volume and page number. 
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Geniuses, you who draw everything from the abysses of your souls, what need is 
there for me to relate to you that intoxicated hymns of a sacred inspiration for 
religion and the state, moving hymns and paintings of human emotions and situa-
tions-which even show disdain for the very altar of Bacchus himself-can also be 
evoked from the innermost part of our religion, our nature, our education, and our 
conception of the world? (I, 180) 
Like Hamann, Herder traces Dionysian poetry back to the frenzy of wild 
dances (I, 310), and characterizes them as affects from the abyss of the soul (11, 180). 
"In the Dionysian state," Nietzsche writes, "the entire affective system is aroused 
and intensified, so that it discharges all of its means of expression at one time, 
simultaneously driving out the power of representation, transformation, and 
every type of mimicry and play-acting" (11,996). One could continue indefinitely 
to make comparisons between Herder's irrational-ecstatic view of poetry under 
the banner of Bacchus and Nietzsche's conception of the Dionysian in terms of 
the psychology ofintoxication. It is very doubtful whether Herder, whom Nietz-
sche often cites, and Hamann, whose name appears in his works only in connec-
tion with the Socratic Memorabilia (Sokratische Denkwiirdigkeiten) and the lost 
works of the ancients, exerted any direct influence on Nietzsche. The fact that he 
takes Winckelmann so severely to task in connection with his own conception of 
the Greeks could signify for Nietzsche a kind of influence in the sense of an in-
ducement to contradiction. Nietzsche has, as a matter of principle, this irrational 
conception of poetic production based on genius in common with the writers of 
the Sturm und Drang-a conception already encountered in the dry versification 
of the German Anacreontics Hagedorn, Gleim, and Uz, for whom, after the 
model of Horace and Ovid, Bacchus-Dionysus was the appropriate symbol for 
the poetry of ecstasy. 11 In the course of just such a tradition the youthful poet 
Goethe, in his "Wanderer's Storm Song" ("Wandrers Sturmlied") of 1772, 
elevated Dionysus, under his sobriquet "Bromius" (the "Roaring One"), to the 
poetic "genius of the century": "Thou art, what inward fire/ to Pindar was." At a 
later point, however, he characterizes the passionate outburst contained in this 
poem as "half nonsense." 
It is in the writings of the German Romantics, however, that the topos 
"Dionysus" first receives its full significance. 12 Independently of each other, both 
11 I have shown elsewhere that Nietzsche's and Wilhelm Heinse's statements on the Dionysian 
often are identical. even in terms of their wording-nevertheless, in this case, too, no direct influences 
have been established. Cf. Max L. Bacumer, "Heinse und Nietzsche. Ausgang und Vollcndung der 
dionysischcn Asthetik," Heinse-Studien (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1966), pp. ()2-124; Otto Kein, Das Apol-
linische ,md Dionysische bei Nietzsche und Schelling (Berlin: Junker and Diinnhaupt, 1935). 
12 A coherent examination of the Dionysian as it relates to the Romantic period, or to literature in 
general, does not exist. Joachim Rosteutscher, in the work cited above, gives a depth-psychological 
interpretation of possible Dionysian attitudes in the writings of Hi:ilderlin, Novalis, Schopenhauer, 
Bachofen, Wagner, Nietzsche, George, Rilke, and others; Louis Wiesmann, in Das Dionysische bei 
Hiilderlin und in der deutschen Romantik (Basel: Schwabe, 1948), investigates the Dionysian character of 
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Holderlin and Novalis celebrate the return of the Greek deity, summoned by 
"the Wine-God's holy priests" ("Bread and Wine") and by inspired poets "in 
enthusiasm and Bacchic intoxication" (paralipomena to Heinrich von Ofterdingen). 
The same religious-ecstatic inspiration which Hamann derived from the mysteries 
and Herder from Greek dithyrambic poetry, and which they require from the 
poets of their time in the name of Dionysus, this inspiration is now kindled, like a 
fire in the soul of the poet, in the form of a new symbol for Holderlin in the poem 
"As on a Holiday" ("Wie wenn am Feiertage"). lt is described as identical to the 
fire oflightning by virtue of which, Holderlin maintains, divinely struck Semele 
gave birth to holy Bacchus, and whose ray the poets now hold in their very hands 
and offer to the people as a heavenly gift veiled in song. This pure ray does not 
bum the poet, but violently shaken, he is compelled to share the sufferings of 
Dionysus. In the hymn "To our Great Poets" ("An unsre groBen Dichter"), 
these poets appear in the retinue of the God of Joy, young Bacchus, who returns 
all-conquering from India in triumphal procession, waking the nations with his 
holy wine: 
0, ye poets, too, waken them from slumber, 
Those who yet sleep; give us laws, give 
Us life, 0 triumph, heroes! Ye alone, 
Like Bacchus, have the right to conquer. 
The topos Dionysus has the same function in the odes "The Poet's Vocation" 
("Dichterberuf') and "Chiron." This function becomes even more apparent in 
the later poems of Holderlin in the form of the return of the "heavenly" and in 
the attempted unification of Dionysus and Christ. Also in Novalis's Christianity 
or Europe (Christenheit oder Europa) the new Savior, "at home among the people, 
... is consumed as bread and wine, embraced as a loved one, breathed as air, 
comprehended as word and song, and finally received, amid the greatest sufferings 
oflove, as death into the innermost part of the failing body." But Novalis is not 
actually using the topos Dionysus here, in the Hymns to the Night (Hymnen an die 
Nacht), the Novices of Sais (Lehrlinge zu Sais), and in his Oftcrdingen-novel; rather 
he is merely making use of Dionysian metaphors, with which he elucidates his 
the language and some of the imagery in Hyperion. Isolated references are to be found in Walther 
Rehm's Griechentum und Goethezeit: Geschichte eines Glaubens (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1936). and in Richard 
Benz's Die de11tsc/1e Romantik: Geschichte einer geist(een Bewe.~•m.e (Leipzig: Reclam, 1937). Momme 
Mommsen, in an article entitled "Oionysos in der Oichtung Holderlins mit besonderer Heriicksich-
tigung der Frieden~feier," Germanisch-Romanische Monatsschriji, NS 13 (1963), 345-79, intends mainly 
to show that the "Prince of the Feast-day" ("Fiirst des Fests") in this poem is Dionysus. More precise 
references can be found in Max L. Baeumer, "Die zeitgeschichtliche Funktion des dionysischen Topos 
in der romantischen Oichtung," Gestaltungsgeschichte und Gesel/sch~fi~eeschichte, Literatur-, Kunst- und 
Musikwissenschaftlichc Studien, ed. Helmut Kreuzer in collaboration with Kate Hamburger (Stuttgart: 
Metzler, 1969), 265-83. 
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ecstatic love-death conception and his idea of unification with nature. 13 His 
translation of the ode by Horace (III, 25), "Quo me, Bacche, rapis tui,/ Plenum?", 
which Hamann before him had used in his formulation of the topos of the poetry 
of intoxication, is a reworking of the theme, which precisely by virtue of its 
deviations from the original makes apparent its transformation into the Romantic 
topos of a new poetic transfiguration of the world. 
Whither carryest thou me, 
Fullness of my heart, 
God of intoxication, 
Through which woods and chasms 
Do I roam, with courage not my own. 
Of things powerful, things unheard, 
Things never before uttered by mortal lips, 
Of these will I speak. 
As the ardent sleepwalker, 
The Bacchic maiden 
In the ode "To our Great Poets" from the years 1797 and 1798, and in the 
hymn "As on a Holiday," stemming from about the year 1800, Holderlin equates 
the inspired poets with Dionysus himself. They are to arouse the people from 
sleep, conquer "like Bacchus," and "ignited by the holy ray," proclaim to men 
"the fruit born oflove, the work of gods and men .... " Also in both of his. later 
significant poems, the elegy "Bread and Wine" (first called "The God of Wine" 
["Der Weingott"]) and the hymn "The Rhine" ("Der Rhein"), Holderlin 
equates the poets with Dionysus. In the Rhine-hymn, the Dionysian characterizes 
the content and form of a new, unrestrained, and divine priesthood, expressed 
here of Rousseau: "that he, from holy plenitude/ As the God of Wine, divinely 
foolish/ And lawlessly gives it away, the language of the most pure." In "Bread 
and Wine," Dionysus performs the function of expressing the poetic goal of the 
older Holderlin: the return of the gods and their unification with Christ. Herc 
Holderlin develops, in a way similar to Novalis, the image of the night of holy 
intoxication as the matrix of the Dionysian life, and, like Novalis, intensifies it to 
the point of a nocturnal appearance of Dionysus himself: "Thence has come and 
13 In the Hymns to the Night, in which the poet lies "intoxicated in the bosom of love," and feels 
"death's rejuvenating stream," Novalis describes the night in Dionysian and generally ecstatic symbols, 
e.g., with the expression "the golden flood of the grapes" and the "brown juice of the poppy." ht his 
novel-fragment The Novices of Sais the Dionysian character of the pleasurable submersion in the 
universal is depicted merely in the imprecise images of"procreative power," "the desire to procreate," 
and of "surging waves of passion." ht Klingsohr's wine-song in Henry von Ofterdingen the wine, "the 
golden child," and "the god who brings us heavenly pleasures" are identical. 
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back there points the god who is to come." The answer to the question "Where-
fore poets in impoverished times?" is placed in the mouth of Wilhelm Heinse: 
"But they, sayest thou, are like the Wine God's holy priests,/ Who proceeded 
from land to land by hallowed night." Here, too, the poets have become identical 
to the restless god and his expeditions to India and back to Thebes. 
Christ, the Silent Genius, Holderlin says, appeared as the last in the heavenly 
chorus of gods, and, as a divine consolation, left behind gifts as a sign of His return: 
"Bread is the fruit of the earth, yet it is blessed by the rays of the sun,/ And from 
the god who thunders issue forth the pleasures of wine ... / Thus the poets, too, 
sing in serious praise to the god of wine." The gifts of bread and wine left by 
Christ to his disciples are originally the gifts of Dionysus and Ceres. The return of 
the gods of antiquity and their unification with Christ is to be brought about as a 
function of Dionysus, speaking through the mouths of the poets. When Christ 
then comes as the "Torchbearer, the Son of the Highest, the Syrian," He is 
appearing with the same symbol and in the same manner as Dionysus in the 
Bacchae of Euripides: "Bacchus swings in his dance the torch smelling of Syrian 
incense, startling the revelers with his rejoicing, his long locks disheveled by the 
wind." In the words "Syrian" and "Torchbearer," Holderlin is assigning meta-
phors of the Dionysian topos to Christ in order to express the blessed unification 
of Christ and Dio'riysus, in which the world is to find a new harmony. In the hymn 
"The Only One" ("Der Einzige"), Christ is called the brother of Heracles and 
Dionysus: 
And I confess, Thou 
Art brother also to Evius, who 
To his chariot harnessed 
The tigers and down 
·As far as the Indus 
Commanding joyful service, 
First the vineyard planted and 
Tamed the rage of the nations. 
In the third version of this hymn Dionysus is characterized as the "common 
spirit," and in the elegy "Stutgard" as the "common god," since "each" sacrifices 
"what is his" for the fatherland. Holderlin is referring here to the secret society of 
Swabian republican conspirators and poets who were gathered around him, all 
inspired by the French Revolution. It is in the same sense that Holderlin's letter 
from Niirtigen to his brother in December 1800 speaks of a "common spirit." 
In his conception of Dionysus Holderlin unites mythological occurrences with 
contemporary political and religious events in a Romantic unity. 
In keeping with his destruction of the Romantic picture of the world, 
Heinrich Heine also dissolves the tenuous Romantic unification of Christ with 
Dionysus. For Heine, Dionysus is the "god of vitality," and, in the tradition of 
later Romanticism, a pernicious seducer, the greatest of the dethroned gods who 
174 MAX L. BAEUMER 
live on in concealment while they deceive their Christian subjugators and strike 
terror into their hearts. In his work Gods in Exile (Gotter im Exil) from the year 
1836, Heine has Bacchus play the role of a Superior in a Franciscan monastery in 
the Tyrol. A meddlesome fisherman is forced to view with terror the midnight 
Bacchic procession of the wan gods, "who have arisen from the sarcophagi of 
their tombs or the hiding-places of their temple ruins in order to celebrate once 
again the triumphal journey of their divine liberator, the Savior of the Senses, and 
to dance once more the joyful dance of heathendom, the cancan of the ancient 
world, ... utterly without hypocritical disguises, utterly without any interven-
tion by the police of a spiritualistic morality, with the utterly uninhibited frenzy 
of days gone by, rejoicing, raging, exulting: 'Evoe Bacche!' '' In Heine's panto-
mime "The Goddess Diana" ("Die Gottin Diana") Bacchus appears with Diana 
and his own raging retinue in a German Gothic castle of the Middle Ages. Only 
the knight in love with Diana and his fool are seized by the wild and obscene 
carryings-on and proceed, under the guidance of Bacchus, to the wanton festival 
of pleasure in the Venusberg, the "seat of all voluptuousness and lasciviousness." 
The knight is slain in a Christian duel with the old and awkward "Faithful 
Eckhardt" in front of the Venusberg, so that the soul of the knight, at least, can be 
saved. Apollo, with his music of"peace and harmonious beatification," is unable 
to awaken the knight, lying in state in the Venusberg. Bacchus, however, in his 
"all-powerful inspiration as the god of vitality" causes the knight to be resur-
rected to a new life of love with Diana. After everyone is crowned with the 
heathen rosary of the goddess Venus, the pantomime ends in a "glory of trans-
figuration." 
For Heine, the Dionysian has an exclusively negative connotation. Every one 
of the late Romantic images of a terrifying Bacchus is brought forth by him for 
the purpose of a biting satire on the classical German image of Greece: Eduard 
Morike's seductive, Dionysian nature-spirit in "Autumn Celebration" ("Herbst-
feier"); Wilhelm Hauff's lascivious Bacchus-knave in Phantasies in \a Bremen 
Rathskeller (Phantasien im Bremer Rathskeller); and Joseph von Eichendorff's 
dream-like figure of the moonlight, Donati-Bacchus, who appears "pale and 
disorderly" in his work The Marble Image (Das Marmorbild). The ecstatic passion 
expressed by Bacchus in Heine's works is more base sensuality than anything else. 
Its function is not the Romantic rejuvenation and poeticization of the world, 
rather the demythologization and the zestful destruction of the moral and social 
order; not the ecstatic exaltation and deification of life, but rather an anguished 
lust for life; not the unification of religion and poetry, antiquity, and Christen-
dom, rather their separation into mutually hostile camps. The synthesis Dionysus-
Christ is transposed to the antithesis Dionysian-Christian, which corresponds to 
Heine's antithetical formulation Hellenic-Nazarene. While Holderlin describes 
Christ using Dionysian metaphors in order to express the unity between Him and 
the God of Wine, Heine conversely describes Dionysus as the "Savior of the 
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Senses." The Bacchic celebrations of the mysteries have become the "cancan of 
the ancient world," the Olympian Parnassus has turned into the Venusberg of 
"voluptuousness and lasciviousness," and the creative frenzy of the poets has 
changed into the "unrestrained frenzy of ancient times." Just as the Dionysian 
topos, because of its ecstatic character, had become the appropriate form for 
thought and expression for the early Romantics, so it is for Heine, writing at the 
close of the Romantic period, the favorite topos of the period's rapturous dissolu-
tion and destruction. Nietzsche then attempts somewhat later to unite the positive 
and Romantic function of the Dionysian with Heine's cliche-like, deprecating 
utilization of the topos. Heine's antithesis Dionysian-Christian becomes in the case 
ofNietzsche the slogan "Dionysus versus the Crucified One." 
Even more strongly than Heine, the Austrian Gymnasium professor Robert 
Hamerling, an epigonic classicist, propagates in his great epic poem Ahasuerus in 
Rome (Ahasverus in Rom) the idea of Dionysus as the embodiment of"boundless 
passion." Gothic Romanticism resplendent with color, genius-like pretension, 
and uninhibited pleasure in morbid decadence are all united in Hamerling's best-
seller, which, after six years and during the very same year which saw the first 
publication of Nietzsche's Birth ef Tragedy, was flooding the market of the more 
cultivated middle-class reading public with its eleventh printing. In the figure of 
Ahasuerus,14 the Wandering Jew, utter denial oflife and a longing for death are 
contrasted with the ruthless greed for life and pursuit of sensual pleasure sym-
bolized by the person of"Nero-Dionysus," the prototype of the Caesar-craze in 
the popular tradition of the nineteenth century. In the second of the six "hymns," 
entitled "The Bacchanal," the tyrant, under the double title "Nero-Dionysus," 
is proclaimed by the wild multitude of maenadic followers as the ruler of a new 
age in which man will not first be compelled to earn his right to Elysium by the 
sweat of his brow, but will possess this right in pleasure and happiness from the 
very beginning. 15 An old Silenus proclaims in an anti-Winckelmannian manner 
that the "world of beauty" of a peaceful, boring Olympus is past, and that the new 
god "Nero-Dionysus" is in the process of founding a more beautiful and more 
joyful epoch (45). Here, in the person of the tyrant, Dionysus becomes the 
advocate for the oppressed people, the Roman proletarians. In the year 1848 the 
Communist Manifesto had first appeared, and one year after Hamerling's conclu-
sion of the Ahasuerus poem the first volume of Karl Marx's Das Kapital was 
published. In a grotesque perversion of the socialistic appeal of the time for the 
emancipation of the oppressed Third Estate, Hamerling has his Dionysus, as the 
initiator of a new epoch, proclaim to the proletarian class of Rome a participation 
14 Patterned after the main characters in the late Romantic writer Joseph Christian von Zedlitz's 
epic Die Wanderungen des Ahasverus which appeared in 1832, and in Eugene Sue's ten-volume, best-
selling novel, Le Juif errant of I 844. 
15 Robert Hamerling, Ahasverus in Rom: Eine Dichtung in sechs Gesiingen (Hamburg and Leipzig: 
Richter, 1866). Cited hereafter by page number in the text; here, p. 49. 
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in material pleasure in its most sensual form. As the high point of the proclamation 
from "the Bacchic destroyers," Hamerling stages a confrontation between his 
"Nero-Dionysus" and the God of the Christians amid the flames of Rome: 
Yet another new god! calls Nero. Ha! 
A new god, crucified on a cross? 
In truth, a rival of terrible power 
For a Nero-Dionysus! ... 
Give up this madness, and before 
Ye too arc nailed to the cross, like 
The god whom ye so strangely revere, 
Join in the jubilation of my faithful! 
Join in the evoe of the Corybantes! (124) 
Shortly thereafter, "the new god" Nero-Dionysus is overthrown, and meets his 
end, in Hamerling's version, in the catacombs of the Christians through suicide. 
Hamerling, who had been schooled in the classical tradition, unites the entire 
literary tradition of the Dionysian myths in all of their possible ecstatic and 
negative aspects in his image of this one magnificently wicked sensualist and man 
of power. In spite of, or better yet, because of its obviously trashy and inartistic 
character, this bombastic piece of inferior craftsmanship was, precisely during the 
years of the origin and dissemination of Nietzsche's first Dionysian work, The 
Birth of Tragedy, one of the most popular and most-read books of the semi-
educated upper middle-class. We know that Hamerling was indebted to the 
patriotic and pessimistic lyrics of the classically-trained Italian poet Giacomo 
Leopardi, whose poems, together with a highly regarded introduction on 
Leopardi's life and work, Hamerling published in a translation of his own (Hild-
burghausen, 1866), which was well received at the time. Nietzsche was intimately 
acquainted with Leopardi's work, and designated the poet, along with Goethe, 
"as the last of the great stragglers in the ranks of the Italian philologist-poets" (W, 
I, 428); he twice refers to him, together with Byron, Poe, Kleist, and others, as 
"these great poets ... and the so-called higher types of men in general." Nietzsche 
held the "philologist-poets," to which group the widely-read Hamerling surely 
also belonged, in especially high esteem, and regarded them as equal in rank to 
himself. Moreover, he was surprisingly well acquainted with the sensational and 
semi-or pseudoscientific literature of his time, as we can see from his Untimely 
Meditations, as well as from other of his works. Thus, we must assume that he was 
acquainted with Hamerling's most successful work-all the more so, since we 
know that it was customary for him to remain silent intentionally in matters 
concerning such literary relationships and sources. In view of his claim to have 
been the first to recognize and formulate the Dionysian, it is not surprising that 
Nietzsche would also keep hidden all possible influences on the part of Winckel-
mann, Herder, Novalis, Holderlin, and Heine, all of whose works he knew well 
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and, except in the case of Winckelmann, held in especially high regard. 16 There-
fore, in examining and evaluating the concept of the Dionysian in Nietzsche's 
works it is all the more important to set forth the instances in which he is in 
obvious conformity with the works of these writers, which has been demon-
strated here for the first time. 
II 
The actual Dionysian tradition prior to Nietzsche is to be found for the most 
part in obscure, semi-scholarly works reflecting what is basically a Romantic 
philosophy and mythology, carried on as it was in the circles of classical philolo-
gists oriented toward the fields of philosophy and literary criticism. We must not 
forget that Nietzsche, as a professor of classical philology (officially until 1878), 
belonged to this professional group. I believe it can be shown that he was influ-
enced in his conception of the Dionysian to an exceptional degree by several 
authors who stood outside the field of classical philology and were advocates of 
an imaginary Romantic mythology. 
Friedrich Schlegel's Romantic philosophy and aesthetics of literature are 
based on his study of classical philology and his early philological writings. In 
these, he considers Dionysus, more than any other figure, to be the origin and 
content of dithyrambic poetry, and recommends the Dionysian nature-myths of 
Eleusis to contemporary scholars and poets for the creation of a new Romantic 
mythology. Dionysus is for him "immortal joy," "wonderful abundance," and 
the "abundance of nature. " 17 Nietzsche uses similar expressions to define the 
Dionysian at the beginning of his Birth ef Tragedy. His notes from the years of the 
creation of The Birth of Traiedy contain many quotations from the work of 
16 For Nietzsc-0e, Herder possessed to the greatest degree "the sense for determining the turn 
things would take" ("den Sinn der Witterung"), and had "a foretaste of all the intellectual dishes which 
the Germans brought together during the period of a half-century from all ages and places" (W. I, 
924-25). He praises Novalis for proclaiming with naive happiness "the association between sensual 
pleasure, religion, and cruelty" (W, I, 543). He declares Holderlin to be his "favorite poet" (W. 111, 
95----98), who because of his tender nature is destroyed by the civilization of the Philistines (W, I, 148). 
Nietzsche says of Heine that the poet gave him "the loftiest conception of the lyric poet," and that he 
possessed "that divine malice without which I would not be able to imagine perfection." He especially 
appreciated in Heine the fact that he was capable of conceiving "the god as inseparable from the satyr" 
(W, II, 1088-89). Thus, one could perhaps read into Nietzsche's judgments of Heine and Winckelmann 
concealed references to their preoccupations with Dionysus. 
17 Cf. Friedrich van Schlegels siimmtliche Werke, 10 vols. (Vienna: Klang, 1822-1825), IV, 27; V, 272, 
281; above all his short essay Die griechische Mytho/ogie from 1803-1804, and the well-known Dionysian-
Apollonian quotation from his essay of I 795, Ober das Studium der Griechischen Poesie: "In the soul of 
Sophocles were blended in equal proportions the divine intoxication of Dionysus, the profound 
resourcefulness of Athena, and the quiet reflectivity of Apollo." 
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Friedrich Schlegel, even if there are none which refer directly to Dionysus.18 
Schlegel unites the Dionysian with the feminine, as do Schelling and Bachofen 
after him, and the figure of Dionysus with oriental mysteries, as a short time later 
do the writers Schubert, Gorres, and Creuzer: 
In 1808, in his Views Concerning the Night-Side of Natural Science (Ansichten 
von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft), the Romantic-mystical natural philoso-
pher Gotthilf Heinrich Schubert traced the Dionysian mysteries back to Indian 
mythology and an Egyptian origin, and extolled these and all mysteries as the 
"union of that which destroys and that which creates, of deayi and love."19 
Schubert lectures: "Phallus-worship, which existed in all mysteries, was alto-
gether and everywhere bound up with symbols of decline and death" (72). This 
same union of love and death, decline and rejuvenation is expressed, Schubert 
says, in Indian mythology by the god Siva, whose symbol of the eternal lotus 
blossom is identical to the Bacchic lingam-the grain-shovel and cradle of the 
child Dionysus in the Greek mysteries (76-77). In identical fashion, the prema-
turely deceased "Balder, the most beautiful and best of all the sons of the gods," 
lives on in Teutonic legend with the immortal ring of Odin, the "symbol of a 
new procreation out ofits own being, and the symbol of death" in nature (78-79). 
"The destruction- of that which is individual resulting from the most noble 
strivings of the soul" is, then, the main content of most of the mysteries and 
sacred legends (79). But above all it is essential to note here that Schubert is 
offering the perceptions and conclusions resulting from his Dionysian view of 
the mysteries to his Romantic contemporaries as a new religion of the longing for 
death, rebirth, and immortality (81). 
Two years later,Joseph Gorres, in his History of the Myths of the Asiatic World 
(Mythengeschichte der asiatischen Welt) from the year 1810, describes the mythical 
origin of the world and the development of its different nations as a single Diony-
sian epiphany of procreation and birth: "Heaven is the embracing, bestowing, 
essentially igneous, masculine principle; the earth, on the other hand, is the 
embraced, receiving, dark, moist, feminine principle-out of the combination of 
these two principles all things have issued forth" (24). Gorres goes on to explain 
that the Dionysian lingam-worship is the oldest form of the veneration of the 
divine, and, as Schubert had done two years before, he declares it to be the 
symbol of a unification in love and of a renewal of life. "Sensual life-strength, 
rapid, highly inflamed ecstasy and wantonness, unrestrained raging of the life-
spirits in orgies and Bacchanalian frenzy, and Asiatic hospitality in the form of 
sexual submission at the festivals and in the temples" -so runs his Romantic and 
animated description of the cult during this epoch. In the following universal age 
18 GOA(2), IX, 452. 
19 Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft (1808; facsimile rpt. Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), p. 77; hereafter cited in the text. 
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of the heroic gods Heracles, Dionysus, Vishnu, Belus, Osiris, Odin, and Huang Ti 
which follows, a higher procreative drive awakens in the male and expresses 
itself in a rule of justice and benevolence (25). The victorious procession of 
Dionysus from India to Greece is for Gorres evidence for, and the symbol of, the 
spread of all religions from East to West through tl)e propagation of the mysteries. 
Even in the work of his mature years, Christian Mysticism (Die christliche Mystik), 
he sees Dionysus, Mithras, Krishna, and Osiris as "emanations, procreations, and 
incarnations of the good" in the pre-Christian "dualistic antithesis of the two 
principles light and darkness, good and evil, life and death."20 
Gorres had dedicated his History of the Myths of the Asiatic World to the 
classical philologist and mythologist Georg Friedrich Creuzer. In 1807, three 
years previously, Creuzer had published a treatise in Latin on Dionysus, which 
then appeared two years later in Heidelberg in expanded format with the title 
Dionysus, or Learned Commentaries on the Origins and Causes of the Bacchic and Orphic 
Mysteries (Dionysus sive Commentationes academicae de rerum Bacchicarum Orphi-
carumque originibus et causis). In it he attempts to trace the Greek Dionysian 
religion and the Orphic mysteries back to the Orient, to India, and to Greece, and 
to give evidence for a kind of Romantic longing for death as their most profound 
subject matter. "The blessedness of death was a tenet of the Bacchic mysteries," 
Creuzer writes in his German-language Studies of 18o6.21 In his most important 
work, the four-volume Symbolism and Mythology of the Ancient Nations, Especially 
the Greeks (Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Volker, besonders tier Griechen), which 
appeared during the course of twenty-six years in four editions and a French 
translation, he views the oldest, that is, the Oriental myths as "unqualified 
symbols," whose function it is "to give limits to the limitless and to fathom the 
unfathomable, " 22 and he tries, in light of the cults of Dionysus and the mysteries, 
to trace back the mythological symbolism of the Occident, and above all of the 
Greeks, to the myths of India, Asia Minor, and Egypt. The original Dionysus, 
Creuzer maintains, revered in India as "Dewanishi" with "phallagogias and 
phallophoria," came to the Greeks with the primordial Priapus, and had already 
existed in Asia for thousands of years before Alexander (582-84). 
In the second volume of his Symbolism and Mythology Creuzer unites his 
primal Indian Dionysus with the Phrygian Cybele-cult-and the Egyptian solar 
bull. The comprehensive third volume is totally dedicated to the "Bacchic 
religion." It purports to be the all-encompassing description of the various 
Asiatic myths of Dionysus. Here they all become one: the Egyptian "solar bull 
Dionysus," the Theban "radiant fire-god Bacchus" (III, 93), the Dionysus from 
20 Die christliche Mystik, 4 vols. (Regensburg and Landshut: Manz, 1836-42); here, III, 21. 
21 Studien, ed. Carl Daub and Friedrich Creuzer (Frankfurt a. M. and Heidelberg: Mohr and 
Zimmer, 18o6), II, 312. 
22 Symbolik und Mytho/ogie der a/ten Volker, besonders der Griechen, 2nd ed (Leipzig and Darmstadt: 
Heyer and Leske, 1819-23), I, ~4- Hereafter cited in the text. 
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Nysa (rn1), the "Indian Dionysus" (119), the post-Hesiodic Dionysus, the 
Dionysus falsified by Homer (117), and the "Phrygian Dionysus" (349). The 
"Bacchic myth," he maintains, unites all these figures into a single wild syn-
cretism. 23 Here we see anticipated, nearly sixty years before Nietzsche, the 
supposed "antithesis of the Apollonian and Bacchic religions" (160) and their 
unification in the Orphic mysteries, brought forth out of the antithetical applica-
tion of the (Dionysically) provocative flute and the soothing cithara (151-69). 
Because of its preference for the cithara, Creuzer calls the older "Orphic school" 
an "Apollonian school" (151), "in which the reformed doctrine ofDionysus was 
united with the old light-theories of Upper Asia into a single great theological 
system-a system which "combined within itself probably all the sacerdotal wis-
dom which had at that time found its way to the Greeks" (168-69). The antithesis 
and unification of Apollo and Dionysus arc then treated further by Creuzer in that 
third volume of his Symbolism. The same Dionysus-volume was borrowed by 
Nietzsche from the library of the University of Basel on 18 June 1871, at a time 
when he was still at work on The Birth of Tragedy. 24 
Creuzer's "oricntalization" of Greek mythology and his devaluation of 
classical Greece did not long remain without reply from the camp of the classicists. 
Of the countless refutations published, Johann Heinrich VoB's Antisymbolism 
(Antisymbolik) of 1824 had the greatest effect among his contemporaries.25 As 
Creuzer's Symbolism and Mythology had dealt mainly with the Dionysian, so V 08, 
23 The legend that Semele, "a human girl." gave birth to Dionysus is rejected by Creuzer as a 
usurpation by the Greeks (III, 88}. He maintains instead that the Thcban Dionysus arose from the sea as 
an "equinoctial bull" just like the Egyptian Osiris (pp. 102-6). The sea, the bull. the birth out of fire, 
and the ivy are for Creuzer the Egyptian-Oriental attributes of Dionysus, while the phallus, orgies, and 
the triumphal procession from the East form his Indian characteristics. The Greeks, Creuzer states, have 
partly concealed these origins, and only in his own time will they appear in their true light by virtue of 
the new symbolic understanding of the myths (pp. 119-20). 
24 C£ Karl Meuli's concluding remarks to Bachofen's Unsterblichkeitslehre in volume VII of 
Bachofcn's Gesammelte Werke (Basel: Schwabe, 1943-48} pp. 510-15; likewise the above-cited work 
by Martin Vogel, pp. 97--98. 
25 Johann Gottfried Jacob Hermann, Brieje iiber Homer und Hesiodus (Heidelberg: Oswald, 1818); 
De mythologia Graecorum antiquissima (Leipzig and Heidelberg: 181 8); Ueber das We sen und die Behand-
lung der Mythologie (Leipzig: Fleischer, 1819); Johann Heinrich Vo8, Antisymbolik (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
1824), hereafter cited in the text; Christoph August Lobcck, Aglaophamus, seu de theologiae mysticae 
Graecorum causis, 2 vols. (Konigsberg: Borntrager, 1829). C£ also Goethe's letter (No. 7951) of 16 
January 1818 to Sulpiz Boisseree: " ... one was compelled now to suffer continuously from these 
wretched Dionysian mysteries"; his letter (No. 263) of 25 August 1819 to Johann Heinrich Meyer on 
the "miserable Egyptian-Indian mist-visions" ("Nebelbilder") in Creuzer's Symbolik; and Goethe's 
journal entry for IO March 1826: "Vo8 vs. Creuzer in Hermes, vol. XXV, no. 2"; likewise the "lively 
discussion on the Symbolists" with Boisseree on 19 May 1826 (Eduard Firmenich-Richartz, Sulpiz 
und Melchior Boisseree als Kunstsammler Ucna: Diederichs, 1916), p. 429), and the part of Goethe's letter 
(No. 1332) to Reinhard of 12 May 1826, where he states that the Symbolists arc "basically anti-classi-
cists," who have produced nothing worthwhile in art or the study of antiquity (Goethes Brieje, Hamburg 
edition, IV, 189 and 584). 
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too, concerns himself in the first volume of his Antisymbolism-the volume 
directed at Creuzer-almost exclusively with Dionysus. It has been little noticed 
up to now that the famous argument between the Romantic symbolists and their 
classical opponents-an argument into which Goethe also felt himself drawn-
was decided in reality on the issue of the mythical origin and the symbolic 
meaning of the figure of Dionysus. The very sub-headings for the first chapter 
speak for themselves: "Creuzer's Theory of the Bacchic Religion"; 'fThe 
Illusion of the Theban Dionysus"; "The Spurious Indian Dionysus"; "The 
Phantom Dionysus of Calcutta"; "How the Calcutta Phantom Claims to Have 
Passed through India." At the same time, behind these satirical titles is concealed 
the systematic criticism to which the rationalistic classical philologist subjects 
Creuzer's indiscriminate syncretism and his muddled symbolic and mystical 
interpretation of mythology. In every chapter he singles out another of the 
Dionysian myths treated by Creuzer-always in the form of a couple of especially 
unscholarly and tenuous quotations from the latter-so that he can then pillory 
with biting sarcasm the fantastic exegesis of the author in all its dubiousness. In the 
second part, V 08 inquires especially into the matter of the sexual character of the 
Dionysian mysteries, and criticizes Creuzer's attempts at conciliation and com-
parison between the Dionysian religion and the rites of Christianity, as well as the 
equation and fusion of this religion with other mysteries. He marshals all of the 
well-known accusations and suspicions oflewdness against Dionysus which had 
been raised from the time of Hesiod and Euripides up to those of the Church 
Fathers and directs them against Creuzer and the mystical Romantics. 
Goethe had also taken part in the argument "V 08 vs. Creuzer" with "lively" 
interest, and had also just as decisively dismissed the "Symbolists" as "Anti-
Classicists" (cf. n. 25). As early as 16 January 1818, Goethe writes resignedly to 
Sulpiz Boisseree of"the wretched Dionysian mysteries." Vo8's Antisymbolism is 
the "Anti-Dionysus" of the classicists, and at the same time, their last, and no 
longer entirely effective, bulwark against the Romanticists. The well-known 
argument "Classical-Romantic" ends in the controversy "Classical-Dionysian." 
Nietzsche stands on the side of the Romantics. To be sure, he makes no direct 
references to Vo8's Antisymbolism, but when he boasts, as we have cited above, 
about being the first to have taken the Dionysian phenomenon seriously, he does 
fail to point to the argument between the Dionysian Symbolists and to dismiss the 
work Aglaophamus-written by Christian August Lobeck (cf. n. 25) and directed 
against Creuzer-as the "contemptible babble" of a "worm dried up between 
the leaves of books" who understood nothing of the Dionysian orgies (W, II, 
1030-31). 
This new Romantic conception of the Dionysian is likewise maintained in 
the handbooks of Greek archaeology which appeared around the middle of the 
nineteenth century, even in cases where their authors intentionally keep their 
distance from Creuzer. The eminent archaeologist Karl Otfried Miiller sees the 
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Dionysian as a natural force which shakes man out of his peaceful, rational 
condition of awareness and enraptures him. In his Handbook of the Archaeology of 
Art (Handbuch der Archaologie der Kunst) of 18 30 he states at the beginning of his 
discourse on the deities of the "Dionysian Circle": 
The nature which lies at the base of all Dionysian images, and which is most perfectly 
symbolized by wine, is a nature which overwhelms human feelings and shakes man 
out of the repose of a clear self-awareness. The circle of Dionysian figures which, as 
it were, form their own separate Olympus, depicts this life of nature with its effects 
on the human spirit-conceived of as existing on different levels-sometimes in 
noble, sometimes in ignoble form; in the figure of Dionysus himself there unfolds 
the purest flower, combined with an afflatus which enraptures the emotions without 
disturbing the peaceful flow of perceptions. 26 
Millier is the first to apply the adjective "Dionysian" consistently and with far 
greater frequency than "Bacchic," after Goethe had introduced the word 
"Dionysian" -probably as the first to do so, even though only in passing.27 
Schelling had also played a part in the introduction of this term, but he, too, uses 
it only occasionally, and never in one ofhis most important works. Miiller speaks 
of "Dionysian" festivals, figures, processions, and formations. The adjective 
derived from the name of this god led to a special kind of conception-to that of 
the general attribute "Dionysian." This attribute was abstracted from the Greek 
god himself, from his being and his myths, and was generalized in psychological 
terms by Miiller, aestheticized philosophically by Schelling, and finally made by 
Nietzsche into the substantive "the Dionysian," whereupon it attained the status 
of a legitimate ancient and modern phenomenon. 
Two other important handbooks of Greek antiquity from around the middle 
of the century are Ludwig Preller's Greek Mythology (Griechische Mythologie) in 
two volumes (Berlin, 1854-55), and Friedrich Gottlieb Welcker's Myths of the 
Greek Gods (Griechische Gotterlehre) in three volumes (Gottingen, 1857-62). 
Preller's Greek Mythology, along with Erwin Rohde's Psyche, form the main 
basis of the article on Dionysus by Otto Kern in Pauly-Wissowa's Real-Encyclo-
padie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, a work which is still valid today. In his 
early treatise Demeter and Persephone (Hamburg, 1837), Preller complains-in 
quite the same fashion as the elderly VoB-of the "repulsive nakedness" and the 
"obscenity" of the mysteries (48-49); nonetheless he prepares the ground for 
Bachofen's views of Dionysian sexuality, and is responsible for the differentiation 
which has existed since that time between the Olympic and chthonian deities in 
mythology. 
26 Hereafter cited in the text in the third edition (Breslau: J. Max, 1848); here, p. 594. 
27 Goethe writes in the year 1808 in his notes for the plan to continue his festival play Pandora: 
"Dionysian. Complete obliviousness." On 16January 1818 in the above-mentioned letter to Boisseree, 
he speaks of the "wretched Dionysian mysteries" (cf. n. 25). 
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As early as this, Welcker speaks of the "conception of the entire Dionysian 
essence," and differentiates between "two main tendencies"; an aesthetic-festive 
one, "in which Dionysus sometimes appears spiritualized in a new and broad 
circle of the arts, and at other times as the patron of a gay and dissolute enjoyment 
of life, in contrast to Apollo Musagetcs"; and on the other side, "the chthonic," 
especially as it is manifested in the mysteries (574-75). By bringing the "chthonic" 
into prominence, Welcker gives credence, just as Preller did, to the Dionysian 
conception of Bacho fen and Rohde. On three separate occasions he treats syste-
matically the antithesis-important for Nietzsche-between Dionysus and 
Apollo, as well as the "convergence and merging of their natures" (610). It is 
important to note that he hereby applies the terms "Apollonian" and "Diony-
sian" for the first time in mythology and archaeology, just as Schelling had done 
shortly before in the area of philosophy. As Creuzer before him had done, 
W elcker contrasts the "Dionysian" festivals with the "Apollonian cithara" ( 611). 
"Here and there debaucheries have attached themselves to the Dionysian as well 
as the Apollonian religion," he states (650). Welcker characterizes the more 
festive of the main tendencies of the "Dionysian essence" in its later development 
as the "Dionysian carnival" in the country and "Dionysian passion" in its urban 
refinement (579), and maintains of the "Dionysian orgies" that they were "a 
prologue for the Christian hypocrisies as well" (619). 
The tradition of the Dionysian in Romantic philosophy, that is, in the work 
ofHegel and Schelling, is closely bound up with the development and significance 
of the Dionysian in contemporaneous classical philology and mythology. 
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling himself appeals expressly to Creuzer in 
establishing the foundation for his philosophy of the threefold Dionysus. Georg 
Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel addresses his early poem "Eleusis" from the year 1796, 
in its superscription as well as in its content, "To Holderlin," when he relates the 
mysteries of Ceres to the secret society of his Tiibingen friends and their concern 
for the political matters of the time. Holdcrlin, Hegel, and Schelling, friends from 
their student days at the Tiibingen Theological Seminary, are all at the same time 
also special disciples of Dionysus. When Hegel in his Phenomenology of the Spirit 
(Phdnomenologie des Geistes) of 1807 explains the manifestation of the spirit in its 
pure self-consciousness as existing at the level of"artistic religion," he is describing 
the masculine principle of the self-propelling force of self-conscious existence as 
"the many-named celestial being of the East and its delirious life, which ... roams 
about as a swarm of raving women (Bacchantes), the unrestrained delirium of 
nature in a self-conscious form." 28 In the mystery of the bread and wine, of Ceres 
and of Bacchus, this self-conscious life of the absolute spirit still possesses its living 
unity, Hegel says, in the "stammer of Bacchic ravings" (552). In being banished 
28 Volume II of the 4th edition of the Jubilee Edition of Hegel's Siimtliche Werke in 20 volumes. 
(Stuttgart: F. Fromann, 1927-40). Hereafter cited in the text. 
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to the otherness of the material world, this self-consciousness divides into a nature 
consisting ofhigher and lower powers. Hegel designates the higher power as "the 
celestial side," "Phoebus Apollo"; the lower power he does not call Dionysus, 
however, but "the Erinys who keeps herself hidden," and who is hostile to the 
higher power (56o-63). In the "simple figure of Zeus" the dialectic of the 
Apollonian-Erinnic antithesis of consciousness is overcome (564). Apollo, "the 
many-named celestial being," is for Hegel not separated at the primitive level of 
delirious, Bacchic life from the figure of Dionysus. Bachofen, in his Discourse 
Concerning Tomb Symbolism of the Ancients (Versuch uber die Grabersymbolik der 
A/ten), later reworks the Hegelian antithesis as a procreative, Dionysian "earth 
and sun power," contrasted with "Apollo, holding sway in the higher purity of 
light," 29 while Schelling represents the development of the consciousness of self 
in the form of the dialectical antithesis of a threefold Dionysus. 
For Schelling, Dionysus and the Dionysian form an essential part of his 
entire mythological philosophy. His "Dionysiology" -to anticipate his own 
technical term-which in various treatises spans several hundred pages, can only 
be outlined here in a few sentences, even if for the first time. In his treatise The 
Ages of the World (Die Weltalter) from the year r 8 r 3, Schelling, by means of his 
dialectical theory of "potencies," or powers of nature working against one 
another within the being of God, explains Dionysus as a symbol and an example 
of the blind and unconscious power of creation, and (falsifying Plato30) equates 
him with the "divine madness" of the ancients, which "even yet is the innermost 
part of all things ... the real power of nature and all of her creations," and without 
which "no one can accomplish anything great."31 Noteworthy here, and evident 
in the case of all the Romantic writers on Dionysus previously discussed, is the 
conscious association of the Dionysian with the present, the "even yet" of the 
Dionysian ecstasy and madness, and the assertion that it is a creative force. In his 
lecture and treatise of r 8 I 5 entitled Concerning the Deities of Samothrace (Ober die 
Gottheiten von Samothrake), Schelling attempts-with the help of vague etymo-
logical comparisons of names and objects after the syncretistic manner ofCreuzer, 
on whom he bases his work-to show that Dionysus is one and the same demi-
urgic (world-creating) and transforming principle in the various religions (161-
74; 202-3). The lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology (Philosophie der Mythologie) 
29 Versuch iiber die Grabersymbo/ik der A/ten, volume IV of the Gesammelte Werke, ed. Karl Meuli 
(Basel: Schwabe, 1943-48), pp. 70-82. This edition of Bachofen's works cited hereafter in the text by 
volume and page number. 
30 In the forty-eighth chapter of his Phaidros, Plato differentiates between the prophetic madness 
of Apollo, the ritually atoning madness of Dionysus, the poetic madness of the Muses, and the love-
madness of Eros and Aphrodite. 
31 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schcllings sammtliche Werke (1856--61; rpt. Darmstadt: Wisscn-
schafthche Buchgesellschaft, 1966--68). This edition is hereafter cited in the text; here, Schriften von 
1813-30, pp. 23-24, 82, 142-43, 254-56, 294-309, 365-77, 626--42. 
Nietzsche and the Tradition of the Dionysian 
of I 828 and I 848 contain long expositions concerning Schelling's concept of the 
Dionysus of the three potencies, each acting upon the other dialectically, of the 
divine consciousness which causes its own development, and the way in which 
these potencies become manifest in the various phases of Asiatic and Greek 
mythologies (II, 254-377; 626-42). Moreover, Schelling maintains here that 
Apollo and Dionysus are closely tied together, that in the Greek mind Apollo is 
superior to the threefold Dionysus, and that he has already passed through the 
latter's stages of destruction and beatification and unites these stages within 
himself at the highest stage (667--69). 
Schelling begins his last work, the obscure Philosophy ef Revelation (Philoso-
phie der Offenbarung) by renewing the explanation of his dialectical thesis con-
cerning the development of the divine in the form of three potencies, and preaches 
their utilization and transference from his "Dionysiology" to a "Christology" 
which is to be discussed in detail at a later time (I, 332-33). Before he does this, 
however, he depicts once again, in the eighteenth to the twenty-third lectures, 
the transitions, in the three forms of Dionysian manifestation, from unconscious-
ness to consciousness and then to the spiritual in pre-Christian man and his history 
as the first three steps of the self-identification of the absolute spirit. Human con-
sciousness stands at the same level of development as that at which the absolute 
manifests itself. Among the Greeks, this development manifests itself in the three 
stages of Dionysus: in the wild, orgiastic, raving, utterly-beside-himself Diony-
sus-Zagreus; in the Dionysus-Bacchus of pleasure and the fermented juice of the 
grape, who overcomes and transforms this earlier, unspiritual Dionysus; and in 
the third Dionysus-Iacchus of the mysteries and a higher spiritual consciousness, 
who again withdraws into his spiritual being-in-itself (391-482). Schelling then 
contrasts this masculine trinity of Dionysus as the concept of overcoming with 
the trinity made up of the feminine deities Persephone, Demeter, and Core-all 
of whom are occasionally connected with Dionysus in Greek mythology-as an 
expression of a substantive, quiescent, and maternal primal principle basic to the 
ever-changing forms of marriage, procreation, and birth (486-92). In the case of 
Bachofen, these connections between Dionysus and Demeter are interpreted 
even more fantastically. 
Schelling draws three conclusions from his "Dionysiology." First, he states 
his opinion that "The world of these many gods is actually made up of the 
plurality of divinities begotten and established by Dionysus in which the van-
quished and transformed, exclusive principle now appears-it is the world of 
Dionysus" (399). The ancient world, which since Winckelmann had been 
exclusively classical for the Germans, will appear from now on for many, and 
especially for Nietzsche, to be simply Dionysian. Second, Schelling not only 
explains the Christian trinity as having the same functionality and cosmic inter-
pretation as his Dionysian trilogy of Zagreus, Bacchus, and Iacchus, but he also 
views Christianity as the completion of, and transition from, the pre-Christian 
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religions elevated in the Dionysian mysteries. "The Greek mysteries are truly the 
natural transition from heathendom to Christianity, i.e., to complete revelation" 
(410). Like Holderlin, Schelling still advocates the Romantic union of the Diony-
sian with the Christian; a few years later Nietzsche will follow the lead of Heine 
and place Dionysus in opposition to Christ. Third, Schelling concludes in the 
additional and final book of his Philosophy of Revelation that the theogonic process 
of self-identification of the divine spirit in revelation could, even in man, only be 
the work of a free will, which, according to Johann Georg Hamann, unites the 
affirmative and simultaneously the negative creative powers as creative genius 
(II, 9-25). Out of this latter conclusion Schelling formulates the first true defini-
tion of the Dionysian as the unrestrained, intoxicated power of creation in the 
poetic genius, and the Apollonian as the reflective power of form which negates 
the Dionysian. Schelling sees the unification of these two powers in the con-
summate work of art: 
Indeed, not only in God, but even in men-to the extent that they have been blessed 
with the slightest glimmer of creative power-the same relationship is to be found, 
this same contradiction: a blind creative power, by its very nature unrestrained, 
opposed by a reflective, and thus in reality a negative power, residing in the same 
subject, which restrains and forms this blind power. ... To be intoxicated and sober 
not at different times, but simultaneously-this is the secret of true poetry. It is this 
which differentiates between Apollonian inspiration and the merely Dionysian. An 
infinite content, and thus a content which actually resists form and appears to destroy 
all form-to depict such an infinite content in its most complete, that is, in its most 
finite form, is the highest calling of art. (26) 
Nietzsche's later definition at the beginning of The Birth of Tragedy (W, I, 
21) of the Dionysian and Apollonian as opposing creative powers agrees largely 
with that of Schelling. Nonetheless, it is possible that Nietzsche was not ac-
quainted with this definition of Schelling, hidden as it was in the relatively 
unknown Philosophy of Revelation, or with the latter's obscure "Dionysiology."32 
Also in the case of the lawyer from Basel, Johann Jakob Bachofen, no direct 
influence can be traced. On the other hand, it can be shown that Bachofen, like 
Schelling and Nietzsche, is also dependent on Creuzer's Symbolism, as is confirmed 
by the page-long excerpts from this work in his literary remains. Bachofen's 
theory of the Dionysian can also be given here only in its essential points. In his 
32 As the title of the work and the year of publication indicate, Otto Kein's Das Apollinische und 
Dionysische bei Nietzsche und Schelling (Berlin: Junker and Diinnhaupt, 193 5) deals mainly with Nietz-
sche's concept of the Dionysian, and only incidentally-in terms of a few unconnected comparisons-
with that of Schelling. It is Kein's opinion that Nietzsche was not aware of Schelling's definition of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian (pp. 14 and 1 8). Nietzsche himself only gives Schelling, as he does Hegel, 
adversely critical mention in his works-and this in terms of fleeting wholesale judgments, avoiding 
any and all positive references. 
Nietzsche and the Tradition of the Dionysian 
first mythological work, the Discourse Concerning the Tomb Symbolism of the 
Ancients (1859) mentioned above, he sets the Dionysian phallus over against the 
egg of the mysteries, the symbol of the "substantive primal motherhood."33 His 
thesis reads: "The union of the sexes is always the fundamental Dionysian princi-
ple, and ya.µos [marriage], its realization" (40). "Dionysus in the form of a 
terrestrial and solar power" is not to be found solitary and sexless like Apollo, 
"holding sway in the higher purity oflight," but rather always in connection with 
female beings (74-82). This relationship to female divinities of all sorts is de-
scribed by Bachofen in detail in the next chapter, "Dionysian Women" ("Diony-
sisches Frauenleben"). He concludes his Dionysian exposition in the Tomb 
Symbolism under the political title "Dionysus as the promoter of freedom and 
equality." As "Liber" and as bearer of the purely material creation Dionysus 
gives men indiscriminate "freedom" with relation to the state: 
If the political, civil viewpoint everywhere erects barriers, separates peoples and 
individuals, and expands the principle of individuality to the most complete egotism, 
Dionysus, on the other hand, leads everything back to unity, to peace, and to the 
</nAia of primal life. Slaves as well as free men take part in all mysteries, and all 
barriers fall before the god of material lust, barriers which political life would raise 
in time to ever greater heights. (238-39) 
Here Bachofen draws a parallel between Dionysus and the realization of the 
ideas of freedom and equality of the French Revolution, and between Dionysian 
and political-revolutionary utopias. Even more clearly than this, he is in full 
agreement with Hamerling's proclamation of the unbridled sensual desire which 
the lower classes would obtain through Dionysus. And Nietzsche, too, was not 
the last to proclaim a few years later in The Birth of Tragedy-in words identical to 
Bachofen's (but appealing to Schopenhauer)-the Dionysian as a shattering of 
the "principle of individuality," and as "the unification" of all mankind with the 
"primal life." On 18Junc 1871, as he was occupied with the conclusion of the 
manuscript of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche borrowed from the library, along 
with Creuzer's Symbolism and Mythology, Bachofen's Tomb Symbolism, in which 
he was able to find a word-for-word preview of his negative association of the 
Dionysian with the "principle of individuality."34 Also from the works of his 
colleague and sometime friend Bachofen he was able to glean any number of 
different versions of the distinction between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. 
"Dionysian gyneocracy" (rule by women) and "Apollonian paternity" are 
the true opposing themes in Bachofens Matriarchal Rights (Das Mutterrecht) of 
I 861. In the main part of the work he attempts to show the difference between 
phallic-procreative "Dionysian paternity" and a pure and lucid "Apollonian 
paternity" in the religious congregations of Egypt, India, Crete, Asia Minor, and 
33 C( note 26; here, IV, 37; hereafter cited in the text. 
34 C( note 25, Karl Mculi and Martin Vogel. 
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Greece, as well as in the Minoan civilization. "If Dionysus merely regarded 
fatherhood more highly than motherhood, Apollo, on the other hand, frees 
himself completely from any and all association with the female" (III, 61). 
Finally, Apollo and Dionysus are united in the Greek mysteries: "The Apollonian 
mystery becomes a Dionysian one, and Orphic mysticism fully identical in 
meaning to the Dionysian" (570). Bachofen's biographer, Karl Meuli, says of the 
former's third and last book, The Doctrine of Immortality of Orphic Theology as 
Depicted on the Tombs of Antiquity (Die Unsterblichkeitslehre der orphischen Theologie 
auf den Grabdenkmiilern des Altertums) of 1867, that it contains "the most brilliant 
and moving description of the religion of Dionysus" (1076). Bachofen begins 
with the wholesale assertion that the principle of inner unity in all cosmic life has 
passed over to Dionysus in the secret Orphic religion and united in him the entire 
host of deities of the mysteries. At the same time, however, the spiritualized con-
ception of religion has been rendered sensual in Dionysus, so that, as he says, "now 
the passionate life of the tiger and the luxuriousness of tropical nature, every 
fetter removed, every inhibiting barrier withdrawn, appear as the true manifes-
tations of this deity" (96---97). The second chapter again treats the exaltation and 
spiritualization of Dionysus in union with the celestial nature of Apollo. Here it is 
not a mutual antagonism which divides them; rather they are distinguished from 
each other only by the degree of purity: "Apollo becomes Dionysus' supple-
mentation upwards, Dionysus Apollo's continuation in a downward direction. 
Out of this coupling arise a Bacchic Apollo and an Apollonian Dionysus, and 
these restore once again in twofold embodiment the unity of the principle of 
light" (II 1). 
The many-sided Dionysian tradition ends with Bachofen, and with him the 
connection is established with Nietzsche's alleged discovery of the Dionysian and 
the Apollonian. In summation, it can be said that for Bachofen the Dionysian 
represents the degrading, sexual, and all-leveling democratic principle; the 
Apollonian manifests itself as a pure, spiritualized, and sexless principle oflight. 
The unification of both these principles in impure union signifies the sensual and 
spiritual totality oflife. Only the Dionysian is at times a destructive power which 
dissolves the principium individuationis and equalizes everything in aphrodisiac 
desire; at other times, however, in connection with regulated maternal culture, 
it is a constructive principle, bringing joy and peace. In the realm of the mysteries 
the Dionysian effects the elevation of the earthly to the spiritual, and its own 
unification and equation with the Apollonian. Bachofen does not transfer the 
Dionysian and Apollonian, as do Schelling and Nietzsche, over to the realm of 
aesthetics and philosophy; rather he extends it from the area of religion to that of 
biology. In the case of Nietzsche, too, the Dionysian possesses a biological signi-
ficance in addition to its aesthetic one, and, being an utter degradation of the 
feminine, it is the expression of a Romantic idealization of the ecstatic life. 
Nietzsche himself stood in rather close association with Bachofen during the 
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years in which he was writing The Birth of Tragedy, and frequently was a guest of 
the latter's patrician family at Basel. Since both of them were intensively occupied 
with the Dionysian among the Greeks at the same time, it is very probable that 
they touched upon this theme in their conversations. Bachofcn was "quite 
delighted" with The Birth of Tragedy. 35 In his formulation of the concept of the 
Dionysian, as well as in his writing during the genesis of his Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche was influenced not only by Bachofcn, but also by his friends Richard 
Wagner and Erwin Rohde. In the writings of Wagner from the years r 849 and 
1850-which were available to Nietzsche-the subject of Dionysus in art and 
music had already been discussed. In like manner, we also find here a notation of 
Wagner's which, in terms of content and form, largely corresponds to the theme 
of Nietzsche's early work: "Birth out of music: Aeschylus. Decadence-Euripi-
des." Only recently has it been shown that Nietzsche, Rohde, and Wagner, 
during the period I I to 13 June r 870, entered into a lively discussion at the 
Tribschcn residence on "the theme of the Apollonian and the Dionysian," and on 
Nietzsche's essay "The Dionysian World-View" ("Die dionysische Welt-
anschauung")-his preliminary work to The Birth of Tragedy-and that this 
conversation took place while the three were viewing the painting "Bacchus 
among the Muses," by the painter Bonaventura Gcnelli (1797-1868).36 The 
tradition of Dionysus and the Dionysian in German literature from Hamann and 
Herder to Nietzsche-as it has been set forth for the first time from aesthetic 
manifestoes, from literary works, and from what today are obscure works of 
natural philosophy and mythology-bears eloquent witness to the natural-
mystical and ecstatic stance of the German Romanticists which reached its final 
culmination in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
1
' Cul Albrecht Bemoulli,Johann]akob Bachofen und das Natursymbol (Basel: Schwabe, 1924), p. 
593. 
36 Cf. here, and with regard to details previously mentioned, Martin Vogel's work Apollinisch 1md 
Dionysisch, pp. II5-20, 147-48. 
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Nietzsche, Byron, and the Classical Tradition 
RALPH S. FRASER 
At the time of Nietzsche's birth in 1844 Lord Byron had been dead for some 
twenty years. He and Napoleon were, of course, the dominant personalities in 
Europe as the nineteenth century opened, and their influence upon life and 
thought had become incalculable long before the century had reached its halfway 
mark. One need refer only to Goethe and Heine to realize the importance that 
Byron's contemporaries ascribed to him. Their writings and conversations offer 
ample evidence of their interest in him and the phenomenon of Byronism. 
Many studies have been made of the nature and extent of Byron's influence, 
both in a general and a particular sense. 1 Curiously enough, while Nietzsche 
scholars have alluded to his interest in Byron, no comprehensive analysis has yet 
been made of the subject. 2 In the present study I shall examine the several refer-
ences to Byron in Nietzsche's writings with a twofold purpose: to assess the nature 
of the relationship, particularly with respect to Nietzsche's development as a 
thinker and poet, and to ascertain the attitude of the two writers concerning the 
classical tradition in the Western heritage. 
Briefly stated, Nietzsche's view of Byron undergoes a considerable change, 
moving from youthful enthusiasm and adulation to a strong disenchantment that 
ultimately leads to the expression of mixed favorable and unfavorable comments 
having to do with Byron both as a man and a poet. It seems best generally to 
follow Nietzsche's remarks in chronological order so that this triple pattern may 
be seen in its proper perspective within the development of his thought. His 
comments, while frequently expressed in extreme terms, nevertheless accurately 
and pertinently portray a particular stage in his own evolution as a philosopher. 
1 Typical are such works as the following: Cedric Hentschel, The Byronic Teuton: Aspects of 
German Pessimism 1800-1933 (Folcroft, Pa.: The Folcroft Press, Inc., 1940, rpt. 1969) and Peter L. 
Thorslev, Jr., The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1962). 
2 The 196o International Nietzsche Bibliography, ed. Herbert W. Reichert and Karl Schlechta 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press) contains only two entries under "Byron." Since 
this essay was written an essay "Nietzsche and Byron" by David S. Thatcher has appeared in Nietzsche 
Studien, 3 (1974), 130-51. 
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Nietzsche's initial enthusiasm for Byron 1s reflected in various incidental 
comments and notations made during the period of his schooling at Pforta, from 
1858 to 1864. The first such reference is found in a letter of November 1861 to 
his sister Elisabeth, in which Christmas wishes are discussed: "Do you want an 
English book? Ifl were you I most certainly would read Byron in English."3 In 
the following month Nietzsche delivered to the "Germania" society of the 
school an address, "On Byron's Dramatic Works."4 Like other youthful writings 
of Nietzsche (an essay on Holderlin, for example, also written in 1861) this 
address reveals in embryonic form several attributes that were to be more fully 
developed by the mature writer: a sound sense ofliterary standards and qualities 
and, importantly, the ability and willingness to submit even an admired per-
sonality and artist to close examination and, where necessary, a good degree of 
skepticism. 
Nietzsche discusses three of Byron's plays here, Manfred, Marino Faliero, and 
The Two Foscari. Although the last-named play is the principal object of analysis, 
Nietzsche is especially drawn to the character of Manfred. He calls him "this 
superman who controls spirits," speaks of "his superhuman despair," and 
concludes that the play "is almost to be called a superhuman work."5 There is a 
double significance in this: it is the first recorded instance of Nietzsche's use of the 
terms "Obermensch" and "iibermenschlich," and it emphasizes the importance 
that this play and its protagonist were to assume as particular symbols in Nietz~ 
sche's writings. 
In 1862 Nietzsche lists the books in his personal library, and the list includes 
three Byron entries: two individual volumes in German and one complete set in 
English.6 And another letter to Elisabeth in December 1862 asks for the Tauch-
3 HKG (Briefe), I, 167. (For key to abbreviations see p. xvii above.) The translations from this 
edition arc mine; in other instances, unless noted otherwise, the translations are those of Walter Kauf-
mann. 
4 "Ober die dramatischen Dichtungen Byrons" HKG (Werke), II, 9-15. 
5 Interestingly enough, in these three plays Byron followed his version of the Aristotelian unities 
of time, place, and action. Nietzsche correctly characterizes this as subtracting from their effectiveness 
as dramas. Since Nietzsche's thinking at this period was concentrating on theories of the evolution of 
the drama, his comments are quite pertinent. Ma,ifred is the one work by Byron to which Nietzsche 
makes repeated reference. Byron himself called it "a mad Drama" and "a Bedlam tragedy" in a letter of 
25 March 1817 to Thomas Moore. It may be profitable to compare Nietzsche's use of"Obermensch" 
and "iibermenschlich" here to Manfred's own words:" ... my sciences, my long-pursued and super-
human art" (Act 11, scene 3); " ... whate'er I may have been, or am, doth rest between Heaven and 
myself.-! shall not choose a mortal to be my mediator" (Act III, scene 1); and " ... I disdain'd to 
mingle with a herd, though to be leader-and of wolves. The lion is alone, and so am I." (Act III, 
scene 1). Many have quoted Nietzsche's words in Ecce Homo, "I must be profoundly related to Byron's 
Manfred: all these abysses I found in myself; at the age of thirteen I was ripe for this work. I have no 
word, only a glance, for those who dare to pronounce the word 'Faust' in the presence of Manfred. The 
Germans are incapable of any notion of greatness ... " (Kaufmann, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, p. 701). 
6 HKG (Werke), II, 67. 
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nitz edition of Byron's works, adding that Nietzsche hopes to begin the study of 
English the next year:" ... my favorite English poet will be the greatest incentive 
for me."7 
The passage often years brings about a radical change in Nietzsche's opinion 
of Byron, or at least of Manfred. While it may seem at first glance nothing more 
than maturity's abandonment of the enthusiasm of adolescence, there is consider-
able significance to such a change in attitude. A letter of 29 October 1872 to 
Hans von Biilow, the eminent conductor and critic, makes short shrift of Robert 
Schumann's music, including his "Manfred Overture." Nietzsche moreover 
turns upon himself, expressing an aversion for Byron's play; in the spring of 1872 
he had attempted to replace Schumann's Manfred music with a "Manfred 
Meditation" of his own and asked Biilow's opinion of his efforts. Billow's 
comments were unfavorable and Nietzsche, acknowledging their correctness, 
suddenly realized that his long-standing admiration for Manfred itself was replaced 
by a new found dislike: " ... I cannot see in Byron's Manfred, which I almost 
venerated as my favorite poem when I was a boy, anything but a madly formless, 
dreary absurdity."8 
The reversal of Nietzsche's opinion has its basis not only in aesthetic con-
siderations, but in ethical ones as well. In 1872 he was professor of classical 
philology at Basel and was seeing his first book into print. This was The Birth of 
Tragedy, which contains Nietzsche's distinctive application of the concepts of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian. There is a distinct and direct correlation between 
Nietzsche's work on this book and his rejection of Manfred (and of Byron). That 
is, since the Apollonian represents harmonious form and control while the 
Dionysian exemplifies uninhibited energy and passions let loose, it is more than 
merely probable that Nietzsche saw in Byron and Manfred what may be termed 
the dangers of excess. In Nietzsche's view the Apollonian and Dionysian must 
merge into one to produce art; such had been the case, he says, when Greek 
tragedy originated; such was the case in the late r Soos in Germany when Wagner's 
music began to predominate. In the light of his later renunciation of Wagner and 
his second thoughts about the validity of his conclusions in this early work, it is 
not difficult to understand his new aversion to Byron that appears in the letter to 
Billow. Manfred is "mad" ("toll") and "formless" ("formlos") and a "dreary 
absurdity" ("ein monotones Uncling"). The use of such harsh descriptive terms 
is by no means haphazard on Nietzsche's part; although he occasionally indulged 
in hyperbole in applying epithets and descriptive phrases to one-time idols with 
newly-discovered feet of clay (Wagner and Schopenhauer, for instance), in the 
7 HKG (Brieje), I, 202-3. 
8 HKG (Briefe), Ill, 3 10-1 I. For a discussion of Nietzsche's musical compositions sec Curt Paul 
Janz, "Die Kompositioncn Friedrich Nictzsches" in Nietzsche-Studien, I (1972), 173-84. 
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present case his characterization seems sincerely meant. It is a result of his writing 
The Birth of Tragedy and is a direct reflection of his preoccupation with the 
concepts of the Apollonian and Dionysian. Byron's drama very fittingly illus-
trates Nietzsche's point about the excesses of the Dionysian, for that is exactly 
what it suggests. The failure of Manfred to establish self-control, to bring order 
out of chaos, and to strike a balance between melancholy emotionalism and a 
sound intellect must have alarmed Nietzsche in a way that the adolescent Pforta 
student could not yet grasp. 
It is of more than passing interest to note that Nietzsche makes no reference 
to works of Byron other than the three dramas mentioned above and a few 
scattered poems. He does not mention Don Juan, for example, although the 
change in his opinion of Byron is somewhat parallel to the changes in Byron 
himself that may be seen when one proceeds from Manfred to the more mature 
work. The latter represents a poet whose attitude is quite different from the Byron 
whose gloomy Manfred sought the end of his unsatisfactory existence in the 
menacing grandeur of the Alps. Moreover, there is in Don Juan an obvious 
maturity of characterization, a clear controlling of intensity that is due to a 
balance of extremes within the protagonist. Byron, in his maturity as an artist, at 
least makes some attempt to synthesize extremes, and his effort in this direction 
suggests Nietzsche's synthesis of the Apollonian and Dionysian. 
The thesis and antithesis of Nietzsche's attitudes toward Byron are now 
followed by a third stage. His final judgment is expressed in a variety of comments 
over several years that refer to Byron's personality and way of life as frequently as 
they do to his poetry. Of particular interest is his speculation that a combination 
of impatience and disease (specifically, epilepsy) occasioned Byron's restless 
activity and his need to undertake striking or astounding projects. In "Flight from 
the Self," which is section 549 of the fifth book of The Dawn (1881), Nietzsche 
explores this idea: 
Those men of intellectual convulsions who are impatient and darkly brooding where 
they themselves are concerned, such as Byron or Alfred de Musset, and who 
resemble runaway horses in everything they do, truly realize no profit from their 
creativity except for a short-lived exultation and a fire that almost bursts their veins; 
but they realize an even greater bleakness and grief-how can they stand themselves! 
They thirst for a union with something "beyond the Self"; if the man with such a 
thirst is a Christian he yearns for a union with God, for "becoming entirely one with 
Him"; if he is Shakespeare, only his merging himself into portraits of the most 
passionate kind of existence will satisfy him; if he is Byron, he thirsts for deeds, 
because deeds draw us away from ourselves more so than our thoughts, feelings, 
creations. Perhaps, then, the urge to action is basically a flight from the Self? Pascal 
might ask us. It is indeed! The rule may be confirmed by considering the most 
prominent examples of the urge to action: let one judge with an alienist's knowledge 
and experience how proper it is that four of those who throughout history most 
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needed action were epileptics (i.e., Alexander, Caesar, Mohammed, and Napoleon), 
just as Byron too was subject to this illness. 9 
This theory is further developed in Beyond Good and Evil (1886), when 
Nietzsche discerns the true nature of various writers: 
Those great poets, for example-men like Byron, Musset, Poe, Leopardi, Kleist, 
Gogol (I do not dare mention greater names, but I mean them)-are and perhaps 
must be men of fleeting moments, enthusiastic, sensual, childish, frivolous and 
sudden in mistrust and trust; with souls in which they usually try to conceal some 
fracture; often taking revenge with their works for some inner contamination, often 
seeking with their high flights to escape into forgetfulness from an all-too-faithful 
memory; often lost in the mud and almost in love with it, until they become like 
the will-o'-the-wisps around swamps and pose as stars-the people may then call 
them idealists-often fighting against a long nausea, with a recurring specter of 
disbelief that chills and forces them to languish for gloria and to gobble their "belief 
in themselves" from the hands of intoxicated flatterers-what torture are these great 
artists and all the so-called higher men for anyone who has once guessed their true 
nature! 10 
Nietzsche's view of European intellectual history leads him inevitably to 
liken Byron to Rousseau, a figure for whom he had very little regard. He cites 
the "likeness" on several different occasions, and in each comment Byron appears 
in an unfavorable light. His writing seems outdated and a failure when compared 
with the music of Beethoven, who really grasped the significance of the days of 
freedom at the end of the eighteenth century: " ... how strange to our ears sounds 
the language of Rousseau, Schiller, Shelley, Byron, in whom, taken together, the 
same fate of Europe found its way into words that in Beethoven knew how to 
sing!" 11 And two jottings from the 1880s offer a similar judgment; in the first 
Nietzsche deplores the influence on modern times of what may be termed 
Byron's "pathetic stance" as a man: "The sickly about Rousseau most admired 
and imitated. (Lord Byron similar; also screwed himself up to an exalted posturing, 
to the rankest resentment; a sign of 'vulgarity'; later, restored to equilibrium by 
Venice, he grasped what eases and comforts more: /'insouciance.) " 12 And he par-
ticularly castigates what he defines as "the romantic outlook of modern man": 
... -the noble man (Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand); noble indignation; 
sanctification through passion (as true "nature");-sponsorship of the oppressed and 
downtrodden: motto of historians and writers;-the Stoics of duty;-"selflessness" 
as art and knowledge;-altruism as the most depraved form of egoism (utilitarian-
ism), the most sentimental egoism. 
9 W, I, 1269; my translation. 
1° Kaufmann, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, pp. 408--9. 
11 Ibid., pp. 370-71. 
12 W, III, 508; my translation. 
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All of this is eighteenth century. What has not come down to us from that time: 
insouciance, gaiety, elegance, intellectual brightness. The tempo of the mind has 
altered; pleasure in intellectual refinement and clarity has given way to pleasure in 
color, harmony, mass, reality, etc. Sensualism in things of the spirit. In short, it is 
Rousseau's eighteenth century .13 
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Surely such comparison or arbitrary alignment with Rousseau would have 
not appealed to Byron, who protested at his contemporaries' doing much the 
same thing.14 If one here takes Nietzsche at face value and grants that there may be 
some justification for his so comparing Byron and Rousseau, the question arises as 
to why he singled out the latter as an expression of that dislike that led to his own 
rejection of Byron. The answer to the question lies in the stance. that Nietzsche 
took concerning contemporary romanticism and the classical tradition. 
In The Gay Science (1882, with additions in 1887) he seeks to define roman-
ticism by distinguishing two types of suffering: that which arises from "overful-
ness of life" and its opposite, arising from "impoverishment of life." Goethe 
exemplifies the former, Wagner and Schopenhauer demonstrate the latter: 
... The desire for destruction, change, and becoming can be an expression of overfull, 
future-pregnant strength (my term for this is, as one knows, the word "Dionysian"): 
but it can also be the hatred of the misdeveloped, needy, underprivileged who 
destroys, who must destroy, because the existing, and even all existence, all being, 
outrages and provokes him .... The will to eternize ... can come from gratitude and 
love: an art of this origin will ever be an art of apotheoses ... bright and benign with 
Goethe, and spreading a Homeric light and glory over all things. But it can also be 
that tyrannic will of one who is seriously ailing, struggling, and tortured ... who as 
it were revenges himself on all things by impressing on them ... and burning into 
them his image, the image of his torture. The latter is romantic pessimism in its most 
expressive form, whether as Schopenhauerian voluntarism or as Wagnerian music: 
romantic pessimism, the last great event in the fate of our culture. ( ... there could 
still be quite another kind of pessimism, one that is classical ... only that the word 
"classical" antagonizes my ears-it is far too trite .... I call this pessimism ... 
Dionysian pessimism).15 
Briefly, Nietzsche's antidote to romanticism and the flawed Byron (and 
Rousseau) is found in the classical ideal embodied in Goethe, who expressed the 
spirit of self-control and harmony, of the sublimation of potentially harmful 
13 Ibid., p. 529; my translation. 
14 Byron's objection to being likened to Rousseau is based in large part on the fact that " ... he 
was of the people, I of the Aristocracy .... Altogether, I think myself justified in thinking the com-
parison not well founded. I don't say this out of pique, for Rousseau was a great man, and the thing 
if true were flattering enough, but I have no idea of being pleased with a chimera." (Cited from "My 
Dictionary: Detached Thoughts," entry of 15 October 1821). 
15 The translation is by Walter Kaufmann and is taken from his Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, 
Antichrist (New York: Random House Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 374-75. 
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energies. 16 Self-overcoming and restraint are necessary components of the will to 
power as Nietzsche formulated it, and he was moving on the road to this concept 
even as he was developing the types of the Apollonian and Dionysian. 
It is evident in light of the above that Nietzsche would put Byron into the 
second category (those who suffer from impoverishment oflife). The basis ofhis 
doing this must be found in the latent aversion to the Byronic attitude that made 
itself felt during the writing of The Birth of Tragedy. 
And yet there is some evidence that Nietzsche's opinion of Byron both as 
poet and man was not completely one-sided. For instance, in order to substantiate 
his conclusion that the classical ( or Goethean) ideal of form and restraint offers 
the only alternative to the destructive tendencies of romantic excess (as seen in 
Rousseau) Nietzsche cites Byron's words on the state of poetry in his day. To be 
sure, there is some irony in Nietzsche's choice of expressions, but his position and 
Byron's seem to be quite similar. He says: 
One of the great ones, whose instinct we can trust and whose theory lacked nothing 
more than thirty years' practice, Lord Byron, once said: "With regard to poetry in 
general, I am convinced, the more I think of it, that we arc all in the wrong, one as 
much as another. We are all following a wrong revolutionary system-the present 
or the next generation will be of the same opinion." 
This is the same Byron who says: "I consider Shakespeare the worst example, 
even if he is the most remarkable poet." And does not Goethe's mature artistic 
vision in the latter half of his life say basically the same thing, that vision that so 
leaped over a whole succession of generations that by and large we may say that 
Goethe has not yet exercised an influence, that his time is yet to come?17 
Nietzsche sustains this "classical" thought of the need for self-control and 
disciplined form over the next three years, until the publication of The Dawn in 
I 881. In this work he lists six ways in which one may combat the violence that his 
drives may bring him. The six ways are: submission to the drive; the imposition 
of some kind of regularity upon it; its over-indulgence to the point ofloathing; 
the association ofit with some sort ofintellectual trick that ties it in with mentally 
painful memories; diverting one's energies to quite other things; the total 
suppression of it in the manner of the ascetic. In Byron Nietzsche claims to have 
found an illustration of the fourth way: 
This· is the case when a man's pride, as with Lord Byron and Napoleon, revolts and 
makes him consider the primacy of any one emotional state over his total behavior 
and the ordering of his reason an insult; from which there consequently derives the 
16 Nietzsche makes a distinction between the Goethe who wrote Faust and the "other" Goethe. 
Faust drew a mixed reaction from him. 
17 W, I, 577--81. Nietzsche here merely approximately quotes Byron; the full text of the passage 
is found in Byron's letter of I 5 September 1817 to John Murray. The translation is mine. 
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habit and desire to tyrannize the drive and make it grovel, so to speak. ("I do not 
intend to be the slave of any appetite," Byron wrote in his diary.) 18 
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Nietzsche's ultimate judgment of Byron fails to take into account several 
points that are worth noting. For one, Byron was by no means such a child of his 
age that he could summarily dismiss as outmoded and irrelevant the classical 
heritage of the West. His unease concerning the state of poetry in his day is 
testimony to this, suggesting, as it does, a feeling that there has been too radical a 
departure from the classical roots of the poetic tradition. Byron's dissatisfaction 
in this regard parallels Nietzsche's conviction that his times also were out of joint 
and needed to be set aright. Thus a fundamental similarity between the two 
becomes discernible, expressed by each one just a few decades apart. Byron's 
words did take some root among his contemporaries, but Nietzsche's reputation 
was of course not solidly established in his day. And in another respect Nietzsche 
found in Byron the words that best expressed his own feelings when he quoted in 
1878 the well-known lines from Manfred about knowledge and its melancholy 
dangers: 
Sorrow is knowledge; they who know the most 
Must mourn the deepest o'er the fatal truth, 
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of life. 
Indeed, Nietzsche's position frequently was closer to Byron than he may have 
wished to admit. 
Throughout his life Byron made constant reference to the writers of classical 
antiquity and to the neo-classicists of modern times; his defense of Alexander Pope 
is an obvious case in point. Byron shared with Nietzsche an admiration for Horace 
and a particular antipathy toward Friedrich Schlegel, one of the leading figures 
of German romanticism. 19 Again, Byron would surely have protested Nietzsche's 
linking him so closely to Rousseau. In his dramas he followed Aristotle's unities 
as interpreted by the French classicists, and he spoke well of Voltaire's efforts in 
the drama. He admired and respected Goethe as Nietzsche did, and perhaps for 
many of the same reasons; his drama Sardanapalus is dedicated to Goethe. Cer-
tainly the man who revered Greek art and deplored its pillage by Lord Elgin, who 
swam the Hellespont in tribute to Leander, and who gave his life for Greece had a 
sure sense of the nobility and value of the classical tradition. 
Ironically, it is Carlyle (whom Nietzsche detested) who is allowed the last 
word here. When he says "Close thy Byron: open thy Goethe" he states what 
18 Ibid., p. 1082; my translation. 
19 Cf. Kaufmann's discussion of Nietzsche and Schlegel in reference to Lessing (Nietzsche, pp. 
137-39). Byron's letter of 28 January 1821 to Teresa Guiccioli contains the following: "He (Schlegel) 
is like Hazlitt, in English, who talks pimples-a red and white corruption rising up (in little imitation of 
mountains upon maps), but containing nothing, and discharging nothing, except their own humors." 
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Nietzsche must have considered his own final judgment of Byron to be. That his 
interest in Byron was of benefit to his own development is certain. He was 
willing to submit Byron to examination and question, and in this sense the English 
poet was as much his teacher as Holderlin or Plato. In formulating his opinions of 
Byron Nietzsche thus grew by outgrowing. 
XIII 
Parody and Parallel: 
Heine, Nietzsche, and the Classical World 
SANDER L. GILMAN 
A vituperative debate has been raging for the past decade in the Federal 
Republic of Germany concerning the position ofHeinrich Heine in the pantheon 
(or rogues' gallery) of German letters, a debate initiated by a suggestion to name 
the new university at Diisseldorf after the poet. Marcel Reich-Ranicki, in a 
feuilleton in Die Zeit, summarized the tenor of the present discussion as well as the 
history of Heine's reception in Germany with the observation that "whoever 
writes about Heine in Germany either defends him or attacks him."1 The 
accuracy of Reich-Ranicki's conclusion for Heine criticism in Germany can be 
best judged on the basis of the two most often represented views of Heine. 
Historically, he has been presented either as one of the "unfortunate cases in the 
development of a truly German culture" or placed on the same plane as Goethe: 
"Germany has produced only one poet in addition to Goethe: Heinrich Heine."2 
While these contradictory views are not unexpected, given the radical positions 
usually taken by critics of Heine's works, what is astounding is that one man 
wrote both quotations. That man is Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche's view of Heine (and of the latter's works) has been the subject of 
numerous references in major studies, learned articles, and, most recently, an 
American dissertation.3 Not only do most of the attempts to link the works of the 
1 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, "Eine Provokation und eine Zumutung," Die Zeit, 22 September 1972, 
pp. 16-17. 
2 All references to Nietzsche's works are to the Musarion edition (hereafter MusA). (For key to 
abbreviations sec p. xvii above.) Wherever possible, the available volumes of the new critical edition 
edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (WKG) have been used for comparison. Here MusA, 
VII, 233; MusA, XVII, 344. All translations are by the author. 
3 The most important studies which raise this question are Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philo$-
opher, Psycholo~ist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), esp. pp. 376-81; Ernst 
Bertram, Nietzsche: Versuch einer Myrhologie (Bonn: Bouvier, 1965 (critical edition)); Hans Landsberg, 
Friedrich Nietzsche und die deutsche Literatur (Leipzig: Hermann Seemann, 1902), pp. 58-60; Ingeborg 
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two men fall into the pro/contra syndrome of Heine (and most of Nietzsche) 
scholarship, but their authors tend to oversimplify the relationship between the 
two men. It is neither sufficient to illustrate Nietzsche's knowledge of Heine's 
works, nor is it permissible to underscore the parallels in their thought. The 
former leads to unwarranted conclusions; the latter to polemical hyperbole. The 
potential goal of such a study should be threefold: first, an understanding of 
Nietzsche's individual reception should be obtained by examining his views of 
Heine; second, the greater contexts of these views should be comprehended; 
finally, the development of Nietzsche's image of Heine must be understood 
within the total development of Nietzsche's character and thought. Such a model 
would provide a basic approach to the question of the interrelationship of the two 
men, while supplying, at the same time, fruitful conclusions which may serve as 
the basis for further philological investigations. 
II 
Nietzsche's first written reference to Heine placed the latter in a specific 
aesthetic context in that he challenged Heine's presentation of the classical myth. 
Opening the (unpublished) introduction to a planned, expanded version of Die 
Geburt der Tragodie, which he composed in 1870-71, Nietzsche makes common 
cause with Wagner in prefacing his attack on Heine: 
I know that you, my dear friend, share with me an ability to distinguish between 
the true and false concept of Greek serenity, even while meeting the latter-the 
false concept-in its harmless comfort everywhere. I also know that you believe it 
to be impossible to achieve insight into the true nature of tragedy from this false 
concept of serenity ... To take an aesthetic problem so seriously is indeed offensive 
to all sides, for our aesthetic-sensitive nature and its nauseating softness as well as for 
that robust or popular rabble, which is able to see art only as an amusing hobby or 
Beithan, Friedrich Nietzsche als Umwerter der deutschen Literatur, Bcitrage zur Philosophie, 25 (Heidel-
berg: Carl Winter, 1933); Elrud Kunne-lbsch, Die Stellung Nietzsches in der Entwicklung der modernen 
Literaturwissenschaft, Studien zur deutschen Literatur, 33 (Ti.ibingen: Niemeyer, 1971); Dolf Stern-
berger, Heinrich Heine rmd die Abschaffimg der Siinde (Hamburg: Claasen, 1972). 3m-8. 390-95. The 
basic articles remain: Arno Carl Coutinho, "Nietzsche, Heine und das 19. Jahrhundert," PMLA, 53 
(1938), 1126-45; Georg Lange, "Heine und Nietzsche," Osterreichische Rundscha11, 64 (1920), 190-202; 
Helmut Prang, "Heine und Nietzsche," Die Erlanger Universitiit: Beilage des Erlanger Tageblattes, 9, No. 
2 (1956), 53; Karl Quenzel, "Heine und Nietzsche," Das literarische Echo, 19 (1917), 599-603; Anon., 
"Heinrich Heine im Urteil Nietzsches und Karl Kraus'," Psychologische Monatshefte, 9 (1960), 49-50. 
The most extensive single study is the dissertation by R. J. Floyd, "Heine and Nietzsche: Parallel 
Studies in Paradox and Irony" (Diss. University of Washington, 1969). Recently, Hanna Spencer, 
"Heine and Nietzsche," Heine]ahrbuch, II (1972), 126-<i1, offered a summary of the earlier literature. 
The most striking omission in this regard is to be found in Charles Andler's Les precurseurs de Nietzsche, 
Vol. I of Nietzsche: Sa vie et sa pensee (Paris: Bossard, 1920), in which Andler docs not devote any space 
to Heine (even though there arc references to Heine in the later volumes). 
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as the missing fools' bells which introduce the "seriousness of existence." As if no 
one knew what was implied with this juxtaposition of the "seriousness of existence." 
Since the term "Greek serenity" rings out into the world from so many different 
sources, we should be content if it is not interpreted as placid sensualism: which is 
the sense in which Heinrich Heine usually used the term, always exclaiming it with 
longing emotion. (MusA. III. 167-268) 
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Thus Nietzsche places Heine on a specific plane, separate and distinct from the 
fools (his reference to the fools' bells [ Schellengeklingel] is echoed in the verb 
"rings out" ["hineinklingt"]). While the fools do not see the vital importance of 
art in life, Heine has reduced art to placid sensualism. This interpretation of Greek 
culture is, for Nietzsche, an even more destructive one than that of the "robust" 
fools. Here Nietzsche reveals yet another category for his analysis of Heine. The 
fools are presented as "robust" and Heine as "sehnsiichtig." This image of Heine 
as the prototype of German decadence was widely accepted throughout Europe 
in the nineteenth century. 4 Yet Nietzsche's classification has its roots in his own 
presentation of the Greek myth. For Nietzsche, the wellspring of Greek art was 
the presence of Dionysian ecstasy beneath the seeming order of Apollonian art. 
The illusion of order is present in the apparent harmony of Apollonian art only 
as the crust which eventually gives way, revealing the rushing undercurrent of 
Dionysian force. Both forces were vital for the existence of art, which is itself the 
synthesis of dissonance. 5 Nietzsche presents the apotheosis of these two forces 
early in Die Geburt der Tragi:idie: 
Apollo again appears as the divine embodiment of the principiium individuationis, in 
which the eternally achieved goal of primal unity, its redemption through appear-
ances, is achieved: he indicates with regal gestures how this entire world of suffering 
is necessary, so that the individual is forced by it to produce a redeeming vision. 
(MusA, III, 37) 
"Titanic" and "barbaric" were the effects of the Dionysian as conceived by the 
Apollonian Greek, without, at the same time, being able to deny that he was 
internally related to the deposed titans and heroes. Indeed he had to feel even more: 
his entire being, with all its beauty and restraint, rested on a disguised basis of passion 
and knowledge, which was revealed to him by the Dionysian. And look! Apollo 
could not live without Dionysus. (MusA, III, 38) 
It would be too crass to follow these categories literally and place Heine in the 
camp of the Apollonian and Nietzsche in that of the Dionysian. Yet such a 
comparison springs readily to mind. For Heine remains, with his concept of 
4 In this regard see esp. Sol Liptzin, The English Legend of Heinrich Heine (New York: Bloch, 1954). 
5 Cf Peter Heller, Dialectics and Nihilism: Essays on Lessing, Nietzsche, Mann and K~fka (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1966), pp. 69-148, and Otto Kein, Das Apollinische und Dionysische 
hci Nietzsche und SchellinJI. Neue deutsche Forschungen, 16 (Berlin: Junker and Diinnhaupt, 1935). 
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placid sensuality, in the realm of Schein (in Nietzsche's rather than Schiller's sense 
of the term), creating a closed, compact world based on personal suffering. While 
this may be Nietzsche's initial presentation of Heine's concept of the classical 
world, is it indeed Heine's projection? 
In the biographical essay Ludwig Borne, Heine chooses the image of the 
classical world as the metaphor through which to present to the reader the 
dichotomy between two seemingly antithetical forces. He seeks the basis for 
Bi:>rne' s criticism of Goethe in the juxtaposition of Nazarene and Hellene: 
Borne reveals his Nazarene limitations in his judgments concerning Goethe as well 
as in his comments on other authors. I say "Nazarene" in order to avoid the terms 
"Jewish" and "Christian," even though both of these terms are sy'nonymous to me 
and are used, not to indicate a religion, but a natural occurrence. "Jews" and 
"Christians" are, for me, semantically related terms in contrast to "Hellenes," by 
which I do not mean a specific people but an inherited as well as an acquired intel-
lectual posture and manner of observation. In this regard I would like to note: all 
people are either Jews or Hellenes, people with ascetic, iconoclastic, spiritually 
dependent drives or people with joyful, proudly developing and realistic beings.6 
Here Nietzsche's interpretation of Heine's concept of"Greek serenity" seems far 
from accurate. Indeed, the polarity between Nazarene and Hellene seems to 
prefigure, in at least general form, Nietzsche's own dialectic. For the Apollonian, 
like the Nazarene, seeks the closed, comprehensible system, while the Hellene, 
like the Dionysian, presents the undercurrent. Such a parallel would seem all too 
superficial, if Heine did not also present a synthesis of Nazarene and Hellene in the 
second book of Borne: "Shakespeare is at one and the same time Jew and Greek, 
or rather elements of both spiritualism and art have been reconciled in him, have 
illuminated him and developed in him a higher synthesis. Is perhaps the har-
monious synthesis of both aspects not the goal of European civilization?" (HH, 
VII, 37). For Heine, the synthesis of the two discordant strains of civilization is the 
true European, a concept which, of course, plays a major role in Nietzsche's 
later thought. 
The parallels as well as the divergences between Heine's and Nietzsche's 
dialectic are apparent. However, Nietzsche's refusal, at least in his early writings, 
to acknowledge these parallels reflects his general rejection of any personal, in-
tellectual rapport with the dead poet. Yet, if Heine's understanding of the classical 
heritage is investigated even further, this rejection takes on an even more unusual 
color. For within Heine's presentation of the classical myth are the very concepts, 
the Apollonian and the Dionysian, which comprise the basis of Nietzsche's 
dialectic. 7 
6 All references to Heine are to the edition of Ernst Elster, 7 vols. (Leipzig and Vienna: Biblio-
graphisches Institut, 1887--90), hereafter referred to as HH; here HH, VII, 24. 
7 Heine's own source for this dialectic is questionable. It is possible that it stems from the Saint-
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Heine had presented a classical dialectic in Ludwig Borne; in his ballet scenario, 
"Die Gottin Diana," he introduced the prototypes of the Nietzschean categories. 
The banal plot of the ballet, a distant relative of the Tannhauser legend, cul-
minates in the death of the central figure, a knight, at the hands of the true 
Christian, der treue Eckardt. Diana attempts to resurrect her beloved, calling upon 
her fellow gods for succor. Venus, the first summoned, can do nothing. The 
power of love has no hold over death. Apollo, the embodiment of ordered art, 
has little more effect: "The music changes and announces peace and harmonic 
bliss. At the head of the muses Apollo appears at stage left .... Apollo tunes his 
lute and playfully dances at the side of the muses about the corpse of the knight. 
The sound of these notes arouses the knight as from a heavy sleep, he rubs his eyes, 
looks about in a puzzled manner, and falls almost immediately back into rigor 
mortis" (HH, VI, I 10). The absolute failure of Apollonian art is intensified by the 
appearance of Dionysus, for while ordered art can create the illusion oflife, it has 
no power over the reality oflife. Only the primordial force ofDionysus possesses 
the ultimate power: 
The music again changes; noteworthy is its transition to a joyful affirmation of life 
and Bacchus appears at stage right with his bacchanalian troop ... Now Bacchus 
takes a hand-drum and, accompanied by his excited band, dances about the knight. 
A powerful sense of enthusiasm seizes the God of Joy; he almost destroys the tam-
bourine. These melodies awaken the knight from his sleep of death and he sits up 
slowly, with his mouth longingly opened. Bacchus fills a cup with wine and pours 
it into the knight's mouth. He has hardly had time to enjoy the drink when he springs 
up, newly born, from the stage. (HH, VI, 110) 
Dionysus, resurrector and resurrected, stands increasingly at the center of Heine's 
new mythology. In Die Gotter im Exit, he becomes "the savior of the senses" and 
"the divine liberator" (HH, VI, 83). 8 Dionysus as Christ is not that far removed 
Simonian contrast between pagan sensualism and Christian spiritualism. Cf. L. A. Willoughby, The 
Romantic Movement in Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 144. The influence of 
Heine's concept, however, is not limited to Nietzsche and Germany. With the acceptance of Heine 
into the forum of world literature by Matthew Arnold, Heine's influence also became a major factor in 
nineteenth-century English letters. It was Walter Pater who continued to develop these concepts until 
they assumed a form strikingly similar to Nietzsche's thought (cf. esp. his essay "The Marbles of Aegi-
na" (April, 1880) rpt. in his Greek Studies (London: Macmillan, 1910), pp. 251-68}. The relevant 
studies are: John Smith Harrison, "Pater, Heine and the Old Gods of Greece," PMLA, 36 (1924), 
655-86; R. T. Lenaghan, "Pattern in Walter Pater's Fiction," Studies in Philology, 58 (1961), 69-91; 
David J. DeLaura, Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England: Newman, Arnold and Pater (Austin: Univer-
sity of Texas Press, 1969), pp. 253-55; David S. Thatcher, Nietzsche in England 1890-1914: The Growth 
ef a Reputation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). 
8 See A. I. Sandor, The Exile of the Gods: An Interpretation of a Theme, a Theory and a Technique 
in the Work ef Heinrich Heine. Anglica Germanica, 9 (The Hague: Mouton, 1967) and Alexander 
Schweikert, Heinrich Heines Ein.flusse auf die deutsche Lyrik 1830-1900. Abhandlungen zur Kunst-, 
Musik- und Literaturwissenschaft, 57 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1968). The recent study by Peter Koester, Der 
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from the Nietzschean image of Dionysus. For as E. M. Butler so succinctly 
stated, "Dionysus, who came late into Greece, came late into Germany. Heine 
ushered him in and then left it to Friedrich Nietzsche to see that he got his rights. " 9 
III 
The parallels between Nietzsche's and Heine's views of the classical world, 
as well as the disparities, tend to force a reassessment of Nietzsche's general 
condemnation of Heine. One other major aspect of Heine's presentation of the 
classical myth warrants examination in the light of Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche 
is generally held to be the promulgator of the concept of the death of God. In Die 
frohliche Wissenschaft he presents the often quoted anecdote of the madman who, 
seeking God, finds him not, but rather becomes aware of the death of the deity: 
"Don't we smell the divine decay?-even gods rot! God is dead! God remains 
dead! And we have killed him! How can we comfort ourselves-the murderers 
above all murderers" (MusA, XII, I 57). For the madman, the symbol of the dead 
God is the fossilized institution of religion: "It is said that the madman broke into 
various churches on the same day and sang his Requiem aeternam deo. Led out and 
asked to explain, he only answered: 'What are these churches, if not the tombs 
and monuments of God?'" (MusA, XIII, 157). While the madman uncovers the 
death of God, accusing mankind as his murderers, it is only in Also sprach Zara-
thustra that Nietzsche fixes the actual cause of death: "God is dead: he died through 
his sympathy with man" (MusA, XIII, 114). The death of God is, for Nietzsche, a 
direct result of the human situation. His death, however, makes little impression 
on the forms of human action, such as religion, for mankind is, by nature, sclf-
contained. The forces of this world transcend the death of God, as Zarathustra 
proclaimed: "I even love the churches and tombs of God, when the sky shows its 
pure eye through their broken roofs. I enjoy sitting, like the grass and the red 
poppies, in destroyed churches" (MusA, XIII, 193). 
Nietzsche's indebtedness to Heine's image of the death of God has been 
widely acknowledged, as Georg Siegmund observed: "It was Heine who trans-
lated the philosophical speculation of his time into visual images in order to make 
the ideas more easily comprehensible."10 Indeed, Heine's images are most 
striking, as in his lyric cycle Heimkehr: 
sterbliche Gott: Nietzsches Entwu,j iibermenschlicher Gro}Je. Monographim zur philosophischen For-
schung, 103 (Meisenhcim am Gian: Hain, 1972) offers a summary of Nietzsche's views as well as a new 
interpretation. 
9 The Tyranny of Greece over Germany (1935; rpt. Boston: Beacon, 1958), p. 300. Miss Butler's 
study remains the best discussion of German classical thought. For this present study the following two 
investigations were of interest: Maria Filtso, Heinrich Heine umi die Antike (Diss. Munich, 1928; Munich: 
privately printed, 1928) and Karl Schlechta, Der junge Nietzsche und das klassische Altertum. Universitas 
(Mainz: Kupferberg, 1948). 
10 Georg Siegmund, Nietzsches Kunde vom Tode Gottes (Berlin: Moms, 1964), p. 128. 
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Das Herz ist mir bcdriickt, und schnlich 
Gedenke ich der alten Zeit; 
Die W cit war damals noch so wohnlich, 
Und ruhig lebten hin die Leut'. 
Doch jetzt ist all es wie verschoben, 
Das ist ein Drangen! eine Not! 
Gestorben ist der Herrgott oben, 
Und unten ist der Teufel tot. 
Und alles schaut so gramlich triibe, 
So krausverwirrt und morsch und kalt, 
Und ware nicht das biBchen Liebe, 
So gab' cs nirgends eincn Halt. (HH, I, 114) 11 
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"Time past," the antiquity of his own myth of Greece, was, for Heine, the age of 
the gods; modern philosophy and theology sounded its death knell. The con-
frontation began with the confrontation between Hebrew and Hellene, between 
Christ and the pagan gods as described in Die Stadt Lucca: "Then suddenly a pale 
Jew, dripping blood, enters panting, a crown of thorns on his head and a large 
wooden cross on his shoulder. He threw the cross on the high table of the gods, 
so that the golden cups trembled and the gods became silent. They grew pale and 
then even paler until they vanished into a mist" (HH, III, 394). Christianity is a 
somber replacement for the gods of Greece, and the temples of the new religion a 
source of superstition (as in Heine's depiction of the Cologne cathedral in 
Deutsch/and: Ein Wintermiirchen) and morbidity, as in Heine's answer to Schiller's 
Die Gotter Griechenlands: 
Die Gotter sind, die euch bes1egten, 
Die neuen, hcrrschcnden, tristen Gotter, 
Die schadenfrohen im Schafspelz der Demut-
O, da faBt mich ein diisterer Groll, 
Und brechen mocht' ich die neuen Tempel, 
Und kampfrn fiir euch. ihr alten Gotter. 
f'iir euch und eu'r gutes ambrosischcs Recht .... (HH, I, 188) 12 
11 My heart is sad and filled with longing/ I think of the past;/ the world was then so comfortable/ and 
everyone lived so peacefully. 
And everything is now as if displaced./ Such crowding! such need./ Lord God is dead above,/ And 
below the devil is dead. 
And everything looks so peevishly sad,/ so confusing, so rotten, so cold,/ And ifit were not for the bit 
oflove,/ there would not be a foothold anywhere. 
12 It is the gods who conquered you,/ the new, ruling, sad gods,/ who, maliciously, in a sheepskin of 
modesty-/ 0, a melancholy anger appears within me,/ I wish to destroy the new temple,/ and fight for 
you, you ancient gods,/ for you and your good, ambrosian law. 
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Nietzsche's vision of the churches in which the madman reads his memorial 
masses, his placing of natural forces above the artificialities of religion both find 
their presentations in Heine's works. If Heine stands as the promulgator of the 
death of God in the nineteenth century, he felt that its roots were to be traced 
back to Kant. In Heine's Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutsch/and, 
published in 1834, it is Kant who is made responsible for the death of the murderer 
of the ancient gods: 
We shall speak of this catastrophe, the January 21st of Deism, in the next chapters. 
A strange dread, an unusual piety will not allow us to write any further today. Our 
heart is full of overwhelming pity-it is the old Jehovah who is preparing himself 
for death. We knew him so well, from the cradle in Egypt, as he was born among 
the divine calves, crocodiles, holy onions, ibixes and cats .... 
Don't you hear the bells ringing? Kneel, they are bringing the sacrament to a 
dying God. (HH, IV, 246) 
Heine and Nietzsche rejected the intrusion of the concept of the omnipotent deity 
into the human sphere. Emphasizing a religion of this world (a Diesseitsreligion of 
"love" or "grass and red poppies"), they relegated the role of the conventional 
representation of God to a negative position. For Heine, however, the death of 
the gods was a continual process. With the advent of Christianity they underwent 
a series of metamorphoses. These changes merged them into the development of 
Western religious thought. For Nietzsche, the death of God in modern times is an 
absolute. There is no question of the perpetuation of the religious tradition of the 
past for it no longer has any validity in the contemporary sphere. Thus Heine's 
image of the death of the gods and Nietzsche's view of the death of God, while 
similar in overall structure, are radically different in their final conclusions. Heine 
is able, at the conclusion of his life, to find solace in a simplified version of the 
Judaeo-Christian God; Nietzsche ends his philosophy, which strives for the 
realization of a world without the need for God, in the unfulfillable desire for 
God: 
Was bandest du dich 
mit dem Strick deincr Weisheit? 
Was lockest du dich 
ins Paradies der alten Schlange? 
Was schlichst du dich ein 
in dich-in dich? ... 
Undjiingst noch so stolz, 
auf alien Stelzen deincs Stolzes! 
Jiingst noch der Einsiedler ohne Gott, 
der Zweisiedler mit dem Teufel, 
der scharlachne Prinz jedes Obermuts! ... 
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0 Zarathustra! .. . 
Selbstkenner! .. . 
Selbsthenker! ... (MusA, XX, 200-202) 13 
IV 
It was not solely the content of Heine's works which attracted the interest 
and opprobrium of the young Nietzsche. In the spring of I 876 Nietzsche observed 
that: 
The influence of Hegel and Heine on German style! The latter destroys the barely 
finished work of our great writers, the barely achieved feeling for the uniform 
texture of style. He loves the variegated fool's cloak. His inventions, his images, his 
observations, his sentiments, his vocabulary are not compatible. He controls all styles 
like a virtuoso, but uses this mastery only to confuse them totally. With Hegel 
everything is an unworthy gray; with Heine, an electric fountain of color, which 
however, attacks the eye as much as the gray dulls it. As a stylist Hegel is a factor, 
Heine, afarceur. (MusA, VI, 225) 
Heine's style appears to Nietzsche as the formalistic equivalent to the placid 
sensualism of his classical world. Yet Nietzsche uses specific references to Heine as 
an actor: he wears his style like a clown's cloak, he is afarceur. This approach to 
Heine reveals the basis for much of Nietzsche's antipathy towards Heine. For as 
early as Schubert's musical interpretations of Heine's poetry, the importance of 
the mask in Heine's aesthetic vocabulary had been known and appreciated.14 
Nietzsche, in the period reflected in the above quotation, assumed that Heine was 
but a poseur, putting on that mask which struck his fancy at any given moment. 
Thus the ego of the poet, his inner being, was not present in his work. 
In reality, the importance of disguise and the altered presentation of per-
sonality in Heine's "ironic" Weltanschauung is not so easily dismissed. S. S. 
Prawer, in what is without a doubt the best modern book on Heine, illustrates 
this subtlety by comparing two passages in Atta Troll: "An early draft ofCaput II 
has been preserved in which the poet tries to introduce himself into the poem as 
the sick man he really was. Atta Troll has just broken away from his keeper: 
13 Why did you bind yourself with the coils of your wisdom?/ Why did you tempt yourself/ into the 
paradise of the ancient serpent?/ Why did you steal into yourself-into yourself? .. ./ But recently so 
proud,/ On all the stilts of your pride!/ But recently a hermit without a God,/ a compatriot of the devil/ the 
scarlet prince of pride ... / 0 Zarathustra! .. ./Self-knowing/ Self-destroying! 
14 Jeffrey L. Sammons, Heinrich Heine, the Elusive Poet, Yale Germanic Studies, 3 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 1969). 
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Dies geschah den zweiten Juli 
Achtzehnhunderteinundvierzig 
Und ein kranker deutscher Dichter 
Der voin sicheren Balkone 
Diesem groBen .... 
SANDER L. GILMAN 
At this point Heine broke off, crossed out the last two and a half lines and sub-
stituted: 
Und ein groBer deutscher Dichter 
Der dem groBen Schauspiel zusah 
(Von dem sicheren Balkone) 
Seufzte tief: 0 Vaterland .... "15 
With this glimpse into the author's working method, it becomes quite clear that 
the "ironic" mask does not merely disguise the poetic ego but serves to mitigate 
it. Thus the pathos of the "ill German poet" is altered to that of the ironic "great 
German poet" so that the immediacy of the effect is avoided. This avoidance 
creates an ambiguity concerning the reference to the irony. Does it stem from the 
ego of the poet, from yet a second mask (the poet as ironist), or merely from the 
most superficial and immediate use of irony as a rhetorical device? 
It was only with Nietzsche's own development of the understanding of the 
role of the mask (or Schein) in all personality that he was able to come to terms 
with Heine. He became aware that the relationship between mask and ego was 
not merely one of armor to the defenseless spirit. The mask and the ego are so 
closely intertwined so as to make them inseparable. This fact has its clearest pre-
sentation in the Preface to the second edition of Diefrohliche Wissenschaft: 
Those who could, would attribute to me more than foolishness, exuberance, "gay 
science," -for example the handful of poems which have been added to the present 
edition of this book-poems in which the poet mocks, in a manner which is difficult 
to forgive, all poets. Oh, it is not merely poets and their pretty "lyrical emotions" 
against which this resurrected one vents his malice; who knows what monster of 
parodic material will tempt him in the future?" Incipit tragoedia" -thus reads the end 
of this thoughtful-thoughtless book-take care! Something extraordinarily evil and 
malicious is being announced: incipit parodia, without a doubt! (MusA, XXI, 2) 
15 S.S. Prawcr, Heine, The Tragic Satirist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 65. 
"This took place on the second ofJuly/ Eighteen hundred and forty-one/ As a sickly German poet/ who, 
from a secure balcony/ this great ... " "And a great German poet/ who observed the great spectacle/ 
(from a secure balcony) sighed heavily: 0 Fatherland ... " 
Parody and Parallel: Heine, Nietzsche, and the Classical World 209 
It is Nietzsche himself who serves as the object for the parody of the poems, the 
Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei. The mask he presents to the reader of the parodist as 
"malicious" and his ironic defense oflyric emotionality shows that he has come to 
an awareness of the omnipresence of the mask and its necessity in self-reflective 
art. For like Heine's, Nietzsche's mask serves not to conceal but to reveal. He has 
come to the realization of the falseness ofhis earlier statement that "Hartmann and 
Heine are unconscious ironists, rogues against themselves" (MusA, VI, 343). On 
the contrary, Nietzsche and Heine are both conscious parodists, with their 
parodic source their own masks and egos. 16 
In the Lieder des Prinzen Vogelfrei Nietzsche set a monument to his new-found 
understanding for Heine. Written after Nietzsche's serious illness of 1879, the 
poem, "Rimus remedium," subtitled "Oder: Wie kranke Dichter sich trosten," 
parallels his illness to Heine's "Mattress Tomb": 
Aus deinem Munde, 
Du speichelfliissige Hexe Zeit, 
Tropft langsam Stund auf Stunde. 
Umsonst, daB all mein Eke! schreit: 
"Fluch, Fluch dem Schlunde 
Der Ewigkeit!" 
"Wclt-ist von Erz: 
Ein gliihcnder Stier,-der hort kein Schrein. 
Mit fliegenden Dolchen schrcibt der Schmcrz 
Mir ins Gebein: 
"W cit hat kein Herz, 
Und Dummhcit wars, ihr gram drum sein!" 
GieB alle Mohne, 
GicB fieber! Gift mir ins Gehirn! 
Zu Jang schon priifst du mir Hand und Stirn. 
Was fragst du? Was? "Zu welchem-Lohne?" 
- Ha! Finch der Dim 
Und ihrem Hohne! 
Nein! Komm zuriick! 
DrauBen ists kalt, ich hore regnen-
Ich sollte dir zartlicher begegnen? 
-Nimm! Hier ist Gold: Wie glanzt das Stiick!-
Dich heiBcn "Gliick"? 
Dich, Fieber, segncn?-
16 Cf. Beda Allcmann, Ironie und Dichtun~ (Pfullingen: Neske, 1969) and Charles I. Glicksbcrg, 
The Ironic Vision in Modern Literature (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969). 
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Die Tiir springt auf! 
Der Regen spriiht nach meinem Bette! 
Wind loscht das Licht,-Unheil in Hauf! 
- W er jetzt nicht hundert Rei me hatte, 
lch wette, wette 
Der ging drauf! (MusA, XX, 117-18)17 
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While this is evidently a Rollengedicht, it is in no way clear exactly who is speaking; 
the striving after "Gliick" is no more a leitmotif of Nietzsche's poetic fantasy than 
it is of Heine's. For Nietzsche has incorporated the image of the suffering poet 
into the model ofhis relationship with Heine. Heine had given sufficient material 
for this parallel in his poem "Frau Sorge": 
In meines Gliickes Sonnenglanz 
Da gaukelte frohlich der Miickentanz. 
Die lieben Freunde liebten mich 
Und teilten mit mir briiderlich 
W oh) meinen besten Bra ten 
Und meinen letzten Dukaten. 
Das Gliick ist fort, der Beutel leer, 
Und hab' auch keine Freunde mehr; 
Erloschen ist der Sonnenglanz, 
Zerstoben ist der Miickentanz, 
Die Freunde, so wie die Miicke, 
Verschwinden mit dem Gliicke. 
An mcinem Bett in der Winternacht 
Als Warterin die Sorge wacht. 
Sie tragt eine weiBe Unterjack', 
Ein schwarzes Miitzchen, und schnupft Tabak. 
Die Dose knarrt so graBlich, 
Die Alte nickt so haBlich. 
17 From your mouth/ you salivating witch, time,/ hour drips on hour,/ Needlessly I cry with 
revulsion:/ "Damn, damn the abyss/ of eternity!" 
"The world is made of brass:/ a glowing steer,/ which hears no cries of anguish./ With flying 
daggers pain inscribes/ on my limb:/ "The world has no heart./ And it would be foolish to be angry 
with it for that reason." 
Pour all opiates,/ Pour fever! Poison into my brain!/ You have studied my hand and face too long./ 
What you ask? What? "For what-reward?"/ Ha! Damn the whore/ and her mockery! 
No! come back!/ Outside is cold, I hear rain-/ I should approach you more gently? Here! Here is 
gold: how the coins glisten! To call you "joy"/ you, fever, I should bless? 
The door springs open!/ Rain sprays towards my bed!/ Wind extinguishes the light-disaster en 
masse! I He who does not have at least a hundred rhymes,/ I would wager,/ that he would come undone. 
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Mir traumt manchmal, gekommen sei 
Zuriick <las Gliick und der junge Mai 
Und die Freundschaft und der Miickenschwarm-
Da knarrt die Dose-daB Gott erbarm', 
Es platzt die Seifenblase-
Die Alte schneuzt die Nase (HH, I, 424-25) 18 
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A further parallel to Nietzsche's poem may be found in the pointe in the last verse 
ofHeine's "Boses Getraume," in which the poet awakes from an ironically idyllic 
dream to find himself still chained to his bed: 
Was sie zur Antwort gab, das weiB ich nimmer, 
Denn ich erwachte jahlings-und ich war 
Wieder ein Kranker, der im Krankenzimmer 
Trostlos daniederliegt seit manchemJahr- (HH, I, 428)19 
The mask of the ill poet permits Heine (and later Nietzsche) to achieve distance 
from the reality of suffering. All illness and torment are transferred to the mask, 
which becomes a separate reality in which the ego is mirrored. This division of 
personality, the escape from the mask of the ill poet which is present in both of the 
Heine poems quoted above, is revealed in the pointe to be but a false mask for the 
true mask of suffering. Nietzsche takes over this structure in "Rim us remedium" 
with, however, a substantial alteration. "Frau Sorge" becomes transmuted into 
the image of time, the cause of the poet's suffering. The dialogue which results 
between time and the poet, like the dream sequences in both Heine poems, 
bridges the appearance of one mask with that of the other.Yet the culmination of 
the poem, the sudden presence of death in the form of the intrusion of the external 
world into the sickroom, is handled in an ironic mode quite unknown in Heine's 
poetry. For it is the rhymes of the poet which protect him from ultimate dissolu-
tion. Indeed, Nietzsche's attack on Heine's style seems here reversed. For 
Nietzsche, writing his own defense as well as Heine's, presents the fantasy, the 
mask, through which all sick poets comfort themselves. They view themselves as 
18 In the sunny glow of my joy/ the dance of the mosquito buzzing/ lingers happily./ Loving 
friends loved me/ And in brotherhood shared with me/ my best roasts and my last ducats. 
Joy is past, my wallet empty/ And I have no friends anymore;/ The sunny glow has disappeared,/ 
vanished has the mosquito dance,/ vanished, the friends, like the mosquito, with the joy. 
Sorrow, my attendant, watches/ at my bedside during the winter nights./ She wears a white 
undershirt,/ a black cap and dips snuff./ The snuff box squeaks dreadfully,/ the old woman nods so 
grotesquely. · 
Sometimes I dream,/ that joy and May have returned/ And friendship and the swarms of mos-
quitos/ the snuffbox squeaks-God have mercy,/ The bubble vanishes-the old woman blows her nose. 
19 What she answered, I don't know/ For I awoke suddenly-and was/ once again an invalid, 
having lain/ without solace in a sickroom/ for many a year. 
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immortal through their works. Nietzsche is, however, quite aware that this is but 
a mask, and thus the final parodic pointe establishes the nature of the mask as mask, 
without negating its vital role in the expression of the poet's ego.20 
Nietzsche's identification with Heine reached its height in his final major 
work Ecce Homo. In the sophomorically entitled section "Warum ich so klug bin" 
Nietzsche confesses: 
Heinrich Heine gave me the highest concept of the poet. I have looked in vain in all 
of the kingdoms of the centuries for an equivalently sweet and passionate music. 
He possessed that divine malice without which I cannot conceive of perfection. -I 
regard the value of men, of races in the light of how much they do not isolate the 
god from the satyr. In the future it will be said that Heine and I are by far the primary 
artists of the German language-an inconceivable distance from everything created 
by mere Germans. (MusA, XII, 199-200) 
Here the "malice," which Nietzsche attributed to his own parodic attempts in 
Die frohliche Wissenschaft, forms the bridge between his personality and that of 
Heine. Indeed, Nietzsche, who emphasized the Slavic source of his family, 
isolates himself, with the Jew Heine, from the stylistically banal camp of the 
Germans. It is the awareness of that godly "malice" as the bond between the two 
men which forms Nietzsche's finaljudgment of Heine. He became aware that 
Heine's greatest talent was the use ofhis linguistic facility to probe and present his 
own ego. 
With this understanding of the development of Nietzsche's appreciation for 
Heine, the question of the image of Heine's classicism, as reflected in Nietzsche's 
works, can be examined in a new light. Nietzsche sought and found, in Heine, a 
poet whose prime consideration was the presentation ofinternal reality in artistic 
form. This preoccupation extended even to the presentation of a classical world 
which mirrors the basic human desires of the poet. The masks which Heine 
created in the search after the classical myth, those of Hellene and Hebrew, of the 
exile and death of the gods, are but extensions of the poet's ego. Thus Nietzsche 
began his debate with the shadow of Heine by rejecting an ego-oriented image of 
the past. As he came more and more to the awareness that his image, too, was 
determined by his own desires, his opinion of Heine altered. By the end of his 
creative period, Nietzsche assumed a sense of modified autoscopy, in which 
Heine became his historical Doppelgiinger, a figure in which he found himself 
recapitulated. His awareness of the parallels between his fate and that of Heine led 
to this total identification with the poet. Thus the question of Heine's "influence" 
on Nietzsche is one which can be answered only to the degree that this dramatic 
2° Cf. my essay, " 'Braune Nacht': Friedrich Nietzsche's Venetian Poems," Nietzsche Studien, I 
(1972), 247----00 and "Incipit parodia: The Function of Parody in the Poetry of Friedrich Nietzsche," 
Nietzsche Studien, 4 (1975), 52-74. 
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alteration in Nietzsche's acceptance of Heine is taken into consideration. Even the 
more moderate question of the parallels between Heine's thought and Nietzsche's 
philosophy must be treated carefully. For Nietzsche knew Heine well even when 
he sought to reject him. What remains is the internal biography of Nietzsche's 
relationship with his own image of Heine, a biography which sheds much more 
light on Nietzsche's personal evaluation of the artistic process than on the more 
banal questions of indebtedness and influence. 
XIV 
Nietzsche and the Finis Latinorum 
MARK BOULBY 
Nietzsche's work, in particular that of his final years, comes into existence 
as a continuous process of excited interaction with selected luminaries of previous 
ages and, to a lesser extent, with his own contemporaries. This process is, of its 
very nature, one-sided; frequently, however, it impresses us as self-enclosed to 
the point of solipsism, an activity in which the imagination appears to cannibalize 
its own flesh. Sucked into this vortex, philosophers and poets become the victims 
of a subjectivity so intense that it quickly reduces them to little more than mario-
nettes in Dionysus the Crucified's world drama, and dream, of history and ideas. 
The eclecticism of this procedure is partly a result of the thinker's isolation, his 
periods spent in lonely retreats, his dependence upon a few newspapers such as 
the Journal des Debats, and his book-shop browsing-by which means he dis-
covered Dostoevsky as late as 1887, just as he had stumbled upon Schopenhauer 
in 1865 and Stendhal in 1879. For the rest, it is a selectivity induced by the obses-
sional quality of Nietzsche's mind, returning time and time again to the same 
battle with the same minotaurs, Pascal, Rousseau, Kant, St. Paul, Gotama 
Buddha and, of course, innumerable Greeks. 
Among scholars there has been a tendency-both explicable and in some 
degree justifiable-to place but little stress on the importance of Nietzsche's 
encounter with the imaginative literature of his own period. Nonetheless it is 
clear that towards the end of his career the creative writers-poets and novelists-
of his own day and age come increasingly within the range of his philosophical 
activity. Much ofNietzsche's reading in contemporary literature was in French-
German had little enough to offer him at this time. It was a reading that seems to 
have been quite extensive but unsystematic. Certain questions about it still 
remain unresolved-even unposed. A good deal of it-Flaubert, Bourget, 
Baudelaire, a little Barbey d' Aurevilly-gave Nietzsche an acquaintance with 
the literature of decadence, on which topic he had of course developed his own 
comprehensive theories. Though much has been written on these, the problem 
of their relationship-or lack ofit-with the writings of the decadents themselves, 
as they developed their style and peculiar conventions in France, England, 
Germany and elsewhere has actually been little examined. Not much has been 
214 
Nietzsche and the Finis Latinorum 215 
pointed out save Nietzsche's obvious dependence, for a few of his concepts, upon 
Paul Bourget's Essais (and Nouveaux Essais) de psychologie contemporaine (1883 and 
1885). It is curious but true that an attempt to do something to remedy this 
deficiency can profitably place at the center of discussion what might at first sight 
appear to be an entirely different problem, namely that of the classical tradition 
and Nietzsche's response to it. That there was a certain connection, certainly in 
France and England, between decadence and some forms of neo-classicism is 
however not difficult to show, 1 and it can be demonstrated that, especially in 
Nietzsche's later years, his manipulation of Roman and Greek material is some-
thing of a touchstone of his relationship to the so-called Decadent Movement. 
A necessary prolegomenon, however, is the consideration of a pair of deep-
seated paradoxes, which seem to me to underlie very much of Nietzsche's 
thinking on this subject. These may be called, for the sake of convenience, the 
paradox of the primitive-organic, and the paradox of the artificial man. Now it is 
generally and persuasively held that what Nietzsche gleaned from contemporary 
French literature and thought did not affect the development of his theories on 
decadence in any fundamental way; at the most (and this is true even in the case of 
Bourget) it merely confirmed them and greatly helped him to make them ex-
plicit. 2 That Nietzsche's ideas might themselves have influenced decadent writers 
in France or England before 1890 is quite improbable, although the suggestion 
has recently been made that Stefan George may conceivably have first heard of 
the philosopher at one ofMallarme's soirees.3 Certainly there is nothing in Euro-
pean literature at this time to compare with the exhaustive and passionate analysis 
to which Nietzsche subjects the idea of decadence and what he calls its "logic" -
that is to say, nihilism. His arguments probe more deeply into it than do those of 
French and English commentators, not to speak of German. But his perspectives, 
while they do pick on similar substantive issues, are often peculiar to him. This is 
especially obvious in regard to his fulminations against Christianity, about which 
the French decadents showed themselves sometimes indifferent, sometimes 
cynical, and sometimes perversely aroused to blasphemy or belief, but against 
which they never mounted a consistent and determined campaign. No doubt it 
would have seemed to them quite old-fashioned to do so. 
1 Though the classical tradition in the authentic sense is scarcely reflected in the work of the French 
decadents proper, many of them-even Baudelaire ("Lesbos")-use at least some classical motifs. Neo-
classicism is however a conspicuous ·feature of the literature of the 188os and 189os-for instance Jean 
Moreas and his "Ecole romane." The Roman Emperors had intrigued writers such as Gautier and the 
young Flaubert. In England the decadents were commonly regarded as dissolute neopagans. Cf. the 
article "Neopaganism," The Quarterly Review, 172 (1891), 273-304, which commences with Goethe 
and traces the tradition through Leconte de Lisle, Gautier and Baudelaire to Walter Pater and J. A . 
. Symonds. 
2 Thus W. D. Williams, Nietzsche and the French (Oxford: Blackweli 1952), p. 156. 
3 Cf. Peter Piltz, "Nietzsche und Stefan George," in Stefan George Kolloquium (Cologne: Wienand, 
1971), pp. 49-66. 
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Confronted, as were these decadents themselves, with what seemed to be the 
exhaustion of European man, the collapse of his vital instincts, Nietzsche bears 
down upon the Christian ethic as the very root of the disease. The symptoms are 
many; weariness, a general "morbidity" in social life,4 a nervous passivity, a 
disassociated intellectuality, the absence of "force"; and Nietzsche sees these 
manifestations as in part the result of heredity, in part however the consequence of 
environmental factors, aided by the gross suggestibility of people-he speaks of 
"acquired exhaustion" (W, III, 806). 5 There is a striking passage in a letter to 
Gast, on the appearance of the second volume of the journal des Goncourts, with 
its description of the famous "diners chez Magny'': 
... that brought together twice a month the cleverest and most sceptical band of 
Parisian intellects of those days (Sainte-Beuve, Flaubert, Theophile Gautier, Taine, 
Renan, the Goncourts, Scherer, Gavarni, occasionally Turgenev, etc.). Exasperated 
pessimism, cynicism, nihilism, alternating with a lot of exuberance and good humor; 
I myself would fit in pretty well there-I know these gentlemen by heart, so much so 
that I've really had my fill of them already. It is necessary to be more radical: 
basically they all lack the chief requirement- "la force." (W, III, 1269) 
This deficiency is of course an essential burden of Nietzsche's entire campaign 
against decadence. As early as On the Use and Abuse of History (Vom Nutzen und 
Nachteil der Historie fur das Leben, 1874) he employs an image not only relevant 
here but in fact central to his whole philosophy: "This is an analogy for each one 
of us: he must organize the chaos within himself, by reflecting upon his genuine 
needs" (W, I, 284). Wise beyond subsequent overstatements, Nietzsche here 
distinguishes the true self from the false, and insists passionately upon the possi-
bility of the "genuine." Later pronouncements make clear that the "organization 
of the chaos" of impulses is to be the work of the will, the "inner tyrant" (W, III, 
4 72). The really important point is that for this thinker form and organization are 
ideals from the outset and never cease to be. His work must be regarded as being 
dominated by an intense commitment to hierarchy, order and structural cohesion. 
As a celebrated section in Beyond Good and Evil makes clear, it is just such principles 
which are always subverted or abandoned by the decadent, with his lack of 
"force," his preference for passivity, for repose, for a corrupt Epicureanism: 
Man in an age of dissolution, in which the races are jumbled together, in whom 
therefore there is a multiple heredity, that is to say antagonistic and often not even 
merely antagonistic impulses and standards, which fight one another and seldom 
allow one another any peace-such a man of cultures that are old and lights that are 
broken will on the average be a rather weak man: his profoundest yearning is that 
the war which he is should come to an end; happiness appears to him, in accordance 
4 "Morbid" is a favorite epithet of Nietzsche's. Cf., e.g., W, II, IOIO, I071; lll, 708, 787, etc. (For 
key to abbreviations see p. xvii above.) 
5 All references in the text, in my own translation, are to the Schlechta edition. 
Nietzsche and the Finis Latinorum 
with a comforting (for example Epicurean or Christian) physic and mode of 
thought, principally as the happiness of repose, of being undisturbed, of satiety, of 
ultimate unity, as a "sabbath of sabbaths," to use the words of the saintly rhetorician 
Augustine, who himself was such a man .... (W, II, 656) 
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The distinction is clear enough, and it is carried consistently through 
Nietzsche's later writings, including the so-called Will to Power.6 Nevertheless 
Nietzsche's theory of decadence remains, viewed as a whole, profoundly enig-
matic and in some ways self-contradictory, like so much of the rest of his thought. 
In this particular case the difficulties arise in part from the fact that the categories 
in which he formulates the problem are themselves a function of it. The well-
known paragraph in The Case of Wagner which so closely echoes the words of 
Bourget in his essay on Baudelaire will eventually help to bring this point out: 
What is the characteristic feature of all literary decadence? The fact that life no 
longer adheres to the whole. The word becomes sovereign and jumps out of the 
sentence, the sentence spills over and obscures the sense of the page, the page gains in 
life at the expense of the whole-the whole no longer is a whole. But that is a meta-
phor for every decadent style: always anarchy of the atoms, disaggregation of the will, 
"freedom of the individual" if we speak morally-if we expand it to a political 
theory it becomes "equal rights for all." Life, the identical living quality, the vibration 
and exuberance oflife, forced back into the smallest entities, the rest impoverished of 
life. Everywhere paralysis, fatigue, petrifaction or hostility and chaos: both of these 
become more and more apparent the higher the forms of the organization one 
penetrates. The whole lives no longer; it is composite, computed, artificial, an 
artifact. (W, II, 917) 
A detailed examination of this enigmatic and highly debatable passage 
would lead, in every direction, into the monstrous labyrinth of Nietzsche's later 
works. Let us note merely a few points. Though Bourget himself begins with the 
analogy of the social organism he goes on very quickly to the issue of literary 
style; the highly tendentious social and political extensions in The Case of Wagner 
are a Nietzschean polemical outgrowth, but even in Nietzsche they are not turned 
into the essence of the matter. The aspersion upon "freedom of the individual" 
does perhaps have interesting implications, in view of the common notion that 
Nietzsche was a fanatical individualist. What is significant above all else, however, 
is that the philosopher seizes upon the organic metaphor used by Bourget and 
intensifies it, and that in his manipulation of it the independent animation of the 
disaggregated parts is seen to result in the destruction of hierarchy and the trans-
formation of the living whole into an artificial pseudo-entity, a lifeless "artifact." 
The work of art is a common Nietzschean metaphor for the self of man, and the 
decadent process is often regarded-as Bourget regarded it too-primarily in 
6 This title is used for convenience, to characterize the notebook material of the years 1883-88, in 
preference to some German term like Nachlaf]. 
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aesthetic terms as a derogation from unity or sovereignty of style. The meta-
morphosis of organism into artifact is very expressive of the decadent mentality, 
as frequent instances in the literatu~e of the period of such devitalization of 
Romantic organic imagery suggest. Vegetable often becomes mineral, and soma 
becomes machine; flowers are confined to the conservatory, while transcendental 
bliss is replaced by the enclosed "paradis artificiel" of the opium-eater. One of 
the foundations of Nietzsche's critique of decadence is self-evidently an organic 
vitalism in which the whole is always greater than its parts. And it is, as a number 
of passages in The Will to Power clearly show, the will which, in its integrating and 
cohering power, is the mainstay of such organic identity. 
At this point, however, we enter the realm of paradox. On the one hand that 
very will which, according to Nietzsche, is a necessity if the cosmos of the living 
organism is to resist dissolution also appears in his later writings as the sole true 
generator of the artificial, autonomous in its organization of chaos into art or 
"man": "The greatness of an artist is not measured by the 'beautiful feelings' he 
arouses: that's a woman's notion. But by the degree in which he approaches the 
great style, in which he is capable ef the great style. This style has in common with 
great passion that it disdains to please; that it forgets to persuade; that it com-
mands; that it wills . ... To be master of the chaos that one is; to compel one's 
chaos to become form: to become logical, simple, unambiguous, mathematics, 
law . .. " (W, III, 782). The vital will prevents degeneration into artifact, but the 
will is also the force which creates form and brings the artifact into being. On the 
other hand it is precisely something organic, something physiological, "the 
decadence-instinct" (W, II, 988) which induces the disaggregation of the will and 
the dissolution of the living entity. Or, to put the antinomy exceedingly bluntly: 
the organic is both life and its decay, the artificial is both the paralysis and petri-
faction oflife, a sham, and also the surmounting of this disintegration, a creatio ex 
nihi/o by the will, in which the individual imposes his form on chaos and· replaces 
Natural Law with his own artificial principle. 
In this manner the categories in which Nietzsche thinks about decadence do 
disclose a fundamental unresolved polarity of this entire period in the history of 
the Western artistic sensibility, which is as much a part of him as it is of decadence: 
this is the tension between hypersensualism on the one hand and extreme cere-
bralism on the other, which resulted, in certain typical works of the day, in what 
Mario Praz has called "that extraordinary conflagration of cerebral lechery."7 
As far as the sensualist extreme is concerned, we should note that decadence, 
though he may define it variously, is for Nietzsche as physiological a thing as it 
was for Huysmans, coming in the wake of Zola and the Naturalists. Here and 
there we find him pointing directly or indirectly to the biological factors: "erotic 
7 Mario Praz, The Romantic Agony, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1970), p. 395. 
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precocity: the curse of French youth in particular, Parisians fo;st and foremost: 
who emerge from the lycees into the world already ruined and defiled-and 
never free themselves from the shackles of contemptible inclinations, ironic and 
vile towards themselves-galley-slaves, with all their refinements ... " (W, III, 
8o6). It is not certain, but quite probable, that "contemptible inclinations" 
("verachtliche Neigungen") implies perversions, and the question of Nietzsche's 
attitude to perversion is, as will be indicated further, an important one. The 
passage reminds the reader irresistibly of Rimbaud,.of whom the writer had 
surely never heard. It shows us that Nietzsche, with remarkable perception, saw 
in the primitive the seed-bed of the decadent flora, in the instinctual and the 
organic the sure threat to the autonomous will. The sophisticated decadent is in 
fact a "galley-slave," the most primitive of prisoners. Modern analysis of this 
whole literature would generally endorse the nexus: decadents such as Baudelaire 
and Huysmans, or for that matter Wilde and d' Annunzio, deliberately revolted 
against the Romantic cult of Nature, without however abandoning the covert 
belief that such an ideal and norm did indeed exist and remained valid: "the 
decadents, even when they refused to live by Rousseau's gospel, never denied its 
truth ... They accepted Nature as the norm, primitivism as synonymous with 
virtue."8 
At this stage in the argument the question of the influence of de Sade must 
be raised, ingrained as it was in the entire development of decadent literature in 
France. It is strange that Nietzsche, who is so often accused of cruelty and sadism 
in his thought, never mentions the divine marquis, although (as I shall make clear 
later) there is one possible explanation of this omission which might have a wider 
significance. It could well be, of course, that Nietzsche never read a word of de 
Sade, but he must have known of him, if only because Bourget, whom he had 
closely perused, refers to him. De Sade was important for the decadents not only 
because he provided them with a mine of suitable materials, but also because he 
appears to make of the deliberate outraging of Nature a kind of philosophy of 
life. The abnormal and the artificial are supposed to demonstrate the totally 
anarchic individual's superiority to Natural Law. From such a position it is only 
a step to begin to reason that the perverse itself is natural, since, as Arthur Symons 
remarks: "I affirm that it is not natural to be what is called 'natural' any longer."9 
Nietzsche expresses an almost identical view when he declares: "Not 'return to 
nature': for there never was a natural man. The scholasticism of un- and anti-
natural values is the rule, the beginning; man comes to nature after a long struggle 
-he never 'returns' to it .... Nature: that is, to dare to be immoral like nature" 
(W, III, 616). This paradox is meant to subvert thoroughly the notion of a 
8 A. E. Carter. The Idea ef Decadence in French Literature, 1830-1900 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1958), p. 4. 
9 The Symbolist Movement (New York: Dutton, 1908), p. 134. 
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morality of natural conduct. Nietzsche employs a similar argument to distinguish 
his blackest bhe noire, Rousseau, who believed that man was more complete the 
closer he was to Nature, from Voltaire, who thought the reverse. Here again 
however it is surely significant that he adduces the latter, and not de Sade or 
Baudelaire, as his example of the applauded "unnatural" man. At heart Nietzsche 
was, of course, moralist enough. In denouncing what he calls the "Romantic" 
morality of"tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner" as well as the objectivity of 
art for art's sake (W, III, 882), he is seeking to transcend all forms ofnineteenth-
century Epicureanism in favor of some set of new, but "moral," principles. 
However there are, in his opinion, two ways of rejecting or transcending the cult 
of the Natural: if this is done with a sidelong acknowledgement that Nature, 
precisely while being violated, remains the norm, then the outcome is the deca-
dent; if however, the denial of the ideal of the primitive, natural man is genuine 
and total, then there emerges a wholly new type, the true savage as distinct from 
the ideal one, "the 'savage' man (or, in moral terms, the evil man) ... " (W, III, 
742), for whom what is natural is exclusively what his will may dictate. The man 
himself is then artificial, for he is the creation of his own artistic power. 
To understand the late writings of Nietzsche it is necessary to see that this 
artificial creature of adventitious will, whose reality is self-generated, is joined in 
these paradoxical philosophizings to a vitalistic primitive, like a highly dissimilar 
Siamese twin. The two do not understand one another-worse, they hardly 
notice that they are bound together. A recognition of this situation gives us insight 
into a number of typical Nietzschean contradictions, including his puzzling dis-
cussions of the actor and of the histrionic principle. Wagner who, in his one-time 
disciple's view, subsumed in himself the whole of French and German decadence 
(W, III, 64 7), is presented as the most grandiose example of this histrionic temper-
ament. The "actor-spirit" is associated with the "demagogue-spirit" and the 
"beaver and ant-spirit" of scholars (W, III, 472), as all being characteristic of the 
decadent age. Opera is the concrete symbol of decadence in art, and as such, 
despite or rather because of its conspicuous artificiality, is associated with that 
Romantic idealism which Nietzsche believes he is overcoming and refuting: 
" 'Return to nature' more and more decisively in the opposite sense to Rous-
seau's;-away from the idyll and the opera!" (W, III, 532)-and let us note the 
conjunction! "Wagner-French cult of the ghastly and the grand opera" (W, III, 
872). Wagner's showmanship, his exoticism, his sensuality, his fin de siecle passivity 
are all symptoms of the disastrous degeneration into that kind of dishonesty, sham 
and paralytic artificiality which is produced when the will has become disaggre-
gated and life has receded from the calcified whole into the parts. Wagner is the 
complete opposite of that other species of artificial man adumbrated above, the 
man of creative will, the evil man, the superman. He is of course the exemplum 
horribilis of the correctness of Bourget's central perception about decadence. 
But in Nietzsche's lengthy drama there is a whole crowd of actors. There is, 
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for instance, the Emperor Augustus. Nietzsche tells us in The Joyful Wisdom (Die 
Jrohliche Wissenschaft) that, when at the point of death, Augustus, "that terrible 
man ... let his mask fall for the first time, when he made clear that he had worn 
a mask and had acted a comedy, had acted that father of the Fatherland and 
wisdom upon the throne, good to the point of illusion! Plaudite amid, comoedia 
finita est!" (W, II, 63). Augustus has in him, it would appear, elements of a type of 
actor different from the Wagnerian, the existential actor in good faith not bad, 
the creator ex nihilo, the virtuoso of indispensable illusion. In that he demonstrates 
something of the art ofliving in a void, and of true self-mastery, he points away 
from decadence, but he remains a somewhat paradoxical figure in Nietzsche's 
imagination. And, after all, the comoedia itself is paradoxical, as is the artificial life 
per se. For is it the sole authentic, self-created existence in a chaotic world, or could 
it be that it is, commonly at least, merely a perverse sham? 
It is only when such ambiguities are kept in mind that the special features of 
Nietzsche's relationship with the European cult of decadence can be properly 
understood. A most useful standard of comparison in these matters is Stefan 
George, whose emergence as a poet is almost exactly contemporaneous with 
Nietzsche's intellectual demise. The question of when, precisely, and how deeply, 
George may have been influenced by Nietzsche is unsettled, and this is likely to 
remain a matter of controversy. 10 It is in any case not germane to the argument I 
wish to proffer here. What is relevant in this case is that George can provide a point 
of departure for an examination of the connections between decadence and the 
classical tradition. Furthermore there are, quite apart from problems of influence, 
a number of deep-seated affinities between his early poetry and the later writings 
of Nietzsche, especially the preoccupation with will, with artifice and form, and 
with creatio ex nihilo. In George's Algabal (1892) a figure takes the stage, emerging 
simultaneously from the ornate wings offrench decadence and ofRoman history 
of the Decline who, somewhat like the Emperor Augustus, imposes his comoedia 
upon "reality" by an act of tortured will. The characteristics of such a tormented 
act of solipsistic egoism do however differ in important respects from the modus 
vivendi of Augustus, which latter does specifically fulfill a certain social role. The 
nature of such an act as Algabal's had, as we shall see later, already been quite 
precisely defined by Nietzsche, as a typically decadent phenomenon. George's 
Heliogabalus-figure belongs, of course, to the central tradition of decadence, in a 
way in which Augustus does not. Interest in the third-century emperor-priest and 
his brief but vicious reign goes back at least to de Sade. 11 There is a reference to 
him in Poe, and in Gautier's Mademoiselle de Maupin (1834), which Praz calls "the 
Bible of the Decadence. " 12 Barbey d' Aurevilly describes Baudelaire as "un 
10 Piitz ("Nietzsche und Stefan George," Georie Kolloquium) has concluded recently that the 
influence was in fact deeper, and earlier, than has been commonly assumed. 
11 See I.A nouvelle Justine et Juliette. 
12 Praz, pp. 332-33. 
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Heliogabale artificiel,"13 and was not the only one to make the comparison. 
Bourget remarks on the manner in which "I' etrange rage qui a produit les Neron 
et les Heliogabale" gnawed at Baudelaire's heart. 14 French literature of the 1870s 
and 1880s teems with Heliogabali and sub-species thereof, and it is not unlikely 
that George knew Jean Lombard's glisteningly sadistic novel L'Agonie (1888), 
which dwells on the androgyne aspects of the Heliogabalus theme. The German 
poet, of course, also possessed a remarkably rich knowledge of classical literature, 
especially the Latin poets, 15 and with his customary intellectual rigor he went 
beyond French literary re-creations to the primary historical sources, such as Dio 
Cassius, Lampridius and Herodian. 16 
George's portrait of Heliogabalus in Algabal has certain psychological 
analogies with the shadowy figure of the superman that ghosts through Nietz-
sche's post-Zarathustran works. It also discloses specifically decadent nuances in 
regard to the treatment of artifice, perversion and will. 17 The French decadents, 
George, and Nietzsche, are all inclined to take from classical literature and history 
models for their visualization of man. As George reveals in his eulogy of Mal-
larme, 18 his concern with ancient civilization was especially, like that of so many 
of his contemporaries, an interest in the era of the Decline. In choosing the figure 
of Heliogabalus he also accepted by implication one of the most established con-
ceits of decadent literature, the comparison between the final years of the Roman 
Empire and the later nineteenth century. The best known expression of this is no 
doubt Verlaine's sonnet, "Langueur" (1885): 
Jc suis !'Empire a la fin de la decadence, 
Qui regarde passer les grands Barbares blancs 
En composant des acrostiches indolents 
D'un style d'or ou la langucur du soleil danse. 
(I am the Empire at the end of the decline, 
Watching the great white barbarians come past 
While composing indolent acrostics 
In a golden style wherein dances the languor of the sun.) 
13 Quoted by Carter, p. 1 3. 
14 "The strange madness which produced the Neros and the Heliogabali"; Essais de psychologie 
contemporaine (Paris: Pion, 1916), I, 18. 
15 Cf. the evidence in H. Stefan Schultz, "Stefan George und die Antike," in Studien zur Dichtung 
Stefan Georges (Heidelberg: Lothar Stiehm, 1967), pp. 90-124. 
16 Cf., e.g., Victor A. Oswald, "The Historical Content of Stefan George's • Algabal,' " Germanic 
Review, 23 (1948), 193-205. 
17 Cf. Mark Boulby, "Nietzsche's Problem of the Artist and George's Algabal," Modem Language 
Review, 52 (1957), 72-80. I would no longer suggest that the motif of the will is sufficient to differentiate 
Algabal clearly from .the decadent tradition. 
18 Stefan George, Gesamtausgabe der Werke (Berlin: Bondi, 1927-34), XVII, 53. 
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The picture of the Roman intellectual in his exhausted passivity and physical 
satiety working out acrostics as the barbarians ride in is a central symbolic state-
ment of the decadent sense of their particular moment of history and its psycho-
logical content. In a similar vein is Mallarme' s comment: "La litterature a laquelle 
mon esprit demande une volupte sera la poesie agonisante des derniers moments 
de Rome, tant, cependant, qu'elle ne respire aucunement l'approche rajeunissante 
des Barbares ... " 19 Bourget speaks of "la decadence latine" and specifically 
adduces the later Roman Empire as the best example available of a decadent 
society, sterile, with a falling birth-rate and no will to fight, surrendered to 
pleasure, to nervous titillation, to dillettantism and scepticism. In a long passage 
he puts into the mouth of an amateur psychologist the assertion that decadence is 
preferable to barbarism, the Emperor Hadrian debauching (presumably with 
Antinous, another favorite allusion of the day) had more to contribute to culture 
than "un chef germain dune siecle." Though decadent ages always end with the 
inrush of barbarians, is it not "le lot fatal de l'exquis et du rare d'avoir tort devant 
la brutalite?"20 
Neither Nietzsche nor George ever saw the issues quite so straightforwardly, 
but the latter may in fact be found using the analogue as late as a work published 
in 1919, and probably influenced by Spengler.21 It is an analogue which proli-
ferated in the second half of the nineteenth century, and in the 1890s "cette 
antiquite heliogabalique" (Edmond de Goncourt) gradually merged into a dream 
of corrupt Byzantium-indeed these two are confused, so that Karl-August 
Klein, in George's Blatter fiir die Kunst, could make a (deliberate?) error of several 
hundred years and call Heliogabalus a Byzantine emperor. It was tempting, in 
France, to see in the "raffish gloss"22 of the Second Empire all the distinguishing 
marks of the ultimate agony of civilization, the Finis Latinorum. In England the 
comparison between late Rome and the Victorian era was also made, sometimes 
in considerable detail. A pupil of Walter Pater's, T. H. Escott, published in 1875 
an article entitled "Rome and London. A.O. 408-1875."23 Pater himself, in 
Marius the Epicurean (1885), drew an elaborate comparison between his own day 
and the age of the Antonines, which has been called "a straightforward ana-
logue,"24 and a rather similar line was followed by novelists such as Thackeray, 
19 "The literature from which my mind demands sensual delight will be the dying poetry of the 
final moments of Rome, just so long, however, as this does not betoken remotely the regenerative 
approach of the barbarians ... "; "Le Phenomene futur" (1864). 
20 "A German chieftain of the second century .... " 
"the fatal destiny of the exquisite and the rare to be in the wrong in the confrontation with bru-
tality?"; Essais, p. 22. 
21 "Der Brand des Tempels," Blatter far die Kunst, 11-12. 
22 Carter, p. viii. 
23 MacMillan's Magazine, 32 (1875). 
24 Anthony Ward, Walter Pater: The Idea in Nature (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1966), p. 148. 
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Shorthouse and Lord Bulwer-Lytton. The suggestion has also been made that, in a 
rather different fashion, the perverse world of George's Algabal might be regarded 
as a mask for Imperial Germany.25 
At first sight we do not find the basic analogy in Nietzsche, despite occasional 
references to contemporary German civilization as a culture of decline (III, 872), 
some allusions to Roman decadence and, of course the insistence that it was 
Christianity that insidiously undermined and sapped the vitality of the Roman 
Empire. Nietzsche's thoughts on the coming barbarians, however, do come close 
to implying the analogue. All the same, his fundamental model for the decadent 
process is a different one, though also classical-namely pre-Socratic and post-
Socratic Greece. The Birth of Tragedy, in 1872, already of course establishes this 
paradigm. Karl Joel long ago argued that we should see Ni~tzsche as a Romantic, 
who romanticized everything, including Greece, and that his so-called classicism 
is merely incidental, since he always turned his back upon the truly classical, 
Periclean age. 26 This opinion seems to me difficult if not impossible to reconcile 
with the hostility to the Romantics and all their works found throughout 
Nietzsche's middle and final periods. It is also not really compatible with his 
pursuit of the overall style, the "great" or "grand" style, that of form and whole-
ness. Dionysiac pessimism, as Nietzsche adamantly declares, is not Romantic, it is 
rather "classical" (cf. W, II, 246)-and the vision of such a classical pessimism is 
his "proprium and ipsissimum"; "greatness of soul," moreover, "has nothing Romantic 
about it" (W, III, 609). Wagner, after all, was a Romantic, perhaps the ultimate 
one. So Nietzsche did not, as Joel mistakenly supposes, create a Romantic myth 
about the history of Greece. What rather occurred was that his vitalistic primiti-
vism, which has some similarities to types of Romantic idealism, led him to 
establish this particular historical paradigm, the most prominent feature of which 
is the indictment of the Socratic and Alexandrine intellectualism which is sup-
posed to have put an end to the Dionysiac age. 27 Ifwe consider this model, from 
The Birth of Tragedy right through to The Will to Power, we shall see that what is 
really posited is an organic degeneration, the disintegration of the will, the fatigue, 
paralysis and petrifaction of the exemplary cultural entity-namely, the n6},1s ,-
all of which phenomena can be described in aesthetic terms, and often are, as the 
loss of the integrated sovereignty of style and the replacement of a living and 
unified identity by a sham wholeness, a Wagnerian theatrical fapde: 
25 Cf., e.g., Richard Hamann and Jost Hermand, lmpressioni.,mus (Berlin: Akademic, 1966}, p. 26. 
26 Karl Joel, Nietzsche und die Romantik (Jena: Diederichs, 1905), pp. 279-81. 
27 It is not possible to go into this question here. It may well be that in insisting on relating Socrates 
to nineteenth-century decadence Nietzsche made a serious error. For this view sec J. C. O'Flaherty, 
"Eros and Creativity in Nietzsche's Birth qf Tragedy," Studies in German Literature of the Nineteenth and 
Tu,entieth Cc11t11ries. Festsclmfifor Frederic E. Coenen, ed. Siegfried Mews, UNC Studies in the Germanic 
Languages and Literatures, No. 67 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), pp. 83-104. 
Nietzsche and the Finis Latinorum 225 
The philosophers are in fact the decadents of Hellenic culture ["Griechentum"], the 
revulsion against old, aristocratic ("vornehm"] taste (-against the instinct for strug-
gle [i.e., dywr ], against the Polis, against the value of race, against the authority of 
tradition). The Socratic virtues were preached because the Greeks had lost them: 
irritable, nervous, unstable, actors through and through, they had a few reasons too 
many to have morality preached at them. Not that it would have helped at all: but 
grand words and attitudes suit decadents so well .... (W, II, 1030) 
What emerges as an essential element in Nietzsche's paradigm is the Greek 
"actor," graeculus histrio (cf. W, II, 224), who is said to have subverted the Roman 
Empire as well, in the end. The Joyful Wisdom alleges that some similar process is 
now occurring in modem Europe. Everything becomes inauthentic, becomes 
comoedia, as all men turn into actors. A chronic and dissolute individualism wrecks 
all chance for communal effort. An Epicurean preoccupation with the sensation 
of the moment precludes great works of the spirit, prevents the realization of 
human achievements spread over long periods of time. Organizational geniuses, 
Nietzsche maintains, great builders and architects, no longer appear on the scene, 
and here again, in this thought of building for the ages, we may detect the same 
fundamental desire for cosmos and hierarchy, which however is seen currently 
succumbing to the insurgent anarchy of the disparate parts (cf. W, II, 224-25). In 
such passages as these Nietzsche's notorious individualism and anarchism are 
certainly cast in a very dubious light. 
It is in fact a serious error to regard Nietzsche's thought as essentially anar-
chical, or to overstress his commitment to the individual ego. "Freedom of the 
individual," as we have noted, was not one of his slogans. Community and cultic 
unity were more important to him. The "great style" always presupposes the 
hierarchical subordination of parts to whole, whether that whole be conceived of 
as an ideal and undegenerated primitive, a natural organism, or as its alternative, 
the artificial but nonetheless authentic self created by the existential act of will. 
Now when Nietzsche searches for models, not of decadence but of this kind of 
coherent and fully-formed organization, he finds one in the Roman Empire, 
which he depicts therefore in a manner antithetical to its treatment by decadent 
writers. It is worth noting that in his last books Nietzsche is increasingly interested 
in Rome and the Romans and markedly less than previously in the Greeks. Thus 
in The Twilight of the Idols he writes: "My sense of style, for the epigram as style, 
was aroused instantly by the encounter with Sallust .... Concentrated, severe, 
with as much substance as possible at its base, a cold malice against 'beautiful 
words,' also 'beautiful feelings' -I found myself in that. In my style, up to and 
including my Zarathustra, you will find a very serious ambition for Roman style, 
aere perennius . ... I do not owe the Greeks anything like such strong impressions; 
and, to put it bluntly, they cannot be what the Romans are to us" (W, II, 1027-28). 
Roman literature is aristocratic ("vornehm"), and Nietzsche stresses an ideal of 
urbanity which Rome possessed supremely, and which he also finds in the 
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seventeenth and to some degree in the eighteenth century, though.not in that 
Rousseauistic tradition which issued in Romanticism. What Nietzsche admires 
in that latter century is exactly what the Romantics (and therefore the decadents) 
did not inherit, that is, "the insouciance, the serenity, the elegance, the intellectual 
brightness" (W, III, 529). The term imperium Romanum conjures up for him not 
at all a vision of decay but one of self-realization of the will in an integrated cultural 
style, "unity of the artistic style in all the expressions oflife of a people"(W, I, 
140), as he put it very early. The urbane patina was perhaps immune, at least for a 
generation or two, to the pernicious seepage of the Christian slave-ethic and its 
poisonous egalitarianism. What, The Antichrist asks, is imperium Romanum but: 
the most magnificent form of organization under difficult conditions that has ever 
been achieved, in comparison · with which every Before and every Afterwards is 
fragmented, botched, dilettantist-those holy anarchists made a "pious act" out of 
destroying "the world," that is, the imperium Romanum ... Christian and anarchist: 
both decadents . ... The imperium Romanum ... this most admirable work of art in the 
great style, was a beginning, its construction was calculated to prove itself through 
millennia-until today no one has built like this nor ever even dreamed of building 
in such a degree sub specie aeterni! - This organization was strong enough to survive 
bad emperors: the accident of individuals can have nothing to do with such things-
_frrst principle of all great architecture. (W, II, 1229) 
The architectural or building metaphor recurs here. The artistic will which 
hews and piles in stone, refutes the centuries and defies the corruption of the 
organic, is Nietzsche's prerequisite for that style which can overcome decadence 
and nihilism. Its classical mould, its unity of surface actually negates the individu-
alistic or particular. If we think now of the world of George's Heliogabalus, 
mineral and metallic, an artificial underworld created by the Emperor's own will, 
we must needs recognize a distinction between these two forms of artifact. Their 
quality is quite different. Their presuppositions are also quite different. The 
"unnaturalness" of Algabal's underworld is based, in conventional decadent 
fashion, on the notion that Nature is still the norm. Thus Algabal is in the end 
inevitably found wanting, indeed he finds himself so; the activities of George's 
hero are as pathetic as those of Ludwig II of Bavaria, one of the models for him 
(and of course the patron of Bayreuth). The "unnaturalness" of Nietzsche's 
empire of the will is something quite other than this, since it presupposes no valid 
Nature from which it has departed; there is for it, and can be, no other authentic 
"nature" but that of the will, and when this situation is given the universal or at 
least communal value of cult and myth there arises Dionysiac, or classical, 
pessimism. Now of course it is most hazardous to generalize about Nietzsche. His 
entire output is characterized by what may be called, at best, flashes of con-
sistency. However in this case there are enough of these for us to establish the 
argument, as will emerge from a brief consideration of the philosopher's com-
ments upon individual Romans and Greeks. But inconsistencies and side-steps 
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inevitably do occur. On the one hand a brief note- "Primitive jungle creatures, 
the Romans" (W, III, 8 5 1 )-shows a typical Nietzschean reversal, from evaluation 
in terms of urbanity to evaluation in terms of the primitive. On the other hand 
Nietzsche cannot deny that the Empire was eventually successfully attacked, from 
without, and this brings him, in his inner play-writing, quite close at times to 
Verlaine's denouement, the unresisted inrush of the barbarians. By and large, 
however, his Roman models (and some Greek) are exploited in the service of a 
conspicuously non-decadent ideal. 
Nietzsche never refers to Heliogabalus, rarely to Nero. The latter with his 
qualis artifex pereo! (whom Flaubert revered when a young man) is compared with 
the dying Augustus, in a passage in which both are said to have demonstrated 
"histrionic vanity! histrionic garrulity!" They are then contrasted with the Em-
peror Tiberius, who was "genuine and not an actor" (W, II, 63). Itis worth noting 
that here, in The joyful Wisdom, Nietzsche still maintains a clear-cut distinc-
tion between the genuine and the invented (or acted). In fact he never really 
managed to expunge the notion of "genuineness" from his thought. But as the 
apotheosis of the artificial man develops, a more important distinction for him is 
that between the two kinds of artifice, between the Wagnerian histrionic type and 
the superman-artist. The early origins of this latter character, as well as his culmi-
nation, may be found for instance in the references to. Prometheus, with his 
"necessity of crime" (The Birth of Tragedy; W, I, 60) and his barbarian quality (The 
Will to Power; W, III, 846), while in Beyond Good and Evil we find an honor roll of 
heroes of the will, who overcome and "outwit" their inner conflict instead of 
surrendering to the yearning for the "sabbath of sabbaths" and a motionless 
placidity: here we find Julius Caesar cited, and Alcibiades. The latter was also of 
potential interest to decadents, as Praz indicates.28 And even Nietzsche mentions 
him somewhere in some such terms as well, as one who abandoned the instinct for 
struggle-the dywv, which was the real source of Greek vitality (W, III, 299). 
Among Romans, Petronius is probably the best instance of a figure in the 
discussion of whom Nietzsche demonstrates decisively the distance between him-
self and the decadents. The author of the Satyricon was an attractive-example, of 
course, for decadent poets. Verlaine, for instance, mentions as authentic images of 
decadence Sardanapalus in the midst of his women (Delacroix), Seneca reciting 
poetry as he bleeds to death, and Petronius "masking his agony with flowers."29 
The anonymous article in The Quarterly Review, already cited, suggests that the 
decadents derive their inspiration from "Catullus, Apuleius of the 'Golden Ass,' 
Petronius Arbiter, and the host of Greek lyrical singers whom Cicero could never, 
as he observes, find time to read."30 Nietzsche has no doubts about the decadence 
28 Cf. Praz, pp. 295 and 369. 
29 Joanna Richardson, Verlaine (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970), p. 190. The flower 
motif, which is persistent in decadent literature and is found in Algabal, is strikingly un-Nietzschean. 
30 The Quarterly Review, 172 (1891), 293. 
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of Delacroix (c£ W, II, 1091), but he shows no interest in Catullus or Apuleius. 
Particularly in view of the remarks he makes about Sallust (and also Horace), we 
may suppose that "the putrescent hues of Apuleius"31 were uncongenial, that this 
writer's bawdy absurdities and sensual fantasy (so attractive to Huysmans) held 
little appeal for Nietzsche, and this despite the latter's insistence that he esteems 
"buffoonery." In the case of Petronius, significantly enough, the feature he 
stresses is health. Petronius, stylistically, is declared to be "the master of the presto" 
(W, II, 594)-hence impossible to render well in German! Petronius "makes 
everything run." Just as Domenico Boccaccio wrote to the Duke of Parma about 
Cesare Borgia, Petronius is "tutto festo," "immortally healthy, immortally serene 
and felicitously made ["wohlgeraten"]" (W, II, 1210). What a contrast is the 
Satyricon to that appalling New Testament in which "not a single buffoonery is to 
be found" (W, III, 527). Nietzsche's praise for Petronius's novel is a rare case in 
which we find him admiring a work which specifically and centrally treats 
sexual perversion. 
Plato and Socrates were of course major figures in Nietzsche's tragedy of 
decadence. Though to discuss their significance in this context would lead much 
too far afield, there is another Greek thinker to whom attention should be drawn, 
since he is also indicted directly, and perhaps more aptly, as a progenitor and 
excellent illustration of the decadent morality the philosopher thinks to find in his 
own day. This is Epicurus, whose importance among Nietzsche's dramatis 
personae until recently has been somewhat neglected.32 Epicureanism in some 
form or other may be said to underlie many of the manifestations of decadence. 
The preoccupation with the moment, with the senses and with pleasure (in a wide 
sense), the essential passivity of this outlook, its static quality-all this already 
shows the connection. Among French writers of the period, however, there is not 
much interest in Epicurus himself-no doubt because he did not provide an 
obvious enough example of the overcultivated life. Behind him, of course, stands 
the shadowy figure of Heraclitus, whom Nietzsche much admired. The Heracli-
tean flux- "the world forever needs the truth and it forever needs Heraclitus" 
(W, III, 380)-is a fundamental preconception of Nietzsche's entire philosophy, 
although, true to his subjective dramatic method, Heraclitus is sometimes alleged 
in it to have played a role for which there is little or no evidence.33 It is in English 
literature, not French, that these ancestors of late nineteenth-century Epicure-
3 1 Ibid., p. 302. 
32 The International Nietzsche Bibliography (1968) notes only one study: G. Barkuras, Nietzsche und 
Epikur (Diss., Kiel, 1962). Nietzsche's great interest in the work of the contemporary sceptic Marie-Jean 
Guyau (I.a morale d'Epicure, et ses rapports avec /es doctrines contemporaines. 1874) is worth bearing in mind. 
33 Knight accuses Nietzsche of insincerity in this connection (see A. H.J. Knight, Some Aspects of 
the Life and Work of Nietzsche [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933], p. 106). This criticism 
really misses the point, since it overlooks the nature of the imaginative monodrama in which Nietzsche 
is in~olved. 
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anism find their outstanding disciples, especially in Walter Pater. Though, in a few 
ways, Pater and Nietzsche are uncannily close, it is once again the differences 
which really count. Like Nietzsche, Pater is preoccupied with the integrated 
whole, and especially with the achievement of a personal cosmos, a state of order 
which the cosmoplastic moment of"insight" imposes upon an inchoate world.34 
As far as his lecture on Dionysus-" A Study of Dionysus: The Spiritual Form of 
Fire and Dew" (1876)-is concerned, this seems so near to The Birth of Tragedy 
both in its date and its dualistic explanation of Greek art that the argument that 
Pater must have known Nietzsche has been put forward with confidence. But the 
weight of the evidence is really all the other way-that Pater, even in his later 
years, had never heard of the German writer. 35 Pater's view oflife is consistently 
different from Nietzsche's. In one way it is much more oriented towards the cult 
of the self, in another it compromises far more with conventional moral ideas. 
Pater dropped, from the second edition of The Renaissance, the famous preface 
which was supposed to have corrupted the morals of young people-a most un-
Nietzschean concession to make. In Marius the Epicurean, that much misunder-
stood novel, he transcends, as does Nietzsche, the Epicurean solution, and asserts a 
morality of willed action. He is still divided from Nietzsche, however, by his 
altruism, and by his tentative approach to a Christian solution. 
Nietzsche's criticisms of Epicurus epitomize his theory of decadence as a 
failure of the will and a flight from life. They help to confirm that his thinking 
never really led him to an introverted cult of the self, nor to the manipulation of 
experience for its own sake; in this respect he never endorses, even temporarily, 
the position with which Pater's Marius begins. The architectural metaphor 
brought out above is a more accurate indication of the general direction of Nietz-
sche's idealism. Nietzsche believed that the Epicureans, and also the Stoics, had 
lost the original "innocence" possessed, as he thought, by the early Greeks-for 
they did not approach life actively. Epicurus fenced himself in his garden and 
monitored his responses to stimuli, seeking to achieve a steady state. Aristippus, 
Nietzsche admitted, was a trifle more active, but Pyrrho, decided! y "weary," was 
even more decayed. Epicurus is called "a typical decadent, first recognized as such 
by me" (W, II, 1192). He may be commended for having denounced Plato, but he 
is nonetheless "the opposite of a dionysiac pessimist." Moreover, the Christian is 
just a kind of Epicurean, and both, according to Nietzsche, are Romantics. The 
highly significant passage in The Joyful Wisdom entitled "What is Romanticism?" 
34 Barbara Charlesworth, Dark Passages: The Decadent Consciousness in Victorian Literature (Madi-
son: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), pp. 45-46. 
35 Arthur Symons, among others, followed the early fashion which asserted a close kinship be-
tween Nietzsche and Pater. Several modem scholars have repeated this assertion. But for the negative 
evidence see David S. Thatcher, Nietzsche in England (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1970), and 
Patrick Bridgwater, Nietzsche in Anglosaxony (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1972). 
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(W, II, 244-46) distinguishes two types of suffering. There is that positive type 
which comes from "excess oflife," and that negative kind which comes from its 
impoverishment. Those whose suffering is of the latter variety seek "peace, 
silence, smooth sea, liberation from themselves through art and knowledge ... or 
else intoxication, spasm, narcosis, insanity." This is the "dual need," the dual face 
of the Romantic longing. Though Nietzsche does not point it out here, the 
connection with decadent feeling is self-evident, the proximity, for instance, to 
Baudelaire's opium paradise and to his "luxe, calme et volupte." Another para-
graph in the same book, headed "Why we seem to be Epicureans" (W, II, 250-1) 
stresses the hesitancy of contemporary men, their avoidance of hard decisions, 
their obsession with speculation. As for the Stoic, he too is in reality a decadent. 
Seneca is a bad actor-an ostentatious "toreador of virtue" (W, II, 991). Marcus 
Aurelius-much discussed in the mid-nineteenth century and a central character 
in Marius the Epicurean36 -is criticized by Nietzsche for the fact that he did not 
know how to affirm (not, as he is by Pater, because he is unresponsive to human 
pain). Nietzsche confronts the Stoic-Heraclitean doctrines of Aurelius with his 
own affirmation of Recurrence: "My comfort is that everything that was is 
eternal-the sea washes it up again" (W, III, 680). 
"What is Romanticism?" is a statement of great importance. Here, in his 
analysis of the Epicurean pursuit of the steady state of being, aiming at "making 
eternal" ("verewigen") rather than destroying and transforming, Nietzsche once 
more, as in the case of suffering itself, subdivides into two possible types. There is 
first of all this "will to make eternal" which, because it implies the creation of 
great works that overcome time, almost makes the negative kind of suffering 
positive again; and secondly there is the tyrannical, tormented struggle to imprint 
one's own pain upon the flux of life, which leads to something very different, in 
fact a denial of true cosmos, an egocentric sham and fa~ade: 
It can however also be that tyrannical will of a deeply suffering, struggling, tortured 
man, who would fain stamp what is most personal, individual, near to himself, the 
essential idiosyncrasy of his sufferings into a binding law and compulsion, and who 
as it were takes revenge on everything by impressing upon it, forcing it into, 
branding it with, his image, the image of his torture. This last is romantic pessimism in 
its most expressive form, be it Schopcnhauerian will-philosophy or Wagnerian 
music .... 
Here, in The Joyful Wisdom, is Nietzsche's precise definition of the solipsistic act of 
the tortured will that is so characteristic of the decadent-Baudelaire, Huysmans, 
36 For Matthew Arnold on Marcus Aurelius see Essays in Criticism (1865). Taine was a great·admirer 
of the Emperor, and Renan wrote both about him and about the Empress Faustina, who in Marius the 
Epicurean takes on some of the allures of a decadent femme fatale. Pater was aware of the tragedy of the 
man, and Nietzsche too seems to have felt something of this: "The popular ideals: the good man, the 
selfless man, the saint, the wise man, the just man. 0 Marcus Aurelius!" (W, Ill, 482). 
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Bourget, Barbey d' Aurevilly and their many precursors and followers, including 
George in his Algabal. Of the two variations upon the Epicurean attitude described 
in this passage the former is, to use Nietzsche's own terms, "classical" or "diony-
siac" pessimism and its meaning is not purely limited to the individual, while the 
latter, here called "romantic" pessimism, is quite evidently the monstrous per-
version ofHeliogabalus modernized by de Sade. It now appears more explicable 
why Nietzsche should have had no interest (that we know of) in de Sade. The 
admiration for the Satyricon notwithstanding (which is clearly founded on quite 
other factors) Nietzsche must be read throughout his works as unsympathetic to 
all forms of sexual perversion. Though this conclusion is based on a negative, an 
absence, it is of some importance in a thinker writing, as Nietzsche was, in the 
period of the Decadent Movement and whose sexual attitudes are otherwise of 
explicit relevance to a deeper understanding of his books. On the philosophical 
level we can say that Nietzsche's disapproval of perversion reflects inter alia his 
basic rejection of acts of the will which lack a more general framework, or even a 
cultic validity. 
Sadism, as Praz points out,37 was one of the most distinctive hallmarks of 
decadent literature, and perversion one of its deepest thoughts. Nietzsche's work 
is never sadistic or perverse in this fashion. In establishing the distinction between 
the artifice of the superman and that of the decadents he sees the latter as sexually 
and organically degenerate ("sister-marriage"[!], W, III, 872). Their acts of will 
are nothing but exotic, tormented throws of egoism. They are-as the logic of 
"What is Romanticism?" shows-at least incipiently perverted. That their 
excesses should frequently dissolve, as they did for example in Huysmans' case, in 
the embraces of a sensual Catholicism would hardly have surprised Nietzsche. 
Such a result is all but required by his arguments. It is consistent with this that 
Nietzsche scarcely touches on the androgyne motif, which is so common in the 
literature both of the classical world and of the decadents, as Algabal bears witness. 
According to Joel, a proposed course on Sappho at Basel was never given. 38 The 
subversive influence of the female principle seems to Nietzsche an established 
cause of decadence; hermaphroditic features, if encountered, are to be spurned. 
Women, he implies, have infiltrated the male preserve and have destroyed 
"natural" relationships: "Continuation of Christianity through the French Revolu-
tion. The seducer is Rousseau: he unshackles woman again, who from then on is 
portrayed as more and more interesting-as suffering. Then the slaves and Mistress 
Beecher-Stowe. Then the poor and the workers. Then the vicious and the 
diseased .... Then comes the curse upon sensual pleasure (Baudelaire and Scho-
37 Praz, p. 394. 
38 Joel, p. 363. By itself, of course, this signifies little. In Basel Nietzsche lectured almost entirely on 
the earlier periods of Greek literature and thought, avoiding the Alexandrines and hardly touching on 
Latin authors. 
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penhauer) ... " (W, III, 431). Baudelaire, who in Les Fleurs du Mal had composed 
what amounted to a series of awesome imprecations upon sexuality, had, like the 
other decadents, in his cerebral lechery perverted Nature. Good examples among 
literary persons were Sainte-Beuve and George Sand: "It betrays corruption of 
the instincts [i.e., organic decadence ]-apart from the fact that it betrays bad 
taste-if precisely a woman appeals to Madame Roland or Madame de Stael or 
Monsieur George Sand ... " (W, II, 699). George Sand specifically exemplifies 
that condition of decadent unnaturalness in which the organism has become an 
artifact and what life there is is only in the parts: "She wound herself up like a 
watch-and wrote .... Cold, like Hugo, like Balzac, like all the Romantics, as 
soon as they composed poetic works! that fertile scribbling cow. who had in her 
something German in the bad sense, as Rousseau himself, her master, had ... " 
(W, II, 994). 
Shooting out barbs of flame in all directions, Nietzsche's fiery wheels thus 
spin devastatingly through the easily combustible literature of his own age. In 
command of the chariot, in the passages just quoted, is once again the truculent 
primitivist, trumpeting that "natural" masculinity he adored. Europe, he cries, is 
threatened by a "marasmus fcmininus" (W, III, 471). "Feminism: Rousseau, 
dominance of feelings, witness to the sovereignty of the senses, lies" (W, III, 510). 
What are artists nowadays but "hysterical little women?" Though of course this 
"speaks against 'nowadays' and not against the 'artist'" (W, III, 755). The femme 
fatale of the decadents, the Hcliogabalus, the androgyne possess no status here. The 
lyceens of Paris, as we saw, must perforce have their "contemptible inclinations" 
denounced. This obsessional cerebralist thus deplores the cerebral frigidity of 
degenerate Romantic primitives. Hierarchy has been swept away by them, 
organism has dissolved in deliquescence, creative will has succumbed to titillation, 
all that is left is the Wagnerian opera of the sham imperium Germanum, founded in 
1871. But yet: there are presumably still the barbarians. For the poets of the 
nineteenth-century Finis Latinorum, resident in Eternal Paris, those barbarians 
were not that far to seek: to some it must have seemed that after the defeat of 
Sedan they had really passed through, complete with spiked hclmets.39 Such a 
notion would of course have appeared an absurd anomaly to Nietzsche. For his 
own presumptive "new" barbarians, "the cynics, the tempters, the conquerors" 
(W, III, 449) were to combine intellectual superiority with physical health and 
excess of energy. The "wild animal" in man, the barbarian, was to be simultane-
ously the artificial man, organic but invented, a mask but not a sham, and classical: 
39 "II y avait aussi l'idee que Jes Prussicns de 70 avaicnt ete Jes barbares, que Paris c'etait Rome ou 
Byzance." "There was also the notion that the Prussians of 70 had been the barbarians, and that Paris 
was Rome or Byzantium." Gustave Kahn, Symbolistes et decadents (Paris: Vanier, 1902), pp. 37-38. 
C( Carter, p. 108. 
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General view of the future European: he will be the most intelligent kind of beast of 
slavery ... a cosmopolitan chaos of feelings and intelligence. How could a stronger 
species emerge from him? One with classical taste? Classical taste: that is the will to 
simplification, to strengthening, to the visibility of happiness, to awesomeness, the 
courage for psychological nakedness .... In order to struggle out of that chaos to this 
form-for that there has to be some coercion: one has to have the choice between being 
destroyed or fighting through . ... Problem: Where are the barbarians of the twentieth 
century? (W, Ill, 690) 
The will to form is reasserted against the process of dissolution. The para-
doxical twinship of primitive and artificial emerges as dominant. These "classical" 
barbarians, by that very contradictio in adjecto, would be a rejuvenation, a restora-
tion of the empire of the western mind now in decay. Democrats, Nietzsche 
sneered, were always afraid of barbarians from below. But in his dramatic 
imagination he himself rides against Rome with another kind of company, of 
unimpeachable classical lineage: "they come from above: a species of conquering 
and ruling natures, who search for a material that they can form. 40 Prometheus was 
such a barbarian" (W, III, 846). 
40 My italics. 
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Nietzsche and the Death of Tragedy: A Critique * 
WALTER KAUFMANN 
The idea of"the death of tragedy" goes back to Nietzsche. He did not only 
proclaim, first in The Gay Science and then in Zarathustra, that "God is dead"; in 
his first book, The Birth of Tra~edy, we read: 
Greek tragedy met an end different from her older sister-arts: she died by 
suicide, in consequence of an irreconcilable conflict; she died tragically .... When 
Greek tragedy died, there rose everywhere the deep sense of an immense void. Just 
as Greek sailors in the time of Tiberius, passing a lonely island, once heard the 
shattering cry, "Great Pan is dead," so the Hellenic world was now pierced by the 
grievous lament: "tragedy is dead! Poetry itself has perished with her! ... " (sec. II) 
In the first half of the twentieth century, it was Nietzsche's discussion of the 
birth of tragedy, and of what he called the Apollinian and the Dionysian, that 
established the fame of his first book. The so-called Cambridge school in England 
developed his ideas on this subject, and a host of scholars accepted them by way of 
Jane Harrison's and Gilbert Murray's books. But Gerald Else has contested their 
theories and argued for a different hypothesis. 1 
Since World War II, Nietzsche's discussion of the death of tragedy has 
become more influential, and his ideas have become almost a commonplace. It 
will be one of the central points of the present chapter to show that these popular 
ideas are untenable, regarding the death of both Greek tragedy and tragedy in 
our time. 
One of the systematic flaws of the popular argument is that one type of 
* Except for the last paragraph (p. 254), which was added for the present volume, the present chapter 
consists of passages excerpted from Walter Kaufmann, Tragedy and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, 1968), sections 34, 37, 38, 40, 48 and 50, reprinted by permission of the publisher. All 
translations from the German and the Greek are by the author, excepting several instances from Homer's 
Iliad where the translation is by E. V. Rieu. In such cases, the reference given first is the page number from 
his Penguin translation (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1950), then the book and verse numbers of the 
original Greek version. 
'Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Form of Early Greek Tragedy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1965). 
2 34 
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tragedy is treated as if it were the only one; when writers speak of the death of 
tragedy they usually mean that no tragedies like Oedipus Tyrannus were written 
after the fifth century B.C., or are being written in the twentieth century. But 
Sophocles himself, once he had written Oedipus Tyrannus, wrote no more trage-
dies like it: neither Philoctetes nor Oedipus at Colonus ends in catastrophe, and 
Electra ends on a note of triumph. Even in Ajax the hero's suicide occurs at line 805, 
and most of the remaining 5 5 5 lines are concerned with the question of whether 
he is to receive a hero's burial or not, and in the end he docs. In other words, of 
Sophocles' extant tragedies, only three end tragically. 
My argument might be countered as follows. Although Sophocles was older 
than Euripides, both died in 406-Euripides a few months before Sophocles. If 
Euripides was responsible for the death of tragedy, or ifhe at least embodied the 
spirit of a new age in which tragedy was no longer possible-and this is Nietz-
sche's thesis-it stands to reason that Sophocles, particularly in his old age, during 
the last twenty years of his career, was infected, too. 
Nevertheless, the admission that Euripides' tragedies were not really trage-
dies and that Sophocles, too, wrote only three bona fide tragedies would reduce 
the whole notion of the death of tragedy, either around 4o6 B.C. or in our time, to 
the absurd-unless we could introduce Aeschylus at this point, saying that he was 
the creator of tragedy and that we must turn to his plays if we want to know what 
real tragedies look like. This is what Nietzsche clearly implies, and if this point 
could be sustained his argument would not be absurd. For in that case we could 
say that Aeschylus' seven extant tragedies are the paradigm cases of the genre to 
which Sophocles contributed three great masterpieces before he, like Euripides, 
succumbed to the essentially untragic outlook of the dawning fourth century. 
The facts of the matter are, however, quite different. Perhaps in large part 
because so much philology is microscopic and pedestrian, those who aspire to deal 
with our subject philosophically go to the opposite extreme and take it for granted 
that it would be sub-philosophical to dwell on particular Greek tragedies. As a 
result, the philosophical dimension of Aeschylus and Sophocles remains unex-
plored-in The Birth of Tragedy no less than in the Poetics. Hence it never struck 
Nietzsche, or those who have refurbished his thesis in our time, that the very 
attitudes they associate with the death of tragedy are found preeminently in 
Aeschylus. 
Nietzsche's account of the death of Greek tragedy is diffuse, flamboyant, and 
shot through with interesting ideas. Instead of offering a detailed summary and 
lengthy polemics, let us stress three central themes. Nietzsche repeatedly calls the 
new spirit of which tragedy died "optimism" -and this he professes to find not 
only in Socrates but also in Euripides, along with a delight in dialectic and an 
excessive faith in knowledge. The passage in which he attributes "the death of 
tragedy" to optimism and rationalism will be quoted and discussed below; for the 
moment, it will suffice to link these two motifs with a third that helps to clarify 
236 WALTER KAUFMANN 
the other two: the faith that catastrophes can and ought to be avoided. If men 
would only use their reason properly-this is the optimistic notion of which 
tragedy is thought to have perished-there would be no need for tragedies.2 
I will argue that this was the faith of Aeschylus. Euripides, far from being an 
optimist, was indeed, as Aristotle put it, albeit for different reasons, "the most 
tragic of the poets." Aeschylus was, compared with Sophocles and Euripides, the 
most optimistic: he alone had the sublime confidence that by rightly employing 
their reason men could avoid catastrophes. His world view was, by modem 
standards, anti-tragic; and yet he created tragedy. 
On this perverse fact most discussions of this subject suffer shipwreck. How 
can we resolve the paradox? We should cease supposing that great tragedies must 
issue from a tragic vision that entails some deep despair or notions of inevitable 
failure and, instead, read Aeschylus with care. 
One point may be anticipated: tragedy is generally more optimistic than 
comedy. It is profound despair that leads most of the generation born during and 
after World War II to feel that tragedy is dated; they prefer comedy, whether 
black or not. Tragedy is inspired by a faith that can weather the plague, whether 
in Sophoclean Athens or in Elizabethan London, but not Auschwitz. It is com-
patible with the great victories of Marathon and Salamis that marked the 
threshold of the Aeschylean age, and with the triumph over the Armada that 
inaugurated Shakespeare's era. It is not concordant with Dresden, Hiroshima, and 
Nagasaki. Tragedy depends on sympathy, ruth, and involvement. It has little 
appeal for a generation that, like Ivan Karamazov, would gladly return the 
ticket to God, if there were a god. Neither in Athens nor in our time has tragedy 
perished of optimism: its sickness unto death was and is despair. 
II 
Gilbert Murray said of Aeschylus: "He raised everything he touched to 
grandeur. The characters in his hands became heroic; the conflicts became tense 
and fraught with eternal issues."3 After World War I it became fashionable to 
contrast our own paltry and unpoetic time with the great ages of the past, la-
menting that the modem writer lacked that store of myth on which an Aeschylus 
and Sophocles could draw. 
The Greeks did have many myths, but if Aeschylus and Sophocles had not 
brought off this feat, nobody could have said that these myths furnished good 
2 The last motif is more prominent in the twentieth century than it was in Nietzsche, though he 
did associate tragedy with the incurable. 
3 Gilbert Murray, Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy (1940; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 
p. 205. 
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material for great tragedies or for serious literature of any kind. In his own genre, 
Homer could not be surpassed; hence it was pointless to retell what he had told. 
There were stories on which he had barely touched, like that of Oedipus; and one 
might well have thought that this tale would lend itself to treatment as a horror 
story or a comedy-certainly not to tragedy. Yet by the time Sophocles com-
posed his masterpiece, he even had the added disadvantage that one of the greatest 
poets of all time-none other than Aeschylus-had preceded him in writing a 
tragedy on Oedipus, which was first performed the year after Sophocles had first 
defeated him in the annual contest, barely more than forty years before. More-
over, Sophocles wrote Oedipus Tyrannus in a city at war, its population decimated 
by the plague, its policies adrift in the contention among demagogues, its spiritual 
climate saturated with both superstition and enlightenment, its many moods 
including both an optimistic faith in reason and deep disillusionment. Had he not 
succeeded in becoming a great poet, he could easily have said that "the damage of 
a lifetime, and of having been born in an unsettled society, cannot be repaired at 
the moment of composition."4 
It may be objected that Sophocles was born long before the devastations of 
the Peloponnesian War. But when he was a child the Persians invaded and pillaged 
Greece before they were stopped at Marathon, about twenty miles from Athens; 
and ten years later they sacked Athens before they were beaten at Salamis-and 
the following year, they sacked Athens again, before their defeat at Plataea. After 
that, to be sure, Athens was rebuilt along with the temples on the Acropolis whose 
ruins we still admire, and she enjoyed unexampled prosperity-and precisely the 
well-being and smugness that arc often considered the worst climate for artistic 
achievements and above all for tragedy. Yet it was in those years that Aeschylus 
created his extant tragedies and Sophocles, too, his early works, including 
Antigone. 
Great art comes into being in spite of the age to which it is linked by its 
weaknesses. And Aeschylus triumphed not on account of the myths he could use 
but in spite of them. 
Gilbert Murray has shown in detail "what raw material Aeschylus found to 
his hand when he set to work" on his Prometheus.5 First, there was a local cult in 
Athens "of a petty daemon called Prometheus, who was a trade patron of the 
potters and the smiths"; and what was related about him was "just the sort of thing 
. for a cunning fire-dwarf to do; and so, of course, Zeus punished him." But there 
was also another poet who had dealt with this material some time ago: the great 
Hesiod. Murray cites the relevant passages from Hesiod before asking: "Now 
what does Aeschylus make ofthis very trivial and unimpressive story? He drops 
the undignified quarrel about the dividing of the burnt sacrifice. He drops the 
•1 T. S. Eliot, After Stran.Re Cods: A Primer oj Modem Heresy (London: Faber and Faber, 1934), p. 26. 
5 Murray, pp. 19-26. 
238 WALTER KAUFMANN 
rustic wit about Pandora."6 And he answers his own question in part by finding 
in the tragedy "the will to endure pitted against the will to crush. " 7 
What we have found in Homer about the slaying of Agamemnon and 
Orestes' revenge is certainly far from being trivial and unimpressive. Neither, 
however, is it fraught with eternal issues. What makes it impressive is more 
Homer's poetry than the pl?t. But that might have served as a warning against 
picking this theme: why choose an essentially unpromising tale that a previous 
poet whom everyone knows has already told and varied several times? 
Aeschylus changed the story, feeling quite free to create his own myth. 
Without contradicting Homer he added what Homer had not said: that Orestes 
killed his own mother. He moved the mother into the center in the first play of 
his trilogy in which he dealt with the murder of Agamemnon. In the second play 
he let Orestes kill both-Clytemnestra and Aegisthus at the express command of 
Apollo, but let the Furies pursue the matricide. And in the third play he presented 
the rival claims of Apollo and the Fur1es, showed them unable to come to terms, 
and brought them to Athens where Athene finally founded a new court and cast 
the decisive vote for Orestes' acquittal. Most of this has no basis whatever in 
Homer, and the plot of the last play may be almost entirely Aeschylus' own 
invention. 
In Agamemnon Aeschylus does what many critics of modern playwrights 
consider a sign of bankruptcy and a warrant of second-rate literature: he takes a 
story already told by a very great poet and makes some changes in it. These will 
be considered in a moment. In The Libation Bearers he takes a terrible deed, matri-
cide, not mentioned by Homer, and makes it the crux of the play. One can 
imagine a critic exclaiming, "First a pastiche and then outright decadence!" In 
The Eumenides, finally, we encounter in absolutely climactic form that rationalism 
and optimism of which tragedy is said to have died-and find them at the cul-
mination of the greatest work of the so-called creator of tragedy. 
A court is founded in Athens not only to adjudicate the case of Orestes, who 
is acquitted, but also to sit on all capital cases henceforth so that future tragedies 
like that of The Libation Bearers may be prevented; and the action closes with 
hymns of jubilation. In heroic times Orestes' vengeance was justified, but in 
civilized Athens a man in such a dilemma needs only to come to the Areopagus, 
and all will be taken care of without catastrophe. Men have only to learn to 
employ their reason properly, and their most terrible moral problems can be 
solved. In this respect, as in others, Athens has led the way, and the joyous choruses 
in the end celebrate the great triumph of reason and, patriotically, Athens. 
One can imagine the outcry of intellectuals in our time at any poet's con-
cluding a tragedy with such a show of patriotism, glorifying his own society 
6 Ibid., p. 26. 
7 Ibid., p. 31. 
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instead of exposing its dry rot-of which there was plenty in Athens, along with 
so much conceit and self-satisfaction that most citizens of the other Greek cities 
hated her. And Aeschylus sang her praises because he thought that she had an 
institution by means of which tragic dilemmas could be avoided! 
A modern writer has said, voicing the common sense of his generation in his 
uncommonly vigorous prose: "Any realistic notion of tragic drama must start 
from the fact of catastrophe. Tragedies end badly. The tragic personage is broken 
by forces which can neither be fully understood nor overcome by rational 
prudence. This again is crucial. Where the causes of disaster are temporal, where 
the conff.ict can be resolved by technical or social means, we may have serious 
drama, but not tragedy. More pliant divorce laws could not alter the fate of 
Agamemnon; social psychiatry is no answer to Oedipus. But saner economic 
relations or better plumbing can resolve some of the grave crises in the dramas of 
Ibsen. The distinction should be borne sharply in mind. Tragedy is irreparable. " 8 
A page earlier we arc told that, while "in the Eumenides and in Oedipus at 
Colonus, the tragic action closes on a note of grace," "both cases are exceptional." 
We have already seen that the conclusion of Oedipus at Colonus was not excep-
tional for Sophocles; none of his later tragedies ends "badly." We have also seen 
in the first section of the present chapter that the whole theory of the death of 
tragedy depends on Aeschylus. 
It is not enough to say of The Eumenides that it "closes on a note of grace." It 
exemplifies the very view held to be incompatible with tragedy, namely that the 
conff.ict can be resolved by reason, by social means, by sound institutions like 
those at Athens. 
A play like The Eumenides, if written in our time, would not be called a 
tragedy. Nor did Aeschylus write many, if any, tragedies in the modern sense of 
that word. Like most of his plays, six of his seven extant tragedies were parts of 
connected trilogies, and not only the Oresteia voiced the very temper of which 
tragedy is supposed to have died a few decades later, but the trilogies of which 
The Suppliants and Prometheus were the first plays gave expression to the very 
same experience oflife. Scholars agree that both of these trilogies ended happily, 
not in catastrophe. 
Only in Seven Against Thebes is catastrophe final, but Aeschylus goes out of 
his way to tell us that all of it, including Oedipus' tragic fate, could have been 
avoided but for Laius' "folly" (745 ff.); he had been told by the oracle to save his 
city by not having children. This version of the oracle seems to have been original 
with Aeschylus,9 and its introduction (or repetition) at this point in the final 11lay 
8 George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 8. Similar statements by 
Nietzsche (much briefer) and Max Scheler (much less eloquent} are cited in secs. 58 and 59 of Tragedy 
and Philosophy. 
9 H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormsell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), I, 299. 
Neither Sophocles nor Euripides retained Aeschylus' version. 
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of the trilogy tells us a great deal about Aeschylus' outlook. 
In the case of The Suppliants, too, we need not go beyond the play that has 
survived to find that "as in ·The Eumenides, reason and persuasion are put forward 
as the proper principles of civilized life." 10 In fact, the parallel is striking and 
extends to the crucial point: no sooner has the poet stressed the tragic dilemma of 
the king of Argos who must either deny asylum to the suppliant maidens, thus 
outraging Zeus, the patron of suppliants, or plunge his city into war with the 
Egyptians who pursue them, than he cuts the knot by having the king announce 
that he knows an honorable solution. Being a king of free men with fine institu-
tions, he needs only to bring this matter before them, take counsel, weigh both 
sides, and take a vote. Once the citizens have voted to protect the suppliants, the 
issue is clear. And when the Egyptian herald says in his last speech but one, "the 
judge is Ares," the good king reminds him that, if the maidens were willing or 
could be persuaded, he would let them go with the Egyptians, but the unanimous 
vote decreed that they must not be surrendered to force. And what has thus been 
resolved by vote is the law and the voice of freedom. 
In the Oresteia we gradually move from the Homeric age to the founding of 
the supreme court of Athens. In The Suppliants the spirit of Athens is boldly pro-
jected into the heroic past by a poet who clearly felt, having fought at Marathon, 
that if a free people resolved to resist aggressive force this was not morally prob-
lematic. In the Prometheus trilogy the same ethos is projected on a cosmic scale: 
in the surviving first play, the titan with whom we cannot help sympathizing 
defies naked force and threats; and to remove any doubt about this he is crucified 
by two demons, Might and Force. The crescendo of the last hundred and fifty 
lines in which Prometheus hurls his defiance of Zeus into the face of Hermes, the 
messenger of the gods, is indescribable. But when Zeus thereupon casts him into 
Tartarus that is the end only of the beginning; two more plays follow: The 
UnbindinR of Prometheus and Prometheus the Fire-Bearer. On the basis of surviving 
fragments and many references in ancient literature, at least the outlines of the 
plot can be made out. Prometheus knew that Thetis' son was destined to be 
greater than his father, and if Zeus had followed through his plan of having a son 
with her this would have been his undoing. But Zeus and Prometheus come to 
terms: the titan reveals the secret and is set free-and then a great festival may have 
been founded in the titan's honor in the third play. If Gilbert Murray's recon-
struction is right, 11 the analogy to The Eumenides is very close. 
In any case, we may here recall a sentence from the Iliad: "Why do we loathe 
Hades more than any god, if not because he is so adamantine and unyielding."12 
Pride wins Aeschylus' admiration, and he finds words for it more majestic than 
10 Philip Vellacott in the preface to his Penguin translation. 
11 Murray, pp. 99 ff. 
12 IX. 1 58 f.; sec. 29, Tragedy and Philosophy. 
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almost anyone else; but what must be learned, not only by men but also by titans 
and Furies and gods-Apollo in The Eumenides and Zeus in The Unbinding of 
Prometheus-is the willingness to reason with one's opponents and to come to 
terms. It is violence that makes for catastrophes that prudence could prevent; 
and in democratic institutions such prudence is embodied. 
Plainly, Aeschylus himself embodied the very spirit of which tragedy is said 
to have died first in the ancient world and later, after its rebirth in Shakespeare's 
time, again in modern times. And yet Gilbert Murray voiced a view shared by 
scholars and critics generally when he subtitled his book on Aeschulus: "The 
Creator of Tragedy." 
It might seem as if no more than Aeschylus' reputation were at stake. 
Suppose we simply said that most of his plays were not tragedies; that The 
Persians and Seven represent two early forerunners of tragedy, while the works of 
his maturity that we know-Suppliants, Oresteia, and Prometheus-represent an 
altogether anti-tragic spirit. Who, in that case, did write tragedies? We have 
already seen that Sophocles' last three plays were not tragedies in the narrow, 
modern sense either, and that only his Antigone, Women of Trachis and Oedipus 
Tyrannus end in complete catastrophe. And according to Nietzsche, tragedy died 
under Euripides' violent hands. 13 Clearly, Nietzsche's reputation, too, is at stake; 
for from what we have found it appears that he was utterly wrong both about 
Aeschylus and about the alleged death of tragedy. And yet more is at stake. It has 
been said that it was "not between Euripides and Shakespeare that the Western 
mind turns away from the ancient tragic sense oflife. It is after the late seventeenth 
century. " 14 What becomes of the ancient-or any-"tragic sense oflife?" If the 
Greek tragic poets lacked it no less than Ibsen and the moderns, was it merely an 
Elizabethan phenomenon? And if some few of the so-called tragedies of the 
Greeks really were tragedies in the more exacting sense of that word, can poets 
without a tragic sense of life write great tragedies, if only occasionally? In that 
case, is there any close connection between the tragic sense oflife and tragedy, and 
arc there any good reasons for saying that tragedy is dead? 
III 
What Aristotle did to some extent, modem critics have done with a ven-
geance. He thought that tragedy had "found its true nature" when Sophocles 
wrote Oedipus Tyrannus, and in many passages of the Poetics he made this tragedy 
the norm. But this did not prevent him from arguing in chapter 14 that, other 
things being equal, the best type of plot was one that involved a happy ending. 
13 GT, sec. 10, final paragraph. 
14 Steiner, p. 193. 
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Most critics, as we have seen, have balked at this conclusion and tried to show, 
albeit unsuccessfully, that he did not really mean it. But there is every reason for 
believing that he did mean it, and that the great Greek tragic poets would not have 
taken offense at this preference. 
Modern critics go much further than Aristotle in their single-minded admir-
ation for Sophocles' Tyrannus. They postulate this one play, for the most part 
quite unconsciously, as the standard of true tragedy and feel uncomfortable with 
all Greek tragedies that are not very similar to it. They want a tragic hero, but 
The Persians, Suppliants, Eumenides, and even Agamemnon do not have one (four 
out of the master's seven); and in The Women of Trachis, in Antigone, in Philoctetes, 
and to some extent even in Ajax there is a dual focus. The same is true not only of 
Romeo and Juliet and of Antony and Cleopatra but also, very strikfogly, of Julius 
Caesar and, in a different way, of King Lear. 
Tragedies, alas, are not what they're supposed to be. Aristotle, living so much 
closer to the evidence, came far closer than recent writers to doing justice to the 
wide range of Greek tragedy when he said that tragedies are plays that evoke 
eleos and phobos but provide a sobering emotional relief. Such relief is obviously 
quite compatible with non-tragic conclusions. What is decisive is not the end but 
whether we participate in tremendous, terrifying suffering. 
No poet before Aeschylus and hardly any after him equalled either his 
majestic, awe-inspiring poetry or the immensity ofhuman misery he captured in 
it. His belief in progress through the use of reason has no parallel in Homer and 
seems basically untragic. His preoccupation with moral issues, which concern him 
more than individuals, points in the same direction. He is not interested in 
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra beyond what is relevant to what one might call 
philosophic issues; he does not dwell on Agamemnon's life or his adventures, on 
the queen's relation to him, her upbringing; he does not raise the question what 
it felt like to be the sister of the most beautiful woman in the world, Helen; nor 
does he care what became of Orestes. Aeschylus does not approach Homer's 
interest in his heroes, in their deeds of valor, and in hundreds of details: he is 
centrally concerned with justice. Yet it would be utterly absurd to say that Homer 
wrote a tragic poem and Aeschylus destroyed the tragic spirit. Aeschylus is more 
tragic than Homer and everyone else before him in his determination and ability 
to show how tragic life is without reason, compromise, and sanity. 
Homer's radiant appreciation of the countless aspects of human experience 
distracts from the tragic element-that is irremediable, but there is so much that is 
beautiful and interesting; there remains the possibility of leading a short but 
glorious life; and telling and hearing of men who covered themselves with glory 
is exhilarating. For Aeschylus the tragic is remediable and represented as a foil for 
progress through the use of reason. But misery is no less great for having been 
avoidable. One might even argue that the belief in necessity spells comfort, while 
the sense that a catastrophe was not inevitable heightens our suffering. But at this 
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point Aeschylus does not insist on being metaphysical; he simply pictures suffering 
with a concentrated power, piling image upon image, overwhelming us with the 
whole weight of human grief, leaving a mark on our minds that no eventual 
insight, institution, or joy can wipe out. All the glory of the triumph at the end of 
The Eumenides cannot silence Cassandra's cries: they stay with us, like Prometheus' 
defiant anguish; they echo through the centuries and change world literature. 
Tragedy is not what the philosophers and critics say it is; it is far simpler. 
What lies at the heart of it is the refusal to let any comfort, faith, or joy deafen our 
ears to the tortured cries of our brothers. Aeschylus believed, like Hegel, that 
though history was a slaughter bench, the monstrous sacrifices of men's happiness 
and virtue had not been for nothing. But the founding of the Areopagus does not 
erase Cassandra's anguish any more than the establishment of the state oflsrael 
wipes out the terrors of Auschwitz. 
To call the poet who created Cassandra an optimist would be grossly mis-
leading; but to call the author of The Eumenides and Suppliants a pessimist would 
be worse. Admittedly, the Cassandra scene alone is not conclusive, although it 
ranks with Lear on the heath and Gretchen in the dungeon as one of the most 
magnificent and heartrending dramatic creations of all time. Nothing is more 
moving than a noble mind gone mad; and Aeschylus was the first poet to realize 
this. (The author of the First Book of Samuel did not depict the madness of King 
Saul in a comparable scene.) But if one had to call Goethe either an optimist or a 
pessimist, one would surely have to choose the former label, in spite of the dun-
geon scene; and Aeschylus' case is similar. 
Optimism and pessimism arc simplistic categories, and Nietzsche did us a 
disservice when, as a young man under Schopenhauer's influence, he introduced 
them into the discussion of tragedy. Unfortunately, others have accepted the 
suggestion that tragedy perished of optimism and faith in reason; but we have 
said what needs to be said about this as far as Aeschylus is concerned. 
IV 
We are brought back to Nietzsche and the death of tragedy. The step Aes-
chylus took from Homer's world toward the realm of the Platonic dialogue was 
far bigger than the further step in that direction taken by Euripides. It is even 
arguable that Aeschylus' interest is more purely philosophical than Euripides', 
considering the later poet's more intense concern with character and with psy-
chology. Parts of Euripides' plays are certainly closer to Plato than anything in 
Aeschylus; for example, the scenes in which Clytemnestra in Electra and Helen in 
The Trojan Women are confronted with the charges brought against them and 
permitted to try to defend themselves. But no Euripidean tragedy as a whole is as 
close to Plato as the Oresteia, taken as a whole, or The Eumenides in particular. The 
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Trojan Women, for example, is far from being a particularly philosophical play. 
The Oresteia, on the other hand, is preeminently about justice. Not only are 
Agamemnon and Orestes incidental to this larger theme, even the house of Atreus 
is. As the trilogy ends, the house of Atreus is out of the picture. The joyous 
conclusion celebrates neither Orestes' acquittal nor the passing of the curse from 
Atreus' house; both are forgotten when Orestes leaves the stage (777). The whole 
final quarter of the drama is concerned with the very matter that modem critics 
consider most incompatible with tragedy: the founding of an institution that will 
resolve conflicts by eliminating the causes of disaster, namely a court of justice. 
I love and admire Agamemnon more than its two sequels, and Cassandra's 
scene above all; but this cannot change the plain fact that the first play merely sets 
the stage for Orestes' dilemma, which in tum allows the poet to pose problems 
about justice and to weigh different conceptions of justice. In no sense is the con-
clusion merely tacked on: like Homer and Sophocles and the builders of the Greek 
temples, Aeschylus was a master craftsman with a superb sense for architectonics. 
In retrospect it becomes perfectly clear, if it was not at the time, that Cassandra, 
too, confronted us with a conception of justice-not, of course, her own. 
All this is as foreign to Homer as the conception of Cassandra as a prophetess; 
in the Iliad she is merely Priam's most beautiful daughter (XIII, 365) and the first 
to see Hector's remains brought home by her old father (XXIV, 699 ff.). Justice is 
of no central concern in the Iliad, and the question whether the Trojan or the 
Achaean cause is just does not agitate Homer. The vague poetic notion that there 
is some balance in human affairs suffices him. When Hector, having killed 
Patroclus, who had been wearing Achilles' armor, strips the corpse and puts on 
the armor, the Homeric Zeus says: 
... For now I grant you your moment of power, 
recompense for your not coming home from the battle 
to Andromache-not she will take from you 
Achilles' glorious armor. (XVII, 206 ff.) 
The free rendering of Rieu puts the point as we usually do, 1'But you must pay for 
it" (321)-and falsely suggests that Hector has become guilty ofhybris. 
A more precise conception of justice is encountered in another passage, where 
Acamas, a Trojan, taunts the Achaeans: "Look at your man Promachus, put to 
sleep by my spear, in prompt repayment for my brother's death. That is what a 
wise man prays for-a kinsman to survive him and avenge his fall" (269; XIV, 
482 ff.). Any argument about this notion of justice would be totally out of place 
in the Iliad; but Aeschylus examines this very idea in the Oresteia. 
Here, finally, is a passage from the Iliad in which justice is mentioned 
expressly. When Menelaus is about to take Adrcstus, a Trojan, alive, as a prisoner 
to be ransomed, Agamemnon reproaches him:" 'No; we are not going to leave a 
single one of them alive, down to the babies in their mothers' wombs-not even 
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they must live. The whole people must be wiped out of existence, and none be 
left to think of them and shed a tear.' The justice of this made Menelaus change 
his mind" (118; VI, 57 ff.). Or more literally: "he turned the heart of his brother, 
for he urged justice." One cannot imagine Aeschylus letting such a conception of 
justice pass unchallenged. Euripides later presented its \flhumanity in his Trojan 
Women. But we have already noted that this play is less philosophical than the 
Oresteia; and we have found ample reasons for rejecting Nietzsche's notion that 
tragedy died at the hands of Euripides, as well as the popular variant that it was 
destroyed by the currents of thought and feeling that Euripides represented to 
Nietzsche's mind. 
The question remains how in that case tragedy died, for it remains a stri~ing 
fact that the fourth century evidently did not produce tragedies that could be 
ranked with those of the three masters, nor is Roman tragedy in the same class 
with fifth-century tragedy. Indeed, no tragedy at all was, for two thousand years 
after the death of Euripides and Sophocles in 4o6 B.C. What, then, happened in 
the fourth century? 
At first glance, it may seem easier to say what did not happen. The demise of 
tragedy was not due to a changed attitude toward the gods. To be sure, Aeschylus 
had used the myths and figures of traditional religion, but not in order to shore up 
its ruins, and least of all to counter the iconoclastic spirit of the Greek enlighten-
ment with miracle, mystery, and authority. On the contrary, he had attacked 
tradition. Even as Homer had found the language of polytheism ideally suited to 
a poem about war, Aeschylus, sublimating Homer's contests into moral collisions, 
had found that he could side against Apollo with Athene, and that he could blast 
Zeus through Prometheus. 
A critic whose eloquence and erudition "almost persuade" has said that 
"tragedy is that form of art which requires the intolerable burden of God's 
presence. It is now dead because His shadow no longer falls upon us as it fell on 
Agamemnon or Macbeth or Athalie."15 This comes close to being an inversion 
of the truth. Did His shadow really fall on Macbeth? And arc there not millions 
of believers today? And if one were a believer, what further evidence could one 
possibly require that His shadow has indeed fallen upon us? 
Nietzsche, incidentally, associated precisely our age with His shadow. 16 But 
more to the point, Oedipus Tyrannus does not require "the intolerable burden of 
God's presence"; neither does Antigone, nor Philoctetes. Indeed, in Philoctetes the 
outcome would be tragic but for the sudden appearance of a deus ex machina. And 
while the Delphic oracle is involved in the tragedy of Oedipus, the presence of the 
gods-not to speak of God-is not, and at the very least it is not indispensable. The 
15 Ibid., p. 353. 
16 FW, sec. 108-included in my edition of GM (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 191, and 
in my Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: Modem Library, 1968). 
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situation in which Oedipus finds himself at the outset is preeminently tragic, and 
neither its genesis nor the development to the final catastrophe requires the super-
natural. That adds a note of inevitability, but the keen sense that great calamities 
were not inevitable can be just as tragic. The gods can add great weight; but this 
can be achieved without "the intolerable burden of God's presence": witness 
Lear, Othello, or-the critic's own example-Agamemnon. 
Tragedy requires no reverence for the gods, and it is doubtful whether 
Aeschylus had much of that. It would certainly be difficult to name many great 
poets who composed blasphemies to match Prometheus'. No less than in the 
Iliad, belief is out of the picture. Indeed the great tragic poets experienced tradi-
tional religion as an intolerable burden. Obviously, most poets during those 
twenty centuries when tragedy was all but dead had more religious beliefs than 
Aeschylus did-or Shakespeare. 
To understand what happened after Aeschylus, we will have to consider 
Sophocles and, above all, Euripides. To wind up our consideration of Aeschylus 
and the death of tragedy, it will almost suffice to quote a remarkable but all too 
little known passage from Goethe's conversations with Eckermann. On I May 
1825, not quite fifty years before the publication of The Birth of Tragedy, Goethe 
contested "the widespread opinion that Euripides was responsible for the decay 
of Greek drama." His·remarks are worth quoting at length: 
Man is simple. And however rich, manifold, and unfathomable he may be, the 
circle of his states is soon run through. If the circumstances had been like those among 
us poor Germans, where Lessing wrote two or three passable plays, I myself three or 
four, and Schiller five or six, there might have been room for a fourth, fifth, and 
sixth tragic poet. But among the Greeks with their abundant productivity, where 
each of the Big Three had written over a hundred, or close to a hundred, plays, and 
the tragic subjects of Homer and the heroic tradition had in some cases been treated 
three or four times-given such an abundance, I say, we may suppose that material 
and content had gradually been exhausted, and a poet coming after the Big Three 
did not really know, what next. 
And when you come right down to it, why should they? Wasn't it really enough 
for a while? And wasn't what Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides had produced of 
such quality and depth that one could hear it again and again without making it 
trivial or killing it? After all, these few grandiose fragments that have come down to 
us are of such scope and significance that we poor Europeans have been occupied 
with them for centuries and will yet have food and work enough for a few more 
centuries. 
Amen. 
Or is Goethe too serene? Was Nietzsche not right after all that there was a 
somewhat sinister development from Aeschylus to Euripides? He was. With the 
loss of the great war that had lasted almost thirty years, and the passing of Euripi-
des, Sophocles, Thucydides, and Socrates, all within less than ten years, a great age 
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ended. The new generation that was born during and ,ifter the war had a different 
attitude toward life and suffering. War was no longer the glory of Marathon and 
Salamis, heroism seemed futile, and Euripides' skepticism became much more 
popular than it had been during his lifetime. Aeschylus came to appear somewhat 
archaic, Sophocles old-fashioned, while Euripides' mistrust of convention and 
pretension, his social criticism, and his pioneering tragicomedies (Ion, for 
example, and Alcestis) became paradigms for the new age. Gradually the confi-
dence that had grown in the wake of Marathon and found its ultimate expression 
in Pericles' great funeral oration gave way to doubt and increased self-conscious-
ness, and eventually the New Comedy replaced tragedy. 
V 
No other poet of the first rank has been underestimated as much as Euripides. 
It was his great ill fortune that nineteen of his plays survived, compared to seven 
each by Aeschylus and Sophocles. 
The extant tragedies of the two older poets represent selections of what were 
considered their best plays. There is reason to suppose that most of their lost plays 
were no better than, if as good as, The Suppliants and Seven, or Ajax. Suppose 
Aeschylus and Sophocles were each represented by another dozen of such dramas, 
while Euripides were known to us only through Alcestis and Medea; Hippolytus, 
The Trojan Women, Electra, Ion, and The Bacchae/17 
Like his two predecessors, and other major poets, Euripides should be ranked 
according to his best works. And we should also be grateful to him for his share 
in making possible Sophocles' best plays. All but two of Sophocles' seven were 
17 Of these seven, Hippolytus won first prize, as did The Bacchae posthumously. Alcestis and The 
Trojan Women won second prize. Medea placed third in a contest in which Euphorion, Aeschylus' son, 
won first prize and Sophocles placed second. For the way in which the judges were chosen by lot, see 
Gilbert Norwood, Greek Tragedy, rev. ed. (1920; rpt. New York: Hill and Wang, 1960), p. 61. It is also 
noteworthy that the extremely wealthy and popular Nicias was often choregus, paying for the pro-
duction, and he was never defeated (Plutarch's Lije of Nicias, p. 524). 
In antiquity ten of Euripides' plays were selected for school use, along with all of the surviving 
plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles: Hecuba, Orestes, Phoenician Women, Hippolytus, Medea, Alcestis, 
Andromache, Rhesus, Trojan Women, and Bacchae. Five of these are surely inferior to some of the other 
nine extant plays, which survived purely by accident, as they were close to each other in an alphabetical 
arrangement: Helen, Electra, Heracleidae, Heracles, Ion, Suppliants, Iphigenia in Au/is, Iphigenia in Tauris, 
and Cyclops, the only satyr play that has survived in its entirety. 
For the history of these manuscripts sec Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Mi:illendorff, Einleitunj/ in die 
griechische Tragodie, unveranderter [sic] Abdruck aus der ersten Aufiai/e von Euripides Herakles I Kapitel I-IV 
(Berlin: Weidmannschc Buchhandlung, 1906), chapter III; Norwood, ibid., 21; Bruno Snell, "Zwei 
Ti:ipfe mit Euripides-Papyri," Hermes, 70 (1935), 119 f., and Denys L. Page in the introduction to his 
edition of Medea (1938; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), xii ff. 
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written in competition with Euripides, whose influence is often striking. But the 
point is less that this influence is writ large in The Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, 
and elsewhere, than the infinitely more important fact that the younger rival, who 
was a great innovator, kept the older poet from getting into a rut. Sophocles 
repeats himself a good deal even in his extant plays; the marvel is that he did not 
copy his own successes even more, considering that four or five of his seven were 
written after he was seventy. Not only did the competition of Euripides and the 
presence of a master poet whose critical powers were second to none force Sopho-
cles to be satisfied with nothing less than his very best, Euripides was also one of 
the most original dramatists of all time, and his new ideas provided never-failing 
stimulation. 
The myth that tragedy died at Euripides' hands is thus almost the obverse of 
the truth; only one of Sophocles' masterpieces, the Antigone, antedates his in-
fluence. Nor was this influence what Nietzsche thought it was when he charged 
Euripides with an anti-tragic optimism. If there is a sense in which Aeschylus is 
more tragic than Homer, and Sophocles more tragic than Aeschylus, Euripides 
is indeed "the most tragic of the poets. " 18 
Nietzsche's point is clear but nonetheless mistaken: 
Socrates, the dialectical hero of the Platonic drama, reminds us of the kindred nature 
of the Euripidean hero who must defend his actions with arguments and counter-
arguments and in the process often risks the loss of our tragic pity; for who could 
mistake the optimistic element which, having once penetrated tragedy, must grad-
ually overgrow its Dionysian regions and impel it necessarily to self-destruction-
to the death-leap into the bourgeois drama. Consider the consequences of the 
Socratic maxims: 'Virtue is knowledge; man sins only from ignorance; he who is 
virtuous is happy.' In these three basic forms of optimism lies the death of tragedy. 
For now the virtuous hero must be a dialectician; now there must be a necessary, 
visible connection between virtue and knowledge, faith and morality; now the 
transcendental justice of Aeschylus is degraded to the superficial and insolent 
principle of'poeticjustice' with its customary deus ex machina. (GT, sec. 14) 
Here the relationship of Euripides to Socrates and Plato is inverted, and both 
the poet's historical significance and his philosophical dimension are totally mis-
apprehended. There is no evidence that Euripides was under the spell of Socrates, 
as Nietzsche claimed, and there is every evidence that he did not accept the three 
Socratic dicta of which Nietzsche says: "in these three basic forms of optimism 
lies the death of tragedy." 
An intense interest in arguments and counterarguments is present in Euripi-
des, but there is not the slightest reason to attribute it to the influence of Socrates, 
that of the Sophists will do. It should also be recalled how much of this is found in 
18 Aristotle's Poetics 13: 53a. 
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The Eumenides and, not quite to the same extent, in Antigone. While the super-
abundance of dialectical fireworks in some Euripidean tragedies dissipates our 
tragic emotions, it usually illustrates the futility of reason, its inability to prevent 
tragedy.19 At this point, Aeschylus is infinitely more optimistic than Euripides. 
Aristotle says that Euripides was criticized for having more tragic endings 
than the other poets.20 To have had more than Aeschylus cannot have been diffi-
cult, but evidently the surviving nineteen plays give a misleading picture of the 
way most of his tragedies ended. Of the seven that most critics would probably 
agree in calling his best, four end in catastrophe; the two earliest, Alcestis and 
Medea, are, however, no less relevant. The former ends happily, but was per-
formed in lieu of a satyr play. While it provides some laughs at the drunken 
Heracles, it was, no doubt, incomparably more tragic than any satyr play. The 
portrait of the king is anything but optimistic, the less so if we recognize it as a 
cutting attack on the men of that, and not only that, time. His wife, Alcestis, 
belongs with Antigone and Deianeira and foreshadows Euripides' later heroines 
who die for others-few critics question that the Sophoclean Deiancira was 
profoundly influenced by her. Admetus needs someone to die for him, or he will 
have to die; he eagerly accepts his wife's self-sacrifice, and then feels that others 
should feel sorry for him because he has lost his wife. Eventually, Heracles brings 
her back from the underworld, but it is difficult to find any optimism in this play; 
rather is it a bitter tragicomedy, perhaps the first one ever written, and quite 
possibly the best. It is doubtful whether anybody before Shakespeare wrote a 
tragicomedy that merits comparison with Alcestis. 
Medea, Euripides' earliest surviving tragedy, ends with a machina, but 
hardly with "poetic justice." Having killed her husband's new wife and slain her 
own children, because they were also his, the triumphant sorceress flies off, un-
scathed. Where is virtue? Where happiness? Where optimism? What makes the 
play great, apart from the poetry, is, once again, the telling attack on the callous-
ness of men, the poet's subtle understanding of the feelings of a woman, his insis-
tence that barbarian women wronged suffer no less than other human beings, and 
his probably unprecedented portrait of impassioned jealousy. The Women of 
Trachis ,might well show the influence not only of Alcestis (438 B.C.) but also of 
Medea (431 B.C.) and possibly even of Hippolytus (428 B.C.). We cannot be 
certain whether Sophocles meant to counter the younger poet's Phaedra and 
Medea, or whether Euripides felt provoked by the idealized portrait ofDeianeira 
and resolved to show the Athenians how a jealous woman really feels. Either way, 
19 Cf. John H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 49 
(1938), 43: "Both Thucydides and Euripides lost faith in debate, although both, it must be added, were 
molded intellectually by it." Also E. R. Dodds's introduction to Bacchae (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1944), p. xliii: "There never was a writer who more conspicuously lacked the propagandist's faith in 
easy and complete solutions." 
20 Poetics 13:5p. 
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one might say that Sophocles portrayed people as they ought to be, Euripides as 
they really are.21 
We have previously discussed Hippolytus and The Bacchae: 22 neither they nor 
The Trojan Women fit Nietzsche's account of Euripides' untragic optimism. The 
point is not that Nietzsche was devoid of insight; he scarcely ever wrote on any 
subject without noting something interesting. The few exceptions are comprised 
by cases in which he repeated the prejudices of earlier writers, for example, about 
women. The opinion, widespread at one time, that in The Birth of Tragedy 
Nietzsche vilified Socrates cannot be sustained, and it is odd how regularly those 
who have made this charge have simply ignored the vehemently anti-tragic out-
look of Socrates' most famous pupil, Plato. But Nietzsche was exceedingly unfair 
to Euripides, fa!Iing in with an old prejudice against that poet, which Goethe 
already had attacked. The most relevant passage from Goethe's conversations 
with Eckermann has been quoted above; here is another: After noting that classical 
philologists have long ranked Aeschylus and Sophocles far above Euripides, 
Goethe said: "I have no objection to the view that Euripides has his flaws." But he 
felt outraged by August Wilhelm Schlegel's treatment of Euripides: "If a modern 
man like Schlegel should have to censure flaws in such a grand old poet, decency 
demands that he should do it on his knees" (28 March 1827). 
A passage in Goethe's diaries (Tagebiicher, 22 November 1831) is more 
extreme. Exactly four months before his death, he jotted down these words: "I 
reread the Ion of Euripides to be edified and instructed again. It docs seem odd to 
me that the aristocracy of the philologists fails to grasp his merits and, putting on 
traditional airs, subordinates him to his predecessors, feeling justified by the 
buffoon Aristophanes .... Have all the nations since his day produced a dramatist 
who was even fit to hand him his slippers?" 
21 Aristotle ascribes this remark to Sophocles himself (Poetics 25: 6ob). 
The date of The Women of Trachis is utterly uncertain. Cedric H. Whitman, Sophocles: A Study of 
Heroic Humanism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 48, stresses its "unmistakably 
Euripidean flavor" and the influence of Alcestis, but dates it rather early, between 437 and 432 (p. 55). 
His argument that "the immense technical superiority of the Oedipus [ Tyrannus ], however, seems to 
demand that we allow a few more years to elapse between the two" (p. 257, note 40) carries little weight, 
as Sophocles' last two plays do not approximate its perfection either. G. M. Kirkwood, A Study of 
Sophoclean Drama (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 293 f., devotes a whole appendix to the 
question; he concludes that "the evidence for early dating is not really strong," but favors "a date after 
Ajax and before Antig." In the end he acknowledges that H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy: A Literary 
Study, 3rd rev. ed. (1939; rpt. Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, n.d.), placed the play "about 
420" and Gennaro Perrotta, Sofocle (Messina and Milan: Principato, 1935), "at the end of Sophocles' 
career." Wilamowitz argued at great length in his 162-pagc introductory essay in his edition of Euripi-
des' Herakles (2nd rev. ed., 1895) that the influence of Heracles (after 425 B.C.) was writ large in The 
Women of Trachis (I, 152-57), and Gilbert Murray was of the same opinion (The Literature of Ancient 
Greece, 3rd ed. [1897; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1956), p. 246). 
22 Sec. 42, TraJedy and Philosophy. 
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The fact that Ion-a magnificent tragicomedy-is quite generally considered 
Euripides' most anti-clerical play throws a good deal of light on the old Goethe 
who had just finished his Faust (writing Act IV after Act V). Goethe's implicit slur 
on Shakespeare is surely unintentional; his many references to Shakespeare 
testify to that. But even if one considered Euripides as merely the fourth greatest 
tragic poet of all time, it would be utterly absurd to suppose that this was grounds 
for censure. 
We will resist the temptation to consider his plays, one by one, conceding 
weaknesses but showing again and again how, "even though Euripides manages 
his plays badly in other respects, he is obviously the most tragic of the poets. " 23 
VI 
E. R. Dodds argued in an early article, long before he succeeded to Gilbert 
Murray's chair at Oxford, that Euripides, though, of course, a "rationalist" in the 
sense that he was anti-clerical, was more importantly an "irrationalist."24 By this 
Dodds meant two things. His first point, to which most of"Euripides the Irration-
alist" is devoted, is grist to my mill. Euripides steadfastly opposed the three claims 
"that reason (what the Greeks called rational discourse, logos) is the sole and 
sufficient instrument of truth"; "that the structure of Reality must be in itself in 
some sense rational"; and "that moral, like intellectual, error can arise only from a 
failure to use the reason we possess; and that when it does arise it must, like 
intellectual error, be curable by an intellectual process."25 
Dodds shows this in some detail, calling attention, for example, to Medea's 
words "in vv. 1078 ff. 'I recognise,' she says, 'what evil I am about to do, but my 
thymos (my passion) is stronger than my counsels: thymos is the cause of Man's 
worst crimes.' Her reason can judge her action, which she frankly describes as a 
'foul murder,' (1383) but it cannot influence it: the springs of action arc in the 
thymos, beyond the reach of reason. " 26 
Dodds's second point, on the other hand, seems dated. He applauds what he 
has spelled out in the above three claims and calls rationalism. "The philosophy 
thus summed up in its most generalised traits was the decisive contribution of the 
Greeks to human thought."27 "Socrates affirmed the supremacy of reason in the 
23 Gilbert Murray says very neatly: "There is not one play of Euripides in which a critic cannot 
find serious flaws or offenses; though it is true, perhaps, that the worse the critic, the more he will find" 
(The Literature of Ancient Greece, p. 273). Murray and Wilamowitz did nor rank Euripides below his 
predecessors. 
24 "Euripides the lrrationalist," Classical Review, 43 (1929), 97-104. 
25 Ibid., p. 97. 
26 Ibid., p. 98. 
27 Ibid.. p. 97 
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governance of the universe and in the life of man; in both these spheres Euripides 
denied it .... Some of the passages about the relation between knowledge and 
conduct do at any rate look like a conscious reaction against the opinion of 
Socrates, or of other persons who thought like Socrates."28 
It is surely uncertain whether Socrates really affirmed that reason governed 
the universe, and Dodds himself goes on to admit that "some of the characteristic 
features of this [Euripidean] outlook appear already in the Alcestis, produced in 
438 B.C.; and it is very doubtful if Socrates had emerged as an independent 
thinker at so early a date."29 But in that case Dodds might be almost as wrong as 
Nietzsche, who thought that Euripides got his ideas from Socrates. The truth of 
the matter might be that Socrates, of whom ancient tradition relates that he 
attended only the plays of Euripides, was stimulated by this poet-to develop 
countertheses.30 This hypothesis goes well with what Socrates says in the Apology 
about the poets: "upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be 
the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise."31 And Plato's 
attitude toward the tragic poets supports my reconstruction far better than either 
Nietzsche's or Dodds's. 
Philosophers have rarely had any great influence on poets, and that a young 
philosopher should ha.ve decisively influenced a mature poet in whose oeuvre we 
can find no break at all is so improbable that we can safely discount it. The philo-
sophers who did influence important poets did it posthumously; for example, 
Aquinas, Kant, and Nietzsche. That a mature poet whose work obviously has 
strong philosophical relevance should influence younger philosophers, even some 
of his contemporaries, is much more likely; Goethe's strong influence on Schei-
28 Ibid., p. 103. 
29 Ibid. 
30 I find corroboration for this surmise in Bruno Snell, "Das friihste Zeugnis iiber Sokrates," 
Philolog11s, 97 (1948), 125-34. He argues that Medea !077 ff. may have led Socrates to formulate his 
counterthcsis, and that Hippolytus 380 ff. may be Euripides' reply to Socrates. That Plato's polemic 
against the view of the multitude (Protagoras 352) represents his reply to the Hippolytus passage has long 
been noted, as Snell himself emphasizes (p. 129, note); e.g., by Wilamowitz at the end of a long footnote 
that documents the ways in which Plato was stimulated by Euripides (Einleitung, pp. 24 f.). 
In the 2nd rev. ed. of Die griechische Tragiidie, II (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954), pp. 
I 12 f., Max Pohlenz accepts Snell's demonstration that Phaedra's words in Hippolytus constitute a 
direct polemic against Socrates, but not his claim that Medea, 1378-80 [sic!], led Socrates to formulate 
his counterthesis. Pohlenz's brief note bears the signs of haste (he also refers Snell's article to the wrong 
year) and is unconvincing. See also Snell's Scenes from Greek Drama (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1964), chapter 3. 
The first to adduce Hippolytus 374 against Nietzsche's claim that Euripides shared Socrates' outlook 
was Wilamowitz in Zukunftsphilologie! Eine Erwidrung a,ef Friedrich Nietzsches "Geburt der Tragiidie" 
(Berlin: Gebriider Borntraeger, 1872), p. 28. Rohde's defense of Nietzsche on this point lacks all force 
(Afterphilologie. Zur Beleuchtung des von dem Dr. phi/. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Miillendo,ff herausgegebenen 
Pamphlets: "Zukunftsphilologie!" [Leipzig: E.W. Fritzsch, 1872], pp. 39 f.). 
3t Plato's Apology 22. 
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ling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer provides a striking example. Even so, Euripides' 
influence on Socrates remains only probable; but his decisive influence on Plato 
appears indisputable. 
We have noted earlier that Aeschylus stands halfway between Homer and 
Plato, and Euripides halfway between Aeschylus and Plato. The dialogue between 
Electra and her mother and other such scenes in Euripides are not great poetry or 
thc:.ltre but point toward a new genre: the Platonic dialogue. To try writing 
better tragedies than Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides was not an inviting 
prospect, and Plato, who had tried, destroyed these early efforts when he met 
Socrates. To try writing better philosophic dialogues than Euripides, wedding the 
poet's talent to the legacy of Socrates, was the challenge Plato tried to meet. 
Dodds's conclusion is utterly unfair to Euripides: 
The disease of which Greek culture eventually died is known by many names. To 
some it appears as a virulent form of scepticism; to others, as a virulent form of 
mysticism. Professor Murray has called it the Failure of Nerve. 
My own name for it is systematic irrationalism .... To my mind, the case of 
Euripides proves that an acute attack of it was already threatening the Greek world 
in the fifth century .... He shows all the characteristic symptoms: the peculiar blend 
of a destructive scepticism with a no less destructive mysticism; the assertion that 
emotion, not reason, determines human conduct; despair of the state, resulting in 
quictism; despair of rational theology, resulting in a craving for a religion of the 
orgiastic type. For the time being the attack was averted-in part by the develop-
ment of the Socratic-Platonic philosophy .... Greek rationalism died slowly .... 32 
Nietzsche thought that rationalism put an end to the great age of Greece, and 
found rationalism in Socrates, Plato-and Euripides. Dodds blames irrationalism 
and considers Socrates and Plato the culmination of the Greek genius-but 
Euripides is again on the losing side. As Goethe remarked long ago, the classical 
philologists-and when Nietzsche wrote The Birth of Tragedy, he was one-are 
hard on Euripides. 
Suppose we ask for a moment, not of what Greek culture "died" -a rather 
questionable and misleading metaphor, when you come to think of it-but 
rather whether the three claims that comprise "rationalism" happen to be true. 
If, as I think, none of them is, Euripides was wiser than the rationalistic philoso-
phers. What philosophers nowadays would consider reason "sufficient" for the 
discovery of all truth, particularly when reason is expressly juxtaposed with 
sense-perception?33 And who would hold that all moral errors are curable by a 
purely "intellectual process"? And why speak of "despair of rational theology"? 
If rational theology is not sound, why not give our poet credit for renouncing it? 
32 Dodds, p. 102 f. 
33 Ibid., p. 93. 
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Since my outlook is close to that with which Euripides is charged by Dodds, 
I might be considered partisan; and this is not the place for detailed arguments 
against the kind of rationalism Dodds extols. But we should at least note that a 
double standard is implicit in this criticism of Euripides: like Hegel and Nietzsche, 
he is fair game, while Sophocles is not. Surely, Sophocles was not a rationalist in 
Dodds's sense; he did not believe the three crucial claims, nor did he credit rational 
theology. But it would never do to use language so negatively charged when 
speaking about Sophocles. 
Dodds's later book on The Greeks and the Irrational is not only far more 
judicious than his early article but an outstanding contribution to our under-
standing of Greek culture. His early article on Euripides, of which he made some 
use in the chapter on "Rationalism and Reaction in the Classical Age," is no more 
representative of Dodds at his best than is The Birth (!{ Tra~edy of Nietzsche in his 
prime. And Dodds's edition, with introduction and commentary, of The Bacchae 
is a masterpiece. But it should be plain that we do Euripides a monstrous injustice if 
we associate him with "the Failure of Nerve." Without any optimistic faith that 
he could stem the tide of superstition that, seven years after the poet's death, 
claimed Socrates as one of its victims-and during Euripides' lifetime, it had 
driven into exile, probably Aeschylus and, without a doubt, Anaxagoras and 
Protagoras-Euripides fought his public his life long, and died in voluntary exile. 
That Sophocles always remained a popular favorite, even at such a time, 
might raise questions about him. But he led his own chorus in mourning for 
Euripides when the news of his death reached Athens; and in our reading of 
Oedipus Tyrannus-and, of course, of The Women(!{ Trachis-we find how far 
he was both trom popular superstition and from "rationalism." 
* * * 
In sum, in his first book Nietzsche was wrong about the birth of tragedy, 
about Aeschylus and Euripides, and about the death of tragedy. Yet the remarks 
about Hamlet in section 7, much of section 15, and the "Self-Criticism" added as 
a preface in 1886, are magnificent; and nobody has ever found a better characteri-
zation of Nietzsche than the image of the "artistic Socrates" in section 14. All in 
all, however, neither The Birth of Tragedy nor his other early books can brook 
comparison with Nietzsche's later works, beginning with The Gay Science. The 
Birth of Tragedy is widely overrated, but the later Nietzsche is inexhaustible. 
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